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Abstract
This thesis presents an attempt to create a general approach
to the sexes in society through the sociology of Max Weber. This
falls into three main sections: a consideration of methodological
issues; a set of comparative historical studies located in the
Ancient Civilization; and, between them, an essay in sociological
theory.
The first section diagnoses a traditional paralysis in the
general theory of gender due to the irrational relationship be¬
tween sociology and anthropology, and turns to Weber's methodol¬
ogical practice for the cure: the comparative historical method
of enquiry and a formal conception of the relationship of biology
to society in Interpretive terms. This last entails seeing biol¬
ogy not as supervising society, but as an input into social act¬
ion under the supervision of history; this entails replacing the
strategic notion of "reproduction" with a treatment of demograph¬
ics. Under this strategy, the biological basis is developed
through Jungian psychology to give the conception of "sexual pol¬
arity" in four elements: fertility and maternity, maturation,
sexuality, and aggression; and a basic typology of social action
based on or oriented to these is raised.
The second section develops these conceptions and compares
them in City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. The first issue is
how different power systems impact upon the economy to produce
different demographic regimes, in which sex, fertility, and women
must either be controlled or accepted; the struggle for control
of the state then makes for different types of family, household,
and community arrangements - here the family sociology of Zimmer¬
man is recalled. Local community, household, and family patterns
are then compared on their own account; then contrasting patterns
in motherhood, childhood and adolescence, sexual relationships,
and violence, the protection of personal security, and citizen-
ship. Finally, sexual divisions are examined: in the structures
of the state apparatus, the various aspects of the economy, and
the "bearing of these for stratification.
The third section presents three studies in the position of
women in Antiquity: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens, and the
Roman Empire. Finally, two appendices present, respectively, an
outline of the general sociology of Antiquity, and a "brief acc¬
ount of the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung.
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The thesis that follows presents an attempt to raise a gen¬
eral account of the sexes in society in terms of the sociology of
Max Weber. This seems to be a somewhat heterodox project. Weber
himself has considerations on gender (see especially Weber 1978
Part ii ch 3 & 4> Weber 1981 ch 2), but these seem never to have
entered the sociological tradition. Weberian sociology has rather
mostly stayed with mainstream issues, and has tended to leave
gender out of account. There are some exceptions, in the work of
for example Bryan Turner, Michael Mann and Randall Collins (Tur¬
ner 1981 ch 10; Mann I986; Collins 1975 ch 5» 1986 ch 8). But
none of this entails the development of a sustained focus on gen¬
der. As to feminism, this despite the Weberian origins of the
concept of "patriarchy" has very much kept its distance from Web¬
er, presumably due to Marxist influence. Neither has it tried to
recover Marianne Weber as an ancestress.*
It has to be stated that the project here does not really
relate directly to current sociological debate and practice -
indeed, the greatest difficulties that I have encountered have
been in trying so to relate it. On the contrary, it is rather an
attempt to work out an approach to gender from first principles.
If I must relate this critically to the field - and I attempt
this with the greatest reluctance - then the fundamental issue
that I would point to is the division in the human sciences be¬
tween sociology and anthropology. It seems clear to me that trad¬
itionally anthropology is far more interesting and generous in
its treatment of gender issues than sociology is; and indeed,
recognizing this, sociology seems traditionally always to have
*It may be of interest that I have found Marianne Weber's book
"Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung" to be completely
unavailable through the British academic library system, de¬
spite its recent republication in Germany.
placed the greatest reliance on anthropology to create the basic
understanding of gender for both disciplines. Yet sociologists
seem to have little understanding of the ambiguities of anthropo¬
logy' s positions ambiguity between sociology and archaeology,
ambiguity between society and culture, ambiguity between primit¬
ive humanity and humanity in general. Reciprocally, these ambig¬
uities leave sociology ambiguous, between modern society and soc-
ity in general. But if the locus classicus of the theory of wom¬
en' s oppression in the origins of civilization, of the state and
stratification, is in fact the interface not between primitive
and complex society but between culture and society, then it is
a methodological problem and a historical illusion. In face of
this methodological problem, sociology must be prepared, setting
aside all that anthropology may do, to raise its own general
theory of the sexes in society at the level of the general theory
of society by its own methodologies. That is what I have tried to
do.
My attempt rests on two methodological planks: the Interpre¬
tive conception of social reality and the comparative historical
method of enquiry. For the first, two points should be made.
Firstly, working with the Interpretive conception of social real¬
ity entails dismissing the notions that biology supervises soc¬
iety or that society subserves biology. Rather, biology is merely
an input into society tinder the supervision of history. Above
all, this means abandoning the notion of "reproduction" and gett¬
ing involved with demographics - this indeed is the major strat¬
egic issue. It should be noted that this means drawing on cultur¬
al anthropological resources. Secondly, although biological sup¬
ervision is excluded, a door should be kept open to biological
explanation, including explanation from ethology or sociobiology.
This is controversial, but a sociological "critique" of the nat¬
ural or the behavioural sciences is clearly irresponsible in
principle. Even so, much of the sting of ethological and socio-
biological argument can be drawn if it is contextualized with a
set of intellectual resources that social theory, for no sane
reason that I can find, has always ignored: the depth psycholog¬
ies of Alfred Adler and Carl Jung.
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Turning now to the comparative historical method, this as I
have said is the method of enquiry, through which both the com¬
parative and the developmental patterns of gender relationships
and practices and the general sociological interdeterminations,
e.g. with power or the economy, in which they are located are to
he ascertained. The main methodological issue here is scepticism
towards preconceptions - especially the preconception that wom¬
en' s position in modernity is unique. Behind this lies the pre¬
conception that whatever is not unique about women's position in
modernity must be universal. This sort of sociological flat
earth-ism desperately needs a Copernican revolution.
Beyond this, the problems are practical: above all the need
in a first essay to define a limited substantive field in which
studies of some substance can be placed. I have chosen Antiquity,
the main reason for this being the desire to highlight the meth¬
odological incommensuracies of the sociological and anthropolog¬
ical disciplines and the vacuity of the traditional type of evol¬
utionist approach. Specifically my studies are on: New Kingdom
Egypt, classical Athens and the Roman Empire. The sociological
typology, of course, is City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms: I
try to show contrasting patterns of gender relations and practic¬
es in the two types. The contrasts are discussed at length in the
four theoretical chapters that comprise Part B of the thesis; I
will not try to precis it here. But the basic theoretical concep¬
tion is of a "material triad" of forces: power, demographics and
the economy. Different types of power structure impact upon the
economy to produce different demographic regimes, in which women,
fertility and sexuality either must be controlled (City-states)
or can be acquiesced in (Bureaucratic Kingdoms). I try to analyse
such factors as family and household structure, the place of wom¬
en in the community, practices of parenthood and child-raising
and patterns of sexual relationships on this basis, as well as
considering for example sexual divisions in the economy and their
relation to stratification. Again a division of sociological and
anthropological themes can be seen here. But the structure of all
this, as I have indicated, is worked out from first principles,
as will be seen.
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The historical studies themselves each follow the same struc¬
ture as the four theoretical chapters. They are presented as the
final part of the thesis, Part C. These studies presented their
own problems. Not least among them is the poor reception of Web¬
er' s work on Antiquity into the sociological tradition, and even
more into Weber scholarship - a tremendous failure to engage with
the fact that Antiquity is where Weber's intellectual career be¬
gins. In particular, the appearance in 1976 of an English trans¬
lation of "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" has
been met with a thunderous silence. Yet this is very much the
pivotal work (19^9) in which Weber transforms from a classical
historian into a World historian. Against this, there is consid¬
erable interest in Weber among classical historians, especially
thanks to the work of M.I. Finley. Egyptology presents a special
range of problems of course: a general remoteness from the hist-
oriographical mainstream and above all, a basic lack of economic
historical perspectives.*
But more particularly a persistent problem has been that,
whereas what I wanted to do was to contrast Athens with Egypt,
and then to show Rome changing from the Athenian pattern to the
Egyptian as the Republic gives way to the Empire, instead I kept
getting drawn into attempts to contrast early Rome with Athens.
Partly this was because the historians upon whom I was reliant
for general studies of women in classical Antiquity were themsel¬
ves using this frame: generally they see Rome as a decaying City-
state, and are quite reluctant to engage positively with the
emergence of new structures in the Empire (see e.g. Pomeroy 1975;
Cantarella I987). My own work here indeed seems to be innovative
in this regard. But beyond this there is here the question of
Weber's typology of City-states: the Patrician City and the Pleb¬
eian City. This is not simply a question of which stratum is dom-
*There is apparently only one authoritative modern study of the
economic history of Ancient Egypt, that of Wolfgang Helck
(Helck 1975)« Being in German, this could only be consulted at
a very late stage, and systematic revisions in its light could
not be incorporated into the chapter on Egypt (ch 8). However,
the impact of Helck's study is clearly supportive of the argu¬
ments that I present.
inant: it reflects structural changes, as membership of patrician
clans gives way to membership of peasant villages - a territorial
as opposed to a personal basis of citizenship. This occurs at
Athens at the end of the 6th century, at Rome during the 4th cen¬
tury. But the two Cities then follow quite divergent courses:
Athens progresses to radical democracy while Rome reverts to
oligarchy. Thus Athens marks a strong break with the Patrician
past whereas Rome has a strong continuity with it (see Weber 1978
p 1343 - 49)• However, in both cases it is only with the Plebeian
City that secure historiography really becomes possible. In con¬
sequence, my thesis has no direct focus on the Patrician City,
and accepts that the differences between Athens and early Rome
are not directly accessible in secure terms. For the most part I
speak of democratic Cities and oligarchic Cities when comparing
the Athenian and Roman City-states, and this typology is kept
very much subordinate to the major typological contrast of City-
states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. But candidly, I came to under¬
stand the issues here much later than I should have done.
What is presented in this thesis necessarily has a provis¬
ional character. That is the unavoidable consequence of the com¬
parative historical method: the studies have to be built up grad¬
ually, and the first synthetic essays have a limited perspective,
limited leverage, and perhaps distortions too. The cure for this
is to make further studies and not to expect quick results. But
also, what is presented here has a provisional character in that
it would have benefitted from further revision. Each element, in
methodology, social theory and historical study, reflects on the
other elements and changes the way one sees them, especially
after the whole thing is written out and the overall pattern fin¬
ally begins to emerge. Then too some obvious directions of devel¬
opment begin to appear. At this time, then, I am concious that
there are many issues of theory whose resolution is clear enough
from the comparative studies but which are not spelt out in the
theoretical chapters. Again, I would wish now to make a positive
engagement with the question of the social science and cultural
science perspectives and the location of Weber's sociology be¬
tween them - reading A.L. Kroeber seems increasingly to clarify
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this. And. not least, I would wish to improve weak or defective
argument, in particular on matters of the origins of the Ancient
Civilization and the City-state as they are presented in Appendix
A.
However the resolution of these matters is not the precon¬
dition for gender theory, and probably the stage of completion
at which one finally presents one's work must always seem arbit¬
rarily chosen.
I would like to express my thanks, for criticism, support
and getting extensions, to John Holmwood and Gianfranco Poggi.
Patricia Jeffery's supervision was also influential in the pro- .
ject's formative stages.
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Something should perhaps he said first about political symp¬
athies. My intention in this thesis is to raise an account of gen¬
der in terms of the sociology of Max Weber. This is an exercize
in value-free sociology: that is, political sympathies may cond¬
ition the choice of subject for enquiry, but once that choice is
made, the enquiry must be pursued impartially. As against this,
gender studies at the present time have a virtually mandatory fem¬
inist value-commitment, and almost always take their orientation
from Marx (and sometimes Freud). Some discussion of the issues
here then will be expected.
Perhaps it is best to start at the level of personal biogra¬
phy, by stating that my commitment to gender as an area of conc¬
ern, and my adoption of a Weberian intellectual identity, both
developed at the same time and in terms of each other, while I was
an undergraduate student. There is no question of my coming to
gender as a ready-made Weberian. My reasons here were simply dis¬
satisfaction with the way that the intellectual resources were be¬
ing marsalled against this particularly difficult group of prob¬
lems, gender and society. On the one side, there seemed to be a
feminist polemic, gathered around the "emancipatory discourses"
of Marx and Freud; on the other side, a received body of social
theory on gender characterized by functionalism, positivism, bio¬
logical determinism, Idealism, and epitomised in the work of Tal-
cott Parsons. Probably neither of these identifications is wholly
satisfactory. But the point is that in this antithesis a great
deal of sociology is being left out of account: the sociology of
Max Weber and everything that comes from it, in neo-Weberian or
post-Weberian sociology, conflict sociology, Interpretive socio¬
logy» comparative historical sociology. It seemed to me that,
given the continuing difficulties of the area, these resources
should he brought to bear. In this, sympathy for women, the desire
to understand society, and (what is by no means the same thing)
the desire to understand sociology, all played about equal parts.
I do not want to become involved in a sterile rehearsal of
standard arguments. The central questions about facts and values
are whether certain political sympathies require certain sets of
analytic concepts for their articulation, and conversely, whether
certain sets of analytic concepts entail certain (inimical) pol¬
itical sympathies. The critique of value-freedom is above all the
possession of Marxism, which would then reject Weber as a "bourg-
oise sociologist". As I have said, Marxism is the commonest reso¬
urce and orientation for feminist theory. But it is fair to point
out that the bearing of this argument for feminism is not straig¬
htforward, for even if Weber is a "bourgoise sociologist", the
relationship of Capitalism to patriarchy remains something of an
unsolved problem. Indeed, so far as the "woman question" can be
considered to be Marxism's great political and analytical failure,
we would seem to have grounds here for a rejection, of quite gen¬
eral application, of the whole argument: Marxism has bought its
value-commitment in the sphere of socio-economics at the cost of
gender-blindness. This surely is a positive argument for value-
free sociology. Though it should be kept in view that, in actual¬
ity, feminism adopts a range of options in its stance towards
Marxism: there are definite tendencies that seek to keep it at
arm's-length, and to work only in parallel or on analogy with it.
Against this, the sociology of Max Weber taken at its own
estimation can be described as a positive critique of Marxism who¬
se central thrust comprises the systematic qualification of econ¬
omic determinism through the development of the sociology of pow¬
er. Now the sociology of power has a self-evident potential for
articulating feminist concerns (patriarchy, the subordination of
women to male authority), and my explorations of this comprise an
essential dimension of my project, as will be seen. But there are
other dimensions no less essential. Above all, there is my attempt
to deal with demographic history. I cannot see that as a specif¬
ically Weberian issue. Any attempt at gender theory which claims
to be historical and materialist surely must consider demograph¬
ics, for sex produces babies - not socialized children or the rep¬
roduction of the social order, just babies - and what happens then
- not what "must" happen - is matter for historical enquiry. Yet
feminist theory does not seem to have thought this way. Some con¬
vention of sociology seems to keep women's issues and population
issues insulated from each other, and feminists do not appear to
have questioned it.
Before going further, however, a basic point must be made:
that the subject in view, sociology and gender, can be understood
in two quite different ways, according as how one understands the
term "sociology". On the one hand, it can mean the general theory
of gender and society, that is, society as such, all societies?
on the other hand, it can mean the consideration of gender relat¬
ions in a particular kind of society of sociological interest -
usually modernity. Contemporary feminist sociology most usually
follows this second senses its theoretical framework is overwhelm¬
ingly the analysis of relations between Capitalism and patriarchy
(see e.g. Barrett 1980). This can be done in a number of ways,
but it is not to the point here to examine them in detail. Rather
there are general strategic problems. The development of women's
oppression through Capitalist history is clearly at a lower level
of significance than the historical transformations that created
(and may end) the Capitalist order itself, so that patriarchy is
being made from the outset a second-order phenomenon. Further,
the classical formulations of the theory of Capitalism do not add¬
uce gender factors, so that women's oppression is made not const¬
itutive but only restitutive (or reproductive) for the Capitalist
social order, in a sort of Marxisant functionalism. This again is
secondary status: women's oppression is given no causal signific¬
ance for social change. And with all this, the attempt to maxim¬
ise in the face of these difficulties the significance of the link
between Capitalism and patriarchy has the perverse consequence of
implying that women's oppression is specific to Capitalist society
- which is palpably untrue. These points are briefly enough made,
but the underlying issue is that the theory of Capitalism and pat¬
riarchy really requires explicit grounding in a general theory of
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gender and society. Equally, a methodological statement is needed,
as to how the theory of patriarchy and Capitalism has leverage
upon the general theory of gender and society.
To turn to this deeper level, the general theory of gender
and society in Marxist conception seems to offer three "basic "re¬
ceived" positions: firstly, that women's oppression is universal
and invariant; secondly, that women's oppression does not occur
in primitive societies hut is universal in class societies; third¬
ly, that women's oppression is specific to, or at least reaches
its culmination in, Capitalist society. Although the locus class-
icus of gender theory used to he the emergence of civilization -
stratification and the state - from primitive conditions, the
last position here seems now to be the commonest orientation of
modern feminist, sociology, at least at the level of logical impl¬
ication if not always of explicit statement. Here again, it is
the general criticisms that need to he made: that even hy a comm-
onsense knowledge of history and of the modern world, all these
positions are palpably untruee; that meta-ethical structures are
being imposed here where an empirical enquiry is what is needed;
that the premature introduction of value-laden terms such as "wom¬
en's oppression" introduces confusion. At base of this is exactly
the same problem as with the theory of Capitalism and patriarchy:
that the classical formulations of Marxism did not adduce gender
factors, especially at the level of changes of mode of production,
so that the theory of women's oppression again comes out as a
sort of functionalist account of second-order phenomena. It would
be only fair to admit that Parsons actually does better than this;
his treatment of society itself may be weak, but it is properly
integrated and all on one level.
The most basic problem with the theory of gender and society
is precisely that it is a problem in the general theory of society,
society as such, and yet we approach it through two sciences of
society: sociology and anthropology. These are institutionalized
side by side in our universities with no formalized intellectual
relationship between them; how one conceives their relationship
is very much a factor of how one sees each discipline. Sociology,
as indicated above, may be the general science of society, or it
l I
may toe restricted to a focus on modernity; anthropology equally
may be the general science of society, or indeed the general sci¬
ence of culture, or it may toe the science of primitive peoples.*
Formal synthesis in overarching or grand theory, as with Parsons,
tends conventionally to toe called sociology. let "anthropology"
has the literal meaning "the science of Man". This betrays, I be¬
lieve, an implicit assumption of sociology: that the general the¬
ory of gender and society is really anthropology's prerogative.
This for many reasons: it is a matter of origins, of human nature,
best seen in simple "close to nature" societies similar to those
of the far past; it is a biological problem, best understood thro¬
ugh types of social theory that have a biological input (e.g. fun-
ctionalism) - these are perhaps the main assumptions. And above
all, there is the anthropological tradition of dealing with themes
like incest taboo, puberty rites, polygyny, bridewealth and dowry,
matrilineal and patrilineal descent, etc. Sociology really has
very little to set against all this, and therefore must restrict
itself to applying the general theory that anthropology creates
to the restricted range of "sociological" societies - modernity.
Thus is created an anthropological supervision of sociology, and
with it an implicit evolutionist paradigm for the integration of
the two disciplines. All this was pointed out 40 years ago by
Carle Zimmerman, and although that was contemporary with a fairly
early stage in the development of Parson's work, he also pointed
out that there was no real difference between the conventional
and the Marxist versions (Zimmerman 1947 ch 1 - 5> esp. ch 2).
But for the modern feminist sociologist, this irrational situat¬
ion in regard to anthropology makes it tempting, either to dis¬
regard the problem of general theory altogether and consider mod¬
ernity only, or else to take refuge in the received, traditions of
grand theory of Marxism and Freudian Psychoanalysis (e.g. Mitchell
1975)* These offer an antithesis to Parsonian grand theory at the
*There are important national differences here, especially as
between Britain, the U.S.A., and France. Especially important
is the distinction between social anthropology and cultural
anthropology; though anthropology can also include e.g. archae¬
ology or linguistics. See Diamond (ed) 1980; Barnouw 1975» The
problems of relating sociology, social anthropology, and cult¬
ural anthropology will come up in this thesis again and again.
level of values; and yet they have the same overall strategy -
indeed, Freudian Psychoanalysis is indifferently a resource for
"both: Marxist and Parsonian grand theory - and their anthropology
moreover is hopelessly ohselete.
In my judgement, it is in these issues that the real heart
of the problem with gender theory lies: how to build a general
theory of gender that will be valid in terms of contemporary soc¬
iology and anthropology, in the face of the uncomprehended lesions
between the two disciplines. More specifically, how can the socio¬
logist create gender theory at the level of the general theory of
society without adducing incompetent anthropology under an illeg¬
itimate methodology? The answer that orients this present thesis
is clear-cut: through the comparative historical method. I discuss
this at length in the next chapter (ch 2). It may be that other
answers could be given. In particular, some might point to con¬
temporary developments in "materialistic" anthropology (c.f. e.g.
Ennew 1979; Bland et al 1978). I lack expertise in this, but I
would make two points: firstly, that a materialist perspective
does not necessarily mean a conflict perspective, and where a
focus on environment, population and technology grounds theories
of exogenous change in functionally integrated societies, this is
a very different thing from the Marxist sociology of the class
struggle; secondly, that the strategy of superimposing the con¬
temporary ethnographic record upon prehistory to ground specul¬
ative reconstructions of the evolution of conflict society is
methodologically dubious to the point of illegitimacy. Parsons
pointed out over 40 years ago the ambiguities in anthropology's
position: if on the one hand it is conceived as the study of prim¬
itive social systems, then it cannot justify its status as a sep¬
arate discipline from sociology; if on the other hand it is con¬
ceived as the general science of culture, then it cannot justify
its traditional focus on primitive peoples (Parsons 1954 P 236 -
7). These ambiguities can by no means be resolved by assuming a
qualitative: difference between primitive society and complex
society and a process of "evolution" from the one to the other.
Nor should the materialist critique of Idealism be confounded
with the difference between cultural science and social science;
13
the difference between culture and society is that between tech¬
nology and economy. In fine, there are methodological problems
here, and whatever the preferred solution, it must be given expli¬
cit statement.
It might be thought that this discussion has strayed from
its initial concerns with facts, values, and political sympathies,
but this is by no means so. My central point is that feminist the¬
ory appears to have grounded itself on the assumption that the
adoption of the "emancipatory discourses" of Marx and Freud is
the only strategic innovation that requires to be made. This I
reject at all levels: there is nothing innovative in applying
Marx and Freud to gender theory; it is highly problematic getting
any such approach to work; and above all, whether we use Marx and
Freud or not, there are still fundamental methodological problems
whose resolution is essential. I would make the accusation, then,
that feminism's insistence on a value-committed mode of analysis
conceals a profound failure of intellectual radicalism. This is
what the present thesis sets out to supply: an intellectually rad¬
ical treatment of gender and society. Most broadly, this means an
attempt to conceive gender factors as constitutive of society and
contributing directly to general processes of social change.
I approach this through the sociology of Max Weber. But this
is not to be narrowly understood. At base is the comparative his¬
torical method: the insistence that sociology can and must work
independent of and on the same status as anthropology, given that
the two disciplines cannot easily be reconciled. With this, the
relationship in the abstract of human biology to social reality
is to be established through consideration of the Interpretive
conception of social reality, not through evolutionistic recon¬
structions. Central theoretical concerns that emerge, as I have
indicated, include the sociology of power and the sociology of
demographics; it goes without saying that they also include the
sociology of economics. However, it will also emerge that the
ideological realm is not central in the same way. All this will
be seen in the chapters that follow. Another issue is that I make
use of Jungian psychology (Analytical Psychology): Jung offers a
positive critique of Freud exactly as Weber does of Marx, and so
l<f
far as social theory has neglected to consider it, this is an ob¬
vious resource for a project in intesllectual radicalism. But to
draw all this together, the basic point is that in attempting
intellectual radicalism, I have not let the desire to belong to
a politically and socially radical movement dictate my intellect¬
ual choices:. That is value-freedom.
It should be added, however, that there are positive attract¬
ions, at the level of value-orientation, to working specifically
with the sociology of Max Weber. For the modern development of
sociology has produced two critiques of "functionalist orthodoxy"
successively from different directions: Interpretivism and Marx¬
ism. The Interpretive critique focusses especially on reification
- treating hypothetical things as real and attributing action to
them, when it is only persons who act. This indeed is part of a
wider humanist critique found: generally in the human sciences,
e.g. in psychology or psychiatry, where indeed its thrust is as
much against Freud as against behaviourism; it is a critique of
positivism, determinism, reductionism - all argument that seeks
to treat people as things, or bits or composites of things, in¬
stead of persons. Weber is very much a part of this. As against
this, Marxism's critique is specifically sociological: it accuses
functionalism of defending the status quo as inevitable; of being
insensitive to oppression; of lacking a sense of history, of con¬
flict, and of change. But with this, Marxism also makes a criti¬
que of Interpretivism, accusing it on the one hand of lacking,
like functionalism, a sense of history and of change; on the oth¬
er, of having false individualistic sympathies instead of coll¬
ective class sympathies - an error that reflects the nature of
bourgoise society rather than penetrates it. In response, Inter¬
pretivism might point to the difficulties of Marxist theory in
the areas of ideology, conciousness, and revolution: is Marxism
humanist or mechanistic?
Above, I argued that to call Weber a "bourgoise sociologist"
in the face of persistent difficulties in establishing a relat¬
ionship between Capitalism and patriarchy could in the gender
context be something of a two-edged sword. Similarly here, it can
be argued that Marxism's collectivist sympathies are patriarchal
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sympathies (what have women to do with class?), whereas Interpre-
tivist individualism reflects women's interests. I stress that
some hasis for this does emerge in my theoretical discussions
(ch 4-7 below). But beyond this, the attractions of Weber are
obvious: he combines the humanist orientation to the individual
with a sociology that is powerfully oriented to history, conflict
and change (and that can identify collective interests, though
without identifying with them). In short, he goes far towards
offering a synthesis of Interpretivist and Marxist positions. And
even Marxists respect Weber's comparative historical range, and
his sociology of power.
My position in this is not purely an intellectual one. I
would like to see the development of critical thought and pract¬
ice as cumulative, not as a succession of mutually destructive
critiques. Not least,. I would like to see the sexual revolution
and the woman's revolution as cumulative - I hate to see the wom¬
an's movement keep company with Mary Whitehouse and Victoria Gill-
ick. There is immense dissent to the oppressions of modern civil¬
ization, however experienced and conceived; I would like to see
that dissent brought together and achieve change. I do not want
to see it weighed in the theoretical scales of class-struggle and
revolution, and found wanting. But it often seems to me that Marx¬
ism in the modern West has become an intellectual ghetto, a refuge
for those who seek not change but vindication - and a- location
from which communication with the outside world is impossible.
My avoidance of this position has nothing to do with political
sympathies.
At any rate, the value-orientation of this thesis is by in¬
tention positive towards women's liberation, however sceptical
about feminist approaches in social theory. My position is that
an impartial analysis on Weberian lines will do most to clarify
the sociological issues with which feminism is concerned. There
is no question of showing those issues to be illusory.
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Chapter 2
The Comparative Historical Method
The project of raising an account of gender in terms of the
sociology of Max Weber is easier to state than to define. Indeed,
it is probably easier to carry through than to define, for meta-
statements, if they have substance and are not merely programmat¬
ic, have most often the character of on-going (which means at lea
st partly retrospective) commentary, rather than that of a recipe
provided in advance. Weber himself indicates this in his method¬
ological essays, with the comment that knowledge of methodology
is not necessary for science, any more than knowledge of anatomy
is for walking (Weber 1949 P 115)« Even so, some kind of metastat
ement is required here, to try to say what the proposal, to raise
an account of gender in terms of the sociology of Max Weber,
means.
Weber's location in sociology is complex and paradoxical.
There is an older layer of piecemeal and fragmentary translations
appropriations, criticisms, etc., starting from the end of the
1920's, in which the major landmarks are: "The Protestant Ethic
and the Spirit of Capitalism", "The Theory of Social and Economic
Organizations", and Gerth and Mills' "From Max Weber: Essays in
Sociology". Then there is a newer layer of systematic translation
and appraisal, in which the major landmarks are Reinhardt Bendix'
"Max Weber - An Intellectual Portrait" (1960), and the full trans
lation of "Economy and Society" (1968). My own location is whole¬
heartedly in this newer layer, though it is still developing and
changing. But a further range of problems lies in the encyclopae¬
dic nature of Weber's sociological contribution. On the one side,
he gives us, by precept and by example, a sociological methodol¬
ogy; on the other.side, he gives us a substantive sociological
fabric of analytic concepts - especially in the areas of economy,
power, stratification, law and religion - interwoven with secular
theses of historical kind that run all through World history. The
Protestant Ethic thesis is only the best known of these. Incident¬
ally, it should be specified that this includes an embryonic tre¬
atment of at least some gender issues (see esp. Weber 1978 Part ii
ch 3 & 4; Weber 1981 ch 2). The problem, then, is both how to rai¬
se and how to locate the account of gender now; do we find it al¬
ready in the fabric of the substantive sociology, or do we use
the methodology to make a new enquiry? And if we choose the latt¬
er option and make a new enquiry, will the fabric of the substan¬
tive sociology be able to accomodate its results?
Clearly these questions could be answered in different ways:
there is here a whole universe of sociological discourse, and
there could be as many Weberian accounts of gender as there are
Marxist. But there are better and worse answers, and here the ex¬
ample of Marxism is suggestive, for here too there is an embaras
de richessess Marxism's basic problem with gender is that Marxism
does not need to invoke gender as a causal factor for the socio-
historical phenomena with whose explanation it is centrally con¬
cerned. Or perhaps that is feminism's problem with Marxism. Either
way, the conseqixence is the trivialization of gender issues. And
while the parallel with Weber is not exact - Weber's explanatory
concerns range more widely - nonetheless;, it remains true that gen¬
der ought to be allowed to explain things, i.e. general sociohist-
orical processes, and not be limited to merely describing itself,
and that an honest enquiry cannot have the character of an exer¬
cize in damage limitation. This means that the account of gender
cannot simply be sought in the corpus of Weber's substantive soc¬
iology; it must be raised at the methodological level, in terms
of a new enquiry, and the problem of accomodation simply has to
be faced. That is, the most radical option should be taken from
the outset. In actuality, this is not so much of a problem: the
theory of gender ma.y not be to be sought in the corpus of Weber's
sociological writings, but many elements of it are nonetheless to
be found there, once one knows what one is looking for. Weber's
sociological genius is overwhelming. But even so, one must orient
oneself to the fact that a full-scale treatment of gender is some-
do
thing that he did. not do.
As to Weber's own considerations on gender, the following
comments might be made. The main discussions (Weber 1978 Part ii
ch 3 & 4; Weber 1981 ch 2) are evidently largely in response to
the Socialist theory of the Family; as such, they are centred on
the wife and mother in the family and the household, rather than
considering women in society at large. Furthermore., they appear
to be based in great part on an untranslated work of Marianne
Weber, "Ehefrau und Mutter in der Rechtsentwicklung" (The Wife
and Mother in Legal History - published 1907). This work has never
entered the sociological canon, and its recovery would be a major
scholarly project in itself. With this, subsequent historiograph-
ical and other scholarship has developed without generally taking
account of Weber's ideas, and so appears to be of limited value
either for confirming or refuting them. Indeed, to work on the
scale of "Economy and Society" requires encyclopaedic knowledge,
at least partly at the level of primary sources. Otherwise an un¬
acceptable superficiality of treatment results. In sum, on these
grounds too I have judged it necessary to start again: to make
focussed historical studies and produce a restricted synthesis-
from them, within a limited substantive arena, appropriating and
incorporating the various elements of Weber's gender theory acc¬
ording as it becomes possible to do so - using them as sighting
shots rather than starting points, if you will. There are many
fragments besides the main discussions, as a reading of especially
"Economy and Society" (which is well indexed) will show. All these
matters will appear again in this and subsequent chapters.
The problem, then, is placed on the level of methodology.
The two methodological planks on which Weber builds his sociology
are the Interpretive method and the comparative historical method.
A central point here is that Weber used a fusion of these two met¬
hods; by contrast, sociology post-Weber seems rather to have pur¬
sued them as two quite separate methodological options. With this,
while there is a great deal of debate on the questions of Inter-
pretivism, much less seems to have been written about the compar¬
ative historical method. Indeed, that is true of Weber's own meth-
odological essays. These however are contributions to an ongoing
Methodenstreit in the socio-cultural sciences in contemporary
Germany (see Weber 1975 p 16 - 24; Weber 1977 p 10 - 22; i.e.
translator's Introductions); they are not prescriptions ex nihilo
for how to do sociology. As such, they consider only certain kinds
of questions. Modern mothodological debate, oriented fundamentally
to the differences between the French and German streams of class¬
ical sociology, has a different range of concerns, and the appar¬
ent philosophical continuities are deceptive. To my mind, these
matters might be better understood through the application of
less philosophy and more history (the philosophy of science can¬
not organize the history of science). At least, I do not want to
pursue this into a discussion of philosophically grounded method¬
ology for its own sake here - an academic "black hole" if ever
there was one. But the questions of the relation between the two
arms of Weber's methodology, and the methodological location and
nature of the comparative historical arm, do require considerat¬
ion.
Weber was a historian: he began his intellectual career in
the 1880's as a historian of Rome under Theodore Mommsen. He pro¬
gressed from there via economics and economic history (not forge¬
tting his training in law) to sociology, writing his first for¬
mally sociological works (the essays on Protestantism and capit¬
alism) and the essays on methodology in the 1900's, and the great
encyclopaedic works ("Economy and Society" and "The Economic Ethic
of the World Religions") in the decade following. But his works
from the outset (e.g. the "Roman Agrarian History" of 1891 -
Weber 1982) are sociological in character, even though their sub¬
ject matter is from the point of view of modern sociology somewhat
arcane. The point is that what drew Weber into sociology was pre¬
cisely the sociological tendency that is inherent in historiogra¬
phy: Weber became a sociologist because he was a historian. It is
this that is the significance of the comparative historical meth¬
od, and the reason why it can appear somewhat opaque to sociolog¬
ical interrogation. It is a historiographical, not a sociological,
methodology - or if you like, it is sociology, seen from a hist¬
orian's point of view. Weber made this transition within an over-
all neo-Kantian intellectual environment; he contrasts history
and. sociology in terms of individualizing and generalizing scien¬
ces, rather than in terms of e.g. narrative and explanation, sin¬
ce for both disciplines explanation is ultimately grounded in In¬
tentional action and the individual. Again, he is compelled to
evolve an account of how mass phenomena can be grounded on Inten¬
tionally acting individuals, which is the aspect of his methodol¬
ogy most often discussed now: the notion of ideal types. But this
is by no means his starting point, nor is it something uniquely
his own; there are similar conceptions among his contemporaries^.
But, as I have commented above, our modern practice of view¬
ing these issues solely in the light of the philosophy of the soc¬
ial sciences is not altogether useful. It is perhaps more to the
point to make an approach through the history of the social scien¬
ces, and ask what it was that Weber, as historian becoming socio¬
logist, did not do. This question should be considered in the
light of the contemporary developments in the sciences of society
especially in Britain and Prance (see Evans-Pritchard 1965a,
1981)« Weber did not involve himself with the biological sciences
or with anthropology. The distinction should be marked here bet¬
ween anthropology and ethnography, for Weber did consider ethno¬
graphic material. The distinction seems to lie precisely in the
biological sciences! the invocation of biological explanatory
principles in the social field, whether in terms of continuity
(e.g. race theory) or analogy (e.g. evolutionism). All this Weber
avoided! indeed, his development of an Interpretivist position
could be seen as a deliberate distancing of himself from such bio-
logistic tendencies; though there can be little question that his
primary disagreements were specifically those of a historian, and
on substantive historical grounds. Later (e.g. in "Economy and
Society"), Weber would sometimes cite ideas from some of these
English and French sources, but he never really debated with it
systematically as a form of social theory. If this was because he
did not take it seriously, then on the whole modern thought would
vindicate his judgement. But it has left us with a difficult lac¬
una in the history of social theory.
This is difficult ground, for there is a definite heritage
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in modern social theory from the biologistic tendency of Victor¬
ian "armchair anthropology", coming partly direct through the
work of Durkheim and partly by the left hand through Freud. I
have to admit here to an outright cynicism as to the standing of
Freud in social theory (c.f. Bocock 1976): surely there is a
strong element here of invoking an outside authority in order to
reinflate notions that we have ourselves discredited. And besides,
a critical evaluation of Freud really requires some engagement
with the great schismatics, Adler and Jung, which social theory
seems never to have done. This is no academic point, for I will
be much concerned with Jung in the next chapter (ch 3; see also
Appendix B). But staying with more general considerations, I have
argued above (ch 1) that the biologistic tendency in social theo¬
ry seems to be concommittant with a broad assumption in social
theory, of very long standing, that since gender issues are grou¬
nded in human biology, they accordingly have an affinity with
those forms of social theory that have a biological input - wheth¬
er in terms of continuity (this would now mean ethology or socio-
biology) or of analogy (this would usually now mean functionalism,
though evolutionism remains a strong, if not always explicit,
presence). This, with the institutionalization of sociology and
anthropology as parallel disciplines in our universities with no
formalized intellectual relationship to integrate them, grounds,
a tacit strategic assumption that it is anthropology that makes
the real fundamental treatment of gender theory, and in this re¬
gard "supervises" sociology. This again underwrites evolutionism,
whether explicated or no. I have argued this (and recalled Zimm¬
erman) earlier. To my mind, the traditional difficulties of gen¬
der theory are very much located in these issues - and of course,
Marx and Freud are both far too much a part of this picture to
offer any critique of it.
But to return to Webert what must be grasped is that, desp¬
ite distancing himself from biology and anthropology, Weber does
still unquestionably intend a general science of society, that
will undertake to enquire into the full range of social phenom¬
ena at the most fundamental level. This science is not envisaged
as requiring complementation by a "science of Man" ("anthropol-
ogy"). Though Weher centres his enquiry on World-historical patt¬
erns in which the primitive is peripheral, his rejection of anth¬
ropology as I have said is a rejection not of ethnography but of
biologism. And it seems to me that it is precisely Weber's posit¬
ion that sociology must adopt now, in face of the modern sociol-
ogy/anthropology divide: the commitment that, however anthropol¬
ogy may conceive itself, whatever anthropology may do, sociology-
must undertake gender theory at the level of the general theory
of society on its own account, by its own methodologies. Weber's
Interpretivism is no renunciation of biologically grounded prob¬
lems. On the contrary, it is the positive provision of a method¬
ological conception whereby the biological is to be dealt with:
as a conditioning environment for social action, subject to the;
process of social construction. He uses this argument in regard
to race and other "anthropological" factors; he uses basically
the same argument in regard to the material environment for the
sociology of economics, though clearly the considerations here
will not be identical (see Weber 1978 Part i ch 1 & 2; Part ii
ch 5). All this will be taken up in the next chapter (ch 3). For
the meantime, however, it must be made clear that this Interpret¬
ive conception of social reality and its inter-relation with hum¬
an biology is intended to do no more than provide the most basic
ontological statement - the relationship "in the abstract". Wo
more: as I have said, Weber's fundamental argument with biologis-
tic social theory was that it was bad history, that it could not
make a basic statement of the nature of social phenomena without
proposing evolutionary sequences and stages that were historic¬
ally nonsensical. Paradoxically, then, it is precisely the virtue
of the Interpretive method that it does not tell us anything.
Therefore it leaves us free to find out everything.. The comparat¬
ive historical method is the reverse of this coin: it is Weber's
way of finding things out.
I think that it has been worthwhile to spell this out. For
it seems to me that, just as modern Interpretive sociology sets
out to achieve far more than Weber ever intended for his Inter¬
pretivism, so conversely modern sociology has tended to forget
that the comparative historical method has methodological force;,
and instead has tended to treat comparatives historical sociology
merely as a "body of received knowledge:. As I have pointed out be¬
fore, Weber's substantive sociology is an interwoven fabric of
analytic concepts and secular theses in World History. The tend¬
ency post-Weber seems to have been to work in terms of thisj to
extend or consolidate it in specific areas; to argue with it;
very commonly to try to rework it so as to reflect a preferred
set of values or theoretical assumptions: Marxist, functionalist,
evolutionist, Christian, whatever. It seems rather more rare for
modern sociology to actually set out in comparative historical
terms to find out anything really new, far less to initiate a
radical enquiry into a wholly new area. Indeed, there are matters
here that merit discussion, for the sake of the thesis that foll¬
ows.
To come straight to the heart of the matter, modern scholar¬
ly historiography seems to have become established in Germany
long before it did anywhere else, quite early in the 1'9th cent¬
ury (see Marwick 1981 ch 2 - 4)• In consequence, Weber at the
beginning of the 20th century was very strongly placed to write
works of comparative historical sociology on World Historical
scale, even by comparison with the sociologist in modern Britain
or America. With this, the historiographical traditions of Brit¬
ain and America are not only younger, but also they do not seem
to have centrally concerned themselves either with Max Weber or
with perspectives on World History (though perhaps more the latt¬
er in recent times). This creates difficulties for the modern
sociologist both in reading Max Weber and in undertaking compar¬
ative historical work himself; for all our respect for Weber, it
is not always easy to find out just how far his actual history
is sound. (Though in the classical field, the historians do seem
now to have discovered Weber - in advance indeed of the sociolo¬
gists* See e.g. Finley 1973» 1985)» It is perhaps this that giv¬
es post-Weberian comparative historical sociology its peculiar
character: that on the one side, it regards Weber as its great
presiding genius, while on the other, it refuses to engage in
extended debate with him. (Oddly enough» it seems that the touch¬
stone here is the intellectual reference group, rather than the
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intellectual resources as defined by use of the English language
- many of the contributors to the post-Weberian tradition have
been fluent in German.)
A good example, and one specially relevant for the later con¬
cerns of this thesis, lies in the economic sociology of Karl Pol-
anyi (Polanyi et al eds. 1957j Polanyi 1968, 1977)• Polanyi shar¬
es with Weber a basic concern with the relation of the substant¬
ive economy to the formal economy of classical economics, and an
extended consideration of this problem in the light of the econo¬
mic arrangements of Antiquity (see esp. Weber 1976), and his debt
to Weber here is considerable and explicit. Yet he theorizes the
ancient economy quite differently from Weber, focussing narrowly
on the institutions of trade, money and markets, where,Weber has
a wider focus that also takes in both agrarian and artisanal re¬
lations, and also slavery. Moreover, Weber contextualizes this
with an account of the ancient polity, inter-relating polity and
economy through the concept of non-peaceful economic action. I
do not wish simply to assert the superiority of Weber's account,
merely to point out that Polanyi never seems to tell us where
Weber is wrong, or why his own account is better. This holds not
merely at the level of general theory, but also at the level of
the specific analyses, which both undertake, of e.g. Mesopotamia
or Athens. I would have thought that, by Polanyi's own arguments-
- that the ancient economy cannot be equated with trade, money
and markets, but must be seen in wider terms, including the power
structures with which it is contextualized - Weber's account wou¬
ld come nearer to meeting Polanyi's criteria than does Polanyi's
own, and I cannot see how Polanyi can not have known that. It
should be added that Polanyi has an over-riding value-concern to
show that only a market economy (an exchange economy) can ground
real inhumanity in general social relations (see Polanyi 1977
Introduction). Accordingly, he will not focus on usury, debt-
slavery, the expropriation of the peasantry, the marginality of
the urban artisanate, or the slave trade in the Ancient Civiliz¬
ation, though he quotes Weber marginally on these points. Equally,
his focus on the market as the diagnostic of the market economy
(as against Weber's focus on the enterprise) has the consequence
that Polanyi has no theory of Advanced Capitalism; he draws mid-
20th century Capitalist society in the image of the mid-19th cent¬
ury, with neither price-fixing cartels and monopolies nor bureau¬
cratic state intervention. But despite this inadequacy, the point
I want to insist upon is not merely that Polanyi holds different
views from Weber, but that he never seems to justify the differ¬
ences. We are just left with a vague impression that since this
is later, it's got to be better - Weber was after all writing
half a century ago.
I have chosen to discuss Polanyi here not merely for his rel¬
evance to my later thesis, where I discuss gender in the context
of the Ancient Civilization, but also because he is one of the
most original and powerful thinkers to have taken a post-Weberian
line in terms of World-historical questions. Other lesser but
still classic works could have been chosen to illustrate the iss¬
ues - e.g. S.N. Eisenstadt's "Political Systems of Empires", or,
most recently, Michael Mann's "The Sources of Social Power"
(Eisenstadt 1963; Mann 1986). The characteristic paradox is al¬
ways there: on the one side, the inspiratory orientation to Weber;
on the other side, the curious reluctance to actually engage in
debate with him. I am frankly sceptical as to what progress in
comparative historical sociology is possible in these terms; Web¬
er's work is tremendously robust (and his status is continually
growing). I think that we have to take the bull by the horns: to
realize that there is a failure of continuity in historiographic-
al scholarship, and that this failure of continuity must not be
imported into sociology (where we have enough failures of contin¬
uity of our own already). We must be prepared to read our histor¬
iography much more critically, and start treating Weber as our
contemporary not our ancestor.
I have the right here, I think, to distance this present
thesis from the post-Weberian tradition of comparative historical
sociology, for my purpose is not to rehearse or revise a familiar
thesis in the sociology of economics, power, religion, etc., but
to try to do something new: to open up the gender question thro¬
ugh the comparative historical -method. But having returned to
this, it becomes necessary to try to say what the comparative his-
torical method is.
Having insisted upon the methodological status of the compa¬
rative historical method, it is now the elements of comparison
and history that have to he discussed: their meaning and their
reasons. Some of the points here have already been indicated! in
particular, I have shown that Weber is a historian before he is
a sociologist, and that it is through the process of comparison
that he comes from history to sociology. For this reason, the
ideal type is not the best place to begin this discussion; it is
where Weber winds up rather than where: he starts. The ideal type
mediates between the comparative historical method and the Inter¬
pretive method. Given this, Weber's methodological arguments may
rather have the character of exploring the implications of his
position than of stating the preconditions of his enquiries - it
is only a convention of modern sociology that refrains from read¬
ing Weber prior to "The Protestant Ethic". Again, the notion of
the ideal type is used by others than Weber, and in other contexts
and ways; methodological debate on the concept as such does not
necessarily clarify Weber's intentions with it. I do not wish to
seem adulatory, but I am always sceptical of approaches to this
question whose implicit orientation is that Weber did sociology
wrong. I would have said, in view of his achievement, that he did
sociology right. But that is by the way. Rather I want to return
to a point I made earlier, about Weber distancing himself from
contemporary positions in British and French social theory, with
their input from the biological sciences. A key issue here resides
in the word "society": while the biologistic tendency in social
theory has always constituted this in organismic terms as the bas¬
ic macro-unit of study, Weber has no exact equivalent to this
concept. That is, "society" (like "community") has two or more
quite distinct meanings: the "Geselleschaft" (or "Vergesellescha-
ftungen") of German sociology rather has the meaning of "associa¬
tion"; not a macro-unit of study, but simply one type of social
relationship. A closer equivalent to the conventional sociologic¬
al concept "society" is given in the sub-title to Part ii of
"Economy and Society": "The Economy and the Arena of Normative
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and de Facto Powers". But more simply still, it is history that
is for Weber the arena for study: World History. There is no
macro-unit, certainly no reified macro-unit that is capable of
acting, within this arena; only individual persons. Weber's socio¬
logy is built upon social action - the socially acting individual
person - in the context of history. To bridge the gap between
these two things is the function of the ideal type.
This then is the "history" of Weber's comparative historical
sociology. It is not a history in which entities "societies" are
located, subject to a passage of time; equally, the comparative
method is not the comparison of entities "societies". It is most
important for the enquiry into gender to realize this: gender re¬
lates to history through being a conditioning environment for
social action, and the relations of this social action to history
are not mediated through entities "societies". Especially they
are not mediated through the self-reproduction of entities "soc¬
ieties". All that can be saiid is that history is the product of
social action. The fundamental relation of biology to history is
a philosophical imponderable:- whether humanity is still constrain¬
ed by the Darwinian laws; whether historical processes must sub¬
serve the survival of the species, etc. The biological input into
social theory has resulted in certain strategic assumptions being
made on these matters, although not always being explicated. But
they are no more than assumptions; their worth, as Weber would
say, is to be judged by what they produce in the way of knowledge
and understanding. And here we follow a different way, assuming
that while biology environs and conditions social action, it does
not supervise it: the social realm has its own ecology. Again,
this argument will be pursued in the next chapter (ch 3 - "The
Interpretive Method"). But so far as history and the impact of
biology is concerned, there is one obvious point: that there is
no reason why either the motives, e.g. sexual desire, or the out¬
comes, e.g. babies, should be considered to be contained within
the social process or subserve the status quo. They could equally
well be in conflict with it. Indeed, an orientation to the "pop¬
ulation explosion" would surely make that obvious. There is sure¬
ly a most fundamental strategic point for feminist theory here:
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to seek to locate human biology to the processes of social change
not those of social continuity. Despite the biologists' word "re¬
production" (women do not reproduce; they have babies), there is
no reason why this cannot be done.
These comments, however, are perhaps somewhat previous, for
the comparative element in the comparative historical method
still remains to be discussed. Something on this has indeed al¬
ready been indicated» that Weber comes to sociology from history
through the process of comparison; that sociology in a sense is
comparative history. But more than this needs to be said. Weber's
sociology is built up of historically filled ideal types: that is,
it comprises arrays of contrasted types of social action (typolo¬
gies), in terms of descriptions; and identifications of the elect¬
ive affinities and disaffinities between them. As I have said be¬
fore, analytic concepts and secular theses in World History are
interwoven together in Weber's sociology. The process of compar¬
ison serves both to establish the definition of the given ideal
types, and to establish the patterns of affinity and disaffinity.
The process, if freed from its Interpretive setting, is basically
a commonsense one: the attempt to separate the necessary from the
contingent on the common scientific methodological presumption
that the necessary will be a common presence in all alike cases,
while the contingent will vary from case to case; or conversely,
where a distinctive identity is to be established, the contingent:
will be a common presence in unalike cases and the necessary will
be the unique factor. (As stated earlier, Weber distinguishes his¬
tory and sociology as the individualizing and the generalizing
sciences respectively, rather than as narrative and explanation.)
What makes this more complex is Interpretivism: social phenomena
have an essential subjective dimension; action is not simply
observed behaviour. This unavoidably intrudes a degree of uncer¬
tainty into sociological (and historical) analysis, as compared
to the certainties of the natural sciences. However, in compensat¬
ion, sociology achieves a greater depth of explanation, in terms
of the motives and intentions of social a.ctors, their perception
of their situations, etc. This methodological position is above
all true to the experienced difficulties of historical and socio-
logical enquiry (also incidentally to legal proceedings). Sociol¬
ogy has often set out to achieve something better, but whether it
has ever attained it is another question.
Weber's comparativism should perhaps be distinguished from
the comparative approach used in classical anthropology, for that
approach came in time to be criticized in anthropology both from
the point of view of the developing fieldwork tradition and from
the point of view of functionalist theory (see Evans-Pritchard
1965b)* The point was that isolated traits or practices, often
imperfectly understood or inadequately reported, were being wren¬
ched out of their original contexts for the sake of the comparis¬
on, which would build them into hypothetical meta-sociological
structures. From this point of view, it is interesting to regard
Weber's own consideration, and indeed selection, of ethnographic
material. But the correctives to this practice, in meticulous re¬
porting and in the interpretation of social phenomena by their
place in the totality of which they form a part, can have too
high costs; at least so far as the latter entails the suppression'
of social conflicts and processes of social change in social the¬
ory and explanation. Besides, it is surely questionable whether
complex societies at least are in fact so tightly integrated, and
whether all their phenomena are-: open to such analysis. There is a
level of folk-custom and folk-tale, for example, even in modern,
industrial society, which the sociologist would not ordinarily
concern himself with and could not easily explain. (We tend to
select what is significant by what we can explain, but this ent¬
ails great risk of complacency.) I guess that here social theory
is showing Freudian influences: the notion of over-determination,
and the insistence that everything is significant, even symptom¬
atic. Yet I would be ha.rd pressed to explain to such criteria why,
for example, our civilization presents stories from the "Arabian
Wights" in books for young children. It seems to me that sociolo¬
gy must make allowances for a civilization's creative use of a
cultural repertoire drawn partly from alien sources. Human creat¬
ivity cannot be accomodated in closed explanatory structures, yet
it is essential that sociology should accomodate it.
In these matters, Weber steers between two poles: his compar-
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ison is always grounded both in wide-ranging analysis of the soc¬
iological context and in historical analysis of the course of ev¬
ents - and he is, moreover, a skilled historian. This meets the
most basic objections. Yet he does this without pursuing analysis;
to exhaustion, especially in its synchronic dimension. He can do:
this because of his Interpretivism; because ultimate explanation
for Weber lies in finding out why people did what they did, not
how the bits of "society" fit together. At the same time, this
leaves room for the less systematizable elements of particular
situations; it keeps, one's optionst opeui for what is not readily
explicable, without paralysing the overall project of explanation.
These surely are the reasons why Weber, as historian turning soc¬
iologist, found Interpretivism attractive. It is also another- an¬
gle on the ideal type. And it is also a fundamental reason why
the accomodation of the results of an enquiry into gender into the
fabric of Weberian sociological explanation is unlikely to produce
the same kind of problems - embaras de richesses - as found with
Marxism.
The comparative method of ideal types, then, is rather one
of emptying than of filling: its consequence.is to build up a bat¬
tery of analytic concepts and secular theses from which the elem¬
ents of the contingent and the prejudged have been removed. The
impact of this methodology for sociological enquiry is first to
get us away from the parochial and local - the phenomena, and
(apparent) relations between phenomena, that vie are used to and
take for granted. Yet there is something further to be said on
this, for the comparative historical method is not simply a guard,
against naivety; rather it is a corrective to sophistication: soc¬
iological sophistication. This relates to the argument I made ab¬
ove, on the status of the "tradition" of comparative historical
sociology as simply a body of received knowledge. In the light of
this, we have a definite apparatus of conceptions as to the World-
historical location of modern society, expressed through a whole
range of comparative-analytic concepts: capitalism, industrializ¬
ation, market economy, rationalization, secularization, democracy,
nation state, etc. etc. All this is implicit comparison, and it is
concommittant with a quite general sociological assumption» that
modern society is unique, and that this uniqueness necessarily
qualifies all modern social phenomena. Conversely, any phenomena
which are not so qualified and made unique by modern conditions-
must be universal, and therefore grounded in a deeper, non-socio¬
logical, reality - e.g. psychological or biological determinism.
Both these tendencies are to be seen in gender theory.
It would be well to set against this a brief consideration
of Weber's conceptions. In the first place, then, Weber sees mod¬
ernity and all World History as being fundamentally comparable»
he identifies particular civilizations in terms of syndromes, the
component factors of which commonly do appear elsewhere, even in
significant combinations (e.g. democracy and capitalism in ancient
Athens; capitalism and bureaucracy in the Roman Empire). There
are diagnostic features - e.g. the City in Western history; rat¬
ional capitalism in modernity - but these do not create a civil¬
ization on their own, nor render everything else in that civiliz¬
ation sui generis: the fundamental comparabilities across World
History remain. It should also be grasped that Weber's views on
the elective affinities- and disaffinities- between ideal types- -
the component factors of a syndrome - are subtle and flexible: it
is quite possible and indeed frequent for the development of one
ideal type to draw a second ideal type after it, which in turn
destroys the first. Thus the substantive relations between capit¬
alism, democracy, bureaucracy, and class stratification, for ex¬
ample, may be most complex and variable. There is no question here
of a destined social order realizing itself; Weber is not that kind
of teleologist. There is only the unceasing pattern of develop¬
ment and change of history.
With this, Weber's view of the uniqueness of modern civiliz¬
ation, and its unique significance, is sceptical and reserved.
This is probably for two main reasons. First, though modern socio¬
logy shows little awareness of the fact, for most educated people-
up to Weber's time, the Great Event of history was not the Indus¬
trial or French revolutions, but the Fall of the Roman Empire,
and Weber, for obvious reasons, at least took serious account of
that view (see Weber 1982 ch 45 1970a/76a). Incidentally, there
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is nothing inherently absurd about it; indeed it might well be
suggested that the Romans' failure to comprehend their economic
nemesis could be compared to the failure of modernity to compre¬
hend its ecological nemesis. (The other Great Event, the Biblical
Flood, for all that Darwinism throws doubt on it, receives vindi¬
cation from Assyriology. Evolutionism makes good biology but bad
history; catastrophism makes bad biology but good history. But
I cannot pursue this here. See Desmond 1977 ch 1.) But however
this may be, Weber certainly does see important comparabilities
between Antiquity and modernity, though modern sociology may take:
little account of them: it was in the Roman Empire that Weber
first saw the stifling of capitalism by bureaucracy, for example.
I will return to these issues for their own sakes later in this
chapter.
The second point, though its bearing is less direct for the;
thesis that follows, is probably even more important for Weber's
overall perception of World History: indeed, the key issue. This
is, stated simply, that an exclusive focus on the uniqueness of
modern civilization in the context of World History contradicts
itself: it forces one to realize the unique nature of medieval
Western European civilization, such that it did give rise to mod¬
ernity where other, supposedly indistinguishable, premodern civil¬
izations did not. Hence comes Weber's insistence on the importance
of the City, which is not a feature of modern society (it is of
course a feature of Antiquity). It may be added, as a symptomatic:
issue, that the unique Western cultural forms; e.g. in music and
painting are medieval not modern developments; on the whole, med¬
ieval and modern Western culture are in continuity with each oth¬
er, and Weber observed this and took account of it. In sum, as I
have said, Weber's views on the significance of modern civilizat¬
ion were sceptical; he considered that there was a subjective el¬
ement in our perception of ourselves which could only partially
be given sociological vindication. And Weber's work most certain¬
ly does not vindicate an exclusive sociological preoccupation
with modern conditions, however diagnosed.
Bringing these arguments to bear, then, upon the sociologic¬
al consideration of gender, the point is simply that we do not
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sociologically "know" anything about gender until we have studied
it. This is a fundamental methodological point, and one that must
he insisted upon. There are two dimensions: the structure of wom¬
en's history in World History; and the pattern of interdeterminat¬
ions between gender factors and general sociological factors'. Nei¬
ther may legitimately be "read off" the received wisdom of the
sociological tradition - not even that of Marxist sociology. A
comparative historical enquiry without preconceptions is essent¬
ial.
Taking the dimensions in turn; in the previous chapter (ch 1)
I commented that there appear to be three implicit paradigms for
the overall conception of women's history: either that women's
oppression is universal; that gender relations are non-oppressive
in primitive society but are oppressive in all class societies;
or that gender oppression, in significant degree at least, is
specific to Capitalist society. This is to take the Marxist view;
functionalist approaches would tend simply to reverse the vector
within the same structure, arguing that it is in modern society
that women become free from the oppression of traditional sex-
roles. But it is the structure, not the vector, that must be rej¬
ected, and that in all its variant forms. Most fundamentally,
there is no presumption that either the rise of civilization -
stratification and the state - or the rise of modernity - Capital¬
ism or industrialization - marks a decisive moment in women's his¬
tory. (Weber certainly did not think so: in Antiquity he saw the
"decisive moment" as the development and universalization of char¬
iot warfare across Asia, North Africa, and Europe in the later 2nd
millennium, with its implications for the inter-relations of civil
and military administration; this marked the zenith of patriarchy.
Yet though very general, this process remairrs= historically contin¬
gent; it did not, for example, subvert the emancipation of Egypt¬
ian women. Of course, the "rise of civilization" in the above
terms is not an assignable historical process, but an attempt to
rationalize the division of sociology from anthropology. Weber
knew well that civilization has arisen piecemeal and in many forms
all across World History - and that state and stratification are
also found among "primitives".) Again, the development of modern
society in the West cannot he assumed to entail a unique develop¬
ment of modern gender relations out of an amorphous traditional
past. Even if systematic development could he shown, this could
equally well represent a restoration of the normal conditions of
World civilization out of an anomalous local past, given the uni¬
que nature of medieval Western civilization. Indeed., in matters
of sexuality especially this is probably more nearly the case.
With all this, it can also he said that all societal types - pri¬
mitive, precapitalist civilization, and Capitalism - all show mar¬
ked variation in their gender relations, and that change and dev¬
elopment are seen wherever history is known. The historical stud¬
ies in the present thesis- indicate that gender relations in Ant¬
iquity are broadly comparable to those in the modern world, not
simply "on average", but in their overall pattern of variation
and development (see "Conclusions" below). Yet it would be folly
to attribute a cyclic pattern to women's history on that basis.
Women's history is simply history! it has no metaphysical or meta-
ethical structure. Inability to comprehend this is symptomatic of
illegitimate methodology.
Turning to the second dimension, the sociological interdeter-
minations; here the point to be made is the converse of the above;!
there can be no justification for making gender factors dependent
upon certain general sociological factors simply because these
are the factors we are used to use to structure World History or
to diagnose modernity. In particular, in view of the tradition of
Marxist scholarship, it must be stated categorically that there
are no evident reasons, either on analytic or on substantive gro¬
unds, for trying to make gender relations vary as a factor of the
mode of production - nor specifically as a factor of Capitalism.
My own comparative studies in Antiquity at least are certainly
contradictory of any such view. But this could equally be said
in relation to e.g. the market economy, or industrial technology,
as indeed it could be said generally of the sociological diagnos¬
tic repertoire of modernity that I discuss above - secularization,
democracy, etc. But two issues need to be distinguished here -
three, really, for the lack of an agreed conceptual apparatus to
describe gender relations and the oppressions specific to them
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promotes a general confusion. First is the point that sociology
must go beyond the level of cliche, must enquire in terms of bro¬
ad areas of concern such as power or the- economy, and not simply
modern conditions of these things:, however conceived. Second is
that the determinations must be allowed to run both ways: we need
to know what gender causes, not just what causes gender. It is the
absence of that dimension (or its functionalist pre-emption) that
reduces so much of gender theory to triviality. And lastly, with
all this, it must be realized that the major sociological inter-
determinations cannot be specified in advance. Power, the economy,
ideology - these (and others, e.g. demographics) can be identif¬
ied as essential dimensions for sociological enquiry, but the en¬
quiry must be open-ended. There can be no prior commitments, e.g.
to economic determinism, or for that matter to ideological deter¬
minism (never mind balancing acts between the two). As I have
said, it is a basic methodological point that must be insisted
upon, that sociology does not know about gender until it studies
it - and that is not compatible with an exercize in damage limit¬
ation.
It can also be said that no enquiry can answer more than it
asks, and that a comparative historical enquiry based on an In¬
terpretive conception of social reality is the most intellectual¬
ly radical approach to the problem of gender: the one that asks
most questions and has fewest preconceptions and prior commit-
mentsi Though it will have to be shown what can be made of this.
The comparative historical method, then, is the method of
comparative analysis in the arena of history. I have chosen to
discuss this closely in terms of Max Weber's work, with a focus
on gender enquiry, and more in the light of the history of class¬
ical social theory than the philosophy of modern social theory. I
believe that it has been legitimate and useful, if somewhat hetero¬
dox, to do this, in view of the overall location and intentions
of this thesis. There are many other points that coulcl be made,
less perhaps about historical sociology - where Weber tried to
(analytically) separate the disciplines, the modern tendency is
perhaps rather to fuse them - than about the comparative method.
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One point is that this is sometimes employed in modern anthropol¬
ogy (e.g. Lewis 1971) between ethnographic studies, where either
(or both) the histories of the peoples concerned are not known,
or an ahistoric mode of analysis is being used. (This is a more
disciplined and restrained practice than the old comparativism,
as earlier comments on the developments within anthropology sho¬
uld indicate.) In the widest sense, this too is comparative hist¬
orical sociology, subject to the peripherally of the peoples in
question to World-historical patterns. I have not intended any¬
thing that I have written as a critique of modern anthropology,
or as a claim that sociology can or should supervise anthropology.
My points only are: that Weber worked before the present parallel
institutionalization of the two disciplines; that his sociology
offers in principle a general approach to gender, which offer in
view of our confusions we would do well to consider; that evolut¬
ionist grand theory of the kind once fashionable and still some¬
times implicitly or explicitly favoured is methodologically sus¬
pect. A comment might be added on the relations of the comparat¬
ive historical method and Marxism. The detailed arguments would
have to be different as between Marxist and Interpretive concept¬
ions, of course, but it can surely be said that Marxism should
cut itself free from speculative anthropology and from evolution¬
ism, and should not do so at the cost of becoming a parochial
sociology of Capitalism. Marxism should be a comparative historic¬
al sociology too.
However, I want to conclude this chapter by turning away
from general issues to the specific methodological problems of the
comparative historical component of this present thesis. Here,
most of the basic issues have already been indicated: the intent¬
ion not to rehearse familiar sociological themes but to create a
new sociological enquiry; the need to approach this without re¬
strictive preconceptions from "received" sociology; the discontin¬
uities in both sociological and historiographical scholarship,
and the consequent need to engage with Weber as our intellectual
contemporary rather than our intellectual ancestor, and to read
our historiography critically. Taking these issues together, the
first point to come from them is that an attempt at a historical
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overview of gender would, as I have indicated earlier, result in
unacceptable superficiality. Instead, focussed studies must be
undertaken, in terms of specified place, time and course of ev¬
ents. Comparison requires a number of such studies, but their
capability for synthesis will again be limited, in terms of the
overall arena within which they are located. We are in no posit¬
ion to move direct to the creation of general theory, but must be
content with an essay towards general theory, within specified
limits, until further comparative studies can be made.
Accordingly, I have chosen to make three comparative studies:
New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens and the Roman Empire, and to
synthesize from them an essay in the sociological theory of gen¬
der within the limits of the Ancient Civilization. (This essay
comprises Part B of the thesis; the studies themselves are presen¬
ted in Part C.) The reasons for choosing Antiquity are many, but
first it should be explained that the three cases are intended to
provide a skeletal overview of the contrasts and developments of
Antiquity as a whole, within the limits of availablity of mater¬
ials and restrictions of space and time; this with especial ref¬
erence to Weber's major work on Antiquity, "The Agrarian Sociology
of Ancient Civilizations" (Weber 1976). The specific considerat¬
ions involved here will become clearer as the thesis progresses
(and an overview of the sociology of Antiquity is presented in
Appendix A). Other studies e.g. of Mesopotamia or Hellenistic Eg¬
ypt could certainly be added with advantage, and a study of Juda¬
ism and Christianity would be an important direction of develop¬
ment. But it is important to start with a finite task.
As to the choice of the Ancient Civilization as the arena
for study, one reason for this is that, for all that sociologists
may be unfamiliar with much of Weber's work on Antiquity, there
is strong awareness and powerful vindication of it in the modern
historiography of classical Antiquity at least, which thus becomes
an attractive body of scholarship to work with (see e.g» Finley
1973, 1985). Admittedly the preclassical civilizations are some¬
what more problematic; indeed, Egyptology and Ancient Near Eastern
studies tend to centre on archaeology and philology, and to be
somewhat remote from the historiographical mainstream (see Redford
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1979)* Again, though there is interest in Polanyi among Ancient
Near Eastern scholars, Egyptologists have never really discovered
economic history (though see Helck 1975; Janssen 1975)« On the
other side, these disciplines were still young in Weber's time,
and there has been far more scope than in classical studies for
scholarship to make dramatic advances. Indeed, Egyptian civiliz¬
ation seems to have undergone a quite profound re-evaluation since
perhaps mid-century; it is no longer thought to have been death-
obsessed and priest-ridden, with its people groaning under oppre¬
ssion (see e.g. Mertz 1964» 19^7; also bibliography to ch 8 be¬
low). Weber's views here accordingly require some reconsideration;
the principles of his sociology must be taken rather than his sub¬
stantive views. Yet all in all, this is still probably less diff¬
icult than would be trying to work with a Weber-blind mainstream
historiographical tradition, and Antiquity as a whole remains an
attractive arena.
Yet here lie the problems of discontinuity of scholarship,
and it must be said that central among them is sociology's long¬
standing failure to take account of W eber* s early career as an
ancient historian - in particular, the work I refer to above as
central, "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations". In
face of the vindication of Weber's work on Antiquity from modern
Graeco-Roman historiography, this situation is absurd. And it fac¬
es this thesis with practical difficulties, both in how to read
historiography and in how to present sociology. For the first,
there have to be two levels: a critical appraisal of the diverse
responses of historians themselves to their own rediscovery of
Weber the historian; and a more orthodox application of Weberian
sociological principles to modern historiographical literature.
For the second, the two levels just referred to must be interfused
not separated: since the purpose here is not scholarship for its
own sake, but the use of the Ancient Civilization as the arena
for an enquiry into gender. The primary requirement is to main¬
tain a Weberian thrust through the general analysis of Antiquity.
But it would be better if the recovery for sociology of Weber's
sociology of Antiquity had gone further.
But there are other kinds of reasons for choosing Antiquity:
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its remoteness from sociological preconceptions; its place at the
"beginning of World. History, and the depth that this gives to a
comparative historical sociological appraisal of gender. This is
especially of value against the persistent evolutionism that, lat¬
ent or proclaimed, I believe to be so pervasive in established
gender theory. For there is so much sociological development dur¬
ing Antiquity - e.g. the invention of banking, finance and money,
the development of rational law, the development of City-states
and of political philosophy, the invention of writing and of
written secular culture, the rise of the Great World Religions
- that any general sociological thesis that seeks to locate all
significant sociological development in prehistory, e.g. with the
neolithic revolution, simply lacks historical credibility. But
besides this, it can be added that there are both continuities
and comparabilities between Antiquity and modernity that should
lend immediacy to the study. Most obvious among the former are
Roman law and the Christian religion; the latter include democra¬
cy, bureaucracy, capitalism (though not rational industrial cap¬
italism), imperialism and migrant labour. Also, and perhaps most
interestingly, Antiquity features a cultural realm that is on the
whole this-world oriented, secular and pluralistic, in contrast
to the cultural hegemonies of the Great World Religions in the
medieval Western and oriental civilizations. This seems broadly
comparable to secularized modernity, though the orientation of
the Ancient Civilization to war and politics, to non-peaceful
economic action, provides a positive environment for the non-rat¬
ional side of conciousness and culture, where rational capitalism
provides, a destructive one. (This is further discussed in Appen¬
dix A part iv below.)
Indeed, there are strategic issues here of the location of
Antiquity in World History. For it must be obvious that, so far
as a great part of Weber's work is oriented around the economic
ethics of the World Religions, so also it is oriented around the
rise and fall of the World Religions, a basically cyclic concept¬
ion for which the analysis of Antiquity is the foundation. Here
then is the underlying comparability between Antiquity and modern¬
ity: civilization without the Great World Religions, before and
after. With this, it should he clearly realized that Weber assoc¬
iated the predominance of ideology in sociohistorical causation
with the Great World Religions and the medieval civilizations,
not with modernity: the "rationalization and disenchantment" the¬
sis of modernity is a secularization thesis. Weber sees Advanced
Capitalism in terms of power (bureaucratization) qualifying econ¬
omic determinism - again, broadly like Antiquity, though there it
is rather the economy that qualifies power. Weber's views on mod¬
ernity, then, are quite at variance with those of post-Durkheimian
and Western Marxist thought. But they are grounded in a far deep¬
er and more wide-ranging historical study, and they are much less
confused. (How can it be a "unique" state of ideology that prev¬
ents class revolution in Advanced Capitalism, when this was pre¬
cisely the function of ideology in precapitalist society? - it
is High Capitalism that is unique in its ideological regime. Ag¬
ain, the notions of alienation and reification might better be
brought to bear on the general conception of social reality than
on a specifically modern state of conciousness and culture.) All
this raises one final point: all the classical social theorists.
Marx, Durkheim and Weber, were educated in ancient history, and
this conditions all their thought. This too is a reason for mod¬
ern sociologists to study Antiquity.
As to the problems of the "history of women", I have frankly
not much concerned myself with this: I have simply worked in
terms of the available secondary literature, with a little use of
art-books and translated sources. As to the point that women have
not left us their own words, being (supposedly) mostly illiterate,
I cannot attach much significance to it; the same could be said
of the barons of medieval Europe. The methodological individual¬
ism of Weber's approach has ontological not epistemological stat¬
us; the point is to understand the processes of social conflict
in which women were located. Do we understand this about modern¬
ity? Prom one point of view, all culture can be taken to be a text
that women have co-written with men, just as the various status
groups and classes have co-written it together. The decoding of
this requires first and foremost an understanding of the gender
dimension of social structure. But here again Antiquity becomes
an attractive arena for first study, due to the way that ancient
polytheistic religion appears to mirror social structure. Further
considerations on these matters are presented below, in the next
chapter (ch 3)» chapter 7 (especially "Stratification"), and App¬
endices A part iv and B.
As to the secondary literature, that is, the historiograph-
ical literature in broad terms, the basic point is to try to see
this as a process, rather than simply as "state of the art".
Clearly, we cannot do this at the depth that the specialist would;
also, even classical historians have apparently not written much
on historiographical methodology (see Momigliano 1966; Finley
1975» 1985)» But the chief necessity for the sociologist is to
try to monitor the input of sociological ideas into the historio¬
graphical tradition he is dealing with, especially the older ideas
(such as the Matriarchy theoryj) which may well not be attributed.
For as I have said, although sociology now makes little consider¬
ation of Antiquity, in the classical sociological era a concern
with Antiquity was very common, for both sociologists and anthro¬
pologists. Such inputs may continue to be taken for granted by
the historian when for the sociologist they have long become ob¬
solete, and therefore possibly unfamiliar. Two especially problem¬
atic such areas are: migration, kinship, and the origins of the
Greek City-state; and synthetic considerations on ancient relig— •
ion. (See Appendix A parts iii & iv below.) Here is much of what
is meant by the need to read one 's historiography critically.
At any rate, these remarks must serve to locate the thesis:
that follows in terms of Weberian comparative historical socio¬
logy.
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In the previous chapter, I discussed the relationship between
the two arms of Weber's methodology, the comparative historical
method and the Interpretive method, arguing that the comparative
historical method is the method of enquiry, whereas the purpose
of the Interpretive method is to constitute the subject for enqu¬
iry. Its special virtue in this regard is that it constitutes its
subject matter with the minimum of assumptions as to its substant¬
ive character - especially in evolutionary or developmental terms;
in particular it contrasts sharply here with those forms of soc¬
ial theory which have an input from biological reasoning (e.g.
functionalism, evolutionism). But, I have argued, the methodolog¬
ical insulation of Weber's sociology from biologistic input is by
no means a refusal to engage with biologically grounded problems:
on the contrary, there is a strong undertaking and a specific
methodology towards them, as shown in the matter of race (Weber
1978 Part ii ch 5) and indeed, though minimally, of gender itself.
The need is to give this explicit expression and systematic dev¬
elopment. That is what is to be undertaken in this and the follow¬
ing chapters.
Interpretivism is above all a conception of the nature of
social reality. This conception is grounded on social action,
that is, behaviour illuminated by the subjectivity of those con¬
cerned, and a certain reciprocality of orientation (see Weber
1978 Part i ch 1). Given this reciprocality of orientation, the
tendency is for patterns of social action to crystallize into per¬
manence, the social actors both shaping their actions to and draw¬
ing the meanings of their actions from the social environment in
which they act - reciprocally pursuing their material and ideal
interests. This provides the basis for social continuity, though
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this continuity does not amount to stasis; social change remains
grounded in human creativity, the capacity for innovation. In
Weber's view this has two faces: on the one side, the radical
innovations of the individual, to which others may or may not re¬
spond; on the other side, the slow accretions of adaptive change
made at a general level - charisma and rationalization. There is
a good deal more that could be said about these things, in par¬
ticular the conditions under which innovation of either type will
or will not succeed. Again, the relation between the two types of
change is interesting and complex: the historical influence of
intellectuals. But the argument is not to be pursued for its own
sake here (indeed, these matters are too often considered in vac¬
uo) . The concern of the present thesis is with gender. Therefore
the question is, how is gender to be dealt with in terms of the
Interpretive conception of social reality?
Roughly speaking, by "gender" is meant here human biology as
it concerns sex and reproduction. It will be necessary to consid¬
er this further at a later point, but this statement will do for
present purposes - with the proviso that "human biology" should
be understood to include behavioural as well as physical compon¬
ents. This then has to be inter-related with a conception of soc¬
ial reality that centres on Intentionality: on social action and
its subjective meanings. The basis for this inter-relation is
that human biology must be treated as an aspect of the material
environment in which social action takes place. That is, the hum¬
an biology of sex and reproduction relates to the sociology of
gender as the geographical environment - land, plants and animals,
minerals, etc. - relates to the sociology of economics (Weber
1978 Part i p 7 - 8; p 64). There will be specific issues to con¬
sider. But first, the general point should be grasped, that mater¬
ial reality and social reality meet here as distinct realms work¬
ing by distinct logics, the one causal, the other Intentional:
material causes cannot have sociological effects. Material real¬
ity enters into social reality only subject to a process of social
construction; that is, as social actors attach meaning to it and
take account of it in their actions. Thus material factors can
function as stimuli or hindrances or precipitating factors in soc-
ial action, though not as causes (see Weber 1978 Part i p 7 -8).
It is the first point to grasp: that biological determinism in
the Interpretive universe is logically impossible. Even the pro¬
cess of social construction into the realm of meaning is not mat¬
erially determined; it can take various forms.
To take this position in relation to the human biology of
sex and reproduction involves specific problems. Perhaps the most
obvious of these is the notion of treating behaviour as an envir¬
onment for action; a rather tenuous notion, it might be argued,
unless some kind of dissonance can be shown between them. I shall
return to this issue. But most fundamental is the problem that
"human biology" is not just a set of facts, but a whole function¬
ally integrated causal realm which asserts the continuity of our
world with that of plants and animals. What is the relationship of
the biological to the social? Is Man still an animal? If so, how
far and in what sense? Does Intentionality, Mind, society, tech¬
nology, culture, whatever - do these things mean that Man is no
longer subject to the Darwinian laws? Clearly there is a large
element of philosophical imponderability in these questions; they
do not have "right" or "wrong" answers. Clearly too we would be
much more cautious towards them now than were the Victorians,
whether out of revulsion against Judaeo-Christian inhumanity to¬
wards the living world, or increased awareness of the possibilit¬
ies of ecological disaster, or whatever. But for the practical
purposes of social theory, we have to take a position - and, it
must be stressed, an explicit position - on these questions. Given
the impossibility of "right" or "wrong" answers, our criterion-
for choosing our position (within the limits of credibility) must
be its productiveness, in terms of enquiry and explanation. That
is, sociological enquiry and explanation: we should choose the
position which gives a specifically sociological enquiry maximum
scope.
This means taking a position which (unsurprisingly) runs con¬
trary to the tendency of biologically modelled social theory: it
means assuming that, whatever the biological heritage of humanity,
the species has on the whole escaped the functional integration
of the biological realm. That is, biological reality does not sup-
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ervise social reality, and "society" does not subserve biological
ends - is not teleologically supervised by the necessity of spec¬
ies survival. This is not to deny that a biological level of hum¬
anity remains; far from it. But the functional integration of the:
causal patterns is fragmented and the elements are left piecemeal.
And they condition social action in piecemeal fashion, without
providing overall integration. Society cannot be understood in
terms of a closed structure, however conceived; all that we have
is an unclosed narrative of variation: World History. This can be
sampled in the quest for patterns, for affinities and disaffinit-
ies between types of social action; it cannot be exhausted, nor
defined. Moreover there are within this unclosed narrative of
World History no entities whose survival on biological analogy is
necessary: no "societies". There are only social actors: people.
I have discussed this in the previous chapter.
It can be seen, then, that what is coming into focus as the
central problem is the relationship between social continuity and
human reproduction. These can by no means be equated with each
other, and neither of them is a matter of necessity; they are each
contingent upon social action. The question of social continuity
I have already discussed at its most general level: the crystall¬
ization of patterns of social action and meaning; this is a matt¬
er of minute to minute, day to day continuity, and also, as noted,
of minute to minute, day to day change. This basic conception of
social reality must be contextualized with historical narrative;
on the whole, it is the nature of "society" to change, and not to
stay the same. That is the meaning of history. Equally it must be
contextualized with sociological conflict, for which it constit¬
utes the arena; the reasons why particular continuities and part¬
icular changes do and do not take place is very much a matter of
the perceptions, interests, and power of the variously located
social actors in the given situation. Again, the dynamics here
make for change rather than for continuity; the historical dimen¬
sion of "society" is essential. But these processes which define
social continuity and change are not directly factors of the pro¬
cesses of generational replacement, the birth and growth and death
of individual persons. Indeed, these are quite separate issues.
The Interpretive conception of social reality is existential;
it conceives social actors acting in terms of their immediate
social environment, and does not insist on a background of "soc¬
ialization". On the contrary, "socialization" is a concept at lea¬
st potentially inimical to the creativity on which Interpretive
theory insists. Also, it entails paradoxes that Interpretivism
would tend to highlight: how do you "socialize" a child for adult¬
hood, when childhood and adulthood are quite distinct things? And
if adulthood requires a preparatory socialization, then why does
not childhood too? For children are not incipient persons; they
are persons, and the child as much as the adult has a place in
society. Or what if childhood and adulthood are typically in phys¬
ically remote locations? Rural-urban migration, for example, is
as old as civilization. And again, how do you "socialize" for the
future, for a situation that does not exist and is different from
the one in which "socialization" takes place? These problems seem
to be the consequences of an ahistoric mode of analysis, suppress¬
ing time both as history and as life-cycle, and it is surely sur¬
prising to find Marxism as well as functionalism arguing in these
terms. Interpretive theory would prefer to assume a basic exist¬
ential competence (on the part of children as well as adults), and
to focus its analysis on ongoing social conflict processes.
It is in the arena of history that social actors reproduce;
human biology is the environment for history not for "society".
In view of this, it may be questioned whether the term "reproduct¬
ion" really should be used. Children are not copies of their par¬
ents, but new and different persons; perpetuation of the human
race is not a sociological consideration. Equally, when women have
babies, this is Intentional social action, not biological repro¬
duction. It might be better perhaps to use the term "procreation".
But more than this, rather than the imposed meanings of biolog¬
ists or social theorists, we might consider the meanings that soc¬
ial actors use themselves: when they have their babies, do they
think they are "reproducing" or perpetuating something, and if so,
what? It is obvious that different social actors have returned
different answers here: for example, some might see themselves as
perpetuating a lineage, or a status group, or an ethnic or relig-
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ious community; others might rather consider themselves to he
creating new individuals with their own separate; identities and
unforseeable destinies. Most especially we should remember here
that pregnancy and childbirth are a consequence of sexual inter¬
course, and that social actors may orient themselves variously to
these facts: some want children, and use sexual intercourse to
meet that want; others want sexual intercourse for its own sake,
and accept or try to control or avoid having children as the con¬
sequence. It is nonsense to argue in human affairs that sex happ¬
ens "because" of bs.bies, or that babies happen "because" of sex -
though it is remarkable how far social theory has favoured the
first and ignored the second of these alternatives. But the true
relationship is neither functional nor causal, but Intentional,
according as the social actors construct and orient themselves to
their biology.
These points made, it should be realized that there is no
guarantee or even presumption that the consequences of procreat¬
ion will be contained within the situation in which it occurs -
even assuming that situation to have continuity over time. "Repro¬
duction" may equally well be "under-reproduction" or "over-repro¬
duction". Moreover this can apply differentially for variously
located social actors and conflicting groups; there is no presump¬
tion that the process will even itself out in accordance with the
status quo. In sum, procreation - the production of babies - must
be seen in the context of demographic history, for its social im¬
pact to be theorized.
This is certainly a complicated matter. There seems to be no
agreement in social theory as to how population should be treated,
or indeed as to whether it should be treated at all. The prefer¬
ence is rather to argue for the "reproduction" of society, espec¬
ially at the ideal level - socialization. This is perhaps due in
part to the overall structure of population history (see Cipolla
1979)» which features two episodes of explosive growth, related
to the neolithic and Industrial revolutions, but otherwise appar¬
ently slow growth or stagnation. This pattern would appear to fit
only with types of social theory that focus on technology and that
are prepared to engage in reconstructions of prehistory and the
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development from primitive to civilized. Much of social theory
however is not prepared so to engage, limiting itself to the emp¬
irically secure record in terms of contemporary ethnography, or
history, or contemporary modernity. Thus the thrust of Weber's
sociology (and surely of Marx') centres on patterns within the
historical record and contemporary modernity, which are seen as
fundamentally comparable and in continuity with each other. The
problem of the rise of modernity then seems to be in a different
frame from that of population problems. With this, it might be
said that the broad experience of social theory is that technol¬
ogy is not very useful as an independent variable in social ex¬
planation. It would be more accurate, however, to say (again)
that there are differences between cultural science and social
science - despite the ambiguities of anthropology.
Further to this, we seem to have in social theory two quite
opposed classical approaches to population (seeKeyfitz 1972)*
One, which can be termed the Durkheimian, holds that the social
process is inherently stable, and that the population process is
one of the few endogenous factors that can break through this- sta¬
bility and cause change; the other, which can be termed the Marx¬
ist, holds that, although the social process is inherently un¬
stable, it develops by its own dynamics and will always contain
the population process (Marx 1976 p 781 et seq; exerpted in Over-
beck ed. 1977)» The first of these positions indeed has variants:
Durkheim's own suggestion was that population increase causes soc¬
ial change by increasing "social density" - frequency of interact¬
ions -, a view that for a time at least Parsons shared (Durkheim
1933 P 256 et seq). This is endogenous and sociological, though
the notion of "social density" seems obscure and hard to specify.
Eut other forms of the argument are cultural, treating population
increase as an exogenous factor, population the environment of
society, and arguing generally that social change is caused by
exogenous pressures not endogenous social factors - society's
degree of immunity to such pressures being a factor of the level
of technology (see e.g. articles in Spooner ed. 1972; Renfrew ed.
1973; Cohen and Service eds. 1978). Here again is the basic link¬
ing of population and technology; indeed this approach has been
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turned, round to provide theories of technological development as
well as of population increase (Boserup 1965)« But all approach
in these terms is open to sociological criticisms that technology
is a poor sociological explanans; that society's capability to
deal with environmental contingency even at a low level of tech¬
nology is being underestimated; that sociological factors of soc¬
ial change are being ignored. It might be added that too much
weight is being put here onto archaeological investigations of
the neolithic revolution; this is certainly a legitimate field of
enquiry, but it cannot be made the preferential basis for build¬
ing social theory.
In all this matter, the tensions between sociology and anth¬
ropology can again be seen. In the next chapter (ch 4)> I will
make concrete proposals as to how population questions (see esp.
Weeks 1978) might be dealt with in Weberian sociological theory.
But for the present methodological discussion, only an orientat-
ive sketch is need.ed. Here, the central issue is that the anti¬
thetical (Durkheimian and Marxist) positions outlined above might
be reconciled if they could be regarded as the opposite poles of
the same process. This entails a reorientation to population his¬
tory. For while the neolithic and modern population explosions
are based on imbalance between fertility and mortality, there is
a third population process: migration; and the period between the
population explosions, civilized World History, has been charact¬
erized by migration, not by a simple fertility-mortality balance.
Most especially this is rural-urban migration: the countryside
over-reproduces and exports its excess population; the city under-
reproduces (due to plague, poverty and squalor) and imports the
deficit (the modern population explosion, in the West at least,
is due to reduced urban mortality). The basic suggestion, then,
is that the Burkheimian account is true for the countryside, and
the Marxist account is true for the city. In this, the economic
and power relations linking the city to the countryside must be
grasped! "society" is integrated around mechanisms of conflict
that ground a dynamic of change and are typically centred in the
city; the countryside is integrated around mechanisms of resist¬
ance to exogenous - city-centred - change, (this is why the coun-
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tryside presents the appearance of functionality and ahistoric-
ity).
This is at first approximation; moreover my concerns here
are still with methodology, not yet with sociological theory. But
part of the reason for highlighting the migration process is that,
it suggests a model by which to see the whole question of gener¬
ational replacementi instead of adducing an imperative "goodness
of fit" between procreation and the social status quo, and then
devising the family and socialization accordingly, we can see the
life-cycle as a migration from childhood to adulthood, from the
locus of birth and nurture to the locus of the adult destiny.
This migration may not involve actual physical movement as from
countryside to city; it may be rather a purely sociological re¬
location. Moreover, parenthood must be conceived as a possible
element of the adult destiny - though by no means a necessary ele¬
ment, given the non-reproductivity of cities. But beyond this, it
should be realized that the various elements of the social struct¬
ure differ quite markedly both in how they recruit new personnel,
and in how they treat their members' fertility and progeny. A
closed status group of lineages, for example, will recruit from
its own members' fertility only, and under strict rules moreover
of marriage and legitimacy. A bureaucracy, by contrast, makes a
point of refusing to recognize its members' progeny, and recruits
by a system of appointments - no less rule-bound. It should be
noted that these things are bound up with the general pattern of
conflict in society. Other elements of the social structure, e.g.
the market, or the city itself, come somewhere intermediate be¬
tween these two opposed cases; whereas individual people have to
struggle for their livelihood and their "place in society", often
struggling not to avoid exploitation but to obtain a place in
which to be exploited. All this will be pursued in due time. But
the point that must be grasped is that the loci of childhood and
of adulthood do not simply and of necessity subserve one another;
they may well be unalike, remote, and in mutual conflict. The ov¬
erall matrix in which they are located is conflictual in charac¬
ter.
In view of these considerations, the first formulation of the
poles of migration must "be revised. The former, the countryside,
can rather he identified as the local community, the typical
arena for procreative and nurturant relations in which the child
is horn and grows. The latter, the city, is less easy to name,
hut it can he identified as the arena of political and economic
conflict in society. I term this "the central arena" or "central
institutions". These arenas may geographically interpenetrate;
they are hardly as simply separated as countryside and city. Yet
the analytic distinction does typically have some physical embodi¬
ment, including divisions within the household - front shop and
family quarters, for example. And the hasic strategic conception,
of pressure and resistance in a conflictual matrix grounding ov¬
erall change, remains. This indeed will he taken up and developed
in later chapters (ch 4 & 5)«
To draw the main points of this section together, then, I
have argued that the Interpretive conception of social reality
invites us to dismiss altogether the idea that hiology in any way
supervises society, or again, that society can be conceived at
any level in terms of closed theoretical structures. Instead it
invites us to see the human biology of sex and reproduction in
terms of piecemeal conditioning factors upon social action, and a
conditioning material environment of history. This entails consid¬
eration of actual patterns of social action and meaning, and a
consideration of demographic history with the development of a
sociological approach; all of which amounts to a considerable pro¬
ject in comparative historical study. But it must he stressed that
this is to he evaluated not from the point of view of the logical
closure of social explanation, hut from the point of view of the
comparative historical sociology of gender: a project of an explo¬
ratory nature. That antithesis, explanation and exploration, will
come up again in the next section.
In the foregoing section, I have tried to establish the most
general strategic relationships between the biological realm and
the social realm. It will be necessary in due course to pursue
this further, to lay down a strategy whereby the range of gender
phenomena can be constituted for classification and analysis. But
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first it is necessary to consider more closely what "gender" mea¬
ns; to go beyond the rough definition offered above, "human bio¬
logy as it concerns sex and reproduction", and to work towards
establishing the concept for which this thesis is named: "sexual
polarity". In particular, it is necessary to engage with the be¬
havioural component, and the conception of behaviour as an envir¬
onment for action. These are the things that are to be pursued
here.
I do not want to become involved in this in a biological ex¬
egesis, nor do I think that any real purpose would be served by
it. There is certainly a wealth of biological information and
theory in regard to sex and gender - though palaeo-anthropological
reconstruction, like the archaeological reconstruction of prehist¬
ory, does not appear to me to be a secure basis on which to build
social theory. But as I have indicated earlier, my stance as an
Interpretive sociologist is to regard humanity as sui generis,
possessed of biological origins and a biological heritage but in
no way subject to biological determination. It Is then the over¬
all shape of the biological heritage rather than its details that
should be our concern. With this too it seems to me that our focus
should be on primary rather than secondary gender factors. Thus
for example the average differences of size, weight and strength
between the sexes: such differences also occur on other bases
than sex, and they surely have little sociological value. The Rom¬
ans did not conquer their empire because they were big. Even at
the most primitive level, humanity is defined by factors of intel¬
ligence, technology, culture, society, not by crude physical var¬
iables. This is not to deny that such secondary sexual different¬
iation has biological significance. But dealing in the realm of
society, it seems best to direct the thrust of the argument thro¬
ugh the sociological impact of the primary biological factors.
These can be defined simply enough as: sexual dimorphism with an
attendant division of reproductive functions, and a mammalian pat¬
tern of reproduction with prolonged childhood dependence. It sho¬
uld be added here that the basic sexual dimorphism is evidently
qualified by a broad equivalence of male and female sexuality,
in terms of the clitoris, female desire and female orgasm. Here
any notion of the human female as being somehow biologically de¬
fective or incomplete is surely nonsensical. Difficulties of mod¬
ern Western women with arousal and orgasm should be taken in the
context of their difficulties in breast-feeding; they are due to
cultural ambivalence and equivocation.
So for morphology and function; behaviour is more difficult.
However, it can be assumed for the sake of preliminary orientat¬
ion that there is a basic correspondence between morphology, fun¬
ction and behaviour in the biological heritage of humanity. And
certainly it is to the point to try to see the relationships here:,
not to suppress them as intrusive elements in a project of socio¬
logical explanation. Above all, the causal relationship between
sexual intercourse and pregnancy must be faced. Although my strat¬
egic argument is that biology does not supervise society, I still
hold it to be a most important dimension of the environment of
society; again, while I argue that the functional integration of
human biology (especially at its behavioural level) is fragmented,
I do not thereby argue that all the causal elements are atomized.
But the problem with ''behaviour" is that it is such a generous
concept. Indeed, here it cannot be taken to mean anything more
(or less) than the framework of analysis of the behavioural sci¬
ences.
That is a loose and nominalistic term, covering several dis¬
ciplines that are pursued in various ways. For present purposes,
however, perhaps four main branches can be identified: behaviour¬
al psychology, cross-cultural psychology, ethology or sociobiol--
ogy, and Psychoanalysis. With this, one might tentatively ident¬
ify three levels of analysis: the input of energy (drive or in¬
stinct); the observed trait or pattern of activity or conduct;
and conciousness (a concept which may include the unconcious).
Different approaches work across these levels in different ways,
of course, and concepts such as "instinct" can be variously de¬
fined. Now our basic methodological problem is with the reconcil¬
iation of behaviour in these terms with action in Intentional
terms. The formulation given earlier for this is of stimuli, hin¬
dering factors, precipitating factors, etc. to social action,
conditioning social action according as actors attach meaning to
59
them and take them into account in their actions (Weber 1978 Part
i p 7 - 8). This conception then requires consideration for each
of the three levels just identified. Here it should be realized
that conciousness is a special problem, as impinging directly on
the areas of Intentionality and meaning. This will have to be dis¬
cussed at length in due course. But as to the other two levels,
it should also be clear that drive or instinct itself, the input
of energy, need be no problem. It is only in conjunction with the
second level, observed traits and patterns of conduct - the sense
most usually given to behaviour - that problems start to emerge,
for this gives specific content to the instincts or drives, which
in turn give the behavioural patterns a non-cultural basis. More¬
over, this is typically worked out without thematization of con¬
ciousness, to give "objectively correct" meanings for behaviour
patterns. It is here that the conception of stimuli, hindering
factors, precipitating factors, etc. must be brought to bear. For
it seems to me that social theory must try to grapple with these
"objectively correct" meanings of behaviour structures, not to
suppress them; an over-culturally-constructed conception of human
ns.ture is just as bad as an "over-socialized" conception of hum¬
anity (c.f. Wrong 1961). Rather we should see human nature and
culture as in dialogue. It must be grasped that there can be dis¬
sonance between human nature and its cultural articulation, and
that this can be experienced as conflict by the social actor, or
can be an unconcious cause of distress or malfunction. We know
this well enough in regard to both sexuality and child-raising.
Here then it seems to me that biological continuities in humanity
are to be grasped and engaged with.
Following these preliminary considerations, it seems to me
that the four branches of the behavioural sciences identified
above can be taken in two groups: in the first, behavioural and
cross-cultural psychology; in the second, ethology and Psychoanal¬
ysis. The prime difference resides in the empiricist character of
the first group, and its reluctance to engage in grand theory, as
compared to the second. This is not pure loss; indeed Psychoanal¬
ysis (and in lesser degree ethology in some of its speculations
as to human behaviour) has been damagingly criticized from both
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the "behavioural and cross-cultural psychological perspectives.
But the problem is that, on the one side, behavioural psychology
is not culture-fair; on the other side, cross-cultural psychol¬
ogy seems able to show this (e.g. Mead 1962; Oakley 1972), but
not to create a positive critique or alternative synthesis, poss¬
essing neither a wide enough body of data nor a methodology with
which to do so. The consequence then is rather to throw one, tho¬
ugh with due caution, back to the other two approaches: ethology
and Psychoanalysis.
Ethology and Psychoanalysis are both holistic in character,
as I have indicated; they orient their observations to a ground¬
ing in the macro-explanatory structures of the biological scien¬
ces (and indeed, Psychoanalysis builds similar macro-explanatory
structures itself). Although ethology is somewhat the younger of
the two, they have taken some account of each other, and can to a
point be usefully considered together. I have to state here that
I have greater interest in the "classical" ethology of Lorenz and
Tinbergen (e.g. Lorenz 1964» 1966; Tinbergen et al 1970) than in
more modern developments in sociobiology, in terms of games theory
considerations applied to the hypothetical behaviour-trait carry¬
ing gene (e.g. Wilson 1978). Of course I have no expertize in
this, but I understand that sociobiology has its origins in the
study of insect behaviour, to which ethological methods were in¬
applicable; it then perhaps complements rather than replaces eth¬
ology. At any rate, sociobiology as a project in reductionist ex¬
planation is of no interest here, in a thesis that is basically
exploratory in character; whereas the consideration of the behav¬
iour of higher, even closely related, animals does offer some¬
thing of a positive challenge to social theory, an invitation to
ask new questions - or a resource when we do so on our own account
(see esp. Morris 1968, 1972). As to Psychoanalysis, it will be
seen in due course that this has its cognates and alternatives
too.
Ethology and Psychoanalysis share a common orientation to
human behaviour as being driven by "instincts" which go decisiv¬
ely beyond the mere search for food and shelter. The major in¬
stincts identified usually are, or cluster round, sex and aggress-
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ion. These can he given wide and various interpretation; in par¬
ticular, sex here tends to subsume reproduction. With this, some¬
thing of a difference of tendencies is apparent: ethology, espec¬
ially where it tries to discuss humanity, tends to have a strong
focus on aggression, though sex and reproduction (and indeed oth¬
er instincts) are considered too. As against this, Psychoanalysis
focusses much more exclusively on sex, and indeed tends to make it
the sole instinct on which all human behaviour is grounded. Freu¬
d's own treatment of aggression at least seems to be uncertain
and equivocal. The main impetus to a positive treatment in strai¬
ghtforward terms of the aggressive instinct in Psychoanalytic
thought came from the two great early schismatics, Alfred Adler
and Carl Jung. To my mind, the weight of ethology supports them
against Freud in this.
The question is: how are these approaches to behaviour to
be accomodated in social theory, specifically Interpretive social
theory? Here as indicated before ethology and Psychoanalysis re¬
quire to be considered separately. With ethology, it is as I have
already said a matter of a biological heritage of fragmentary be¬
haviour patterns, organized (largely) around the main instinct¬
ual impulses. This can be treated as argued above, in terms of a
process of social construction into the realm of meaning, where
it acts as stimuli, hindrances, precipitating factors etc. to
social action according as social actors take account of it in
their actions. Perhaps more specifically, one might speak of im¬
pulses, predispositions, innate competences, etc. which the social
actor may accord more or less of recognition and enjoyment. There
is a potential dissonance of behaviour and action, then, a dis¬
sonance of biology and culture; this may well be a strongly felt
conflict or unconcious source of distress or malfunction for the.
social actor, as stated before. So far as sex and reproduction
are concerned, then, the innate behavioural endowment can as sta¬
ted earlier simply be assumed to correspond with the primary div¬
isions in morphology and function: basic sexual and parental (pri¬
marily maternal) instincts, in terms of instinctually driven be¬
haviour patterns, surviving in fragmented form. However, this con¬
ditions social phenomena and does not determine them; the actual
cultural forms will be various. But this stated, the main input
for us from ethology is not in filling out this picture but only
in stressing its biological parameters, and most especially as a
caveat against viewing all biologically grounded human behaviour
in terms of sex and reproduction only. This point will appear
again below.
As to Psychoanalysis (Pine 1962; Stafford-Clark 1965; Bocock
1976), the problem here is quite different, for Psychoanalysis
concerns itself not simply with behaviour but with conciousness.
As a biologically grounded psychology, centred in sexual and rep~
roductive relations, Psychoanalysis ramifies into a general theo¬
ry of conciousness and culture (the latter especially in regard
to religion and art), and of socialization and the family (its
sociological articulation). There is then a strong tradition of
working with Psychoanalysis in social theory, both of Durkheimian
and Marxian kinds (though the ultimate compatibility with Marxism
might be questioned). Psychoanalysis is certainly problematic. It
can be criticized for general lack of scientific methodology; for
lack of verification both from behavioural and from cross-cultural
psychology, and indeed from psychiatry, where its utility both as
therapy and as insight may be questioned; it can be criticized on
ethological grounds, as indicated above; and not least, on socio¬
logical grounds, for its ahistoricity. Yet Psychoanalysis has an
undeniable robustness in the face of all criticism. Even so, the
compatibility of Psychoanalysis with Interpretive social theory
seems slight. The problem does not reside in the notion of the
unconcious, or in the complex nature of motives, for Interpretiv-
ism can accomodate this (Weber 1978 Part i p 9 - 10). But the
emphasis on the primacy of childhood in the formation of the mind,
articulating to social theory through the concept of socializat¬
ion, has, as I have already argued, little compatibility with the
existentialist Interpretive conception of social reality, and the
context of this argument, the whole thrust of the system, is biol-
ogistic and ahistorical in character. Psychoanalysis is ultimately
a biological, causal, theory of Mind, and that must be incompat¬
ible with Intentionality, which takes the acausality of Mind as
its basic principle, (it should, be noted that, whatever the scien-
tific problems, the philosophical problems here are Freud*s.)
But more than this, what must be grasped is the role of Psy¬
choanalysis in social theory, whether of Durkheimian or Marxian
kind. This dictates, and is in turn dictated by, a strategy to¬
wards sex and reproduction that is ultimately biologistic, ahist-
orical, and Idealist. That is, Psychoanalysis is being used not
on its merits but because it fits: not for its exploratory power,
its capability to find out new things, but for its explanatory
power, its capability to give logical closure to certain struct¬
ures of social theory. For no system of thought can explore its
own fundamentals, and it is precisely on the ground of sex and
reproduction in society that Psychoanalysis is based. It is this
more than anything else that makes Psychoanalysis inimical to the
present thesis: a thesis whose pretension is to set up a non-
biologistic, historical, non-Idealist framework, in which, not to
explain sexual polarity but to explore it. This, in the face of
the traditions of social theory, makes it at least desirable to
look for a positive critique of Psychoanalysis on its own terms.
Surprisingly, there is no difficulty about this; such a thing
has always existed, in the Analytical Psychology of Carl Jung
(Storr 1973; Fordham 1966; Jacobi 1968). I cannot understand why
social theory has never taken account of it - except that, as I
have said, Psychoanalysis fitted. However, the issue faces me
with considerable problems of presentation, in that Jung's thought
is apparently very little known among sociologists, and yet is
far too complex and ramified for any brief exegesis. Accordingly,
I present a brief consideration here for the sake of the present
argument, reserving a more full discussion for an appendix (App¬
endix B).
Preliminarily, it should be understood that Freud twice dev¬
eloped definitive formulations of Psychoanalytic theory: id-psych¬
ology in the 1900's, and ego-psychology in the 1920's; and there
is little question but that it was the defections of Adler and
Jung (1911 - 13) that compelled the reformulation. The central
issues were two-fold: the purposive nature of the psyche, and the
aggressive instinct. Of these, the first is a corrective to the
purely reactive conception of the psyche in id-psychology; Freud's-
conception of the ego in ego-psychology incorporates this succ¬
essfully enough (and makes the point familiar). The second issue
has a somewhat more complex history. Adler (Way 1956)(who himself
never really attempted grand theory) tended to substitute aggre¬
ssion for sex as the primary instinct; Freud, as indicated above,
came in time to give some indecisive consideration to the idea of
an aggressive or death instinct, while keeping the thrust of his
system through sex. Jung, however, proceeded to develop a synth¬
esis of Freudian id-psychology with Adlerian conceptions! extra-
vert and introvert are basically the Freudian and the Adlerian
personalities, oriented to sex and to aggression respectively. In
all this, that is, for Adler and Jung, the conception of the
aggressive instinct is of a drive to autonomy and independence,
to exploration and mastery of one's environment. The biological
basis might in part be the need for individual, as opposed to
species, survival. This conception seems to me to be broadly in
line with ethological thinking, though the two disciplines develop
their ideas in different directions. Freud's conception of aggre¬
ssion is more idiosyncratic by comparison.
These remarks provide orientation. But the main significance
of Analytical Psychology for the present thesis resides rather in
the general strategy under which Jung raises his psychology. Sex
and aggression are the main instincts, the channels for psychic
energy (libido), which energy can be diverted from its primary
objectives to the attainment of cultural goals. This last is in
line with Freud; however, where Freud makes libido current-like,
Jung makes it tidal, turning naturally and periodically from one
thing to its opposite. But more: for Jung, the basis of the psyche
is constituted in an innate capacity for the formation of symbols,
emotionally laden concepts which have special value in the deflec¬
tion or redirection of psychic energy; a capacity which is given
content by contact with a specific cultural environment. This is
the theory of the collective unconcious and the archetypes - a
proto-structuralist conception with similarity to Chomsky's theo¬
ries of language acquisition. It should be grasped that this con¬
ception plays the part in Jung's psychology that the universal
Oedipus complex plays in Freud's. 3exua.l and reproductive relat—
ionships, then, have no special privileged significance here. The
psyche interacts with and internalizes the culture in which it is
located; the family is no more, than the common immediate setting
in which this usually occurs. Also the process is one in which .
the psyche plays a highly active part; though at the deeper lev¬
el of theory as the theory of Kan, where psyche creates culture,
sexual and reproductive relationships are an expression of the
psyche, as they are of human biology. But the basic point must be
grasped: that Jung is arguing in an explicit neo-Kantian frame¬
work, raising a theory of Mind and culture in terms of each other,
with biology only a background dimension, of (species and indiv¬
idual) origins and continuing physical environment.
The consequence of this is that the capability of Analytical
Psychology towards sex and gender is far more exploratory than
explanatory. The overall conception here is of an innate psychic
apparatus complementary to the biological apparatus. This means a
certain reciprocality at the level of the archetypes as between
the two sexes; thus man and woman identify parents and lovers in
terms of same-sex and opposite sex, rather than simply male and
female. But beyond this differentiation, male ana female are in
principle alike, equivalent. This is the primary level. At a sec¬
ondary level, culture typically constructs a further different¬
iation of the sexes, by selectively emphasizing and de-emphasiz¬
ing certain attributes, e.g. men's intellect as against women's
emotions, the culturally de-emphasized attribute being driven into
the unconcious. The cultural environment may also permit altern¬
ative gender "careers" of cross-identification: the masculinized
woman or - though not in our culture - the feminized man. It
might be noted here that the conception of primary psychic com¬
plementarity between the sexes provides that at the level of sym¬
bolism, men and women can "read" and "write" the same "cultural
text" differentially. For example, take identifications and emot¬
ional relationships with the Holy Trinity: the man identifies him¬
self as Christ, God as his father and Mary as his mother; the wom¬
an identifies herself as Mary, God as her father and Christ as her
child. This provision should strongly qualify any conception of
women living under male cultural hegemony - it is certainly poss-
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ible but is historically contingent, and demands flexible analy¬
sis.
To take another dimension, childhoods Jung sees this less in
terms of socialization than of individuation. That is, the child
engages actively with the world, and the psyche is pre structured
to acquire cultural content. Some learning of customs, skills,
etc. takes place, but this is hardly psychologically crucial. The
individuation process is the developing internal and external
differentiation of the child, to become a mature, separate and
autonomous person. This indeed is a lifelong process, and as such
central to Jung's interests (as childhood itself is not). Socio¬
logically, it has two phases; a growing away from childhood dep¬
endence towards direct engagement with the world; and a growing
away from the world into oneself, the development of a critical
and creative distance between the individual and society. Eut at
the first level, the level of childhood, this is a child's eye
view; childhood prospective towards adolescence and adulthood.
The resonances here of the individuation process with the aggre¬
ssive instinct, the drive to exploration and mastery of the world,
to autonomy and independence, should be noted. Too, it should be
noted how this conception avoids the pitfalls of "over-socializ¬
ation". Social theory has long needed a concept of individuation.
This should be enough to indicate the basic nature of Jung's
psychology; more is said in the appendix (Appendix B). As to its
value for this thesis, in the first place it is salutary I think
simply to realize that it is possible to think about these matt¬
ers in a manner different from Preud, and that Freud's authority
in social theory rests in fact on a false basis, a simple failure
to consider the available alternatives. But beyond this, there is
the question of making positive use of Jungian insights and con¬
ceptions. Here, to summarize, the main points are; the complem¬
entarity and equivalence of the sexes (male and female are each
the opposite sex); childhood in terms of the individuation pro¬
cess; and sex and aggression as the two primary instinctual chan¬
nels. It can be added that to me at least, Jung's conceptions are
intuitively attractive, even commonsensical; moreover they seem
to have a broad accord with biology and ethology.
(al
Indeed it seems possible after all this to reiterate what was
said at the beginning of this section» a biological apparatus of
sexual dimorphism with an attendant division of reproductive func¬
tions, and a mammalian pattern of reproduction with prolonged
childhood dependence; and a behavioural (now psychic) apparatus
that broadly corresponds to this biological apparatus. The main
regard in which this has been qualified through consideration of
ethology and Analytical Psychology is the consideration of the
aggressive instinct. This could have threefold force: firstly as
organizing certain secondary sex differences, such as differences
in size and strength (which also, incidentally, differentiate ad¬
ults and children). However, I have stated earlier that I regard
this as a sociologically deceptive line of argument. Secondly, i"t
warns us against trying to derive a total theory of Man from the
sexual instinct alone - a warning that is salutary in view of the
Psychoanalytic tradition in social theory. Thirdly, there is the
Jungian relation of the aggressive instinct to the individuation
process. This has force not only for childhood but for adulthood
also, where it provides a constant tension, a desire for separate-
ness, in both sexual and parental relations. In the light specif¬
ically of this third set of considerations, I hold that the aggre¬
ssive instinct should be conceived as a basic element of the hum¬
an biology with which this thesis is concerned, even though it did
not appear in the first rough formulation "human biology as it
concerns sex and reproduction".
This whole area then I term "sexual polarity". The term "pol¬
arity" here is intended to convey the conception of complementar¬
ity, of simultaneous oppositeness and equivalence as between the
sexes; in particular the idea that, despite the division of rep¬
roductive functions, male and female are alike in their sexualit-
ies: each is the opposite sex. Male and female then are two ways
of being human; differentiation does not necessarily create diff¬
erence. With this, I try to preserve something of the structural
character of human biology, taking a cycle of maturation and grow¬
th with its starting point and its end in the adult sexual relat¬
ionship. Aggression thus cross-cuts and limits sexuality/reproduc¬
tion, pointing to the wider society. But the opposite is also
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true, sexuality/reproduction cross-cutting aggression and point¬
ing to the family, the closed set of sexual and parent-child rel¬
ationships. All this exists as a program, which can he variously
socially constructed and to which the individual can variously
react. It does not supervise society, neither directly nor in
terms of species survival, hut it is a most powerful input into
society, of which account must always he taken. The symmetry of
the arguments here with those in the previous section in regard
to the migrations between local community and central institutions
should he noted.
For purposes of sociological analysis, I identify sexual pol¬
arity in terms of four themes: fertility and maternity; the cycle
of maturation; sexuality; and aggression. These will each he dis¬
cussed at length and in turn in a later chapter (ch 6), but I give
some brief delineatory comments on them now.
Fertility and Maternity. This covers all aspects of women's
capability to conceive, hear, and raise children, and the
mother-child relationship from the mother's point of view.
It includes the management of fertility. Although focussing
on the female sex, which actually undergoes pregnancy, child¬
birth, and lactation, male potency and male parenting are
also to he noted.
Maturation. This is the cycle from birth to the attainment
of sexual-reproductive maturity, and to autonomy and indep¬
endence - adulthood. This includes the development of masc¬
ulinity/femininity. It is childhood (including the mother-
child relationship) from the child's point of view, as both
socialization and individuation, with the focus on the latt¬
er and on adolescences childhood seen as prospective for ad¬
ulthood.
Sexuality. This concerns social action and social relation¬
ships involving sexual intercourse. It also includes quest¬
ions of heterosexual and homosexual orientations, chastity
and the social repression of sexuality. It should he noted
that, in keeping with earlier comments, a fundamental equiv¬
alence of male and female sexuality is assumed, subject to
cultural construction. Given the narrow focus on sexual in¬
tercourse, this cultural differentiation cannot be equated
with masculinity and femininity in the wide sense.
Aggression. This concerns social action and social relation¬
ships involving the use of force, so far as they have relev¬
ance for sexual and parent-child relationships, and so far
as they condition the adulthood to which the child aspires.
This includes the protection of personal security. Masculin¬
ity and femininity are again considered here, as typically
differentiated in these regards.
There are various points to add. The resonances between mat¬
uration and aggression, somewhat similar to those between fertil¬
ity/maternity and sexuality, have been pointed out before. A fur¬
ther point is that, if humanity is taken to be driven by the two
instincts of sex and aggression, then "sexuality" in the sense of
the sexuality of the individual must be taken at two levels: one
the "style" of the individual in matters relating to sexual inter¬
course; the other the total conditioning of the personality by
the cultural construction of the individual's male or female bio¬
logy. This second sense indeed should be "gender" or "gendered-
ness" not "sexuality", and the terms "masculinity" and "feminin¬
ity" referred to this alone; the first sense, true sexuality,
divides as "maleness" and "femaleness". Both these things but
genderedness especially I find most usefully discussed under the
heads of Maturation and Aggression. But the issues here will be¬
come much clearer in the discussions in the next section of this
chapter, where a further range of considerations is brought to
bear.
In relation to both sexuality and aggression, the intention
is to focus on actual sexual intercourse and fighting, for these
are sociological not biological activities. Sexuality and aggress¬
ion should be seen as instinctively based and emotionally illumin¬
ated competences, in which skills and lore are transmitted and
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acquired, together with creative exploration. This also can he
said of breastfeeding, and the most immediate physical interact¬
ions of mother and child; incidentally, the "maternal instinct"
should be limited to this. But lore can also be withheld, and
creative exploration discouraged - this for all three of these
fields.
A valuable ethological insight is that in human sexuality,
sexual and parent-child behaviour have become interfused, the one
drawing on the vocabulary of the other for its expression (see
esp. Morris 1972 ch 3). The point of this here is that love, in
both sexual and parent-child relations, is to be considered as
biological and innate, not as a cultural construction ex nihilo»
though of course it is variously culturally constructed and art¬
iculated (which includes the possibility of social repression).
Some final comments might be added on the sexual and aggre¬
ssive instincts. Traditionally, these have always been marginal
to social theory - it is in precisely this regard that I find
"classical" ethology challenging, for social theory seems to me
always to be the theory of society without taking account of hum¬
an nature. As to sexuality, its evident functionality for society
is paradoxical, seeing how obsessed society (or some societies) is
with repressing it. Indeed sexuality in traditional social theory
seems generally to be either functional or delinquent, or else
just an attribute of the personality: in all cases, we never seem
to get a simple account of what people actually do. A conflict
approach, focussing on actual patterns of social action and orien¬
ted to historical outcomes, is probably the best way to explore
this, and it is this that the conception of the sexual instinct
here must subserve. As to aggression, I am aware that my attempt
to theorize this will be controversial (c.f. Siann 1985)» I point
out first, that the way I have done this, basically through Jung-
ian psychology, requires consideration on its own terms, as indeed
does the fact that I work in terms of the Interpretive conception
of social reality. Beyond this, it is surely an obvious point that
aggression can only be regarded as a disruption of society in the
context of consensus theory: in conflict theory aggression is sur¬
ely assumed. Equally it should be realized that there is much to
"be gained, from trying to generalize the aggressive instinct thro¬
ugh, for instance, a general sociology of power - if one wishes
to put all violence in the same analytic framework: state viol¬
ence in war and the repression of civil unrest; policing and
crime; organized crime and "protection"; criminality and deviance;
violence against women; self-defense and the protection of others;
inter-communal violence; etc. etc. A conception such as Weber's
definition of the state in terms of the monopolization of legitim¬
ate violence has obvious leverage here. As against this, an insis¬
tence that aggression can only mean wrongful violence can answer
no more than it asks.
But all these matters must be left now for later chapters
(especially chapter 6). For the present, it is necessary, having
now defined sexual polarity, to give further consideration to the
strategy for its sociological treatment.
In the first section of this chapter, I sought to establish
the most basic strategic relationships between the biological and
the social realms, identifying the biological realm as an aspect
of the material environment of social action, entering into the
social realm subject to a process of social construction, accord¬
ing as social actors take account of it in their actions. I argued
that such social action, in terms of its outcomes, must be seen
not under biological or quasi-biological supervision, but under
the supervision of history. In the second section, I went on to
examine more closely what this biological realm comprises, so far
as this thesis is interested in it: that is, in the general area
of sex and reproduction. I identified this as sexual polarity,
comprising four main elements: fertility and maternity, the cycle
of maturation, sexuality* and aggression; I argued that, while
secondary characteristics, e.g. sexual differentiation in size
ana strength, could be recognized, it seemed best to focus on the
sociological impact of this central complex of elements. But the
question then arises: how to raise a sociology of gender, cover¬
ing the whole range of gender phenomena, on this basis? How is the
conception of sexual polarity to be given sociological develop®
ment? This is what is now to be pursued, in the final section of
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this chapter.
Having started the chapter formally with the conception of
social action and its relations to its material environment, it
might he as well to proceed now by giving a brief consideration
to the means-ends schema of Weberian methodology, and the four
modes of orientation of social action: ends-rational, value-rat¬
ional, affectual, and traditional (Weber 1978 Part i ch 1). First,
then, the point should be made that sexual polarity does lend it¬
self to analysis in means-ends terms, in that it can provide eith¬
er the ends to which social action is directed, through whatever
means, or the means used in social action, to whatever ends, or
both means used and ends sought in social action. More than this,
sexual polarity comprises a causal realm: in particular, the caus¬
al relationship between sexual intercourse and pregnancy. It is
then equally open to social actors, either to use sexual inter¬
course as a means to procreation, or to engage in sexual inter¬
course for its own sake, disregarding, avoiding, or simply accept¬
ing the procreative consequences. Equally, pregnancy may be act¬
ively sought, or feared, or avoided, or simply accepted. All this
I have pointed out before. But here, the point to be grasped is
that, although sexual polarity may in the light of its instinctual
basis give great scope to affectual action, e.g. in sexual or
parent-child relationships, it also gives great scope to calcul¬
ation. In this, the demographic dimension, in terms of the econ¬
omic and power location of fertility, is of great and obvious
importance. I have already given some outline considerations on
this, pointing especially to the migration process, in particular
rural-urban migration, and the conflictual matrix inter-relating
the local community as the location of procreation and nurturance
and the central institutions where the adult destiny is fulfilled.
I have suggested that the local community be seen as integrated
around mechanisms of resistance to exegenous change, pressures
originating in the central institutions. Conversely, I have arg¬
ued at various points and on various grounds against the concept
of "socialization". What comes now from all this, then, is that
these conceptions greatly curtail the scope of the notion of trad¬
itionally oriented social action: a category to be used critical-
ly, even sceptically. It should be realized of course that actual
historical analysis, e.g. of peasantries, would tend to differ
here from general evolutionary overviews.
To sum up, with sexual polarity as with any type of social
action, all four modes of orientation of social action are to be
met with, and although it is true that there is more interest here
than is usual in the affectual mode, nonetheless the thrust of
sociological analysis can be assumed to lie, as with the main
body of Weber's sociology, in the dialogue of ends-rationality
and value-rationality (the affectual elements of sexual polarity
being entered by social actors into the general calculus of com¬
peting means and/or ends).
Given these points, however, the question still remains, how
to constitute a broad field of social phenomena on a somewhat
narrow material basis. Here it seems open to us to follow Weber's
procedure in regard to the economy (Weber 1978 Part i p 63 et
sea), and to raise the sociology of sexual polarity by proposing
two types of social actions one directly concerned with matters
of sexual polarity; the other taking account of matters of sexual
polarity but directly oriented elsewhere. Following Weberian pre¬
cedent, these can be termed "sexually polar action" and "action
oriented to sexual polarity" respectively (with due apology for
the clumsiness of such formulations). In terms of ends and means,
sexually polar action draws both ends and means from the realm of
sexual polarity, whereas action oriented to sexual polarity draws
either its ends or its means from the realm of sexual polarity,
the other element coming from elsewhere. The main cases for anal¬
ysis here will be the inter-relations with the economy and power;
since Weber uses a similar two-fold typology in relation to both,
this will require some expansion. That will be taken up in due
course; a discussion of sexually polar action itself is due first.
But before turning to this, it should be made clear that all four
modes of orientation of social action apply to both types of soc¬
ial action; in particular, sexually polar action itself can be
ends- or value-rational. It should also be made clear that the
methodological purpose here is not classification for its own
sake. The two types of social action are devised in order to raise
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an account of primary and. secondary gender phenomena in the soc¬
ial realm in terms of the sociological impact of primary biolog¬
ical phenomena only. It is in these terms, as the basis for pri¬
mary and secondary gender phenomena, that the two types of soc¬
ial action are now to be discussed.
Sexually polar action is social action directly concerned
(means and ends) with matters of sexual polarity: fertility and
maternity, maturation, sexuality, and aggression. At first sight,
then, its field might appear to be sexual and parental relation¬
ships. This however is a somewhat deceptive issue. For sexual and
parental relationships are not typically free from extraneous con¬
siderations; on the contrary, the economic situation of procreat¬
ion and childcare must always be taken into account by social act¬
ors, in the event if not in foresight. The maintenance needs of
the dependent child ensure this, and this may extend to the preg¬
nant woman and the mother of the young child also. Besides this,
legal and normative factors may also be taken into account: sexual
and parental relations are typically subject to classification in
terms of marriage and legitimacy, categories that, as Weber point¬
ed out long ago, point beyond the household to the wider society;
they refer to the eligibility of the child (or potential child)
for membership in some wider social group, such as a lineage,
status-group, or political or religious community (Weber 1978
Part ii p 357 - 8). Ultimately then their grounding is in the
realm of power: the power these groups exercize over their memb¬
er's sexual and reproductive conduct; in turn a factor of their
policies of monopolization and closure in the general material
and ideal struggle in society. Indeed there is a distinction to
be made between household and family: the unit of common residen¬
ce and maintenance and the closed set of relationships, often
legally defined, that relate to wider social groupings and con¬
flicts in the realm of power. This is complex, for not all societ¬
ies or social locations put much weight on marriage and legitim¬
acy, or their opposites in non-marriage (e.g. concubinage) and il¬
legitimacy: the analytic separation of household and family must
not confound the comparative sociology of the family. But the
point for us here is that the family is not simply constituted in
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primary sexual polarity; far from it. The closest that can be said
is that stable sexual and parent-child relationships (also sibling
relationships) typically must be located in the household, and
that a degree of internal closure may be associated (see Weber
1978 Part ii ch 3).
Primary sexual polarity, then, is simply itself, and its four
themes must each simply be pursued on their own ground. The strat¬
egic conception, as indicated in previous sections, is of two
cross-cutting and mutually limiting axes: sexuality, fertility
and maternity; aggression and maturation; and of a process of mig¬
ration between local community and central institutions. But it
is crucial to realize that, so far as the city is non-seIf-repro¬
ductive , there is wastage, and accordingly a functionalist strat¬
egy is futile. The overwhelming need is to look at actual social
practices and individual careers. Thus sexual relationships, for
example, can be of various kinds 1 adulterous, transient, commerc¬
ial, homoerotic, etc.; equally, fertility can be variously manag¬
ed and have various outcomes: artificially induced infertility,
infanticide, child sale, etc. The household only subsumes- stable
sexual and parental relationships, and at that sexual polarity
cannot be theorized solely from the point of view of the parental
couple. There is also the child's point of view, especially the
adolescent's, with developing sexuality and fertility. Maturation
and aggression direct the individual away from the household into
the wider society; sexuality and fertility/maternity direct them
back to the household again, though as stated above there is wast¬
age, other careers (e.g. prostitution). But it goes without saying
that there are comparative patterns of sexual differentiation in
all this. Indeed, even primary child-care, even childbirth, has
its comparative sociology.
Turning now to social action oriented to sexual polarity,
this, as I have said above, has two main cases: the economy and
power. Before pursuing this, it must be recalled that Weber has
himself a two-fold typology of social action in both these fields.
That is, he distinguishes between ''economic action" and "economic¬
ally oriented action" (Weber 1978 Part i p 63 et seq); the former
social action directly concerned with the economy, while the latt-
er has two senses: action taking account of economic factors hut
oriented elsewhere; and the pursuit of economic ends by non-peace¬
ful means. Again, he distinguishes between "political action" and
"politically oriented action" (Weber 1978 Part i p 54 et seq); the
former is the use of force as means, to whatever ends, and in
practice Weber tends to let this absorb the second sense of econ¬
omically oriented action; the latter is the attempt to gain con¬
trol over or influence the actions of any politically acting org¬
anization - that is, it gives our commonsense meaning of "polit¬
ics". Now the inter-relations of these typologies with the concept
of action oriented to sexual polarity need not be pursued to ex¬
haustion; as I have said before, the purpose here is not classif¬
ication for its own sake. The basic point is that we have a set
of sexual-economic phenomena, and a set of sexual-power phenomena,
and that in both cases we must expect a degree of complexity of
structure. The methodological picture then is only intended to
guide us in raising a sociological account of secondary gender
phenomena, parallel to the account of primary phenomena above.
Taking first the economic case, here the most obvious issue,
in the light of previous discussions, is demographics. It should
be realized that, whatever the conventions that make demographics
a separate discipline similar to (and adjoining) economics, and
whatever the conventions of sociology that have kept gender and
population questions apart, for us demographics is a key issue,
and moreover is constituted precisely in the reciprocal condit¬
ioning of economic and sexually polar factors in social action.
Another and closely related issue is the household. This, though
it may locate stable sexual and parental relationships, is not
simply constituted in doing so; the household is the basic unit
of residence and common maintenance, and also often of approp¬
riation and labour, and of course it may be a basic unit of dom¬
ination. Leaving the last point aside meantime, clearly the house¬
hold is the arena for both types of economic action, and for
both types of sexually polar action. On the whole, however, for
present purposes it is best considered in terms of economically
oriented action and action oriented to sexual polarity: the rec¬
iprocal conditioning of economic and sexually polar factors, just
as with demographics (to which indeed the household is "basic).
This then is one group of issues. Against it is the question of
more purely economic phenomena! gender in relation to economic
action.
Here the first issue surely is prostitution: the social con¬
struction of sexual polarity as utilities. This is subject to the
social construction of sexual polarity itself, and may extend to
include e.g. erotic dancing; again, there is another stream of
the same phenomena in wet-nursing and primary child-care. All this
to my mind should be treated as sui generis. Beyond this, there
are economic gender phenomena such as the sexual division of lab¬
our; sexual divisions in appropriation and consumption also. These
however may be legally conditioned, as with sexual differentiation
in inheritance rights or in economic competence» there is a sub¬
stratum from the realm of power here. The basic point, however,
is to reconsider economic society in the light of gender, to find
the pattern of sexual economic divisions; predictably, this on its
own account will have a complex and many-levelied structure. At
any rate, the issues here, prostitution and sexual economic divis¬
ions, form the second group of sexual-economic issues. As foretold
above, the structure of the field is complex; however, the under¬
lying typology of action does have organizatory value.
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I turn now to the case of power. Here, there is a preliminary
issue that requires some clarification: force can of course be
used as a means to attain sexually polar ends, and on analogy with
the case of economically oriented action, this itself might com¬
prise a primary case of action oriented to sexual polarity. Agai¬
nst this, it should be realized that Weber raises the distinction
between peaceful and non-peaceful economic action, and the ident¬
ification of "the economy" as such above all with the former, on
historical-sociological rather than purely analytic grounds; how
far similar empirical grounds might apply to sexual polarity is
questionable. But this point should be made: that conventionally
the term "economic" is being given here even by Weber too wide a
field of reference. The kidnapping of a girl to share one's bed
is not really economics, even if it does augment one's household.
Yet this has always been a typical element in non-peaceful econom¬
ic
ic action. The point is that a comparative historical economic
sociology must conceive its field more widely than the economy
sensu strictu. Strictly, however, the economy should not be de¬
fined simply with reference to all wants, but restricted in terms
of a typical range of means for attaining those wants; conversely,
the concept of political action should be given a wide field.
This Weber in fact does. As to the concept of "non-peaceful sex¬
ually polar action", this might not have an obvious strategic
place in World-historical developmental patterns, but it is at
least a category to be registered.
This stated, the next issue clearly is the aggressive inst¬
inct. This I have argued should not be limited to some notion of
wrongful violence, though for the present thesis it is needful to
keep it tied to the notion of maturation, the cycle from sexual-
parental relations through the wider society back to sexual-
parental relations again. But I have argued that in principle,
given a conflict society and a general sociology of power, the
notion of an aggressive instinct should not be sociologically
problematic; moreover Weber's definition of the state in terms of
the monopolization of legitimate violence surely offers great lev¬
erage. This indeed should be taken along with the male monopoliz¬
ation of violence which is a historically most widespread phenom¬
enon» the differential relation of the sexes to the state should
be seen as constitutive, not merely reactive (see Weber 1978 Part
ii ch 9)« This entails questions not only of violence but also of
personal security and its protection, of legal rights and person¬
ality, and broadly of citizenship: full membership in the politic¬
al community. There are fundamental issues of sexual inequality
here; possibly imponderables, where the temptation to resort to
biological determinism on the basis of secondary sexual differen¬
tiation, in size and strength, is greatest. But that, as I have
indicated before, is resisted in this thesis.
Beyond this, Weber articulates the bulk of his sociology of
power through the notion of Domination, with its attendant typol¬
ogies of legitimation and of structural form. This indeed is the
original location both of the household and of the notion of pat¬
riarchy, and it is surely sociologically invidious that the sub-
ordination of women to male authority should he kept insulated
from the general sociology of power. It should he realized, how¬
ever, that the location of the household in the domination system,
and its patriarchal character, are hoth historically contingent
questions; they should be contextualized with the questions of
women's citizenship above. But there is also the question of sex¬
ual differentiation in regard to dominational apparatuses; can
women hold office or power? If so, under what conditions and on
what terms? It seems an intuitively attractive point that the
subordination of women to male authority should be reciprocally
related to the exclusion of women from power in society. Weber's
typology of domination systems then invites a comparative histor¬
ical sociological investigation of the subordination of women;
indeed, this is the most probable basis for a comparative histor¬
ical matrix of contrasting patterns of sexual inequality - the
World-historical structure of women's history.
The foregoing questions mostly concern political actions the
constitutive relation of the sexes in polities. Politically orien¬
ted action is rather the struggle to control or influence the
actions of the state. The main question here would appear to be
how sexual polarity relates to the typical bases for such action:
does it summate the situations and interests of women and men, or
does it differentiate them? Above all, there are the questions of
gender and stratification. In view of all that has been written
above on secondary gender phenomena, it will be seen that these
questions cannot be directly approached. It might be added, how¬
ever, that the family, as already indicated, is not seen here sim¬
ply as prims.ry sexual and parental relationships, but in terms of
closed relationships, often legally defined, that point to wider
social conflicts, often of stratificatory kind. Too, it should be
realized that restrictions on women's inheritance rights and econ¬
omic competence, and also the economic arrangements attendant
upon marria.ge, e.g. dowry, are also part of this picture.
At any rate, this gives the basic outline of sexual-power
phenomena. As with sexual-economic phenomena, the structure is
complex and many-levelied. It must be pointed out here, however,
that in developing this outline (ch 4 below) I will be forced to
SO
argue that there are confusions in the sociological tradition as
to Weber's sociology of polity, and that the discussions above of
women's citizenship and of women in relation to domination syst¬
ems are not really two distinct sets of issues, but a single set
of issues seen from two angles, or better, in two transformations:
the differential constitutive relation of the sexes to the polity
and its structuration. It must be insisted upon that the subord¬
ination of women to male authority is not a separate issue from
this: we should envisage an integrated sociology of power.
The foregoing considerations, then, offer an overview of the
Sociology of Sexual Polarity - the social phenomena of gender,
divided as primary and secondary phenomena. I do not pursue this
further here; the next section of the thesis will do so in exten-
so, the four theoretical chapters of Part B. But the present sta¬
tement was needed, for the identification and organization of the
issues is distinctive and even heterodox from the point of view of
traditional sociology. To conclude these methodological remarks,
however, some consideration should be given to the relationship
of the primary and secondary phenomena, arising out of sexually
polar action and action oriented to sexual polarity respectively,
to the division announced in the first section of this chapter,
between central institutions and loca.l community. Here the main
point is that sexual polarity itself - fertility and maternity,
maturation, sexuality, and aggression - is not straightforwardly
identified with any single institution: in the first place, both
the household and especially the family are much more complex
affairs; in the second place, sexual polarity is seen in terms
of the two cross-cutting processes (sexuality, fertility and mat¬
ernity; aggression s.nd maturation) and individual careers ground¬
ed in migration, from childhood to adulthood. The best that can
be said, as said before, is that the household is the typical loc¬
ation of stable sexual and parental relations; it stands then at
one pole of the migration process, at the centre of the local
community. But conversely, secondary gender phenomena, the econ¬
omic and power conditioning of sexual polarity, are found every¬
where, in the local community as much as in the central institut¬
ions. Considerations on the household ana especially the family
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illustrate this. Above all, however, it is the demographic pro¬
cesses, and their location in the conflictual ma.trix of economics
and power that inter-relates the two arenas of central institut¬
ions and local community, that is the key issue. Sexual polarity
is a problem in the general analysis of society.
Finally, there is one last type of social action that requi¬
res methodological comment: kinship (see Keesing 1975; Barnes
1971» Goody ed. 1971» 1973). Kinship is difficult for the socio¬
logist to discuss, for it is pre-eminently an anthropological con¬
cern, and raised mainly in terms of "primitive" societies. More¬
over there is a tradition in social theory that at the primitive
level, kinship structure and social structure are virtually syn¬
onymous. Sociological grand theory, whether of Durkheimian or
Marxian kind, seems always to have accepted this without question.
In terms of the modern anthropology of the fieldwork era, it can
probably be traced back to Radcliffe-Brown (see Kuper 1973 ch 2,
also p 95 -6). Clearly however it also reflects the classical
anthropological theory of the pre-fieldwork era (see Leaf 1979
ch 7; see also ch 8), and it is from this not from Radcliffe-
Brown that the strategy in sociological grand theory of superim¬
posing the modern ethnographic record on prehistory surely deriv¬
es. But this is a profoundly unhelpful orientation for a compar¬
ative historical sociology, whose main arena of analysis is pre-
modern civilization, and which must therefore enquire into the
sociological location and inter-relations of kinship in complex
societies, and equally, its historical specificity. Leaving aside
more recent radical questionings (e.g. Needham 1974; Needham ed.
1971), modern anthropology has always offered alternative approa¬
ches. In particular, Kroeber held that kinship represents only
secondary social structure, the primary weight of social causation
lying rather with residence and subsistence patterns; again, hist¬
orically, the elaboration of kinship beyond immediate biological
relationships to structures running through the whole society
appears as an alternative to the development of stratification
and the state not as its fore-runner: among many primitive peop¬
les, as in civilizations, it does not occur (Kroeber 1952 a,b,c;
see also p 169 - 74)» Weber's views seem to me to be more in line
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with this approach: he considered kinship to he a "basic social
grouping, with primarily legal functions especially in vengeance
and feuding, hut co-existing with equally basic groupings that
carry the weight of economics, domination and political action.
In particular, kinship does not generate the household, nor- is
it the natural basis of the political community or the state. The
polity may come to make use of a kinship metaphor (especially in
terms of "noble" lineages or clans, closed against the mass of
the "commoners"), but this is historically specific not primord¬
ial, and is to be treated in terms of political sociology» Above
all, it is to be approached through the thematization of a concept
of "polity", not a taken-for-granted notion of "society" (Weber
1978 Part ii ch 3,4,5; see also ch 9j see also Weber 1981 ch 2).
These are difficult matters. Central to them is Weber's dis¬
engagement of the ancient City-state from primitive conditions
and considerations; the development of his views here lies large¬
ly in untranslated or neglected texts (Weber 1982, 1924, 1976;
also of course 1978 Part ii ch 16). This will come up again below
(especially ch 9 and Appendix A iii). But for the meantime, the
concern here is methodological. It is clear, then, that for us,
kinship can be regarded as action oriented to sexual polarity, of
the general order of sexual-power phenomena; the legal dimension
would tend to place it in terms of politically oriented action:
i.e. with stratification. But this, as indicated above, must be
contextualized with a thematization of the polity, not an unthem-
atized notion of "society". That is the best that can be said
meantime. But I have commented repeatedly on the problems in soc¬
ial theory of the lesions between sociology and anthropology.
With these remarks, I bring the methodological section of my
thesis to a close. The next section (Part B) will attempt to rai¬
se a body of sociological theory in four chapters, on the basis
of the considerations above. The first will deal with the migrat¬
ion process and its poles in the central institutions and the
local community; the second with the macro—analysis of the local
community and the nature and location of household and family; the
third with primary sexual polarity - fertility and maternity, mat-
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uration, sexuality, and aggression -; the fourth with sexual div¬
isions, in the realms of power, the economy, and in relation to
stratification. The constitutive basis of these chapters has been
provided in this present chapter; the analysis is filled out by
consideration of a set of comparative historical studies, as I
have discussed in the previous chapter (ch 2). The studies them¬
selves will be presented in Part C, the final section of the the¬
sis.
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Central Institutions and. Local Community:
Demographic- Sociology
This chapter and the three that follow present an essay in
social theory: that is, an attempt at social theory, on an inter¬
im "basis. The substantive field that has been considered for this
is a restricted one: the Ancient Civilization^ specific studies
in this are presented in the final part (Part C) of the thesis.
So far is the comparative historical study of gender a terra in¬
cognita that I have considered it essential to work in these
terms, accepting the costs in the provisional character of the
generalizations made and the limited capability to resolve some
of the more interesting sociological questions raised.
A general discussion on the Ancient Civilization is offered
as an appendix (Appendix A). For present purposes, however, this
much must be said: Weber held the basic macro-unit of the Ancient
Civilization to be the coastal or riverine city, dominating its
agricultural hinterland and engaging in maritime trade and in
war. Beyond this, he made a basic typological dichotomy between
the Bureaucratic Kingdom and the City-state, sub-dividing the
latter into two further types: the Patrician City and the Plebeian
City (Weber 1976 Part i; Weber 1978 Part ii cbr 16 "The City").
This setting and these typologies will be central to all that
follows.
In the previous two chapters, I have tried to establish a
methodological framework for the sociology of the sexes in socie¬
ty in terms of social action and history, in which human biology
appears as a conditioning factor- but the social realm is in no
way under biological supervision. This is a conception which is
strongly hostile to the concept "society" as conceived in biolog-
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istic and reified terms. It also strongly qualifies the concept
"reproduction", limiting its sociological use to those cases
where it occurs as an actors' meaning; in general terms, we
should rather speak of "procreation". The consequence of this
position is the necessity to engage with demographics, and with
demographic history.
I have already offered some preliminary considerations upon
this matter; here I intend to reprise and expand upon them, and
to offer some specific proposals for the treatment of demograph¬
ics in social theory, as I promised earlier. Before doing so,
however, I want to emphasize that I do not undertake this for
its own sake, and do not envisage a decisive resolution of the
area's problems. On the contrary, I am undertaking only what I
consider to be an essential orientative exercize for my enquiry
into the sexes in society. This point is worth making, for there
is always a distinction in sociology between the central ground
that we all use for explanation and that all social theory must
cover - the economy, stratification, power, the state, ideology,
etc. - and those ramified areas that we enquire into if we want
to and disregard if we please. Population seems generally to have
come into the second category, and it is not obvious why this
should be so. Again, the feminist problematic and population iss¬
ues seem to have usually been kept insulated from each other; it
is hard to see why. But my own position is that population should,
for present purposes at least, be treated as part of the central
explanatory ground of sociology, and that gender issues cannot
be kept insulated from population issues?. Therefore I have to
make proposals for the area.
Population, as I commented before, is a difficult issue, and
there appears to be a basic lack of agreement in social theory
as to how or even whether to deal with it. One aspect of the
problem seems to be the structure of population history itself,
which is apparently oriented around the two great population ex¬
plosions in history: in neolithic times and in modernity. This
structure seems to go with the kind of universal sociology (or
synthesis of sociology and anthropology) which focusses on the
neolithic and Industrial revolutions in technology, giving a
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threefold developmental schema of primitive, complex-traditional
and modern societies. Parsons is the greatest exemplar of this.
Yet the position has problems. Little is known about the develop¬
ment from primitive to civilized, and there are conceptual differ¬
ences between sociology and anthropology which are accordingly
not being brought into focus, especially as between the social
science and cultural science perspectives. Again, the development
of "modernity" is a complex and many-staged (and contradictory)
process. Further, general sociological experience is that techno¬
logy is not a good independent variable in social explanation; by
the same token, most of what is known about social change in hist¬
orical sociology is here being trivialized. This point is worth
stating conversely: the main approaches in sociology which focus
on the development of modernity in the context of the historical
record, i.e. Marxian and Weberian sociology, seem to have little
concern with either population or technology. Yet it is from here
that our best understanding of social change and development
comes.
There seems on the face of it, then, to be a basic incommen-
suracy of framework between sociology and population. Yet that
view needs qualification, for as I pointed out earlier, the period
between the two great population explosions is not simply one of
stability or of near-stable slow continuous growth. Population
explosion results from an imbalance of fertility and mortality,
but there is a third population process: migration. The apparent
balance of fertility and mortality through most of recorded hist¬
ory is illusory, for in great part they have occurred in differ¬
ent locations. What is true (more or less) is that, between the
two great population explosions, demographic history is the hist¬
ory of the migration process. Above all, this has meant rural-
urban migration. Excess fertility in the countryside is balanced
by excess mortality in the cities - due especially to contagious
disease; indeed, the population explosion in the West at the be¬
ginning of modernity is in large part due to reduced urban mort¬
ality, above all due to clean water and sewers. Yet the migration
process in history has many faces: they include both the founding
of colonies and the slave trade, for example. Also the sociolog-
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ical relationship between city and countryside should be rememb¬
ered; it is at least as much a power relationship as an economic
one. To this it must be added that there is a history of fertil¬
ity and mortality too: indeed, the pattern of population increase
through most of history tends to be one of quite fast medium-term
growth with sporadic strong reversals due to plagues and wars,
rather than one of steady increase. Again, there are actual long-
term reversals: for example, Egypt's population in medieval Islam¬
ic times was often lower than in Antiquity (surely a question of
social organization rather than technology, incidentally)(see
McEvedy and Jones 1978 p 226 - 9)* In all, my view is that these
matters, this history, are best seen by high-lighting the migrat¬
ion process: the location of fertility and out-migration; the loc¬
ation of mortality and in-migration; and the tensions between
them. That is what I intend to provide in terms of population
theory here.
To revert to the questions of orthodox treatments of popul¬
ation, however, in my earlier discussion, I pointed to two furth¬
er ranges of problem: one, the categorical contradiction between
what I identified as the Durkheimian and Marxian views on the rel¬
ation of the population process to the social process; the other,
an apparent uncertainty as to whether population was an endogen¬
ous or an exogenous factor - part of society, or part of society's
environment. I will pursue each of these questions in turn. First,
the opposed classical tendencies: on the one side, the Durkheim¬
ian tendency maintains that the social process is inherently sta¬
ble, and that the population process is one of the few (perhaps
indeed the only) factors that can break through it and cause cha-
nge. This orientation underpins the Parsonian conception discussed
above, of course, especially in relation to the development from
the primitive to the civilized - where indeed some approach of
this kind is commonly adduced. It will come up again later. The
Marxist position by contrast holds that the social process is in¬
herently unstable, but is driven by its own dynamic: the populat¬
ion process subserves this, but is always contained by the social
process; it is not a factor for change in itself. Now I have sug¬
gested earlier that these two opposed positions might in principle
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be reconciled., if we conceive them as each descriptions of the
opposite poles of the migration process. The accounts then are
both partial, and require to be synthesized. The Durkheimian con¬
ception is basically valid at the location of excess fertility
and out-migration, while the Marxian: conception is basically val¬
id at the location of fertility shortfall (or excess mortality)
and in-migration. These locations I identified as the local comm¬
unity level of society and the central institutions of society
respectively, though the migration process is first introduced in
terms of countryside and city. These terms then, for which the
present chapter is named, require some clarification.
To take the central: institutions first; by this I mean the
main arena of sociological conflict, in terms of economic struct¬
ures, power structures, stratification, etc. These things are
diffuse, and penetrate all through society of course. But the
notions of "arena of conflict" and "sociological focus" should
serve to indicate the centre, and at the centre is the state. As
against this, the local community level of society is more diffi¬
cult to define, if easier to point to. (indeed it should be real¬
ized that here again I am involved with the division between soc¬
iology and anthropology, which I have stated from the outset to
lie at the heart of our problem.) However, at the centre of the
local community clearly lies the mother-child relationship. Clus¬
tered around this are the household and the family (by no means
the same things). But though the relation of this to the central
institutions is antithetical, it is a crucial point that there
seems to be more than one mode of division. Rather, there is on
the one hand the division of central control versus local auton¬
omy; on the other, the division of public control versus private
autonomy. It will be necessary to expand on these matters later;
indeed, the later sections of this chapter will be devoted to the
central institutions and the local community respectively. But
for the meantime, the point that must be made is that the divis¬
ion of central institutions versus local community can be taken
to subsume that between city and countryside, for these are soc¬
iologically not simply geographically inter—related, (it should
be remembered that I am working here solely in consideration of
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the Ancient Civilization, a civilization in which uniformly the
city dominates the countryside.)
But I leave this meantime to take up again the second of the
problems in the orthodox treatments of population identified
above: uncertainty as to whether population is part of society
itself, or part of society's environment. This seems to be more
an area of anthropological than of sociological argument, and I
am accordingly off my ground. I note again that much of it con¬
cerns the "evolution" from primitive to civilized, and according¬
ly has a somewhat hypothetical character. However, on the one
side, arguments on the sociological effect of population increase
may be conducted in terms of increase in "social density" - freq¬
uency of interactions - which is supposed to make a qualitative
difference in social structure. This was Durkheim's argument, and
for a time at least Parsons also accepted it. I confess to scept¬
icism: it is at best an interesting idea. On the other side are
arguments that increased population and improved technology -
either of which can be used to explain the other - create an
increasing economic surplus, and thus permit a greater complexity
of social organization, with the emergence of stratification, the
state, a leisured class of intellectuals, etc. This I call treat¬
ing population as environment of society. The two variants might
be contrasted as Idealist and materialist, though perhaps better
as social theory and cultural theory. At any rate, it should be
stressed that this "materialist" anthropology has no obvious com¬
patibility with Marxian sociology, for reasons that should become
clear in the discussions that follow.* But the point to make ag¬
ainst the "materialist" position - leaving aside the speculative
nature of the enquiry — is that it over—estimates the degree to
which society is at the mercy of its environment, even at a low
level of technology (see Leach's "Closing Remarks" in Renfrew ed.
1973). That is the basic criticism that an Idealist anthropology-
would make: that this approach fails to recognize the element of
social construction of the environment which is the irreducible
*It is a conflict anthropology that is needed. Manipulating the
relationships between society and culture cannot substitute for
this. Nor is it the same issue as materialism versus Idealism.
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basis of "the economy.
It is this last conception that I want to use now, for it is
also Weber's conception, along with the further proviso that at
the heart of socio-economics lies not Man's struggle with Nature
but man's struggle with man (this as much at the primitive level
as at the civilized; there is no "primitive communism"). (See Web¬
er 1978 Part I ch 2). It is these conceptions, rather than tech¬
nology, that should be brought to bear on the basic relationship
between economic resources and human fertility. Here the problem
has always been that the relationship is ambivalent (see e.g.
articles in Overbeek ed. 1977)? on the one side, fertility means
increased production capabilities, an increased workforce to ex¬
ploit the available economic resources; on the other side, fertil¬
ity means increased consumption needs, more mouths to be fed on
the basis of the available economic resources. The question is
how to balance these factors against each other. Considering this
in terms of a socially constructed (as opposed to naturally given)
economy in the context of a conflict sociology, we can argue that,
according to general conflictual parameters, it is open to society
to socially construct its economic resources so as to maximize
scarcity or so as to maximize plenty. In the former case, where
scarcity prevails, the primary impact of fertility will be for
increased consumption needs, for the workforce can only work the
resources available to it. In the latter case, where plenty pre¬
vails, the primary impact of fertility will be for increased pro¬
duction capabilities. The question is, then, what are the conflic¬
tual parameters that control this choice?
Clearly, these parameters are the stratificatory order and
the power structures of society, the system of domination. These
indeed and especially the former are shaped by the economic order.
But there are two axes here that require separate consideration.
For the first, there is the question of exploitation: the condit¬
ions of appropriation and of labour under which economic resour¬
ces are worked. For the second, there is the question of dominat¬
ion: how far and with what bias does the state guarantee or pro¬
tect the various classes and/or status groups vis-a-vis each
other? Relating these two axes to each other, clearly two type-
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situations are possible: either the lines of exploitation and
domination coincide and reinforce each other, or else they cross-
cut and interfere with each other.
The first of these cases occurs where the same class or stat¬
us group both owns the main economic resources and controls the
state, which it uses to protect its own position. The second case
occurs inhere the class or status group of large-scale owners is
excluded from control of the state. This occurs above all where a
king suppresses his nobles and rules through a bureaucratic appar¬
atus; typically in doing so he also protects the common people
against exploitation. At the extreme, the nobility of ownership
may actually be dissolved into a nobility of office, dependent
upon salaries derived from the taxes they collect in lieu of rents
- a process wholly under the king's control. It is the conflicts
between ruler, apparatus, and wealthiest class or status group,
then, that are the issue here, and that have to be set against
the more straightforward situation of stratificatory conflict and
rule. Thus the polar opposite of the bureaucratic situation occurs
where no king emerges from the nobility, who exercize rule con¬
jointly themselves, directly and without apparatus. The clearest
case of this is the Patrician City-state, and indeed it is gener¬
ally in the City-state that power conflicts are on a straight¬
forward stratificatory basis, and rule is by class or status
group.
Thus the two type-situations that I have proposed, dominat¬
ion either coinciding with and reinforcing exploitation, or cross-
cutting and interfering with it, can be identified with Weber's
basic typology for the Ancient Civilization which I introduced at
the beginning of this chapter: City-state and Bureaucratic King¬
dom. (See Weber 1976 Part i, esp. p 69 - 79»)
A comment should be added here on the two sub-types of the
City-state: the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. As I have
said, the former occurs where a nobility rules without either
king or apparatus. There are class and/or status conflicts between
patrician and plebeian strata, which can have various outcomes.
The Plebeian City occurs where an element of the common people
(not necessarily all of it) either takes a share in the state, or
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situations are possible: either the lines of exploitation and
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cut and interfere with each other.
The first of these cases occurs where the same class or stat¬
us group both owns the main economic resources and controls the
state, which it uses to protect its own position. The second case
occurs where the class or status group of large-scale owners is
excluded from control of the state. This occurs above all where a
king suppresses his nobles and rules through a bureaucratic appar¬
atus; typically in doing so he also protects the common people
against exploitation. At the extreme, the nobility of ownership
may actually be dissolved into a nobility of office, dependent
upon salaries derived from the taxes they collect in lieu of rents
- a process wholly under the king's control. It is the conflicts
between ruler, apparatus, and wealthiest class or status group,
then, that are the issue here, and that have to be set against
the more straightforward situation of stratificatory conflict and
rule. Thus the polar opposite of the bureaucratic situation occurs
where no king emerges from the nobility, who exercize rule con¬
jointly themselves, directly and without apparatus. The clearest
case of this is the Patrician City-state, and indeed it is gener¬
ally in the City-state that power conflicts are on a straight¬
forward stratificatory basis, and rule is by class or status
group.
Thus the two type-situations that I have proposed, dominat¬
ion either coinciding with and reinforcing exploitation, or cross-
cutting and interfering with it, can be identified with Weber's
basic typology for the Ancient Civilization which I introduced at
the beginning of this chapter: City-state and Bureaucratic King¬
dom. (See Weber 1976 Part i, esp. p 69 - 79«)
A comment should be added here on the two sub-types of the
City-state: the Patrician City and the Plebeian City. As I have
said, the former occurs: where a nobility rules without either
king or apparatus. There are class and/or status conflicts between
patrician and plebeian strata, which can have various outcomes.
The Plebeian City occurs where an element of the common people
(not necessarily all of it) either takes a share in the state, or
else takes control of it outright. But in doing so, they continue
to exercize rule on the same basis as the nobility, i.e. conjoin¬
tly and directly, with neither king nor apparatus (this of course
is the origin of democracy). This does not transcend the category
of coincident domination and exploitation, though the class (or
status group) that controls the state is not the wealthiest (or
at least, not at an individual level). With this, the impact of
plebeian rule for the social construction of scarcity is of the
order of using the state to protect specifically plebeian inter¬
ests; it is not generally ameliorative for the common people. The
contrast of Patrician and Plebeian City, then, while important,
remains secondary to the contrast of City-state and Bureaucratic
Kingdom. (There will be a further note on these issues at the end
of the chapter.)
To reprise, then, what is at issue here is the economic im¬
pact of fertility, whether for increased production capabilities
or for increased consumption needs. I have argued that this is
best answered in comparative typological terms, in consideration
of general sociological variables in economy, stratification, and
power. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the impact of fertility is for
increased production capabilities; in City-states, it is for in¬
creased consumption needs. This argument is subordinate to a con¬
ception of the population process as migration process: migration
from local community to central institutions. Rural-urban migrat¬
ion is the most obvious case of this. But the point is to estab¬
lish the dynamic between the two poles: to show how different
conditions at the one imply different conditions at the other.
The above remarks have sketched this. But it now requires to be
pursued through focussed discussions of the two poles of the mig¬
ration process: central institutions and local community. The
following two sections will consider these in turn.
In the foregoing section, I identified the central institut¬
ions of society as the main arena of sociological conflict, in
terms of the economy, stratification and power, with the state
at the centre. Following the Marxist approach, that the conflicts
in this arena develop by their own dynamic, which the population
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process subserves but does not independently affect, I argued
that the central institutions should be seen as the negative, re¬
ceiving, pole of the population process, viewed as a process of
migration to the central institutions from the local community
(which in turn is centred on the mother-child relationship). Yet
conditions at the central institutions imply conditions at the
local community; they are to be seen as the two poles of a single
process. Again, at an earlier point (in ch 3) I argued that the
local community should be seen as integrated around resistance to
exogenous change - change originating in the central institutions.
The consensual, traditional, timeless conception of the local
community then is an illusion. But that is a matter for the next
section.
To pursue this analysis of the central institutions, I want
first to make some observations on Weber's sociology of power.
First, I want to repeat a point made in discussing the comparat¬
ive historical method above (ch 2): that Weber does not work with
a conception of society of reified and/or biologistic kind, but
simply conceives social action in the arena of history. Where the
term "society" is used, it is probably best understood in terms
of the sub-title given to Part ii of "Economy and Society": "The
Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers".
This point made, I want to consider the question of texts.
The main writings on power in Weber's works seem to come in three
phases.* Firstly, there is a brief consideration on Bureaucratic
*More accurately, there are four phases; the essay of 1905 on
the social arrangements of the early Germans comes first (Weber
1924). However, this text remains untranslated; the gradual dis¬
engagement of German (and medieval European) origins, Graeco-
Roman (and ancient) origins, and ethnographic parallels, in the
earlier phase of Weber's career is difficult ground; and perhaps
most of all, some knowledge of early German history would be
essential for any real discussion. Even so, this essay does un¬
derlie important considerations in both parts of "Economy and
Society": the contrast of warrior-following and manor has much
the same kind of bearing for the types of charismatic and trad¬
itional domination as does the contrast of City-state and Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdom in "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civil¬
izations". Weber's mature typology of power is greatly enriched
by these comparative studies, but its presentation in the later
texts can be hard to puzzle out. (See Roth's "Introduction" in
"Economy and Society" vol. 1 p XLII - XLVI.)
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Kingdoms and City-states, very much as I have given it above, at
the end of "Economic Theory and Ancient Society", Part i of "The
Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations" (I909)* Secondly,
there is Part ii of "Economy and Society" ("The Economy and the
Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers") - to which I will return
(cl9l0 - 18). Thirdly, there is Part ii of "Economy and Society"
("The Theory of Social and Economic Organizations") chapter 3
(1918 - 20). It should be stressed that the chapter in "The Theory
of Social and Economic Organizations", though it may appear to be
an exhaustive re-working of the relevant chapters in "The Economy
and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers", actually envis¬
ages both a chapter on the state and a chapter on revolutions.
Neither of these ever appeared, though chapter 16 of "The Economy
and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers" ("The City") may
fill some of the gaps. This situation must direct us to "The Econ¬
omy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers" as Weber's
most encyclopaedic, if not most refined, work, in power as in most
sociological matters (with the striking exception of the economy).
Equally, it must condition our view as to which chapters of
this work are in fact relevant. The chapters on power here again
fall into three categories: there are two "contextualizing" chap¬
ters that examine the relations between political and economic
power and between political and religious organizations respect¬
ively (chs 10 & 15;'5 there are the chapters on legitimate dominat¬
ion and the various types of domination system (chs 11 - 14, ch
16); and there are the chapters on race, ethnicity, and political
communities (chs 5 & 9). Although for present purposes the first
category can be left aside, it is in my view essential that the
other two be taken together, and in particular, that the third
category, the Chapters on race, ethnicity, and political commun¬
ities, be related back to the first point that I made in this dis¬
cussion: that Weber does not work with a reified concept of "soc¬
iety". It is probably fairly generally understood now that this
concept, in orthodox usage, actually masks the political unit -
nation state, country, "tribe" (or tribes - sicl), etc. Therefore
we must have a thematized sociology of it. To fail in this cannot
but confound the sociology of the state, and makes the whole rel—
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ation of state and. society - that is, the sociological location
of the state - ambiguous and confused.
Other scholars have certainly considered these questions.
For example, Michael Mann (Mann I986) has argued that we should
discard the orthodox concept of "society", and rather conceive of
overlapping networks of power, which he draws largely after the
fashion of Weber's sociology of legitimate domination. Randall
Collins (Collins 1986) has argued, taking Weber's main statement
of the sociology of power to lie in "The Economy and the Arena of
Normative and de Facto Powers", that the chapter on political
communities (ch 9) should be taken to introduce the chapters on
legitimate domination, which should be seen then in geopolitical
context: , the struggles of political communities and imperialism
(however, he ignores the chapter on race and ethnicity - ch 5)* •
Anthony D. Smith (Smith I986) has argued for the use of the con¬
cepts of ethnicity and nation, grounded in Weber's discussions
(especially ch 5 of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and
de Facto Powers"), in political sociology; though he can be crit¬
icized for putting too much weight on these notions, and not giv¬
ing proper consideration to the state or to domination systems.
These three scholars, then, have all of them approached the ortho¬
dox discourse, in political sociology, the sociology of power,
the sociology of the state, in the light of a reconsideration of
Weber, and have found it wanting. Yet since they have all made
quite different critical points and suggestions, it seems to me
that a further consideration of Weber might lead to a synthesis.
To argue this synthesis, the first necessity is to set up a
concept wide enough to accomodate all the phenomena that are under
consideration: "the polity". I propose, then, that we can discuss
the polity in terms of four aspects: a centre of authority; an
apparatus through which authority is exerted; a boundaried field
(in terms of people) within which authority applies; and a strat-
ificatory order of relations to authority within that field. In
terras of these four aspects, I hold that we can identify two con¬
trasting historical aetiologies of the polity: one starting from
a centre of authority; the other starting from a boundaried field.
In the first case, a king or prince will exert his power as
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far as he can, until he meets limits of a pragmatic kind in terms
of geographical or geopolitical factors. The development of an
apparatus and his relationship to it will be an expression of his
geopolitical success. But his authority is not limited to any one
community; it has only pragmatic limits. Indeed his authority, so
far as it is durable, creates a community, of those who accept
his authority as legitimate. A stratificatory order will emerge
here, shaped between apparatus and economy. A point is that the
king's subordinates may have power themselves that extends beyond
the pragmatic boundaries of his own power; this is a factor of
the geopolitical dimension of apparatus. This then is Mann's sit¬
uation of overlapping power networks.
In the second case, a boundaried field creates itself through
a number of social actors agreeing to a common political identity
and destiny. There may be a pre-existent basis for this, in terms
of a belief in common ethnicity, etc. Typically a stratificatory
order emerges grading the degrees of membership of the political
community (the boundaried field), e.g. in terms of nobles and
commoners. A single authority-centre (i.e. a king) may emerge, at
least for a time, but power is more typically shared among the
nobles on a collegiate basis, often with wider involvement e.g.
a warriors' assembly. Such a collegiate direct exercize of power
subject to some kind of wider control marks the greatest extent
to which an apparatus is likely to emerge. Above all, this situa¬
tion is characterized by a hard boundary between citizens and
foreigners, which may also find expression in terms of free and
slave. This alternative situation, then, perhaps reflects some¬
thing of Smith's conceptions.
Now obviously what I have described here corresponds again
to Bureaucratic Kingdom and City-state, and indeed, I pointed to
this typology, in "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizat¬
ions", as the first statement of Weber's sociology of polity. But
what is more to the point is that the above also has correspond¬
ence to the types "traditional domination" and "charismatic dom¬
ination". For bureaucracy is not necessarily rational-legal; only
the modern, purest case is so. Historically, bureaucracies have
generally been of traditional (patrimonial) kind. Equally, char-
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isma is not limited to the case of the following of a hero or a
prophet. The tie of brotherhood or common loyalty is also charis¬
ma, including the sworn confraternity on which the Plebeian City
is based. Again, there is the blood or lineage charisma of the
Patrician City or the clan state.
It can be difficult to analyse Weber's intentions here, for
he both treats the political community as a distinct issue and
presents much of the material again in the discussion of charis¬
matic domination; well, that can also be said of the household,
which is discussed both as a basic sociological grouping (ch 3 of
"The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto Powers") and
at the beginning of the discussion of traditional domination (ch
12). Again, the material presented in "The City" (ch 16) also
appears variously in the chapters on political communities (ch 9)
and charismatic domination (ch 14) - and indeed, this last seems
to be paralleled in the later treatment in "The Theory of Social
and Economic Organizations" (ch 3). In particular, it is in the
chapter of "The Economy and the Arena of Normative and de Facto
Powers" on political communities that stratification is discussed.
But this point must be made: that neither the political community
nor the structures of traditional domination are necessarily co¬
extensive with the polity, and their relations to each other can
be quite various. The next section, and indeed later chapters,
will have to concern itself with this. But it must be realized
that my focus, unlike Weber's, does not extend to ethnographic or
early medieval European material, but is wholly on the contrasting
types of developed ancient polity.
It is perhaps worth spelling out the implications of this
argument for Weber's general sociology of polity. What I am sugg¬
esting is that we identify the polity in four aspects: centre of
authority, apparatus, field of application, and stratificatory
order. Two developmental patterns then can be identified: the
traditional, starting from a centre of authority, and defining
its field of application in geopolitical conflict and through the
notion of legitimacy, in the course of which also an apparatus
and a stratificatory order develop; and the charismatic, starting
from a self-defining boundaried field, and developing a stratif-
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icatory order of internal closure (possibly with geopolitical
considerations), following which a centre of authority and an
apparatus may emerge. These two patterns are together the aetio¬
logy of the modern rational-legal polity; indeed, the components
"rational-legal" echo "traditional-charismatic", and the point is
precisely the rationalization of the relationships between the
two arms in terms of each other. This is not simply an analytic
point, but also a historical one, especially in regard to the
Roman Empire and the medieval European Standestaat, both of which
feature conciously rationalized systems incorporating City-states
into wider traditional realms. The growth of the Roman citizen¬
ship - described in a later chapter of this thesis (ch 10) - is
particularly to be noted.
However, I cannot pursue these wider issues for their own
sakes here. Indeed, although the underlying principles of tradit¬
ional and charismatic domination should be kept in mind, it is
only in terms of specific sub-types that the argument can at pre¬
sent be pursued: traditional (patrimonial) bureaucracies, and
ancient City-states. The purpose of contrasting these two types
of polity is, in pursuit of the demographic argument in the prev¬
ious section, to analyse their contrasting conditions of recruit¬
ment. To this end, it should first be reiterated that the typical
main structural conflicts, in which recruitment is located, are
different in the two types - this I have already sketched.
In traditional polities (see 'Weber 1978 Part ii chs 12 & 13),
the main structural conflicts are between ruler, apparatus and
subjects, especially the most priveleged stratum. In terms of
traditional (patrimonial) bureaucracy, there are two main aspects
to identify. For the first, the ruler strives to maintain his pre¬
eminence over his nobles, who in turn try to reduce him to their
own level, or else to assert their autonomy in the geopolitical
dimension. For the second, the ruler strives to keep his offic¬
ials dependent upon him, both for the means of administration and
for their own subsistence; his officials on the other hand try to
appropriate the means of administration and of their own subsist¬
ence, and to become an autonomous nobility. A definitive issue
here is that a bureaucracy collects taxes for the king, from which
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he pays his officials a salary. By contrast, a nohility will col¬
lect taxes for themselves, and pass on the excess to the king, or
perform services for him (the purer, non-hureaucratic, forms of
patrimonialism) . With this, the conflicts betxveen bureaucracy and
nobility are best seen in terms of, or at least in the light of,
two alternative types of domination, rather than two rival elem¬
ents in a single structure. A nobility may co-exist with a bureau¬
cracy, as an economically, and perhaps legally, privileged strat¬
um, but with no effective claim to power. But this is really an
intermediate situation. The pure type of bureaucratic polity will
rather dissolve the nobility altogether. One way to do this is by
a general expropriation of private wealth and an endowment of tem¬
ples, in which the nobility must seek office; this was done in
Egypt, and probably broadly across the Ancient Near East. But the
main resource is the state apparatus itself. I will return to
this.
Against this, in City-states the main structural conflicts,
given that the nobles have suppressed the king (i.e. that this is
a City-state and not a traditional City-kingdom), are stratificat-
ory in nature, over the closure of the political community. Here
indeed the issue, rather than being the control of the means of
administration, is rather the control of the means of warfare,
for the citizen is a self-equipped soldier, whether a noble in a
chariot or on horseback, a commoner armoured foot-soldier, or
even exceptionally the oarsman of the galleys, (in the Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom, by contrast, the soldiers are typically profess¬
ional and salaried, and are equipped from the king's armouries -
the latter point will hold even where a grant of land is made for
the soldier's support, instead of a standing army being kept in
barracks.) On the one side, then, the nobles strive to deprive
the common people of their political and legal rights, and reduce
them to a dependent following and/or workforce, possibly even to
enslave them. On the other side, the common people, or elements-
of them, strive to overthrow the privileges of the nobles and to
assert a general political and legal equality of citizenship. In
Antiquity, these conflicts featured struggles over the ownership
of land, and over usury and debt-slavery (this is discussed more
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fully in Appendix A, especially part ii). Three status categories
then are typically defined in these stratificatory conflicts:
patrician, plebeian, and proletarian; they correspond broadly to:
large land-owners, peasantry, and urban artisanate. These struggle
to monopolize political and legal rights, and the apparatus of
magistrates, councils, and assemblies through which the political
community administers its public affairs - thus creating the fam¬
iliar forms oligarchy and democracy. Generally, the plebeians
might, with more or less success, assert their ultimate status
equality (i.e. common citizenship) with the patricians, but it
was unusual for the proletarians to do so, unless exceptionally
they were of military importance as oarsmen - Athens is the main
example.
It should be noted in all this that "status" here has a very-
hard meaning, in political-legal terms: it reflects citizenship,
membership and participation in the political community. The ult¬
imate status difference is that between free and slave; the status
difference between citizen and non-citizen (who may be liable to
enslavement) must also be noted. This is the context within which
internal closure of the political community should be seen, (in¬
cidentally, this is also surely the paradigm case of "status" for
Weber, as his intellectual biography should make clear.)
As I have said, then, these contrasting patterns of struct¬
ural conflicts locate and condition the processes of recruitment,
of in-migration into the central institutions; indeed, the con¬
trast between the two types is sharp. To show this, the general
relationships between power, wealth and progeny in each type
must be considered.
For this, it is best to take City-states first. Here we have
a closed political community; closed both externally against for¬
eigners and slaves, and internally in terms of the stratificatory
order. With this political closure goes economic closure, in par¬
ticular the appropriation of the land, and the stratificatory
order is linked closely, and indeed in juridical terms, to prop¬
erty holdings, for the different categories of military service
entail different levels of self-equipment (a chariot and horses
as against a hoplite's armour, for example). This is definitively
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a hereditary system, in which children succeed to their parents'
positions, and on the whole the only way of access to these pos¬
itions is through birth. Above all, the implications should be
grasped for children for whom no provision is made: exile or en¬
slavement. But it must also be grasped that this syst#m requires
the transmission of intact estates down the generations, and
therefore the limitation of the numbers of those with a claim
against an estate at its devolution. If the numbers of children
exceed replacement level, estates will fragment and their incumb¬
ents will be declassed, unless the process of fragmentation can
be balanced by one of re-accumulation. In the face of economic
closure, especially the appropriation of the land by the politic¬
ally dominant strata, that is problematic. Generally, then, there
is great economic pressure on fertility: a socially constructed
pressure grounded in the stratificatory order, and affecting all
strata.
This picture must be set in the context of stratificatory
conflicts. Basic to these are the class struggles between large
and small land-owners, in which the latter become forced into
debt and expropriated or enslaved; expropriated peasants become
the urban proletariat. The large land-owners- may either rent out
their lands to share-croppers or have them worked by slaves, more
typically the former. Slaves are typically domestic servants; or
else artisans in the city, paying a body-rent. Rents of one kind
or another (rather than e.g. direct labour services, or the hand¬
ing over of the labour-product) are the typical form of exploit¬
ation. Yet this process does not typically run its course. Mainly,
military reasons account for this: firstly, in that the geopolit¬
ical situation of the City-state makes for a collective interest
in maintaining military strength; secondly, in that the hoplite,
the self-equipped small-holder heavy infantryman, comes historic¬
ally to dominate the battlefield. On the basis of this, the pleb¬
eian stratum at least keeps a presence in the state, and may well
come to dominate it. Exceptionally this can also extend to the
urban proletariat, if the City develops a fleet of galleys in
which they provide the oarsmen. At the same time, the big land¬
owners are contained, their monopoly of the state broken and the
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laws of usury and debt-slavery annulled. But this again does not
run its course; they keep their patrician status, and they are
not expropriated. In Antiquity, the demands to cancel dehts and
redistribute the land are often heard; but they are never ful¬
filled. The class-conflicts result in compromise, though a status
conflict between the orders remains virtually a permanent feature
of the City-state world.
These processes have various outcomes, as seen for example
at Athens or at Rome. More will be said of them in the later chap¬
ters of this thesis. But for the present, two points should be
made. Firstly, there is pressure here to foreign predation, to
the acquisition of new economic resources. If the internal pred¬
ation of the patricians is blocked, then they are likely to turn
to imperialism: non-peaceful trade, the exaction of tribute, reg¬
ular (though farmed) taxation. On the basis of this, they may re¬
sume internal predation, as shown spectacularly at Rome, where
imported slaves drove out the free peasantry. But equally, if the
plebeians or even the proletarians come to dominate the state,
they also are likely to be forced into foreign predation, in the
same forms. Athens illustrates this. The other point, which is at
the heart of our present concerns, concerns population movement -
migration. In the ancient City-state world this has many faces:
the flight of the landless to the city; colonization (i.e. the
founding of new Cities); the influx of the slave-trade from ab¬
road; the general wanderings around the world of landless mercen¬
ary soldiers. These are typical features of classical Antiquity
(at least until the Roman Empire). The underlying reasons should
now be clear.
As I have said, the City-state is oriented to replacement:
to the transmission of estates down the generations without div¬
ision. This is defined, like the economic pressures on fertility
themselves, not by absolute factors but in terms of social clos¬
ure: marriage and legitimacy. Only children born to sanctioned
unions have a claim to property or to citizenship. Other children
have no claims. But beyond this, the numbers of legitimate child¬
ren may be controlled, especially by exposure. This is not simply
infanticide; the child may well be found and raised by others.
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But it is expulsion from the political community5 indeed, most
often the child will he raised as a slave. More often exposure
happens to girl-children than to hoys. For this, there are many
reasons: males are valued more for their military functions; the
need to dower girls makes raising them an expense; hut ultimately
the reason is surely that females are the hearers of fertility.
Sexual relations with non-citizen and slave women, often prostit¬
utes, are a major resource wherehy citizen men limit the numbers
of their legitimate children; this is commonly the destiny of the
exposed citizen girl-child. Thus the pattern completes itself.
This indeed is the ground for the sociology of prostitution.
(Whether this can lead to an actual sex-ratio imbalance, as some
have suggested, is hard to say; exposure, as noted, is not infant¬
icide. See Guttentag and Secord 1983 esp. ch 2; Pomeroy 1975 App¬
endix. See also Appendix A part ii below.)
It should he stressed that marriage and legitimacy are loc¬
ated in the stratificatory conflicts of a closed political comm¬
unity. In particular, the question what is the status of a union
between partners of different status, and of the child of such a
union, is matter for conflict. Typically, patrician strata will
try to monopolize marriage for their own daughters, taking comm¬
oner girls as concubines; this both in order to monopolize full
citizenship and to protect their property. In this, they may pre¬
fer intermarriage outwith the political community, with foreign
aristocracies. This is an essential aspect of internal closure.
Against this, the lower strata ( especially the plebeians) will
insist on the validity of their own marriages, and will try to
force the patricians to acknowledge unions between the strata,
and the children born of them. Possibly they will pass laws for¬
bidding. or restricting marriage to foreigners (Pericles' citizen¬
ship law at Athens; the Roman laws on conubium). Again, special
forms of marriage that convey legitimacy but not inheritance may
be evolved (as apparently at Rome). But most of all, the citizen¬
ship of the illegitimate child is protected: the patrician strat¬
um is not permitted to use its marriage practices to monopolize
citizenship. In the ancient City-state, marriage and legitimacy
are concerns of the status groups, which indeed may have their
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own distinct forms, rather than of the state. In the last analys¬
is it is the citizenship of the parents, not the nature of their
union (though it should reflect their citizen status), that is
the "basis of the child's claim to citizenship. But equally, it
should "be noted that, as a charismatic community, the City does
not grant membership simply on the basis of birth, at least, not
to a male. Even if the child is raised and not exposed, there
will be an initiation and registration as citizen, at coming of
age. It is this if anything that the state controls.
Finally, a point that should be stressed for the City-state
situation: the urban proletariat is not ordinarily self-reproduct¬
ive, recruiting itself rather through the migration process. This
can be the flight of landless peasants or the influx of foreign
slaves, or both. The non-reproductivity is basically due to pov¬
erty and squalor: men's work will not ordinarily support depend¬
ents, and much of women's work is in prostitution, which has lit¬
tle compatibility with the bearing and raising of children; also
in wet-nursing, which may follow upon the woman's own child being
exposed, or at least reduces its chances for survival. An inclus¬
ive democracy such as Athens might somewhat ameliorate these con¬
ditions, but this is unusual and of limited effect. Many practices
- the artisan's ambition to buy a slave to support him in old
age; the burial clubs of the urban poor in the Roman cities - all
speak of the absence of families at this level.
Turning now to Bureaucratic Kingdoms: here, as stated earl¬
ier, the central issue is the conflicts between king, apparatus
and nobles. The king sets aside the nobility and rules through
officials whom he appoints and whose careers he controls; the off¬
icials collect taxes and remit them to the king, who then pays
them a salary. Thus the means of administration and of the offic¬
ials' subsistence are both kept in the king's hands. Against this,
the officials struggle to appropriate their offices and transmit
them to their sons; also to appropriate the means of administrat¬
ion and subsistence, collecting taxes for themselves and passing
on so much to the king, or providing services for him. In all
these matters, a range of compromises may be reached, including
the appointment of sons to their fathers' offices, or at least to
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an equivalent bureaucratic career. But the point is that, in prin¬
ciple, this is a specifically anti-hereditary system.
In this, the nobility are excluded from playing a role in
the state, and indeed, so far as they remain a threat, the king's
interest is to dissolve the nobility altogether. This requires an
attack on its property base, in terms of large estates of hered¬
itary transmission. Expropriation is the most obvious means, but
this has limits: unless clearly episodic it entails risk of rebel¬
lion. Again, there is the question what to do with the expropriat¬
ed property: to redistribute it will simply create a new nobility.
Instead, then, the king takes it into his own hands, appointing
officials to administer it for him. Again there will be comprom¬
ises here. Some expropriated wealth will be redistributed as priv¬
ate property. A distinction in principle will arise between the
king's private property and the property of the state. There may
also be the endowment of land to religious foundations; the gods
thus become the new nobility, and are served by their own bureau¬
cracies, like the king. But the point is that it is now office in
the administration of the king's property (or state or temple
property) that is given as a reward for service or to the import¬
ant, rather than a gift of property outright, and this at least
theoretically subject to the appointments system. Equally, though
property still ultimately supports the great, it does so not in
terms of simple ownership but through a system of taxes and sal¬
aries routed through the royal treasuries. Basically, then, what
is here is less the displacement of one privileged group by an¬
other than a transformation of the conditions of property (inclu¬
ding its preconditions and consequences). In fact, it is likely
that to a fair extent it is the quondam nobility who will make up
the new salariat. A bureaucracy then is a nobility transformed.
There is, then, here a basic transformation in the conditions
and inter-relations of property, income and participation in the
state. As I have indicated before, the new system is specifically
anti-hereditary; this applies to all its aspects. For the surviv¬
al or re-emergence of a nobility requires a property base in
large transmissible estates, and, as I have shown in regard to
City-states, the transmission of these intact down the generations
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means the limitation of the numbers of heirs who can claim against
the estate at its devolution. Again, as I have shown, privileged
men do not typically achieve this by denying themselves women,
but rather through closure practises: inheritance rights are re¬
stricted in terms of marriage and legitimacy (backed by child ex¬
posure and the use of prostitutes). But in the Bureaucratic King¬
dom, the king controls the law. He can then protect the inherit¬
ance rights of younger sons, daughters, wives, concubines, illeg¬
itimate or disowned children etc. There may be limits here. But a
category especially to be noted is the children of the divorced
wife where there has been re-marriage. By protecting a wide range
of inheritance rights, the king ensures that, at devolution, prop¬
erty fragments. Thus the continuity of large property down the
generations is, if not made outright impossible, at least kept
within the king's control. Instead of a system of hereditary
transmission, then, a circulation of property is established:
estates are built up largely through purchase, are fragmented at
devolution, and have to be re-accumulated through purchase again.
The basis for purchase is typically the salary from bureaucratic
office. Private estates of some size may exist, then, but they
lack continuity over time. Equally, the children of the privileg¬
ed must depend on royal appointment rather than inherited wealth
to maintain their position: there are great persons but there are
no great families.
It should be added that the king himself must stand above
this: his own patrimony must be transmitted intact if his line is
to endure. Equally, special considerations must govern royal succ¬
ession. But it must not be assumed that simple descent provides
the norm for this, or even that the process is rule-bound. Many
of the Roman emperors, for example, adopted a younger colleague
as successor; perhaps this is the pragmatic regulation of power
st ruggle.
It should not be thought that the consideration of the con¬
flicts between king, apparatus and nobles entails a restricted
focus on the upper levels of the stratificatory order. On the con¬
trary, bureaucratization rather has the effect of levelling the
stratificatory order downwards. Especially the tendency to appoint
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and salary junior officials directly, and to allocate senior off¬
icials their staffs (instead of requiring senior officials to
provide and salary their own staffs), goes with the payment of
senior officials on quite moderate scale, to meet their private
needs only. Just as this system does not create a nobility, so
also it does not create a peasantry. Small property may be alloc¬
ated to quite humble persons, and a variety of compromise arrang¬
ements might provide hereditary allocation in return for heredit¬
ary service - this is especially found with soldiers, and is esp¬
ecially characteristic for New Kingdom Egypt. But there is neither
economic closure nor hereditary status here; the king can always
make new appointments and allocations, and the incumbent does not
have to maintain a style of life - soldiers are equipped from the
royal armouries. On the whole, then, small property is simply a
stage in the cycle of property; characteristically, it is bought
and sold rather than inherited. With this, bureaucratization tends
to produce a hierarchy of grades of appropriation (as opposed to
the hard dichotomy of ultimate ownership and immediate possession
in the City-state): the private ownership of the king; state prop¬
erty; property endowed to a temple; allocation of property from
any of these three categories in return for service; private prop¬
erty; cash-rent; share-cropping arrangements; etc. Matching this
is a hierarchy of grades of dependent labour, from the official
appointed to his post to the agricultural labourer appointed to
his field - the two cases are quite comparable. Too, however; as
there is private property, so also are there free persons.
The stratification system itself is basically in terms of
status; it must be so, unless the market is more strongly devel¬
oped than ever occurs in Antiquity. But bureaucratic rule is hos¬
tile to the "hard" political-legal status of City-stateff; there is
rather a "soft" status in terms of Weber's frequently-quoted
"reckoning of social honour". These issues will come up again in
later chapters (especially ch 7). The basic status distinction
separates officials, priests, and perhaps soldiers, on the one
side, from the mass of agricultural labourers, artisans, shop¬
keepers and small traders on the other. The last three of these
together comprise the urban market class. Agrarian labour is typ-
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ically on a share-cropping "basis, not typically personally unfree
or "bound, to the land. Strikingly, there may be no clear concept
of " slave" *
What needs to be grasped here is the political-economic sys¬
tem' s orientation. This is not, like that of the City-state, a
matter of the maintenance of the appropriate style of life in
terms of civic - military - contribution of hereditary privileged
status groups. On the contrary, the orientation here is to subsis¬
tence: to balancing the utilization of economic resources with
the utilization and maintenance of the workforce. Tasks, staffs
and rations are allocated together and in terms of each other, as
with a modern army. There are gradations in this, but no extremes
of wealth or poverty. Again, the system is controlled by state
allocation, not by family inheritance. There is, then, in princ¬
iple no limit to its capability to accomodate its population.
Younger sons, retired fathers, daughters, sisters, all can be
appointed, used, and maintained. This system has none of the
pressures to rural-urban migration of the City-state situation;
usury, debt-slavery and the expropriation of the peasantry are
wholly absent. As noted, there may be no clear category of slave,
though there may be an influx of slaves from abroad. The economy
is socially constructed so as to maximize plenty. In particular,
colonization (both external and internal) is highly characteris¬
tic, and wholly ameliorative in character: it is the breaking of
economic closure by the creation of new settlements and opening
of new economic resources, especially in land. Above all, this is
the state's re-endowment of the landless.
Again, this system's orientation to subsistence entails none
of the pressures to family limitation found in City-states. Fam¬
ily property does not have consequences in status or in privilege;
there is no point in trying to preserve it by limiting the number
of heirs, nor is there much possibility of doing so where the
king protects inheritance claims, as discussed. On the other side,
there is no difficulty in obtaining subsistence for family memb¬
ers; in principle the economic system is quite capable of using
and providing for younger sons, illegitimate children, women, or
the old. But that is under state not family control. There is
•then no element of the population that orients its fertility to
replacement levels, and the practices associated with this, esp-
cially exposure and prostitution, are minimally found. As to marr¬
iage and legitimacy, these do not reflect the closure conflicts
of a political community, though status difference may he involv¬
ed. The referent is more likely simply to he property inheritance
law - this having no significance heyond itself, as shown. Concub¬
inage may reflect status inequality, hut it might rather he a
matter of a union between status-equal partners with children from
previous unions, whose inheritance rights they agree to protect.
I judge this to have heen so in Egypt. The notion of illegitimacy
of children then will he of minimal weight.
In all this it can he seen what is meant hy the general amel¬
ioration of social conditions under bureaucratic rule, and it is
to he stressed how far this is based on state coercion rather
than facilitation: the king's dissolution of the nobility. Due to
this, and the attendant reorganization of the economy, the econ¬
omic pressures on fertility found at all levels in the City-state
are not found at any level in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, and the
migration process in all its aspects is greatly reduced both in
volume (colonization excepted) and in trauma.
Though focussed on the countryside, the foregoing observat¬
ions should extend broadly to the urban poor. These may derive
from the countryside, though more pulled by opportunity than dri¬
ven by necessity; their range of occupations and substantively
free but largely unprotected position is much the same as in the
City-state. The occurence of families, however, is likely to be
higher, due to greater economic capability to support dependents,
including a wider and more suitable range of women's work - pros¬
titution and wet-nursing are not typical. As to mortality factors
in terms of squalor and disease, public works in terms of clean
water supplies and sewers may do something to reduce these. Howe¬
ver, it may be that it is the fusion of City-state and Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdom, rather than either type alone, that makes for this:
the Roman Empire is the great example. The distinctive natural
environment and lack of urban archaeology for Egypt make a com¬
parative statement within the limits of this thesis difficult.
I W
The discussions that I have just presented on the general
inter-relations of wealth, power, and progeny in two contrasting
types of polity (one with two sub-types) should serve to show how
the main structural conflicts of the central institutions of soc¬
iety condition the population process, the flow of people through
society (seen here as a migration from local community to central
institutions). The contrast of the two types could be stated as
follows: in the City-state, power and property are formally, jur¬
idically, linked, through the external and internal closures of
the political community, causing tremendous economic pressure on
fertility. The consequence is a policy, at communal and individual
level, of exact replacement (again juridically defined), which
results in a constant migration: the expulsion of the unwanted
from the community of the privileged. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms,
by contrast, property and power are disengaged, at least in formal
terms, through the organization of the economy through the state
bureaucracy. The economic pressures on fertility are minimal, and
do not make for policies of family limitation. Economic resources
are allocated on the basis of need not inheritance; there is less
migration and it rather has the opposite significance: colonizat¬
ion is the re-admission of the dispossessed. These things centre
on the state, which is at the heart of the structural conflicts
of the central institutions. But they also go far to shape the
family, as remarks above have shown, especially in regard to mar¬
riage, legitimacy, inheritance laws, etc. Further than this, there
are contrasting syndromes: corporativeness and continuity versus
individuality and ephemerality. These issues indeed must now be
pursued. That is the task of the next section, which must discuss
the other pole of the population process: the local community.
I have touched on the local community level of society at
many points in the earlier sections of this chapter. I have stated
that I find it more difficult to define (in an analytic sense)
than the central institutions, though easier to name, and also
that here my recurrent concern with the divisions between sociol¬
ogy and anthropology arises yet again. Yiith this, I have identif¬
ied the local community as centring on the mother-child relation-
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ship, with the family and the household clustered around it. My
other remarks have related to the nature and location of the loc¬
al community in relation to the central institutions and the pop¬
ulation process. Now that I pick up these threads for systematic
discussion, it must be made clear first that there are two dist¬
inct sets of issues here, that must be given separate treatment.
The macro-sociological analysis of the local community in itself
will provide the material for the next chapter (ch 5)• The macro-
sociological location of the local community, in relation to the
central institutions and the population process, is what will be
dealt with here, answering and completing the discussions of the
previous two sections of this chapter.
The local community, as I have indicated earlier, is seen
here as the source of population and of out-migration, the posit¬
ive pole of the population process. With this, it is seen under a
broadly Durkheimian orientation. That is, pace population funct¬
ions, and in contrast to the central institutions, it is seen as
lacking any internal dynamic of change, being integrated rather
around principles of continuity. However, I have earlier suggest¬
ed a (positive) critique of this orientation: that if society is
seen as comprising both central institutions and local community,
with the population process a migration between them, then the
apparent functional integration, timelessness, ahistoricity,
traditionalism etc. of the local community is revealed rather as
a dynamic of resistance to exogenous change, answering the dynam¬
ic of change in the central institutions. Much of the force of
this should already be clear from the discussions of the previous
sections, though further clarification should follow here.
However, within this strategic conception of integration ar¬
ound resistance to the central institutions, there are two cases
to be distinguished, in terms of the type of polity. This too I
have touched on earlier. The Bureaucratic Kingdom comprises a
central authority extending itself in geopolitical terms, that is,
subordinating local princes to become nobles and controlling them
through, or dissolving them into, a bureaucratic apparatus. Res¬
istance to this has a geopolitical character: that is, first, it
is specifically local. This is not meant in the simple sense of
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remoteness from the centre, but rather in the sense of the tend¬
ency for a kingdom to fragment into a series of localities. But
second, there is also the aspect of hierarchy and subordination.
Here the tendency of the king to support the common people and
suppress the nobles comes into play, in terms of the incorporat¬
ion of the village council and/or headman into the state, as its-
lowest level of administration. Resistance here may in fact be
minimal; it is rather the nobility that have the problem of res¬
isting, as shown in the discussion of the central structural con¬
flicts of Bureaucratic Kingdoms above. All this could probably be
more clearly revealed by the consideration of other sub-types of
traditional domination; unfortunately, however, there is no hist¬
orical base for this in the present thesis.
As to the City-state, here resistance is in another dimens¬
ion. For what is here is a charismatically structured political
community, and therefore there emerges a conflict of public comm¬
on interests as against private sectional interests. It should be
stressed at once that this must be seen in relation to the strat-
ificatory conflicts and constitutional forms of the City-state
(oligarchy and democracy), and that "sectional" does not mean
"individual". A good example of the private affairs of a patric¬
ian is his private following: the phenomenon of clientage. This
may convey great power in the City's politics, including power to
defy or overset the constitution. In conditions of democracy, this
is greatly curtailed, and the citizens stand equal. But their
private affairs still extend to control over dependants who have
not themselves the right of participation in public affairs: wom¬
enfolk and children, slaves, and sponsored non-citizens such as
freed slaves and resident foreigners. The political community is
closed, externally and typically also internally (i.e. against the
proletarians). It is basically a community of heads of households,
and their households are their private affairs. There is no quest¬
ion of universal citizenship; that indeed belongs to the Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom, though the content of citizenship there is more
dilute. Individualism likewise belongs to the Bureaucratic King¬
dom. But to clarify these issues, it is necessary to turn now to
types of family and household.
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Some indications on this too have already been given, in the
previous section. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, political recruitment
and economic transmission have been wholly disengaged from each
other, at least in formal terms, and a pattern of circulation of
property has been set up: estates fragment and are re-accumulat-
ed. As part of this, the claims against an estate at devolution
are wide-ranging, and are protected as such at law. There is no
continuity of property; equally, there is no continuity of fam¬
ily. The family rather comprises simply the household membership
at a given time, subject to considerations of sexual partnership
and child-care. In this, marriage and legitimacy, though they may
have a basis in considerations of status, are most likely simply
to reflect intentions in regard to transmission and inheritance.
That is, they have only economic, not political, significance.
With this, the family has no corporate identity. Its members all
relate to the state as individuals in their own right - at least,
with the exception of very young children.
In City-states, the situation is quite the reverse. Politic¬
al and economic transmission are tightly and formally, juridical¬
ly, linked, and the individual family aims at exact replacement;
there is strong continuity of property down the generations, and
continuity of the family with it. The family here is a lineage.
This lineage defines itself in terms not only of descent but also
of marriage and legitimacy, defined in relation to internal clos¬
ure (status) conflicts within the political community; the impli¬
cations for inheritance and for citizenship are matter for con¬
flict and may be various. The family here is corporative, relat¬
ing to the state solely through the adult males (the lineage is
agnatic); possibly only the eldest male, or one male of military
age (another issue for conflict). Other members of the family do
not relate to the state directly and in their own persons, but
only through the adult males, with a partial exception for boys
growing up into adulthood. The bulk of this has been indicated in
the previous section.
It should be apparent that there is considerable vindication
here for the family sociology of Carle Zimmerman (Zimmerman 1947)?
indeed, the two types can be named with his terms: "the atomistic
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family" and. "the domestic family". Zimmerman certainly invites
criticism. For one thing, he presents the domestic family as a
somewhat hazy intermediate form between the atomistic family and
his third type "the trustee family", something which (as he re¬
cognized himself) rightly belongs to a little-known historical
background (e.g. Homeric society). I have rather shown that the
atomistic family and the domestic family are two main types in
themselves, capable of being sharply defined and contrasted. For
another, Zimmerman insists on arranging his three types, trustee
family, domestic family and atomistic family, into historical
sequences instead of viewing them comparatively, equating the
atomistic family with the "decadent" stage of civilization. Now
it can be agreed that, where the domestic family is defined by
marriage and legitimacy in relation to a political community and
its status stratification, then families outside marriage and
legitimacy, e.g. concubinage and illegitimacy or the families of
slaves, will rather be of the atomistic type. But Zimmerman
wholly fails to see - indeed, with his values would be most res¬
istant to seeing - that the atomistic family is however positiv¬
ely "functional" for the Bureaucratic Kingdom, and that the emer¬
gence of domestic families here would be a clear sign of social
breakdown: the decay of the state bureaucracy and the emergence
of a hereditary nobility. Bureaucratic Kingdoms are not decadent
City-states, regardless of the historical location of the Hell¬
enistic and Roman Empires in relation to classical Athens and the
Roman Republic. These civilizations can become "decadent" too -
if we do not define decadence tautologically with the prevalence
of the atomistic family! Even so, despite his errors (and his
lack of value-freedom and his general tone) Zimmerman remains an
interesting and genuinely heterodox thinker in this field.
Zimmerman's "trustee family" is perhaps best equated with
Leber's concept of "the household" (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3),
the basic unit of production and of domination in which sexual
and parental relations, especially mother-child and sibling rel¬
ations, are located as units of shared consumption. This will be
discussed more fully in the next chapter. But the point here is
that there are two processes in the development of the household
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in which the family is defined, and they should he distinguished.
One is a process of internal closure; the other is a process of
reduction in household size. For the first, internal closure
within the household separates off different sets of sexual and
parental relationships. In particular in this "the family" may
he separated off from the slaves and other retainers; again, dif¬
ferent "families" may he distinguished. Marriage and legitimacy
play a definitive part here especially with regard to the former
point, though it should he stressed that non-marital and illegit¬
imate sexual and parent-child relationships are also recognized.
As to reduction in household size, this may make for the setting
up of separate households for each "family", or to the reduction
or elimination of slaves and retainers (to form their own house¬
holds where appropriate), or hoth.
Between these two processes, two situational types can he
identified. In the first, internal closure within the household
occurs in terms of marriage and legitimacy operating with refer¬
ence to citizenship and "hard" status; here each "family" tends
to have its own household. This is the pattern of the City-state
and the domestic family. It should he noted that the same consid¬
erations, especially juridical considerations, apply for hoth the
patrician and the plebeian strata. There is the difference that
patricians will have more servile dependants, and there are more
likely to he non-legitimate unions and families, formed with them
or between them. The patrician household structure is consequent¬
ly more complex. The process of reduction in household size most
strongly affects the plebeian stratum.
In the second type, internal closure within the household
occurs in terms of marriage and legitimacy operating with refer¬
ence to property inheritance rights only, status considerations
playing at best a secondary role on a non-juridical basis. This
is the pattern of the Bureaucratic Kingdom and the atomistic fam¬
ily. Here again each "family" tends to have its own household;
hut there is something of a countervailing tendency, in that
property, although separately owned (i.e. after devolution), may
continue to he jointly administered for a time to prevent frag¬
mentation. This indeed is also found in City-states, as a notion-
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al, legal, arrangement. But here it: is a matter of actual shared
occupancy, and a household structure of co-equal families living
together can result. As against this, the economic pattern, of
maximized distribution of resources under a hierarchy of approp-
riative categories and with a spectrum of semi-servile statuses,
makes it common for the unfree and semi-free to form their own
households, or sub-households. Thus the elimination of retainers
constitutes a typical tendency to reduction in household size in
Bureacratic Kingdoms.
On the ground and at first sight, the family and household
situations in the two societal types, City-states and Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdoms, might seem rather alike: the most general form is a
small nuclear family with a few slaves or servants, with larger
households of retainers among the upper strata. But the similarity
is superficial only; closer inspection shows variations that are
significant, and the underlying processes are in sharp contrast,
as I have shown. In particular, large household size can be a fac¬
tor of patrician wealth and dependants or of possibly quite moder¬
ate shared property; atomistic families can be a factor of polit¬
ically excluded status in the face of the domestic families of
the citizenry or the general societal type for all strata; domes¬
tic families can be a factor of citizen status and a general soc¬
ietal type or an emerging form among the privileged symptomatic
of the weakness or breakdown of the state. I may add that I have
not found the concept of "the extended family" useful in the soc¬
iological context of Antiquity.
The household is the essential location of the mother-child
relationship, the source of population, in which the economic
maintenance of mother and child is secured. There is then a
question of economic allocation at local community level. This
allocation may be in terms of maintenance rights and rights to
work given economic resources, rather than of outright appropria-
tion as property; this is especially typical for Bureaucratic
Kingdoms, as earlier discussions should have shown. The allocat¬
ion of personnel to economic resources comprises the recruitment
of the local community itself. It is in relation to these matters
that the integrative resistance of the local community should be
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seen: a negotiation of rights with the central institutions.
These rights will include "traditional" rates of exploitation,
intensities of labour, including the use of family labour, etc.
- purely economic questions that will be taken up in a later
chapter (ch 7}• But they also importantly include legal princip¬
les, especially principles of inheritance. It is to the point
that the linking of these with human biology, as kinship relat¬
ions, tends to be a rural, agrarian phenomenon. In the cities, it
is likely rather to be guilds that have such functions - though
with slavery in Antiquity there really is no autocephalous con¬
trol. The point here once again is the non-reproductivity of the
urban poor.
These matters again relate to the type of polity, and the
question whether the division between the central institutions
and the local community takes the form of centre versus localit¬
ies or public versus private affairs. In the former case, the
negotiated balance will very much be a matter of the power of the
state. With a bureaucratic apparatus, this power is typically
greatest, and, as commented before, local structures and offices
actually become incorporated into the state as its basic level.
But the impact of this is by no means simply for high labour in¬
tensities and high exploitation. On the contrary, bureaucratic
rule tends to be rather humane and indeed protective (and to com¬
mute rents to taxes). One must rather look at the opposite situ¬
ation, where the division is of public versus private affairs.
Here it is a private domain of personal domination that is being
secured: basically, the private household. Within this domain,
family and servile labour can be compelled and exploited at will.
So far as there is protection for the former, it will come from
the woman's kin rather than from the collectivity - though even
for the latter group there may be collective norms governing such
matters. More to the point, it is the woman's kin who will activ¬
ate protective norms, whereas no-one will do this for servile
labour. But it is precisely this kind of private domain that the
Bureaucratic Kingdom breaks down, by according and protecting
individual rights, including the right to approach the state, to
everyone. This again fits with what has already been said about
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the domestic and atomistic types of family, and it constitutes
the universal citizenship (at least legal personality if not pol¬
itical participation) and the individualism which I refer to
above as characteristic of Bureaucratic Kingdoms.
Lastly, I turn to kinship. I have indicated in an earlier
discussion (in ch 3) that I am unhappy with this topic, an anthro¬
pological theme that I am uncertain how to handle. Dealing now at
the level of sociological theory rather than methodology, I am
nonetheless brought back to the point that Weber's views on kin¬
ship were conditioned by his perception of the need to disengage
the ancient City-state, its origins and- structures, from primit¬
ive conditions and considerations. Especially this means separat¬
ing the tribus (phylum), gens (genos), and curia (phratry) from
the kinship systems of primitive peoples, and this seems to lead
him to a general consideration that, though the polity may employ
a kinship metaphor, this is not really kinship and is rather to
be approached through the sociology of polity. As I said before,
these are difficult matters involving untranslated texts; yet
there is increasing interest among modern scholars on the histor-
iographical side in Weber's views (e.g. Finley 1983 ch 2; Finley
1985). I discuss the issues more fully in later chapters and an
appendix (ch ^-& 10, Appendix A parti iii).
Sociologically, then, there seems to be here a heterogenous
collection of phenomena. On the face of it, perhaps three cate¬
gories are apparent. First, there is the set of relationships
governing economic inheritance rights, rooted in the family with
a negotiated recognition by the state. Second, there is lineage,
a descent system of economic and political force conveying both
property and citizenship; it is rooted in the family with direct
articulation to the state. In Antiquity, this is always agnatic.
Thirdly, there is the issue of clientage, and the commoner foll-
owings of patrician lineages-. Of these, the first two can easily
be located to the preceding discussions, the first in the resist¬
ance mechanisms of the local community in the Bureaucratic King¬
dom; the second in the citizen households of the City-state.
Indeed, they are basically equivalent to each other. The third
case, however, is more complex, and needs some unpacking.
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This requires some consideration of the societal sub-types
"Patrician City" and "Plebeian City". The difference between
these is not simply a question of which stratum controls the
state; the political struggles of Antiquity are more complex than
this. What is at issue is structural change. The Patrician City
is based on patrician clans and their commoner followings, on a
personal basis of citizenship; the gens (genos) and curia (phrat-
ry) apparently expressed this. The Plebeian City by contrast is
based on villages (demes), a territorial basis of citizenship.
With the change, the gens (genos) and curia (phratry) are disen¬
gaged from the state and from each other (though they may survi¬
ve), and the patricians are forced to join the tribes (phyla) and
register in a village like the commoners. This happens both at
Athens and at Rome. But where Athens then proceeds in a democrat¬
ic direction, the plebeians and even proletarians dominating the
state, Rome rather reverts to oligarchy, a resurgence of patric¬
ian dominance. Indeed, there is no pure Patrician City in this
thesis, though observations can be made about the sociological
type on a synthetic basis. I will return to this issue.
Clientage then has very different force in the Patrician
City and the Plebeian City. In the former it is part of the con¬
stitution of the state, of public affairs. In the latter, it is
private. You could say, then, that clientage in the Patrician
City should not be assimilated to kinship; in the Plebeian City
it could not be mistaken for kinship. It is the failure to separ¬
ate the two cases that produces confusion. As to its occurence,
bureaucracy and democracy both tend to break clientage down,
though for different reasons: in bureaucratic conditions it is
feared as a rival form of power; in democratic conditions the
citizens wish all to stand equal and independent. On the other
hand, both wish power to be exercized openly and under the law.
However, clientage certainly does survive under oligarchic con¬
ditions in a Plebeian City: Rome is the outstanding example. It
is with reference to this that I identify clientage above as a
private, sectional, patrician sphere.
The sum of this discussion, then, is that, excluding client¬
age in the Patrician City, all these categories of "kinship" ap-
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pertain to the local community. With lineage and clientage, as
factors of the City-state, this is a matter of the private, sect¬
ional, as opposed to public, communal, spheres; in the case of
inheritance laws only, as a factor of the Bureaucratic Kingdom,
this is a matter of negotiated local resistance to central auth¬
ority. The more overtly political character of the first group,
as against the more economic character of the second, can also be
noted.
Finally, I close this section by returning to the definit¬
ional problem of the local community. This, not unnaturally, ans¬
wers the problem at the beginning of the previous section, of de¬
fining the central institutions, where I try to reconcile two
different streams in Weber's sociology of polity. Something of
the same kind is needed here. In this, it must be faced that Web¬
er himself treats the household and the local community as univ¬
ersal groups; he has some developmental reflections (probably lim¬
ited to a consideration of Western history) but he does not really
pursue a comparative analysis (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3 & 4j see
also Weber 1981 ch 2). Against this, however, in the light of the
considerations above, it can be suggested that the contrast of
City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms can be pursued as a contrast
between "household societies" and "community societies". The ir¬
reducible elements are the mother-child relationship as a subsist¬
ence unit, and spatial location. But only where rule is exercized
through an apparatus does the element of spatial location acquire
(geo)political significance. Where, by contrast, rule is colleg¬
iate and direct, it is the household that acquires political sig¬
nificance. Only in this latter case does the household become the
private sphere of unrestricted patriarchal power - the Greek oikos
or Roman familia. Set against this, communal affairs are public
affairs - politics. An apparatus, on the other side, negotiates
with the local structures in which the household is located, and
in this, patriarchal household authority too becomes negotiable,
and may wholly disappear, if the state is powerful enough. A key
issue in this of course is the control of family labour to hold
down "traditional" labour intensities and exploitation levels.
The contrast here, however, is not between private and public,
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but between local and central.
These matters, and the typology of household society and
community society, will be pursued in the next chapter (ch 5)»
But the point for now is that the term "local community" must
serve to cover both cases.
In this first theoretical chapter, I have set up the societal
types Bureaucratic Kingdom and City-state, with the subsidiary
sub-division of the latter as the Patrician City and the Plebeian
City. This structure will be kept, with one proviso discussed be¬
low, through the three chapters that follow; therefore one or two
general points might be made about it. First, it might be repeat¬
ed that underlying the typology is the distinction of traditional
and charismatic domination: I have evolved my position here, as
discussed above, by reading "Economy and Society" "through" "The
Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations", especially its in¬
troductory essay "Economic Theory and Ancient Society". Second,
it should be remembered that there is a wider sociology of domin¬
ation, in particular many types of traditional domination that
are not brought under scrutiny here. The structural conflicts of
patrimonial bureaucracy are thus the less clearly highlighted; an
unavoidable cost of working in terms of a finite historical task.
But it should be remembered that all that is being presented in
these chapters is a first approximation: an essay in sociological
theory.
Third, as noted earlier, it has to be realized that there is
no direct focus here on the Patrician City, though it is in the
background both at Athens and especially at Rome. It seems that
patricians only turn to writing history when they lose power; at
least, neither the history of early Athens nor that of early Rome
is really securely known. What is in view is the difference be¬
tween patrician and plebeian dominance in a structurally Plebeian
City - oligarchic and democratic Cities. This is the proviso re¬
ferred to above.
Lastly, it should be specified that historically, City-states
have both grown into Bureaucratic Kingdoms and been absorbed by
Bureaucratic Kingdoms - especially the Roman Empire. Consequently
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there are both mixed types and transitional types in the substan¬
tive record.
These points stated, I proceed with the argument.
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Chapter 5
The Macrosociology of the Local Community
In the previous chapter, I discussed, the macrosociological
location of the local community in relation to the central in¬
stitutions and the population (migration) process. In this chap¬
ter I intend to discuss the macrosociological analysis of the
local community itself. In this, there will be two sets of them¬
es. First, there is relations within the household, especially
sexual and parent-child relations. This will include a treatment
of marriage, and related questions such as choice of spouse; dis¬
solution of marriage; and also questions of property endowment
and devolution. The family is located in these matters. Second,
there is relations in the wider community, including the location
of the household in the community, e.g. in regard to social life
and leisure activities, the existence and status of women's quar¬
ters in the household, and women's freedom to move abroad. These
two sets of themes can be seen to relate to the considerations
announced at the end of the previous chapter, where I argued that
the household has political significance for City-states, whereas
the local community has (geo)political significance for Bureau¬
cratic Kingdoms. The basic patterns that will emerge, then, are
on the one side of seclusion and subordination of women within
the household; on the other, of participation and equality of
women in the community. This corresponds again to the types of
City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom; one may speak corresponding¬
ly then of "household societies" and "community societies", as I
indicated before.
Before pursuing this, it might finally be repeated that VJeber
himself covered this ground (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 3; see also
Weber 1981 ch 2) in terms of universal groups, without undertaking
a systematic analysis of variations or societal types. In consid-
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eration of his subsequent chapter (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 4), it
might be suggested that he was most interested here in Western
history, and saw it mostly in the light of City-state patterns.
At any rate, while I have, I think, kept his broad conceptual
approach, especially as regards the household, internal closure,
marriage, legitimacy, etc., I have seen little gain in presenting
a formal precis of his considerations here.
On the household and family indeed, much of the material I
wish to present has already been introduced in the previous chap¬
ter. As weber says, only the mother-child relationship is really
biologically given; all other sexual and parental relationships
(including those between siblings) achieve permanence only when
incorporated in a unit of common maintenance, and that, in sett¬
led agrarian conditions at least, is the household. This is cer¬
tainly universal for the ancient civilizations that I have dealt
with.
Within the household, there is internal closure distinguish¬
ing different sets of sexual and parental relationships, and here
considerations of marriage and legitimacy, resonating with wider
social considerations, come into play. As I have argued earlier,
"the family" may be separated off from the servile dependents,
including perhaps concubines and their children. In City-states,
the reference group for this will be the political community: "the
family" will be citizens, the others, non-citizens. Yet as I have
argued earlier, marriage and legitimacy themselves will be defin¬
ed rather with reference to the status groups within the citizen¬
ry, and will be slightly dissonant with citizenship as such. As
against this, in Bureaucratic Kingdoms marriage and legitimacy
will refer primarily to economic inheritance rights. If there is
a status dimension, it will be secondary and non-juridical in
character. Internal closure here rather distinguishes different
"families" of equal status; this might even include concubines
and their children. That is, instead of a hard status dichotomy
(as between citizen and non-citizen), there is a blurred gradat¬
ion of statuses» With this, actual marriage may well be dispensed
with, at any level of society. This was apparently commonly the
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case in Egypt.
There is a sharp contrast in the matter of the continuity of
the household. Where internal closure distinguishes a family with
reference to a political community, the family becomes a lineage,
and the household its endowment in property and dependents. Trans¬
mission and fertility practices alike will be geared to the
perpetuation of this situation. This has been discussed before;
it is the situation of the "domestic, family" of City-state citiz¬
ens. It is characterized by continuity and corporativeness, and
the position of adult males as holding authority within the house¬
hold and comprising the household's sole representation and link
with public affairs. This is the Greek oikos or Roman familia. On
the other side from this is the situation where internal closure
within the household operates only with regard to property inher¬
itance, and the property accordingly is allowed to fragment at
devolution. Here the household lacks continuity over time; in
terms of both property and personnel it is simply a temporary
existential unit. This is the situation of the "atomistic family",
characterized by ephemerality and individuality; all members have
enforcible rights against each other and free access to the state,
and household authority is only the authority of adults over
young children.
It might be noted here that, although the term "family" comes
from the Latin "familia", neither Greek nor Latin hs.s an exact
equivalent to the modern term. Squally, the term "family" is not
especially useful in discussing Graeco-Roman sociology. It is
rather "the household" that should be the basic sociological con¬
cept - as in Weber's own usage. The points apparently hold for
Egypt also. But the reasons are in contrast: the extent of pat¬
riarchal authority over household members in City-states; the lack
of real status-differences among household members in Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdoms. "The family" is defined by status, at best legal,
factors resonating with the wider society. It only becomes an
"obvious" concept where a process of reduction in household size
has brought family and household into correspondence. This nowhe¬
re happens in Antiquity, and indeed is surely far less typical of
modernity than sociologists have imagined.
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It is to the process of reduction in household size that I
now turn. In City-states, this is clearly a factor of simple
wealth. Yet there is first the political dimension, that the
household is the "basis in property and personnel for a citizen.
That is, the adult male citizen is typically head of his own
household.
However, there are problems here; the differences between
Athens and Rome are hard to systematize. In both cases, we do not
really know the practices of the earlier, Patrician, City. What
we see is the contrast of plebeian (and even proletarian) demo¬
cracy at Athens with patrician oligarchy at Rome, both Cities be¬
ing structurally Plebeian. But it might be taken that Rome shows
greater continuity, and Athens greater breach of continuity, with
the Patrician City.
At any rate, in both cases and at all citizen levels, the
household (in terms of actual common residence) is based on a nu¬
clear family; it does not typically run to three generations. This
means that the devolution of property must be linked to practices
of coming of age and retirement. But Athens and Rome deal with
this in quite different ways. At Athens, the father retires at
age 60; the son attains full adulthood at 30. It is then that he
marries and takes over the household; his father now lives as his
dependant. At Rome, by contrast, the father does not retire, but
retains his property and authority until death; his son, theoret¬
ically, remains a propertyless minor until then. In practice, how¬
ever, he is given interim possession of property from about age
20, and he marries and sets up his own household at about that
time. Another difference is that at Athens, daughters are only
residual heirs, moreover the daughter without brothers perpetuates
her father's lineage instead of her husband's; whereas at Rome,
daughters inherit equally with sons, (in both cases, their prop¬
erty reverts to their agnates.) One feels here that the Romans
are thinking in patrician terms, of three generations, great weal¬
th, and a grandfather's authority over many dependants, whereas
the Athenians are thinking in plebeian terms, of two generations,
moderate wealth, and a father's authority over few dependants. It
has been pointed out (Lacey I986) that in Rome it is the author-
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ity, in Athens the property, that emerges as the key issue - pat-
ria potestas versus oikos. However, it is also striking that the
Romans are willing to disengage their legal concepts from the
concrete actuality of the household in a way that the Athenians
are not. The Roman situation undergoes tremendous development
from these beginnings.
Leaving these difficult questions, however, what can he said
is that there is a common pattern for City-states of actual house¬
holds based on the nuclear family, with a following of slaves the
size of which is conditioned by the household's wealth. At Athens,
slaves were not normally permitted families. There might be a
slave concubine; if she bore children, they would usually be
freed. At Rome, slave families are more common, at least in urban
households. This is probably due to Rome's continuing patrician
dominance, for in Rome, a freed slave becomes a citizen, and his
master's client, whereas in Athens he becomes a metic. Clientage
plays little part in Athenian society, but it is always important
at Rome. It seems then that it is not simply a patrician household
but a continuing patrician dominance in the City that makes for
slave families and large households, although the wealth of the
household is certainly a factor.
To turn to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, however, here there is
no political dimension to devolution, but only an economic dimen¬
sion in which fragmentation not continuity of property is the pat¬
tern. Mot only do sons and daughters both inherit, but devolution
is bilateral: husbands and wives transmit separately to their
children (this in Sgypt and in the later Roman Principate). A con¬
sequence of this fragmentation is that here again the basis of
the household is the nuclear family, though the reasons are entir¬
ely different from those obtaining in the City-state. Again, in an
economy where property is fragmented and re-accumulated, the set¬
ting up of a household is more a factor of acquiring economic opp¬
ortunities (e.g. an official appointment) than of inheritance.
Squally, coming of age and retirement are not a problem, since
property does not have continuity and is not the typical basis
for subsistence. (Devolution in Egypt was at death.) But with the
circulation of property there is also, as remarked earlier, a
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gradation of categories of appropriation, and of status categor¬
ies. Between these processes, the servile are likely to create
their own semi-independent households. If the household in the
Bureaucratic Kingdom extends, then, it is likely to he in terms
of co-equal units (families), and to reflect a resistance to frag¬
mentation of property by having the estate jointly administered
and shared. (This can happen in City-states too, but rather in
terms of a legal arrangement covering the administration of rented
out property, with no implications for the household as an actual
unit of residence. Again, this is typical of Rome rather than of
Athens.) The larger household, then, comprises several nuclear
families living together. In this marriage and legitimacy may be
more or less of an issue, but it does not entail a large follow¬
ing of dependants. Moreover, it is not necessarily a wealthy hou¬
sehold.
A final point may be added: ancient families are small in
terms of numbers of children - typically of the order 2-3. This
certainly for all the Graeco-Roman World, and probably for Egypt
too. The previous chapter has shown the basis for this for City-
states, but for Bureaucratic Kingdoms it is rather surprising. I
will return to the question in a later chapter (ch 6; see also
Appendix A part ii)•
Family types, the domestic family and the atomistic family,
I have already discussed, and not much more needs to be said here:
it is a political difference. It should be remembered that the
atomistic family is a factor not only of Bureaucratic Kingdoms
but also of slave families and families based on concubinage in
City-states. It is basically only the legitimate families of the
City-state citizenry that are of the domestic type, although freed
slaves or resident foreigners may imitate the citizen pattern -
the proverb "when in Rome do as Rome does" is general to the City-
state world. The protection of the Roman citizenship in the Princ-
ipate had the effect of perpetuating some aspects of the domestic
family pattern? this by concious and sustained legal policy. This
mostly affects forms rather than realities, but it produces some
surprising anomalies, as will be seen. The Roman Empire never
wholly comes over to the Egyptian pattern. However, the basic iss-
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ue to keep in mind is the contrast between strong male household
authority and general (including female) community participation.
The difference of prevalent family type relates to this.
Internal closure within the household is a factor of marriage
and legitimacy. These are things which look beyond the household
to the wider society, yet they are not the concerns of either the
state or public religion. In City-states, they are rather located
in the attempted closure of status groups; in Bureaucratic King¬
doms, in relations of economic inheritance. In both cases, concub¬
inage is also a recognized relationship, publicly and legally,
and the concubine's children have a distinct status, quite differ¬
ent from the families of slaves. Again, in City-states the illeg¬
itimate child is not necessarily a non-citizen. No hard boundary
then exists between marriage and concubinage; the latter may be
marriage across wide status difference, which may include one
partner (usually the female) being non-citizen or slave. In Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdoms however there is another possible factor, pro¬
vided by the bilateral devolution of property: the shared desire
of equal partners to reserve their respective property for their
own children by previous unions. But concubinage is a broad phen¬
omenon, not easy to define: a negatory relationship to status pre¬
tensions and to inheritance seems to be the best common factor.
There will be more on this later (especially in the next chapter).
Marriage then is a private affair of the families and indiv¬
iduals concerned. Marriage is also important as an occasion for
the devolution of property and the setting up of a new household,
and I will turn to these aspects in due course. But first, the
difference can be pointed out, that in City-states it is rather
the family, and in Bureaucratic Kingdoms the individuals, who have
control in regard to such matters as choice of partner, consent
to the union, etc. In the City-state, it is specifically the male
head of the household - at Rome the head of the lineage - who
does this, though not necessarily arbitrarily or without taking
advice. The choice of partner is likely to be directed by family
interests, in particular the desire to protect property by sett¬
ing up reciprocal patterns of marriage within a small group who
have inheritance rights against each other. This is in the nature
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of patrician strata anyway, but in plebeian strata too marriages
may be made preferentially with near kin. This happened at Athens,
though not so evidently at Rome. This seems in keeping with the
differences between the two Cities as discussed above.
A comment should be added on the question of political marr¬
iages - marriage as alliance. For City-states, this really needs
to be seen in the context of a stratified political community
subject to conflicts of internal closure (the case of royalty and
nobility in bureaucratic conditions will be considered later). I
have commented before (ch 4) that patrician strata may prefer to
intermarry with the patricians of other Cities, denying conubium
to their own plebeians, but that the plebeians will try to forbid
this, and to insist upon conubium as proof of common citizenship,-
and upon the integrity of the political community. Similarly, mar¬
riage alliances between patrician lineages within the City-state
can only be a factor- of political faction within the patrician
stratum; accordingly, the collective interest is to forbid or pre¬
vent it. Practices making for this include the restriction of
property exchange between lineages on marriage, and the outright
transfer of the wife from her father's to her husband's lineage.
That is, the wife's property is typically restricted to a small
dowry - all other property devolves back to her agnates - and her
family have no interest in her children: the lineages are strictly
agnatic. Against this, the wife's father keeps a last resort pro¬
tection over her and her children's status, in the right to with¬
draw her from the marriage.
At any rate, these are the practices at Athens and initially
at Rome. Later at Rome, another form of marriage, apparently based
first in marriage between the patrician and plebeian strata, be¬
comes generally prevalent: so-called "free marriage". Here the
wife remains in her father's lineage, and does not enter her hus¬
band' s. Moreover she remains (strictly speaking) in her father's
authority, ^ith this, women's ownership of property becomes comm¬
onplace, and indeed it becomes practice for women to handle their
own affairs. Too, dowries start to become larger (though never
really large by broad comparative standards). It is hard to acc¬
ount for this change in prevalent marriage form, but it seems to
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be associated with the breakdown of the Republic. But in my chap¬
ter on Rome (ch 10 below), I argue that stable factions do not in
fact emerge within the patrician stratum; the social practices
simply do not permit of marriage alliances. The stratum actually
fragments in the civil wars and preceding conflicts. If "free"
marriage (and larger dowries) were intended to support such ex¬
periments, then the experiments failed. Again, Augustus did not
try to suppress "free" marriage.
Between political and economic family interests, then, the
partners to marriage in the City-state will have little individ¬
ual choice; even their consent may be nominal, especially the
girl's. However other factors enter here: the age and maturity of
individuals. It is general to Antiquity that girls were married
very young, about 13 - 15; they would thus probably accept the
choices made for them. An older woman remarrying after divorce or
widowhood might have some say in her destiny; probably so would
even a young man at first marriage. If the individuals did init¬
iate matters themselves, the consent of the head of the household
would still be required. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the
factors involved in choice of partner are very different, for the
political implications of devolution are missing, position and
subsistence alike being rather a factor of appointment, and the
system of devolution and its economic location are different too
(not to mention household authority). Here the choice of partners
then seems to be very much at their own discretion, and is made
within the community and on emotional grounds. Some kind of par¬
ental consent might be customary, especially from the girl's fam¬
ily. But the disregard of the young girl in love for parental
authority is clear in the Egyptian love poetry. Theire is no ques¬
tion of a marriage being imposed without the free consent of both
partners.
At least, this holds so far as the common people are concern¬
ed, and in a pure kind of Bureaucratic Kingdom this will be the
general pattern. However, there is a further considerations the
marriage practices of nobilities and royalty. This should be seen
in terms of the structural conflicts of these elements as describ¬
ed in the previous chapter, especially their geopolitical dimen--
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sions. Thus as nohles wish to assert conubium and status equality
with the king, so the king wishes to deny it, and to assert his
supremacy. He will then marry only with foreign royalty, or with¬
in his own household, or with commoners. But it should be realiz¬
ed that marriage here implies status equality and autonomy, and
if the king's realm has only pragmatic (as opposed to legal-con¬
ceptual) limits then marriage with foreign royalty - reciprocal
marriage exchange at the level of principal wives - will be refus¬
ed. Both Egypt and the Roman Empire illustrate this (though in
the latter case there is also another reason, grounded in the pro¬
tection of the Roman citizenship: the old barrier against patric¬
ians marrying outwith their City). Again, if the king's pre-emin¬
ence is assured, then all marriage outwith the royal house itself
is marriage with commoners - the great official is a commoner not
a noble - and again is marriage of choice. Against this, there
may be a practice of inter-marriage of close royal kin, to protect
the royal patrimony from fragmentation. These marriages may be
nominal or real, and will certainly co-exist with other sexual
and parental relationships; they seem to have no clear relation¬
ship to the principles of succession. Outwith this, however, the
pattern of the common people is practice here too. A feature of
this is that the marriages of princesses and other women of the
royal household are basically unrestricted and at their own will
(indeed one could on these grounds question whether the term
"princess" is appropriate!).
It can be seen that I have doubts as to the occurrence of
marriage as a tool of political alliance in Antiquity, at least
as any major typical practice for any of these societies. I might
add that the Roman emperors were never worried about surviving
daughters of previous dynasties, leaving them free to marry as
they pleased. Also, as I have commented before, it is not clear
that royal succession is always rule-bound. It might rather re¬
flect the pragmatic outcome of power struggles - that could be
suggested for Egypt as well as for the Roman Empire. The situat¬
ion of nobilities and royalties in later Western history is some¬
thing quite different from what is found in Antiquity.
Marriage in Antiquity is a private affair, controlled by the
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family and. (in the City-state) the status groups. It is not a
matter for the state or the public religion; in witness of the
latter point, we in fact have very little concrete knowledge of
marriage ceremonial for any of these societies (especially Egypt).
It is, as already stated, coming of age and registration as a
citizen that is likely to be the state's point of control; this
again for City-states only. Even so, there is a public aspect to
marriage, in that the relationship must satisfy certain criteria
of conduct. This is especially notable in regard to the adultery
laws, where the punishment of the wife is mandatory; it is not in
the husband's discretion. The marriage procession that takes the
couple to their new home may symbolize the public appropriation
of their relationship. In these matters, the Roman Empire made a
concious and sustained effort to preserve City-state practice, as
a factor of protecting the Roman citizenship. Egypt provides the
contrast: there the marriage may often have in effect been in the
control of the couple themselves, by virtue of a simple decision
to live together, and always theirs would be the controlling say.
No outside agency seems to have tried to control their conduct,
although their rights against each other were protected. There
will be more discussion on these matters in the next chapter.
But to go further here, the question of devolution of prop¬
erty must be further considered, and the setting up of the new,
or handing over of the old, household. A key question in this is
whether the major devolution of property occurs at the children's
marriage or at the parents' death. As I have noted, at Athens the
former alternative is chosen, and the father retires; at Rome, it
is the latter, but the son receives an interim devolution on
which to set up his own household and marry. It should be recalled
that the Athenian son takes over his father's household whereas
the Roman son sets up his own; as noted earlier, the Romans dis¬
engaged their legal concept of the household from concrete house¬
hold actualities. Too, a point of difference mentioned before is
that at Athens, devolution is ordinarily to sons only, daughters
being only residual heirs; whereas at Rome, especially given free
marriage, sons and daughters inherit in equal shares. In both Ath¬
ens and Rome the daughter is dowered, but in Athens this is in
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lieu of inheritance; in Rome it is interim - and. indeed, with
"free" marriage the daughter may be given interim possession of
property like a son as well. But in both Athens and Rome, proper¬
ty reverts to the agnates. I have already discussed the problems
of trying to account for the differences here on patrician/pleb¬
eian lines. It can be credibly argued that Athens developed prac¬
tices that were directed to the long-term protection of small
property, something Republican Rome clearly failed to do. It
should also be specified that at Athens, the laws of succession
were binding, whereas Rome had a fair degree of freedom of test¬
acy.
But it is the contrast with bureaucratic Egypt that should
be noted. Here transmission of property is bilateral, inheritance
being shared between the surviving spouse and the children, sons
and daughters alike, and devolution taking place at each parent's
death. There is freedom of testacy. Here marriage is not a major
occasion for the devolution of property, and the material endow¬
ment of the newly set up household seems to be otherwise achieved:
by interim devolution, gifts, or purchase of or appointment to
support from economic resources. There is no dowry. It should be
noted that a new household is created, and the conception is of
creating a new household, not perpetuating a lineage. There seems
to be an expectation that •§• of the new household's endowment will
come from the man's side, -§• from the woman's. This is in effect
interim devolution against inheritance. Again, in keeping with
these principles, the principle of property holding is not corpor¬
ative: the partners continue to hold their property separately,
distinguishing what each one owns or acquires and what is owned
or acquired jointly. Incidentally, the age of marriage for both
sexes here is just after puberty (i.e. early to mid-teens), save
possibly for boys following a scribal education. The above account
describes Egypt, but at Rome there are also developments towards
separate ownership and bilateral devolution. Increasingly as the
Principate progresses, women's testacy and even intestate cognatic
devolution (i.e. to their children) become established.
These property arrangements, and the political considerations
outlined above, also condition the terms of the dissolution of
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marriage. Again here there are differences of detail between Ath¬
ens and Rome that are hard to systematize, hut a sharp contrast
between City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms. It should be com¬
mented first that in all cases divorce is relatively unrestrict¬
ed. At Athens and initially at Rome, the husband can divorce at
will; also a marriage can be broken up by either partner's father.
The wife can try to gain a divorce through her kin or the magis¬
trates. In Egypt, both partners (and only they) can divorce at
will, and this also comes to be so at Rome. Like marriage itself,
divorce is not a concern of the state or public religion in any
of these societies.
The sharpest contrast, however, is in the arrangements for
custody and maintenance. At Athens and at Rome, the wife.returns
with her dowry to her male kin, who will arrange her remarriage.
Her children stay with her husband; the wife has no right of acc¬
ess. There is no maintenance. These arrangements may also follow
for widowhood, or the wife may remain to raise the children. Re¬
markably, there does not seem to be development at Rome in these
matters. In Egypt, however, although the divorced wife leaves the
marital home, she takes her children with her, and also her prop¬
erty, and there is also a maintenance arrangement. Probably she
goes to kin, but this is for practical reasons; she is her own
mistress. Again, this is not simply a return to her household of
origin, which is likely to have broken up. Also, importantly, the
inheritance rights of the children of her ex-husband's subsequent
marriage will have to be negotiated with her and her children.
This is a common source of Egyptian litigation. Her own remarria¬
ge (which she arranges herself) does not compromise her rights in
this, though it might itself be a source of parallel litigationl
The Roman Empire does not seem to follow this pattern, at least,
not during the Principate. But I would attribute these patterns
to the City-state versus Bureaucratic Kingdom dichotomy. Rome is
an intermediate case, especially in terms of the continued protec¬
tion of the Roman citizenship.
The household has on the face of it universal functions, in
production and consumption and as the setting for the family. Yet
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I have shown that there are differences, especially as "between
City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms, especially in terms of
political setting and of property holding and administration.
These condition household structure, and also relations within
the household: in the City-state the household is a unit of auth¬
ority, especially of free adult males over slaves, women and chil¬
dren; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom there is rather at most conjoint
authority of parents over young children, and the household is
simply a unit of common residence and maintenance..
Here the contrast between Athens and Egypt should be seen
with the change at Rome: the emerging prevalence of "free" marr¬
iage as a general practice for all strata from early in the Late
Republic. This is marriage without "manus", that is, the husband's
domestic authority over the wife. There are difficulties in see¬
ing exactly what this means, for as indicated earlier, at Rome the
father keeps his position until death, and his adult sons are giv¬
en an interim possession of property on which to marry and found
their own households; with this goes interim household authority,
under the ultimate authority of their father. Here perhaps we know
too much of Roman law and not enough of Roman social practice -
though a basic point, as I have said before, is the Roman disen¬
gagement of legal concepts from concrete household actualities.
At any rate, in "free" marriage the wife remains under the ultim¬
ate authority of her own father; with this she may be given an
interim possession of property on the same basis as a son, a thing
quite apart from her dowry. She does not come under her husband's
household authority, or at least, not on the same basis as slaves
or children. However this does not make the wife conjoint head of
the household or co-administrator of joint property. Moreover her
property, as stated before, reverts to her agnates.
But regardless of these differences, there is still a surpri¬
sing degree of common character to the household across the diff¬
erent societal types. In particular, the position of the wife
within the household in the City-state seems paradoxically strong:
for all that she is under male authority, she is still mistress
of the household. What seems to be the underlying issue here is
the division between public and private spheres: exclusion from
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public life is the key to women's subordination. Within the house¬
hold, the wife controls the slaves and young children - the boys
until school age, the girls until marriage she controls labour,
materials, and keeps the storerooms. Even the young wife, after
initial tuition from her husband, will have a free hand in con¬
trolling these affairs. However, all transaction that goes beyond
the household must be conducted by her husband, and even the hand¬
ling of her own dowry or property will be in her husband's hands,
or conducted through a male agent. Again, the erosion of these
practices at Rome is as striking as their continuing prevalence
at Athens. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, the range of the wife's
functions in the household is similar, but she is not restricted
in her dealings to the household or excluded from public life in
the same way, and she can transact freely with the outside world
in her own person, either for the household or for herself. It is
towards this that Roman practice develops in the Late Republic
and Principate. But the point should be grasped: the position of
the wife within the household in the City-state even under demo¬
cratic conditions is paradoxically strong. The household is the
material basis of citizenship, and it is in her day to day care
(though this is limited to the household itself, and does not ex¬
tend to the fields, or to other property). In my chapter on Ath¬
ens (ch 9), I suggest that it may be that Athens actually under-
represents this strength (i.e. in comparison to the wider Greek,
or indeed City-state, world), due to the predatory income of the
political community from empire providing an alternative material
basis for citizenship.
Too, it should be grasped that the role of the wife in the
City-state household is to be its mistress. She also bears child¬
ren to perpetuate her husband's lineage, and their raising is
under her oversight. But only in restricted sense is she a mother;
so far as possible, the care of children is left to slaves, even
wet-nurses. This will be discussed again in a later chapter (ch
6). Similarly, only in restricted sense is she a housewife; hous¬
ework will be done as far as possible by slaves. The wife's main
actual labour will be in textiles - this above all is women's
work in Antiquity. This too will be discussed again in a later
chapter (ch 7)* But the contrast with the Bureaucratic Kingdom is
discernible: there the wife is mistress of the household, but con¬
trols and shares in family labour rather than directing slaves.
Again, her authority extends beyond the household itself, to the
fields and to other property. Moreover the children are hers as
much as her husband's, and she raises and cares for them herself
- this includes breastfeeding. The wife here is both housewife
and mother in the full sense. Textile production is still typical
female labour, but this will be her own economic asset rather than
the household's.
A point that should be stressed in all this is the control
of large households by young girls. This holds for all societal
types: there is a common pattern in Antiquity of small nuclear
families and young female marriage. In City-states, where the hus¬
band is generally somewhat older (at Athens, much older), the hus¬
band may initially supervise his wife, but even here she soon
takes control of affairs, and in no case is the wife under the
permanent supervision of resident female kin. This should not be
assumed on "commonsense" grounds to be an unwise arrangement. The
immaturity of young girls is a matter of knowledge withheld, or
its validation withheld through cultural equivocation. It is not
a matter of simple inexperience.
Relationships within the household may be variously condit¬
ioned by the social division of public and private spheres. This
division is specific to City-states, and is complex: as I have
said before, the private is the realm of sectional rather than
individual interest. Again, the local community is basically just
the political community in its private aspect. The status-strata,
especially the patrician and plebeian strata, are sectional
groups; so also are the client followings of patrician lineages.
With this, as I have indicated earlier, the quasi-kinship struct¬
ures, the genos (gens) and phratry (curia), may have an ambivalent
role between the public and the private spheres, given the endemic
status conflicts between the patrician and plebeian strata.
In this setting,, men in City-states typically have a social,
recreational life that is politically conditioned in content, and
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from which "their womenfolk are excluded. This social life charac¬
teristically centres on male clubs, political debating, and phys¬
ical sports; it features male friendships and professional female
companionship. Where this occurs, the household either is not a
location for social life, at least not for men, or more typically,
an internal division is set up within the household, between the
public quarters and the women's quarters. Women are kept away
from company and secluded in the latter, though they might receive
their own (female) guests there. This pattern is clearly marked
at Athens. However, matters are different at Rome. There the pub¬
lic social and recreational life of men exists much as at Athens,
but the household too is a location for social life, and without
internal divisions. There is no internal seclusion of women, but
an active sharing of recreational life, including political dis¬
cussion, between citizen men and women. With this, women too have
something of a recreational life outwith the household paralleling
that of men. This pattern seems to start before the Republic even
begins to decay. The reasons for these (and other related) differ¬
ences between Athens and Rome will be taken up below.
However, it is the Bureaucratic Kingdom of Egypt that gives
the strongest contrast, for here the sectional political basis
for an exclusively male social life does not exist, and recreat¬
ional activities are among the household's major functions. These
are shared equally between husband and wife (and indeed children);
there is no question of seclusion. On the other hand, there are
distinct women's quarters; but the meaning of this, in keeping
with the arrangements of the property basis of the household, is
that the quarters belong to the women. That is the opposite case
to Athens, where the women belong to (or in) the quarters. But
the whole public-private division is not a significant dimension
of social structure in this type of society.
The social division of public and private spheres, with the
exclusion of women from public affairs, may result in an actual
seclusion of women: that is, a physical restriction of their move¬
ments in the community beyond the household. This occurred at
Athens, though it is not clear how thoroughgoing it was, and it
clearly did not extend to the urban proletariat, despite their
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real citizenship. On the other hand, there is no trace of this at
Rome. The main factor here seems to be the structure as outlined
above of the social and recreational life of men, and it seems
reasonable to relate this to the stratification (closure) con¬
flicts within the political community. The point is that, in the
City-state, political affairs are public affairs, conducted in
the Council and the Assembly by means of the spoken word - rhetor¬
ic is one of the great branches of learning in the City-state .
world. In the stratificatory struggles for control of the state,
then, the plebeians strive to create public political associations
and to make them centres of power; the patricians respond by using
their own households for their political meetings, and communicat¬
ing privately among themselves by means of writing. This is the
location of much of classical Greek and Latin literature, especi¬
ally in historiography and political philosophy, and it is also
much of the reason why we really only see the Patrician City in
retrospect.* The broad consequence is a process of polarization
whereby patrician closure is directed at the plebeians, whereas
plebeian closure is directed at women. That is, the public nature
of political life, and equally the political nature of public
life, are stressed in conditions of plebeian control, and a strong
division of sex-roles in terms of the contrast of the public arena
with the (inner) household is set up. As against this, the patric¬
ians, especially in conditions of patrician control, will soften
these divisions and stress the supreme value of patrician status.
Actual life in public will be correspondingly depoliticized. It
is the difference between a large group trying to challenge clos¬
ure and a small group trying to defend closure. I will return to
these issues again later. But it might be suggested that the init¬
ial impulse to seclude women is a factor of the stratificatory
conflicts of the Patrician City, and is based on the plebeians'
desire to prevent patrician men from taking their daughters as
*Indeed it should be stressed as a point of general methodology
how far our literary sources for the whole study of Graeco—Roman
Antiquity are conditioned by these factors. Though literacy is
a two-edged sword: written law-codes typically resulted from
plebeian demand. But that was to break the patrician monopoly
of legal knowledge.
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concubines (i.e. refusing them marriage and equality of citizen
status). At any rate, the seclusion of women seems to be a social
practice linked to either or both plebeian status and democratic
conditions; it is contra-indicated for patrician status or for
conditions of at least secure patrician dominance. With this, it
appears to be a practice specific to the City-state; there is no
basis for it in the sociology of the Bureaucratic Kingdom.* In
both Egypt and the Roman Empire women's movements are basically
unrestricted.
The local community in the City-state is the political comm¬
unity in its private aspect. City-states stage recreational and
religious events - the former evidently evolving out of the latt¬
er. These include theatre, games, gladiatorial contests, circus¬
es, etc., as well as festivals and processions. This is one aspect
of public life in which women are included: indeed, it is the one
respect in which their citizenship is real. Yet there may be sex¬
ual differentiation: women are likely to be excluded from matters
related to war and politics, and conversely men will be excluded
from matters relating to sex and fertility. At Athens these prin¬
ciples (especially the former) were kept strongly; women attended
the theatre and religious processions only. At Rome, women attend¬
ed the full range of public entertainments, though often the
sexes were seated separately.
In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, there is somewhat similar public
entertainment, but it has a different location: religious festiv¬
als and processions and public state functions (e.g. royal proces¬
sions) have rather a geopolitical significance; and the people
relate to it as subjects rather than as citizens. There is no
question of the exclusion of either sex, though interestingly
there can still be sexual differentiation and segregation. But
the significance of this is to give each sex its place, rather
than to exclude one or other of them (on the same reasoning as
*1 have no basis for discussing the seclusion of women in the
Ancient Near East in this thesis. Whatever its occurence, how¬
ever, it should be realized that the Ancient Near East is socio¬
logically various: the Pheonicians are a City-state people, for
example, and the Jews are a political/religious community rather
than a traditional kingdom.
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with women's quarters in the household).
Given this background, it is interesting to note that sexual
differentiation in dress is universal to these societies. This
may be part of a spectrum of dress differentiation relating to
the spectrum of general status stratification. This is clearly
marked at Rome, though largely absent at Athens, due to the dem¬
ocratic character of the City. Status distinction in dress, hair,
etc. between citizen women and prostitutes is also part of this
spectrum. Again this is clear at Rome, though absent at Athens;
but the reason for this absence is rather the seclusion of Athen¬
ian citizen women. Status at this level is equally a factor of
Bureaucratic Kingdoms, and the distinctions are maintained in the
Roman Empire, though the protection of the Roman citizenship is
again probably a factor here. The general system of status strat¬
ification is much collapsed compared to that of the City-state.
In Egypt, status distinctions in dress, except where associated
(for both sexes) with physical labour, seem much less clear, be¬
yond the basic differentiation of the sexes. Incidentally, the
veiling of women fits into this general context, basically as dis¬
tinguishing the decent woman from the prostitute, though it was
not actually practiced in any of the societies studied here - it
was rather a practice of the Oriental and Greek East. The issues
here will be discussed again in a later chapter ( ch 7)«
Approaching matters via the City-state and the household
carries a tendency to focus on the citizenry and the wife and
mother. Prom one point of view, this should be the central focus,
as should be clear from the previous chapter, since these are the
main reproducing (and conflicting) strata. Nonetheless, there is
a need to look somewhat more widely. This means in two directions:
servile agrarian labour, and the urban proletariat.
For the former case, this entails looking at the household
as the basis of a wider domination that extends over land, slaves
and livestock. The basic question here is whether the agrarian
workforce is a slave-gang, working perhaps literally as a chain-
gang under the supervisor's lash, or a force of share-croppers,
working on a family labour basis and possessing their own house¬
holds. This is very much a contrast between the City-state under
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oligarchic conditions and the Bureaucratic Kingdom - patrician
estates in the democratic City tend to be on broadly similar
terms to the latter, (it should be remembered that a free peas¬
antry is a typical condition for Antiquity; indeed, it is the
basis of the plebeian citizenry of the City-state. Thus it is of
course not considered here. Again, it is only large estates that
have a servile workforce. And again, it was not the general prac¬
tice of Antiquity to use slaves in agriculture. See Appendix A
part ii for further discussion.) With a slave workforce, the dom¬
ination of the household head is absolute, operating maybe through
a private apparatus but meeting no organization of the workforce
from the underneath. A serf or share-cropping workforce, however,
will have its own village organizations, councils and headman,
which will negotiate labour rates and practices, exploitation
levels etc. with the estate owners (and with the state itself in
regard to corvee), and the state will protect these arrangements.
These organizations will likely also have local functions in sett¬
ling disputes, adjudicating inheritances, etc. As such, men and
women may participate equally in them, and women will then have
distinct rights, and personality to demand those rights; a power¬
ful modification of the household authority of their menfolk. This
was the situation in Egypt, and in time Rome also developed in
this direction, with the development of the colonate. This comes
slowly during the Principate and is eventually associated with
its fall, and with the Dominate that follows. But that is to cross
the threshold into medieval Christian civilization. (As to village
councils in City-states, these are simply the local citizens deal¬
ing with the local administration of the political community.
They have little significance.)
Turning to the urban proletariat: this in the City-state is
a conglomerate of landless citizens, resident foreigners and
slaves living away from their owners, generally recruiting by mi¬
gration rather than by their own fertility, as I have discussed
before. In Athens, the citizen element was politically and milit¬
arily engaged, but that is exceptional. In Rome, this was rather
a field for clientage; again, an extension of private domestic
authority. This is interesting, in that the private authority of
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the patron over his clients is quite disengaged from the author¬
ity of the head of the household over his wife; indeed, the wife
herself may he a patron (so indeed a woman may he a client). This
is illustrative of how far the wife is free of domestic male
authority; something that begins in the Late Republic and increas¬
ingly develops through the Principate. Incidentally, voluntary
associations - basically the burial clubs of the poor (collegia)
- took patrons too; indeed for a time even Cities might do so. It
was not just individuals who were clients.
In the fully developed Bureaucratic Kingdom of Egypt, howev¬
er, the urban poor are basically a single stratum without intern¬
al distinctions, as indeed becomes the case in the Roman Princip¬
ate. Their organization is very much on the same lines as with
agrarian labour: looal councils and headmen. However, the control
over craft* labour and markets does not face exactly the same pro¬
blems as with agriculture; unfortunately, little is known about
this. Closed hereditary recruitment of craft labour, though it
may appear in the Roman Dominate, does not appear to be a factor
anywhere in the Ancient Civilization proper.
In fine, to approach society in terms of servile agrarian
labour and the urban poor is basically to highlight the Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom and the local community organizations - themes
which can be projected back through the chapter through the dis¬
cussions of e.g. public entertainments, the seclusion of women in
the community, internal divisions within the household, etc. As I
stated at the outset, the contrast is of household societies with
community societies, though both types have both households and
communities. Viomen either are secluded and subordinated in the
household, or participate and have equality in the community.
A fairly sharp and consistent contrast can be maintained in
these terms between City-states and Bureaucratic Kingdoms; at
least Athens and Egypt are clear- instances. The case of Rome is
more complex; the process of transition is clearly discernible,
but the protection of the Roman citizenship does make for a sur¬
prising maintenance of City-state patterns in certain regards,
focussing not unnaturally on the transmission of political status.
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Further complicating the picture are the initial differences of
the Roman City-state from the Athenian: indeed, it must he admit¬
ted that the lesser sociological contrast of the sub-types of the
City-state seems rather more difficult to draw and maintain. The
basic reasons for this were indicated in the previous chapter:
Weber's basic sub-types are the Patrician City and the Plebeian
City, but I have not found adequate sources (or space or time)
for the analysis of gender relations in the Patrician City, and
only consider the differences between conditions of oligarchy and
democracy in Cities that are structurally Plebeian. I have to add
that I find it hard to reduce all the differences that stand be¬
tween Athens and Rome to this basis; I cannot but be aware of the
wider Greek civilization, and indeed, the enigma of the cultural
heritage from earlier (e.g. Mycenaean) Greek history.
Even so, it seems clear what the basic differences for our
purposes between oligarchic and democratic City-states at least
are. In the former, there is greater extension of the private do¬
main in terms of clientage, a biassing of the political community
towards political-legal rather than military affairs (internal
rather than external predation), and a greater participation of
women, albeit informally, in these affairs. Basically, there is
an attempt to appropriate public affairs by privatizing them (and
a corresponding depoliticization of actual life in public). As
against this, democratic City-states eschew clientage in favour
of brotherhoods, bias public affairs towards the military dimen¬
sion and war (external rather than internal predation), and rigor¬
ously exclude women from public life, to the point of seclusion
and restriction to women's quarters within the household. The
division of public and private spheres here is rigorous. The un¬
derlying reasons for these differences have already been indicat¬
ed, in the struggle between the strata for control of the state,
the different strategies of a small group defending closure and a
large group challenging closure. It should be kept in mind in
this that the strata are political-military in character not econ¬
omic, and that the economic role of women, as mistress of the
household, gives them a paradoxically strong position, especially
where the menfolk are absent on account of war. At Athens, the
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alternative economic basis of the citizenry in the booty of empire
undercut this. But at Rome, patrician women are players not pawns.
To this can be added that close-kin inter-marriage for the pro¬
tection of property will have greater impact in a small patrician
group than in a large plebeian one, and also that patricians,
through their greater wealth, have more latitude with the manage¬
ment of their womenfolk's fertility than have plebeians. In all,
it seems clear that patricians need to use their womenj plebeians
need to control theirs. The difference in the position of women,
especially the position of women in the community, is a conspic¬
uous element in the differences between the two types of City.
More on these matters will appear in the next two chapters.
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In this chapter I turn to the consideration of sexual polar¬
ity itself. In discussing this earlier at the methodological lev¬
el (ch 3), I defined it in four elements: fertility and maternity;
maturation; sexuality; and aggression. I argued that internal res¬
onances could he found, on the one hand, between fertility/matern-
ity and sexuality; on the other, between maturation and aggress¬
ion. I argued too that sexuality and aggression, and maternity
also, should be seen not simply as instincts, but as emotionally
illuminated competences which are (or may be) the basis for
skills and lore to be acquired and transmitted - though on the
other hand, these may be disapproved or withheld. That is, they
should be seen as forms of social action. The intention in this
chapter is to look at social action, social relationships and
practices.
Integrating this with the material of the last two chapters,
there are two key issues to highlight. One is the demographic
dimension: in City-states, procreation is problematic, for all
strata; in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, procreation is on the whole un-
problematic. The other issue concerns local community structures:
in City-states, the household controls the property and personnel
of the lineage, under the authority of the adult males; in Bureau¬
cratic Kingdoms, the household is a pragmatic unit of shared sub¬
sistence without corporate identity or continuity, and its mem¬
bers are co-equally individual participants in the wider commun¬
ity. Taking these points together, the social articulation of
sexual polarity can be seen in terms of a simple dichotomy: in
the one case, as a realm requiring to be controlled and contained;
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in the other, as a realm to "be accepted and accomodated. In both
cases, the economic impact of fertility is analytically the first
issue, but beyond this is simply the conflict between natural
impulses and the institutions set up to control them. Strikingly,
these institutions are the household and male domestic authority
in the City-state; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom they are unfilled.
Indeed, women have a positive protection from such things.
Fundamentally, then, we can speak of "control societies" and
"acquiescent societies": City-state, domestic family, lineage and
household; Bureaucratic Kingdom, atomistic family, existential
non-corporative unit and local community. Again, two basic aspects
in which the contrast is clear can be identified. Firstly, do
social actors use sexual intercourse as a means to procreation,
or do they enjoy it for its own sake without regard to the con¬
sequences? This point I have raised earlier, in my methodological
discussions (ch 3). Secondly, do social actors demand social crit¬
eria for membership and recruitment to their social groups in
terms of legitimacy, acknowledgement by the father, initiation at
"coming of age", etc.? Or do they accept membership and recruit¬
ment simply in virtue of the natural process of birth? Such social
criteria relate to the social closure processes discussed in pre¬
vious chapters, especially in regard to the domestic family, the
political community, and its status stratification. The two asp¬
ects then clearly reflect each other. Vie can speak accordingly of
"reproduction societies" and "procreation societies".
This is once more to set up dichotomies in terms of the main
typological orientation of this thesis: City-state versus Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom. The correspondences have been indicated. As to
the secondary typology, the sub-types of the City-state, I have
argued in the previous chapter that the stratificatory conflicts
of the patrician and plebeian strata make for a polarization of
the social practices related to their closure strategies. In this
the characteristic gender practices of the City-state are, by
comparison with the Bureaucratic Kingdom, softened under oligarch¬
ic conditions and hardened under conditions of democracy. Patric¬
ians need to use their women; plebeians to control theirs. The
oligarchic City-state then is acquiescent rather than controlling
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in certain respects of sexual polarity, though it retains its
overall orientation to reproduction rather than procreation. How
this applies across the different elements of sexual polarity
will emerge in the discussions that follow.
These preliminary points should provide a basic orientation
for what follows.
Fertility and Maternity
The subject at issue here is primarily women's relation to
their own reproductive biology, the functions of fertility and
motherhood. Secondarily, male parenting is also an issue. As dis¬
cussed above, these things are to be seen in terms of skills,
knowledge and emotion, as meaningful social action, not simply as
biological processes.
The first issue then is women's knowledge of their own bio¬
logy. Here a point universal for Antiquity is the young age of
girls at first marriage: generally of the order 13 - 15 (sometimes
younger), apparently just after puberty. With this, it is also
universal that girls are brought up in small nuclear families set
in wider households, though the nature of the wider household is
matter for variation. In City-states, the household will include
slaves; in conditions of oligarchic control and where wealth per¬
mits, this will include slave families, though typically in dem¬
ocratic conditions and especially at plebeian level it will not.
In Bureaucratic Kingdoms the household will often run to, or be
closely associated with, several nuclear units, of whatever stat¬
us.
This, then, is the situation in which the girl's childhood
takes place. It is also the situation that she goes into at marr¬
iage, and as mistress of her own household despite her youth. In
the City-state, she may be initially under the tutelage of her
husband, at least in democratic conditions where the age differ¬
ence between husband and wife is typically great. In no case how¬
ever is the wife under the permanent supervision of resident
female kin, neither her husband's nor her own. She is mistress of
her household. As such, she will have control of a female staff;
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under oligarchic conditions or at patrician level generally this
is likely to include her own female slaves, "brought with her from
her own household at marriage.
The upshot of these points seems to me to "be that generally
for Antiquity there is no occasion and no possibility of with¬
holding knowledge of their own biology from girls. Only in pleb¬
eian households in democratic City-states would this be possible,
and even here there seems to be no consistent attempt at it. It
should be added that ancient religion and mythology is universally
rich in sexual and reproductive themes and imagery, and that women
were exposed to this and indeed were often its specific bearers.
The low age of female marriage may appear puzzling in regard
to City-states, where the economic pressures on fertility are
high. But it should be remembered that we are dealing here with a
political community, not with a complete population. The main
means through which excess fertility was controlled was exposure,
especially female exposure. I will return to consider this below.
In Bureaucratic Kingdoms none of these considerations apply, and
the young age of marriage is not remarkable.
Pregnancy and childbirth generally follow soon after marr¬
iage. I have already given some considerations on the household
situation in which these things occur: generally the wife is mis¬
tress of her own household, and her control over how she exper¬
iences these things and over her sources of knowledge and advice
is likely to be good. Female kin may be supportive or destructive;
where the continuity of a lineage is in question, probably there
is risk that the husband's female kin will be destructive, where¬
as the wife's own kin will generally be supportive. But in anci¬
ent City-states the wife has a strong, although somewhat isolated,
position against such pressures - especially in plebeian house¬
holds in the democratic City. Midwives assist the birth in all
cases. It is interesting that in Egypt and the Roman Principate,
these were trained and recognized paramedics, associated with the
physician's craft, whereas at Athens, they were of much lesser
training and status, and were apparently sometimes simply neigh¬
bours. This was probably also so at early Rome. The modes of
childbirth too can be contrasted. At Athens, the woman was put to
I ST t5
bed., and made wholly passive; in Egypt, she squatted "on the
bricks", and played a far more active part. At Rome, a special
birthing-stool was used, which seems to give the woman a limited
active involvement.
Child-bed mortality should be given consideration, but it is
hard to discuss: we do not have adequate empirical data (especial¬
ly for rural populations) even for the Roman World. It can be
suggested that the seclusion of women makes for poor standards of
health and physical fitness, and thus increased difficulties at
childbirth. This clearly marks Athenian women as more at risk
than Egyptian or Roman.
However, to go beyond this and try to evaluate the effective¬
ness of the midwife's craft is difficult. It certainly cannot be
straightforwardly assessed from ancient medical literature, for
that is to beg questions both as to the medicalization of child¬
birth and as to the social location and typical uses of literacy.
The latter issue I discuss below, in considering contraception and
abortion: the basic point is that the Graeco-Roman medical writ¬
ings typically have little bearing for the actual practised phys¬
ician' s craft, though that is not true for Egypt. For the former
issue, it should be realized that even if childbirth is not med-
icalized but is regarded as part of household management, it can
still be under male control. On the other hand, where the medical¬
ization of childbirth is accompanied by the assimilation of the
midwife to the physician's craft, and even some opening of the
physician's profession to women, this does not mean the develop¬
ment of male control over female reproductivity. In both cases,
the question is: who is the midwife's client, the woman in labour
or the male head of the household? In both Egypt and the Roman
Principate, the medicalization of childbirth meant medically
trained midwives and female physicians, and the woman in labour
as herself client as well as patient. But the contrast with Athens
should not be overstated: the structure of Athenian religion pro¬
tected the relationship between midwife and patient from male
supervision.
Returning however to the midwife's effectiveness, it can be
assumed that the training and wider experience that accompany
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professionalization made the Egyptian and Roman midwife more
resourceful than the Athenian. But that training is mainly prac¬
tical. Its relation to the medical writings is first and foremost
a question of how far the midwife informed the medical writer.
Only in Egypt is there anything approximating to the medical text¬
book; Graeco-Roman medical literature is literature. Its gynaeco¬
logical content can vary from quite eccentric speculative philos¬
ophy to fairly solid empirical content; the latter is more likely
where there are women physicians and where the physician's text
is a typical use of literacy. That develops to an extent in the
later Principate, though never so fully as in Egypt. But the for¬
mer, speculative, component arises precisely in conditions of
remoteness from practical applications and considerations. What¬
ever its impact for subsequent Western medicine, Graeco-Roman gyn¬
aecological speculation had no impact for actual gynaecological
management at the time. Conversely, the practised midwife's craft
was empirically not speculatively grounded. There are at least no
grounds for questioning its effectiveness.
There are sharp differences between the societies in the
mother's relationship to her children. I have pointed to this in
the previous chapter. In the City-state, the wife is producing
children to perpetuate her husband's lineage; they are his child¬
ren not hers. It is the husband who decides whether to acknowledge
the child, and who names it; these are ceremonies that follow a
few days after the child's birth. At Athens and Rome the father
has at least in principle the right to decide whether the child
is to be raised or exposed, and this seems very widespread in
Antiquity, especially in Graeco-Roman Antiquity. It is the husband
who keeps the children if the marriage is dissolved; the divorced
wife has not even access to them. The wife's role, then, is to
bear children; it is not to raise them. That is done by slaves,
supplemented later by schools. Where possible, even wet-nurses are
used, in preference to the mother herself breast-feeding, though
this is dependent on a certain development of the economy. It
happens at both Athens and Rome.
In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the children belong to
the parents in partnership. In Egypt it was apparently the mother
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who named the child, and there is no question of the father's
giving or withholding acknowledgement. As to exposure, the Egypt¬
ians did not practise it. In the event of dissolution of marri¬
age it is the wife who keeps the children, though it is also she
who leaves the marital household; securing the inheritance rights
of the children may become matter for litigation. I am not clear
what access rights the Egyptian father has, but the inheritance
situation probably indicates it: the wife will be eager for her
children to visit their father's household, though his subsequent
wife if he remarries will resist this. These again are typical
litigational matters. Indeed such matters show in the myths of
Isis and Horus. The mother in Egypt nurses and raises her child¬
ren herself, even at the upper levels of society; she does not
entrust this to slaves. But although the pattern here can be
attributed to the bureaucratic character of Egyptian civilization,
the Roman Principate does not really move towards it, but rather
stays rooted in City-state practice. I have suggested earlier that
the continuing protection of the Roman citizenship under the Prin¬
cipate is probably the main reason for this.
These factors (rather, surely, than child mortality rates for
example) condition the emotional involvement of parents with their
children, and indeed those of children with their parents. In the
City-state, the mother's emotional involvement with her children
is slight, and the father is basically an authority figure. The
main emotional relationship is between children and the slaves
who raise them, especially wet-nurses. Too, there may be strong
bonds between free and slave children raised together. Against
this, in Bureaucratic Kingdoms the emotional relationships between
parents - both parents - and children are warm and uncomplicated,
on both sides. Thus as I indicated in introducing this chapter,
the question is whether Nature is controlled or accepted - a
question on which it is possible to have altogether too much meth¬
odological sophistication.
As to the non-citizen mother, there are two main categories
here: the concubine and the slave-mother. As earlier discussions
should have made clear, the definitions and boundaries of these
categories with each other and with marriage are hazy and complic-
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ated. Typically, though, concubinage is a union of choice, across
wide status difference, especially in the City-state where the
woman is often slave or non-citizen. Always the relationship is
legally recognized and protected; and typically it is the mother
rather than the father to whom the children are attributed. In
consequence, this tends to create family relationships and emot¬
ional ambience after the pattern of the Bureaucratic Kingdom.
This is discernible at Athens and quite unmistakabe at Rome.
As to the slave-mother, this is typical only of patrician
households and the oligarchic City, and even here the urban hou¬
sehold must be distinguished from the rural estate. In the latter,
children simply add to the master's wealth; they are attributed
to the mother only and are often the consequence of promiscuity.
But slave-breeding was never successfully practised in Antiquity,
although incentives - e.g. freedom for the mother of three or
four children - were sometimes given. Broadly, the pattern in
relationships and experiences here again is similar to that of
the Bureaucratic Kingdom. The urban household by contrast is the
setting rather for stable slave unions; the children would be
brought up together with the free children of the household, as
noted before. With this, the female slave's experience of fertil¬
ity and maternity would be similar to, and indeed would reciproc¬
ally condition, that of the mistress of the household. Among such
household slaves there is an aspiration to freedom, indeed at
Rome to citizenship, though slave families did risk break-up
through sale. Here then the tendency is rather towards the City-
state citizen-family pattern. But the arrangement, of permitting
slave families in richer urban households, though favoured was
far from universal.
In sum, it is household and community structure that condit¬
ion the experiences of fertility and maternity rather than the
woman's stratificatory location, although the City-state has,
broadly speaking, opposite patterns for citizen and non-citizen
households in regard at least to maternity and parent-child rela¬
tionships. On the whole, the latter accord with the pattern that
is universal for the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This is as indicated
in the previous chapter, in discussing family types and household
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structures. But the discussion of the universal characteristics
of the household there should also be recalled.
Lastly, I turn to the questions of the control of fertility
and the limitation of family size. Here there are four main pass-
ibilities: infanticide, exposure, contraception and abortion.
They can be taken in pairs.
The first point is that, although exposure is commonplace in
Antiquity, the presumption is that the child will be found and
raised; outright infanticide is exceptional. This at least holds
for the societies that are considered here; in the Ancient Near
East one sometimes finds mention of babies being "thrown to the
dogs". It must be added that the Egyptians do not ever seem to
have practised exposure. In classical Antiquity, the father in a
citizen household had the right to decide whether to raise or
expose the child, as I noted earlier; with this, poor urban women
must often have exposed their children. Yet it is puzzling: there
are indications that exposure may not actually have been practised
in classical Athens, despite its accepted place in Greek culture.
The democracy had some impact for increasing economic opportunit¬
ies (including the tribute of empire) for the poor, and hence
increasing the possibilities for them to raise their children.
However, the matter must be left open.
The economic pressures on fertility that motivate exposure
I have explored in a previous chapter (ch 4)5 the corollary point
is that the exposed child would commonly be raised as a slave.
With this goes the preferential exposure of girl-children, to be
raised as prostitutes. In the light of the earlier discussions,
it can be suggested that all this comprises far more an oligarch¬
ic pattern than a democratic one; in the democratic City, the
economic pressures are contained and the slaves are imported.
Against all this, in the Bureaucratic Kingdom all these pressures1
and conflicts are simply absent. This I have discussed before. At
any rate, exposure is the father's decision. Protective amulets
left with the child might be attributable to the mother. These
had practical value, for by them the child's identity or free-
born status might be proven at a later time; the child could then
be reclaimed, or claim its freedom.
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Contraception and abortion are also attested throughout Ant¬
iquity, a range of means for both being known. Some methods were
worthless or dangerous? others, including spermicidal cervical
occlusions and surgical abortion, were unquestionably effective.
But there are problems in discussing this: most of our knowledge
comes from medical writings, and contraceptive or abortifacient
lore is not necessarily an aspect of the physician's craft, de¬
pending who wants these facilities. Again, medical texts may ex¬
clude surgery, as a craft taught by apprenticeship; our lack of
knowledge of Egyptian surgery is probably for this reason. Beyond
this, there are all the questions of the location of medicine in
ancient knowledge and the nature of ancient science, and their
relations to ancient literature. These issues are too large to go
into here, but some points should be made: above all, that only
briefly in Hellenistic Alexandria did true medical science ever
occur in Antiquity. Generally, Graeco-Roman medicine is simply a
branch of literature, ranging from on the one side speculative
philosophical enquiry to on the other mere antiquarian compilat¬
ion. The "medical writer" is not necessarily a physician, have
patients or pupils; and there are no medical schools with set
text-books. As against this, the Egyptian papyri seem to be the
notebooks of working physicians, and to be a much less problemat¬
ic reflection of the state of the art. In sum,' I have to say that
both Egyptian and Graeco-Roman medicine are capable of vast in¬
flation, though in different ways: the Egyptian for its empirical
content, the Graeco-Roman for its theoretical. The point however
is perhaps rather that neither of them knew how to put the two
things together (with the brief exception noted).
One reason for stating the above is that it should not be
assumed (as Hopkins assumes - Hopkins I965/6) that contraceptive
and abortifacient lore is necessarily a scientific innovation in
a hostile traditional (or religious) environment. It is rather a
question of competing traditional lores in a context of cultural
change. This is especially so at Rome.
More broadly, though, we need to ask first: who is the
client? A sharp distinction must be made between the man's desire
to limit the number of legitimate children he raises, and the
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woman* s desire -to limit the number of children she "bears. The man
may attain his end by means of exposure, or by avoiding sexual
intercourse with his wife. If so, and if the husband is the phys¬
ician's client, then the wife will not be the physician's patient
for contraceptive or abortifacient treatment. These things then
will only be part of the physician's craft so far as prostitutes
(or their owners) are physicians' clients - surely a limited ex¬
tent. Such lore as there is will be unwritten, and found among
midwives and prostitutes. This seems to have been the situation
at Athens. In Egypt, by contrast, exposure is not practised and
the wife's sexuality is not under her husband's control; moreover
it is the wife herself who is the physician's client as well as
patient. This last point extends to women generally, regardless
of personal status. Thus there is contraceptive knowledge at
least in the medical texts; surgical abortion was surely also
known. At Rome, the situation seems to have changed from the Ath¬
enian to the Egyptian pattern, although there was always tradit¬
ional disapproval of the citizen woman taking affairs into her
own hands in this way. But the basis of this disapproval should
be understood: that exactly as with exposure, it should be the
husband's decision. There is no ethical disapproval of contracep¬
tion and abortion as such, until the Christian writers. Even
interdicts against abortifacient drugs are directed at protecting
women from dangerous potions; surgical abortion is not similarly
interdict. This is so in the Roman Principate; it might possibly
also have been so in Egypt.
The demographic impact of contraception and abortion cannot
be assessed without knowledge of general population parameters
that we do not have. This applies especially to the rural popula¬
tion. Child-bed mortality rates and female life expectations can¬
not be assessed from urban data, even if this can be reliably
gathered. (These matters are briefly considered in Appendix A
part ii below.) But the pattern, general to Antiquity, of young
female marriage but small families requires us to propose low
fertility, and exposure and restricted sexual contact for wives
cannot be the general explanation; it would apply to City-states
only. Religious opposition to contraception and abortion appears
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only late in Antiquity, as the Roman Principate is ending (the
reasons for the Christian attitudes cannot be clarified here).
The implication then seems to be that contraception and abortion
do have a demographic impact at least in Bureacratic Kingdoms.
Modern experience suggests that advanced rational technology is
not altogether a necessary precondition for this; rather the
practice brings the technology.
A comment might be added as to non-conceptional sexual prac¬
tices: oral and anal intercourse, coitus interruptus, etc. These
practices really require to be seen in the context of the sexual
relationship, something to be considered in a later section. The
basic point however is the conception of marriage in the City-
state as a relationship geared to legitimate procreation, not to
sexual release. These practices then would have been used with
prostitutes or concubines, not with wives, and at that probably
seen more as sexual variety than as fertility limitation. In Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdoms, however, or indeed in the development at Rome,
the conception of marriage is different, including and even focus¬
sing on preferential sexual partnership. Here these practices will
come into play; they will work in conjunction with contraception
and abortion as above.
Maturation
Maturation is conceived here as a cycle running from birth
to parenthood. In this, the intention is to focus on childhood
from the point of view of the child growing towards adulthood.
The child* s growth is seen in terms of two reciprocal processes:
the acquisition of skills, knowledge, values etc. (socialization);
and the acquisition of individual identity and personal autonomy
(individuation). Masculinity/femininity develops through both
these processes.
To start at birth, at Athens and at Rome there is public
announcement of the ohild* 8 birth by decorating the house's door¬
posts. The sex of the child is declared by the symbol displayed
(laurel or wool). Too, there are ceremonies soon after the birth
of the father's acknowledgement and naming of the child, and at
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Athens the phratry would "be informed, at least for the hirth of a
son. At Rome from the start of the Principate citizen "births were
registered with the state. At Egypt, the mother goes through a
period of post-natal purification, but ritual beyond this does
not seem to be known. Apparently it was the mother that named the
child. Swaddling probably has no consequences for personality
formation, but it may indicate a cultural attitude to human nat¬
ure and its relation to society. It was practised at Athens and
Rome, but in Egypt babies and infants went naked.
The care of babies and infants is everywhere the task of
women, but there are as indicated previously differences between
the societies in household situation. In City-states it is slaves
who care for children, including wet-nurses; in larger households
in the oligarchic City there may be a shared up-bringing with
slave children. In Egypt it is the mother who cares for the child¬
ren, and if the household is extended it is with limited formal
status differences. At Athens, infants are confined to the women's
quarters. There is no parallel to this in Egypb, nor at Rome ex¬
cept when guests are being entertained in the home. The sexual
differentiation of infants in terms of toys, games, clothing etc.
seems to have been fairly limited in all cases.
It is about the age of six or seven that the child starts to-
go into the wider world, and that real sexual differentiation
begins: the boy now passes into his father's care, while the girl
stays in the care of her mother. Too, the boy now has male slave
attendants, while the girl stays with the female ones; at least
this differentiation is made in richer households. This pattern
is most marked at Athens, where boys only go to school while the
girls, like most citizen women, remain secluded in the home. At
Rome, boys and girls go to school together, and this is old est¬
ablished custom - it is impossible to say why. In both Cities,
the availability of schooling extends quite far down the social
scale; this holds for Roman boys and girls alike, although, there
might be a preference to educate the upper strata girl privately
at home. This pattern of education endures and even extends under
the Principate. For Egypt, far less is known. Schools run by the
state bureaus were probably for boys only, but there appear to
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have "been temple schools also, which probably accepted girls.
There may also have been private education. At the least, since
there were literate women, in the temples and elsewhere, some
systematic provision, for it must be assumed. The uptake of school
education must be assessed in terms of the extent of literacy and
the size of the state and temple bureaucracies and the priest¬
hood.
In all cases, schooling includes literacy as a central elem¬
ent; therefore something must be said about the place of literacy
in culture and society. There are sharp contrasts: City-states
run their affairs in oral not in literate terms, whereas literacy
is of the essence of bureaucracy. Thus literacy in the Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdom should really be compared with rhetoric in City-states.
Rhetoric was a specialized advanced education for young adults,
and in all City-states restricted to males. Literacy in City-
states is a factor not of public affairs as such but of closure
conflicts in the political community. The plebeians demand a
written law-code, to break the monopoly of legal knowledge of the
patricians; the patricians for their side develop a literature of
political commentary as a private means of communication among
themselves, circumventing the Assembly. These things are a factor
of the change from Patrician City to Plebeian City, and of sub¬
sequent stratificatory conflicts within the Plebeian City. The
Patrician City itself is basically preliterate.
Culture in the City-state always retains a strong oral elem¬
ent, as for example the theatre, but this holds much more in the
democratic City, where education will also include strong non-
literary elements such as singing and dancing. Again, the demo¬
cratic City has no use for literate women, though prostitute com¬
panions (hetaerae) with an education in non-literary culture will
be valued. But the oligarchic City does have a use for literate
women, due to the greater companionship, the sharing in social
life and even the informal culture of political life, between cit¬
izen (especially patrician) women and men. Again, literacy can be
of use in controlling large households. Indeed, given this, and
its bearing on the origins of bureaucracy, as against the oral
nature of the Council and Assembly of the City—state, it is hard
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to justify any preliminary sociological assumption that it must
be men who are literate, women illiterate. It could even be cred¬
ibly speculated that it was women that first invented writing.
Incidentally, it should be realized that the writing down of old¬
er material, e*.g. Homer, in City-state civilization is basically
a support for a continuing oral tradition; likewise that the read-
of literary texts often means reading aloud by slaves. This last
is a typical Roman practice; presumably a factor of oligarchy
and patrician status.
As to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, in Egypt the monopolization
of the state apparatus by men is partially offset by the partici¬
pation of women in the priesthoods and (though perhaps in less
degree) the temple bureaucracies and the administration of priv¬
ate households, as well as their control of their own households
and private affairs. There is also cultural companionship between:
the sexes, even more than at Rome. Literature also exists here,
though it is comparatively slight; its location is simply that of
the recreation of the literate strata. Both sexes share in the
enjoyment, and perhaps the creation, of this. This character emer¬
ges too to a certain extent in the Roman Principate (and apparent¬
ly in the Hellenistic Kingdoms). The underlying factor is the ex¬
pansion of literature at the expense of rhetoric as the City
loses its political functions and becomes an administrative enti¬
ty. However, a certain cultural continuity of the Roman Princip¬
ate with the Roman City-state remains; indeed, there is a cultur¬
al continuity that runs through the whole of Graeco-Roman civili¬
zation. But however that may be, the final comment must be made
that, in view of these considerations on the sociology of liter¬
acy, I would assume literacy rates to have been as high in Egypt
as in the Roman world, and, due to the literacy of women, higher
than at Athens.
In City-states, education must also include physical and
military training, and an introduction to public affairs. This is
for boys only, and begins at the mid-teens. Gymnasium training is
one aspect; actual military training will begin rather later, and
is focussed on disciplined infantry manoevring rather than weapon-
craft. Besides this, the youth will begin to be taken to the
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Assembly and. to hear speeches and legal proceedings, though he
will not at this stage take part in them. This aspect of his ed¬
ucation will probably be undertaken by his father, and is likely
to be accompanied by an introduction to a politicized social life,
in terms of introductions to the influential, dinner-parties at
which politics are discussed, and so forth. It may also be accom¬
panied by a formal education in rhetoric, though not in the first
years. This stage of the boy* s upbringing is marked by ceremonies
of coming of age, which mark the formal ending of childhood. The
boy is registered on the citizen-rolls of his City (or the Roman
citizenship), and at Athens he would join his father's phratry.
At Rome this would occur somewhat earlier than at Athens (perhaps
about 14 - 15), but the liability to military service would only
follow later.
But these matters have to be considered in the light of the
discussions above (ch 4 & 5) on property inheritance, marriage,
and the household. In City-states, full adulthood means being
head of a household and owner of a lineage's property, and full
participation in public affairs is conditional upon this. This,
as discussed, entails the retirement or death of the father - at
Athens the former; at Rome the latter. Thus City-states have a
prolonged male adolescence, a period of some years during which
the young male passes by stages from childhood to full adulthood.
The coming of age ceremony only marks the start of this process;
the beginning of military service (about age 18) marks another
stage. Beyond this, the situation at Athens is that the son will
take over his father's household and will marry at about age 30;
he becomes a full citizen, playing his part in the Assembly and
law courts and eligible for Council membership or a magistracy,
only from that time. At Rome, however, the son receives an inter¬
im devolution of property at about age 18, on which to set up his
own household and marry; nonetheless he remains strictly a minor
so long as his father lives. This status however is largely not¬
ional, and ceases to have effect on his public status from age
25? for all practical purposes including his public career he is
a full adult from that time.
Viith this, the two Cities have different patterns in regard
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to sexual relations and sexual companionship. At Athens, sexual
companionship is sought with cultured prostitutes (hetaerae) or
in homoerotic relationships; these last are typically between a
young man in his twenties and a youth in his teens. At Rome, sex¬
ual companionship is developed between husband and wife, and
young men below the age of marriage visit brothels for sexual
release. There are no hetaerae at Rome, and for long homosexual¬
ity was disfavoured. These matters will be discussed more fully
in the next section. But it should be noted that there is for men
a positive expectation that they will have sexual relations dur¬
ing adolescence. This holds for both Cities.
As with material in the previous chapter, these patterns at
least make sense in terms of the differences between democratic
and oligarchic Cities, though it is difficult to insist on this
as their ultimate ground. The more military slant of citizenship
at Athens and its more political-legal slant at Rome might be
noted.
As to Bureaucratic Kingdoms, here there is no political cit¬
izenship and the army is professionalized; the closest equivalent
to the education for citizenship then might appear to be the
scribal education in literacy and literate administrative skills.
It may be indeed that a certain deferment of adulthood is assoc¬
iated with this. However the point is deceptive. For one thing,
it is precisely the scribal career that is most closely associat¬
ed with the system of appointments rather than inheritances. For
another, there is a citizenship here, albeit more curtailed, in:
terms of the rights to participate in or appear before the various
councils and legal tribunals. The point is precisely that there
is no constraint upon this status in. terms of the inheritance of
lineage property. It is simply a question of acquiring economic
autonomy, which is generally a factor of appointment rather than
inheritance. In practice, adult status appears to be attained
simply in virtue of acquiring economic autonomy and marrying -
founding one's household. The taking over of one's own affairs-
and the citizenship referred to above would accompany this. The
matters in question would probably be learnt by informal partic¬
ipation rather than a formal induction by the father as in the
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City-state, together with formal education and training in the
state bureaucracy itself. On the other hand, there does appear to
have been a coming of age ceremony in Egypt. It was apparently
purely a family affair, and may have been held for both sexes. As
to military service, this, being professionalized, does not have
the same significance as in the City-state.
The age of marriage for men is generally young, mid-teens,
though this might perhaps be deferred during a scribal education.
Sexual relations with prostitutes might perhaps be associated
with this. The expectation, however, is of sexual companionship
between husband and wife. It must be added that marriage in Egypt
is apparently at the couple's own choice. Accordingly, courtship
is an important, and indeed definitive, element of adolescence.
Again, this makes for a quite distinctive pattern of sexual rel¬
ationships, as will be seen. However, this adolescence of court¬
ship is a comparatively brief affair compared to the long citizen-
apprenticeship of the City-state. Moreover full adulthood seems
to have been acquired at once rather than in stages.
The Roman Principate shows certain developments towards the
Egyptian pattern in these matters. The professionalization of the
armed forces and their use as a means of extending the Roman cit¬
izenship both go some way to replacing the system of political-
economic inheritance with a system of appointments; moreover this
is set in the context of colonization programmes which are amel¬
iorative of economic pressure. The appointment of patricians to
administrative and military posts has similar impact at this lev¬
el. However, the heritable status and expectation of military or
administrative service of the Roman citizenship and its patrician
strata status still remain; moreover the serving soldier was not
permitted to make a citizen marriage. Again, the City is retained
as a basic unit of the Roman administration (often possessing its
own if not the Roman citizenship), though the active participat¬
ion of the citizen is much curtailed. In sum, then, a male adol¬
escence of military and political apprenticeship, especially for
those of citizen status, continues to be the general pattern
under the Principate.
So much for boys; for girls, the City-state pattern is that
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they are kept in their mother' care, out of public life, and that
childhood ends at marriage. This occurs soon after puberty, about
age 13 - 15 (even younger at patrician level at Rome). Yet there
are differences. At Athens, the girl is secluded (like her moth¬
er), and stays in the women's quarters in the household. At Rome,
girls go abroad for example to the baths or the circus; they go
to school together with boys, and have a preparation for a shared
social life and companionship with their husbands. Yet as pointed
out before, neither Athenian nor Roman girls will do housework or
raise children. They will direct their households; the Athenian
girl will work textiles; the Roman will manage her affairs. These
are the skills their mothers are likely to teach them. They may
also acquire knowledge of sex, childbirth, etc., from their slav¬
es if not from their mothers; the Roman girl, as discussed before,
has the more advantaged situation here.
As against this, in bureaucratic Egypt the girl, though
strictly speaking in her mother* s care, goes about freely, learns
her legal rights at the village council and higher tribunals, and
has a brief adolescence of courtship between childhood and marri¬
age. She might have schooling; I have noted above the difficult¬
ies in assessing this. She will also learn household skills, in¬
cluding housework and childcare, and also textile work; too, she
will learn how to handle her business affairs and transactions.
She will also learn about sex and childbirth. All this she can be
taken to be positively taught, though how far by her mother and
how far in the wider household and community is another question;
the household is much less an agency of control here. Like the
boy, she probably learns her rights especially at the local coun¬
cil by informal participation. Again, as with the boy, courtship
is an important element of the girl's adolescence, and although
the mother does seem to have had some control, it does not appear
that the Egyptian girl's virginity was insisted upon. It should
be added that, since the Egyptian girl does have a real citizen¬
ship in legal terms, it is at marriage that she becomes adult.
That is, it is when she sets up her own household (with her hus¬
band) that she becomes a full participant in her local council/
tribunal, and takes full charge of her own affairs. If the Egypt-
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ian girl's adolescence is brief, this is a factor of the type of
society she is in, not of her sex.
In the Roman Principate, there develop similar considerations
of legal personality. Other factors are also important: the syst¬
em of devolution of property, the system of marriage without dom¬
estic authority, the decline of the guardianship of women. Between
these processes, women come to adulthood under much the same con¬
ditions as men, that is, gradually between the age of marriage
and their father's death. In actuality, Roman practice was to
consider a person, whether man or woman, fully adult from age 25.
All this is to deal with propertied strata, at least so far
as City-states are concerned. But as discussed before, the urban
poor are basically not reproductive. There is consequently little
need to consider a specific upbringing or education in crafts and
trades. Where this occurs, the form is simply inductance into a
workshop, whether as child, apprentice or slave. Inductance into
prostitution is also made in these terms: household and workshop
are little distinguished in Antiquity, and a brothel (or an inn
or tavern) is simply a workshop or household. The education of
hetaerae may be a different matter, including skills in music,
dancing, etc. But basically this is still simply a matter of be¬
ing brought up in a hetaera's household, as her "daughter". More
will be said of these matters in later discussions (especially in
ch 7).
To sum up, what can be said about the contrast in maturat-
ional patterns is as follows. First, adolescence, in the sense of
a gradual acquisition of adulthood deferred until after physical
maturation, is basically a matter of males in City-states only,
with a tentative and limited occurrence for scribal class males in
Bureaucratic Kingdoms. There is no female adolescence in the City-
state. Against this, however, there is the brief courtship phase
that both sexes share in Bureaucratic Kingdoms; this too is adol¬
escence. Second, membership, especially male membership, of pol¬
itical communities seems to require social affirmation, especially
at birth, at coming of age, and at final adulthood. Membership of
the lineage is most powerfully conditioned by this. In Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdoms, by contrast, simple birth and physical maturation
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seem to be enough, both at general societal and at household lev¬
el. As I suggested earlier, the question is whether human nature
is seen as having to be controlled and contained, or rather to be
accepted and accomodated.
Beyond this, a contrast can also be drawn in terms of the
two component processes of maturation: socialization and individ¬
uation. In the sense of which process is most stressed, we can
speak of City-states and Bureacratic Kingdoms as "socialization
societies" and "individuation societies". The contrast is most
obvious for girls, since women in City-states have little autono¬
my, especially in conditions of democracy. But it is also true
for boys. For in the City-state, the man aspires not to autonomy
but to domestic authority, and his individual identity is at least
partly submerged in his lineage. It is in the Bureaucratic King¬
dom, as argued before, that autonomy and individual identity are
found.
Sexuality
Sexuality, as discussed before, is to be seen in terms of
instinctually driven and emotionally illuminated competences, in
which there is scope for skills and lore to be acquired and trans¬
mitted (or again, disapproved and withheld). That is, it is to be
seen in terms of what people do rather than what they are. The
focus then is on types and meanings of social action and relation¬
ship. Consideration of sexuality in conciousness and culture
should be grounded in the consideration of sexuality in social
structure, rather than in for example a universalistic psychology
(Psychoanalysis) or a "history of ideas".
The basic types of sexual relationship include: marriage,
adultery, concubinage, mistresses, love affairs, casual sex, rel¬
ations with prostitutes, etc. There are also questions of hetero-
sexuality and homosexuality, and indeed, of positive and negative
evaluations of sexuality and sexual activity. And there is the
question of love. Organization of this field entails establishing
how these things contextualize and contrast with each other, how
they inter-relate. In this, contrasting syndromes can be identif-
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ied, corresponding to the different societal types.
In City-states, marriage is located in the continuity of
political community, status group and lineage, as I have discuss¬
ed "before. Marriages are arranged, the girl especially having
little say in the choice of partner; moreover there are age diff¬
erences, often acute, between the partners.
Yet there are great differences between Athens and Rome,
some at least of which reflect the democratic and oligarchic City
types, as noted before. In Athens, the age difference is greatest:
men marry at 3C, girls at 15« Moreover the structure of household
and social life excludes and secludes women, and education and
the transmission of culture reflect this. Husband and wife then
are in no sense companions to each other, and the marital sexual
relationship seems to be directed wholly to procreation - which
in turn is limited. The Athenian husband uses alternative sexual
outlets, especially hetaerae; that is, cultured prostitutes who
sell professional companionship as well as sexual intercourse.
Much of male recreational life is made up in these terms. Besides
this, the Athenian man may have other arrangements prior to marr¬
iage: a concubine, probably a bought slave, either within his
father's household or set up in her own; a homosexual love-affair
with another young citizen; also the intermittant use of hetaerae
or ordinary prostitutes. Indeed, he may maintain such arrangements
instead of marrying; perhaps more typically, an older man might
do so instead of remarrying. In face of this, the Athenian wife
will have a very limited sexual experience. Entering into marriage
a virgin, her husband may initiate her into sexual intercourse,
but he is unlikely to maintain the sexual relationship for long,
even past the first pregnancy. Y'et her chastity will be insisted
upon; she will have no other sexual outlets.
At Rome, by contrast, husbands and wives share a social and
recreational life in common, and citizen girls are educated for
this. Although the arranged nature of marriage is the same as at
Athens, though typically with far smaller age differences (say 20
and 14), still the companionship of husband and wife is central
to marriage. Rome has no hetaerae. Citizen youths use prostitutes
before marriage, and purely for sexual intercourse. Concubines
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and mistresses may be kept before marriage, or in preference to
remarriage; typically these (the former at least) will be bought
slaves or freedwomen, living in the man's own household or set up
in their own but with the man's slaves. But once married, the man
would make and maintain a positive sexual and emotional relation¬
ship with his wife, and it seems clear that this practice was much
conditioned by the experience of relations with mistresses and
concubines. For the wife's side, she would enter marriage a vir¬
gin, and would be initiated into sexual intercourse by her hus¬
band. But the sexual relationship is also a relationship of com¬
panionship, and it is enduring and is not limited by the constrai¬
nts on procreation. Roman wives learnt skills of lovemaking, and
it seems that they must also have learnt skills of fertility lim¬
itation and used the services of contraception and abortion. The
freedom of movement of Roman wives, and their freedom within the
household, is basically unrestricted, so that their chances for
non-marital sexual outlets are fairly good. Even so, traditional¬
ist criticism of the morals of Roman citizen women is probably
more directed at their style of marriage than at actual adultery
or promiscuity. It should be noted, incidentally, that whatever
the traditionalist past, the above pattern clearly develops in
the Late Republican oligarchic City, although the Principate is
in strong continuity with it.
In Bureacratic Kingdoms, the location of marriage is essent¬
ially different; it is very much the affair of the couple them¬
selves, though perhaps with a formal requirement of consent from
the girl's parents. It appears that the couple have their free
choice of each other, and that consequently courtship is an im¬
portant element of adolescence - indeed, probably a definitive
element. In this, the girl might yield her virginity and the
couple begin their sexual relationship premaritally. All this is
to judge from the Egyptian love-poetry, which is apparently the
shared entertainment of married men and women together, for exam¬
ple read . aloud or sung at banquets, and reflects their own court¬
ships. This is in contrast to Roman love poetry, which rather
reflects upper strata men's dealings with their mistresses. At
any rate, the companionship, education for companionship, and
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shared social life of husband and wife are clear. But there is
little obvious antithesis to the marriage relationship. Concubines
seem most to have been favoured when it was desired not to compli¬
cate inheritance situations, a desire that could come from both
sides. Love affairs either lead to marriage, or else to the break¬
up of marriage and possibly on to remarriage. Prostitutes might
perhaps be used before marriage but only if the scribal education
demanded that marriage be deferred. This is tentative; in truth,
there is very little concrete attestation of prostitution in Anc¬
ient Egypt. On the girl's side, marriage is made young and to a
freely chosen partner of equal age; the sexual relationship is
strongly and mutually developed and maintained. Probably the wife
uses techniques of fertility limitation, though procreation here
is less problematic. Incidentally, prolonged lactation is a known
practice here which may have been a factor in this. Freedom of
movement and freedom in the household being unrestricted, the
wife's chances of other sexual outlets are as great as the hus¬
band's. Indeed, it is adultery, rather than prostitution as in
the City-state, that provides the antithesis to marriage in this
type of society.
This gives the basic outline of three contrasting syndromes.
Much remains to be added of course. One point is that marriage in
the City-state is always something of a public possession; that
is, it is located between the public and private spheres. The
wedding procession that takes the couple to their new home (more
accurately, the wife's new home) amid ribaldry surely marks the
public appropriation of their sexual relationship; that they are
not simply free to establish their intimacy on their own terms.
No equivalent to this in Egypt is known.
Again, the conceptions of adultery are different. In City-
states, adultery is the sexual misconduct of any woman within a
man's domestic authority: not only the wife but also the daught¬
er, divorced sister, or even widowed mother. This can also extend
to a concubine living in his household. This applies to women
only; the reciprocal crime of male sexual misconduct is inter¬
course with a woman who is in another man's domestic authority,
and the offence is against that man. Moreover, all this is in the
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realm of public law. The husband does not have the choice whether
to divorce the adulterous wife; he must do so. These principles
appear to be general to City-states; indeed Augustus passed leg¬
islation re-affirming them for the Roman citizens (at least the
upper strata) in the Principate. The interpretation is difficult,
but it is surely not a question of protecting virginity, prevent¬
ing illegitimacy, or controlling procreation; neither is it a
matter of "morality" in traditional-religious sense. Directly,
such laws protect the citizen-standing of the household head;
above all, his right to secure citizen-marriages for his women¬
folk. One aspect that should be pointed out is that, where fines
and compensation are common resources of the law, the demand that
the adulterous wife must be divorced protects the wife from being
prostituted. But fundamentally it is surely the political commun¬
ity itself that is being protected here: protected from internal
strife. This strife is not on lines of closure but of faction, or
even of piecemeal conflict. For the political community is a comm¬
unity of household heads, controlling both property and lineage;
and yet, as discussed earlier, marriage and legitimacy are equi¬
vocally located in the status groups and their closure conflicts.
It is this equivocal location that gives laws on adultery an im¬
portance in their own right.
However these matters may be, adultery in Bureaucratic King¬
doms is a wholly different affair. It is simply sexual misconduct
of wife or husband, and is a private offence against the marital
partner only, justifying divorce at the partner's discretion. It
is wholly a private not a public concern. This is so in Egypt;
the Roman jurists also begin to talk this way from the 2nd century
A.D., though the Augustan laws on adultery remain in force.
As to Augustus' reintroduction of legislation governing ad¬
ultery and fornication at the birth of the Principate, this is a
notorious historical problem, and I discuss it as such below (ch
10). The thrust of his legislation seems to have been directed at
the Roman patricians, intending to compel them to keep their leg¬
itimate marriages among themselves and their non-legitimate deal¬
ings with prostitutes, concubines and mistresses separate and
distinct. This however should be seen in the context of Augustus'
overall program, together with some assessment of that program's
success. Augustus put an end. to the factional wars of the Roman
patricians and their dispossessed plebeian followings, re-estab¬
lishing the Roman citizenry as a coherent though stratified body;
at the same time disengaging the legal concept of the Roman citi¬
zenship from the concrete actuality of the city of Rome. The Rom¬
an citizenship was thus perpetuated as the basis of the empire.
This is a purely political achievement, and has nothing to do
with "morality". Two points especially to be noted are that Aug¬
ustus made no attempt to curtail "free" marriage, and that the
criminal proceedings for women's sexual misconduct are now trans¬
ferred from the family council to the state. However, although
Augustus succeeded in re-establishing the plebeian citizenry and
in curtailing the patricians' factionalism, he did not succeed in
re-establishing the patricians as a stable, self-reproducing and
politically engaged stratum. Under the Principate, the patricians
increasingly are dispossessed, fail to reproduce themselves, and
become dependent upon imperial appointments and salaries rather
than inherited wealth. With this, although love affairs among
upper strata citizens might be dangerous, the general ambience of
sexual relationships in the Principate seems to be in strong con¬
tinuity with the Late Republic. Only the most overt cultural ex¬
pression at patrician level is curtailed: in particular, the Rom¬
an love-poetry does not survive the Republic (that is, as a liv¬
ing art). It should be noted that the subsequent emperors main¬
tained the Augustan legislation, although it was perhaps not con¬
sistently enforced.
If marriage provides one angle from which to approach the
field of sexual relationships, then prostitution certainly pro¬
vides another. Prostitution has been discussed in earlier chap¬
ters; especially its basis in demographic processes has been in¬
dicated (ch 4); and it will be discussed again later, especially
in the discussion of sexual divisions in the economy (ch 7)« How¬
ever the intention here is to consider it as an angle of approach
to sexual relationships, as stated. Even so, it should be recall¬
ed first that prostitution is typically located in demographic
processes of supply and demand, and that these are associated with
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political communities and their strategies of closure: on the one
side, the exposure of citizen girl-children; on the other, the
non-marital sexual relationships of citizen men. Initially, this
is a pattern of the Patrician City, where it relates to the ex¬
propriation of the peasantry; in the subsequent development of
the stratificatory conflicts, citizen girls may come to be relat¬
ively protected, and the source of prostitutes, like that of all
slaves, become a matter of forcible acquisition abroad. This happ¬
ened at democratic Athens, and for a time in the Roman Republic
too, especially before the Punic Wars, though the later Roman
oligarchy revived the expropriation of the Italian peasantry. But
in either case, the location of prostitution in slavery and in
the exclusionary relationship to the political community is of
the essence. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms where the demographic press¬
ures are ameliorated there is neither the demand nor the supply;
prostitution is much less prevalent and moreover is quite differ¬
ently located. Here it is basically a profession of choice for
free women, with a clientele mostly of travellers, merchants, sea¬
men etc.
Prostitution in the City-state and in the Bureaucratic King¬
dom then is two very different things. In the City-state, prost¬
itution will tend to absorb all forms of non-marital sexual relat¬
ionship; in the Bureaucratic Kingdom, there will rather be love-
affairs of various kinds, and prostitution is something of a res¬
idual phenomenon.
To stay with City-states, then, prostitution here can take
many forms, but two main streams can first be identified: the
common prostitute and the courtesan (hetaera). The first sells
simple sexual intercourse, in a brothel or inn or in the streets.
Her clientele are likely to be in large part her own class: the
urban proletariat who, in the City-state, are not typically able
to marry or support families. This clientele incidentally includ¬
es slaves. But besides these, the prostitute's clientele may also
include travellers such as sailors or soldiers, and again it may
include the citizen, even patrician, young; this was apparently
always so at Rome. The other main strand, the courtesans, are
girls or women with some education who can offer cultural, though
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also sexual, companionship. Their clientele are commonly citiz¬
ens. I have already argued that this is typically co-existent
with marriage, and is a factor of a sexually segregated social
life: a typically democratic City pattern found at Athens and not
at Rome.
In the light of these considerations, a third stream can
also he identified: the bought or freed mistress. Typically this
is a girl raised as a slave for sale or rental to a patron, who
will free her and set her up in her own household, in the care of
his slaves. When the liaison ends, say with the patron's marriage
the girl is free to find new liaisons at her own discretion, poss
ibly expecting gifts rather than actually demanding payment. This
again is typically Roman, though it has Hellenistic precedent,
and is apparently a factor of the decline of the City-state. As
such, it appears in Hellenistic and Roman comedy, and in particul
ar it is this that underlies the love poetry of the last century
of the Roman Republic.
The girl in this third stream is something between a hetaera
and a concubine, and the phenomenon is one of transition: a trans
ition between prostitution and love-affair. This is most obvious
at Rome. But it should be realized generally that love, and sex¬
ual pleasure also, are by no means incompatible with prostitution
on the contrary, the situation is just as complex as with marria¬
ge. There are evident conflicts: the girl's owner may want to
have a man in love with her in order to maximize payment from him
the young man may want the girl to be in love with him for the
sake of love, security, or faithfulness; the girl may want the
young man to be in love with her, for love's sake, or for the
sake of wealth, or to get her freedom. The prostitution situation
then must be compatible with courtship. Again, the girl may value
her sexual freedom, or being sexually manipulated by her owner,
for the leverage it gives her over her lover, or for the sake of
sexual enjoyment. Mutatis mutandis, all this probably goes for
the common prostitute in the brothel too, whether in dealings
with a lover of her own class or a citizen youth. A brothel was
never a factory, and both inscriptions and demotic art such as
lamp decoration clearly indicate tenderness and mutuality at this
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level.
It is not the type of prostitution then but the type of soc¬
iety that controls the ambience of the sexual relationship: the
difference again between Athens and Rome. At Athens, prostitutes,
whether common prostitutes or hetaerae, are used simply for sex¬
ual release - the hetaerae also for entertainment. The distinct¬
ion of the common prostitute and the hetaera is as argued earlier
a factor specifically of the democratic City, but the use of
prostitutes without emotional involvement is surely general to
City-states. And of course, it goes with a comparable attitude to
sexual love in marriage. The approach we see at Rome then is a
factor less of the oligarchic City than of its breakdown and sub¬
sequent transformation into the Principate - the breakdown of the
City-state itself. As indicated before, there is Hellenistic pre¬
cedent. Here prostitution at all levels is penetrated by emotion¬
al involvement and elides into the love affair, and this perVades
marriage also. In ambience, the situation quickly begins to re¬
semble that of the Bureaucratic Kingdom, though structurally there
remain great differences: as argued above, sexual relationships
in Bureaucratic Kingdoms are typically those of marriage and ad¬
ultery, and prostitution is something of a residual category, for
a mixture of demographic and economic reasons. Against this, pro¬
stitution in the Bureaucratic Kingdom has its own distinctive
ambience: as a craft of choice freely practised and directed most¬
ly to transients, it is likely to be oriented rather to sexual
pleasure than to emotional involvement.
Finally, a comment might be made as to temple prostitution.
In Antiquity, this appears to be specific to the Ancient Near
East, where it is due to a conjunction of factors: the existence
of goddesses of sex and fertility; the economic functions of the
Ancient Near Eastern temple; and the disposal of daughters by
substantial families to priestesships in the temples instead of
marriage. This last was presumably a way of controlling the fam¬
ily's- numbers relative to its resources; the demographic situat¬
ion here is broadly in line 'with what has been discussed before
(ch 4). Temple prostitution does not occur in Egypt, probably due
to the suppression of the nobility, women's greater autonomy, and
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perhaps to a less developed economy. I have not gone into the soc¬
iology of the Ancient Near East in this thesis, however» Except¬
ionally, temple prostitution is found in the Graeco-Roman World,
the temple owning slave prostitutes much as it might own farm¬
lands as the "basis of its support. However, temples in the Graeco-
Roman World are economically passive and limited compared to the
Ancient Near East or even Egypt.
Homosexuality now needs to "be considered. Here it must be
made plain at the outset that almost nothing is known about les¬
bianism in Antiquity. Even Sappho herself is a shadowy figure
from a little known society. Not much can be made from mention of
dildos in Hellenistic comedy, or the presence of concubine dolls
in Egyptian women's grave goods. Most indicative perhaps is the
absence of lesbian themes in ancient mythology, though the exam¬
ple of Sappho shows that the subject was not forbidden. But how¬
ever that may be, homosexuality here must mean male homosexuality.
This is difficult. Homosexuality is a characteristic of Greek
culture in general, regardless of City type; initially it was
strongly repressed at Rome, and in Egypt likewise; at Rome it came
increasingly to be tolerated as the Principate developed. Nothing
obvious can be made of this in terms of societal types. Too,
there is a universal reckoning that to submit to homosexual rel¬
ations was to compromise one's political status - a clear distinc¬
tion of active and passive partners being made. This probably re¬
lates to sexual power-divisions and the link between political
rights and military service. But it is odd to find this reasoning
in Egpyt. The Greeks make a more complex picture here, but with
the same elements included. Homosexual prostitution, or homosex¬
ual intercourse with slaves, was practised both at Athens and at
Rome. Homosexual prostitution at Athens could cost one's citizen¬
ship; passive homosexual intercourse by a citizen at Rome could
be punished by death. Too, it should be added that the active
homosexual at least was usually bisexual, not exclusively homo¬
sexual .
Yet in Greece, the homosexual relationship was also a factor
of initiation into the warrior-brotherhood of the citizenry; cer¬
tainly at Athens the relationship was conceived as paedagogic.
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Typically it should he between a man in his twenties and a boy in
his later teens; through the relationship the younger should ac¬
quire citizen skills and moral excellence. Sexual fulfilment was
equivocally regarded; the younger should be pursued but should
not yield, or should yield reluctantly, and without taking pleas¬
ure himself. The elder, the pursuer, should be motivated by love
of beauty, not by lust. Intercourse, incidentally, was interfem-
oral (between the thighs), not anal.
Interpretation of this is difficult. It could be said that
the Athenians made homosexual relationships as complicated and
unsatisfactory as heterosexual; when the Romans did finally acc¬
ept homosexuality, they just made it a matter of ordinary love-
affairs. It can also be questioned how far this Platonic ideal
really reflected Athenian practice. But my own suggestion is that
homosexuality at Athens was basically a patrician affectation,
and that often homosexuality does occur as part of the status
culture of patrician strata, especially where they are dispossess¬
ed by the rise of the plebeians. However, the basis in initiation
and military brotherhood must be remembered, and the poor compan¬
ionship between the sexes. It has to be reiterated that the basic
societal typology here does not offer obvious leverage on this
problem.
Following from these matters, it can be remarked that it
does not seem to me that the hard distinction in Antiquity be¬
tween active and passive homosexual partners reflects a general
conception of women as sexually passive in heterosexual inter¬
course. Certainly the citizen wife in the City-state is consider¬
ed as the passive partner in reproduction, to which her sexuality
is subordinated. But no such conception applies to prostitutes,
courtesans, concubines or mistresses; moreover the conception is
not found in bureaucratic Egypt and quickly breaks down at Rome.
Indeed, at Rome it seems that a female partner is valued precis¬
ely for being an active partner, and this is part of the specif¬
ic attraction of heterosexual intercourse. Too much concentration
on homosexuality at the expense of prostitution, on literature at
the expense of art, and on the City-states at the expense of the
kingdoms and empires even within the Graeco-Roman World, surely
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produces a distorted view of these matters.
As to sexual pleasure, it seems to he generally accepted in
Antiquity that male enjoyment is conditional upon female enjoy¬
ment. This insight indeed is basic to erotic culture in many civ¬
ilizations, oriental and modern as well as ancient. Sex is never
a zero-sum game: a man might wish to impregnate an unaroused wife,
but not surely to have intercourse with an unaroused prostitute.
The basic question, as I have argued before, is whether the orien¬
tation is to sex for its own sake or sex for the sake of reproduc¬
tion. It seems general to Antiquity that wherever the latter pre¬
vails, the consent of the sexual partner is essential. This holds
regardless of the power relations at local community or private
level - clientage, slavery, etc. - with which the sexual relation¬
ship might be contextualized. These things were simply taken-for-
granted social structure.
Much more could be said about different types of sexual rel¬
ationship and practice. All Antiquity shows a wide range of sex¬
ual technique, without apparent traditional or religious restrict¬
ions. "Perversions" such as sado-masochism seem rare, although
bestiality is a theme in Greek mythology. Child-sex was certainly
accepted at Rome, though probably with boys not girls: an extens¬
ion of the passivity of the homosexual partner. Again, the Romans
made homosexual use of eunuchs. These were imported; the Romans
did not practise castration. But it seems that generally the Rom¬
ans accepted that a female partner was an active partner; although
patrician girls might be married very young this hardly indicates
a general taste for intercourse with prepubertal girls'. Again, I
have not heard of cliterodectomy at Rome (nor indeed at all in
Antiquity) .
The cultural ambience of sex and love in Antiquity is prob¬
ably best seen in the light of the Roman situation and its devel¬
opments. Overwhelmingly it is City-states that find sex and love
problematic whereas Bureaucratic Kingdoms do not; moreover the
first signs of breakdown in the City-state see this structure of
problematizations disintegrating - or the field re-integrating.
The characteristics are: the separation of sex and love, the sep¬
aration of sex and reproduction (prostitution and marriage;, the
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problematization of sex in marriage, and the general problematiz-
ation of love. The demographic pressures on the marital relation¬
ship, and their hearing for both the supply and the demand for
prostitution, are certainly key factors here. Indeed sex in marr¬
iage is problematic simply for its impact on reproduction. But
there is more than this. The marital relationship is a public
possession, geared to the continuity of lineage and political
community, and the couple* s own desires and emotions must be sub¬
ordinate to this. Love may impel a young man to marry the wrong
girl, or to refuse a citizen wife, preferring his concubine; it
may impel the young girl to refuse the husband chosen for her.
Equally, it may impel the couple to resist the breakup of a pol¬
itically inconvenient marriage. Love, then, whether in the field
of marriage or of prostitution, is subversive. There may be an
expectation of love of a kind in marriage, as a sort of dispass¬
ionate partnership, but that is a very different thing from the
passionate love between say a man and his mistress. Even sexual
pleasure in marriage may be considered inappropriate; presumably
this is for its emotional consequences. Relations with prostitut¬
es too should be emotionally disengaged, so that they do not be¬
come preferable and hence a threat to marriage.
It should be realized however that there is no repression of
sexuality as such here, as is found later in Christianity. Sexual
abstinence prior to the performance of religious rites is found
generally in Antiquity, but it is strictly bound to its context.
Again, neither is there anywhere a general repression of female
sexuality as such. Vihat there is here is an unemotional but other¬
wise unrestricted enjoyment of sexual relations with prostitutes.
It is love, not sex, that is repressed.
This general repression of love, and problematization of the
relationship between love and sex, may go some way to account for
the cultural ambience of homoerotic relations, especially at Ath¬
ens. For here companionship and emotional mutuality between part¬
ners are possible. The relationship seems to imitate a general
pattern of heterosexual relations: protectiveness and tenderness
towards a younger and more naive partner, who responds with admir¬
ation and obedience. Again, the specific attraction of this for
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the passive partner is evident enough. Yet it is puzzling why-
physical mutuality was eschewed: that is surely not a necessary
characteristic of homosexual intercourse. However, it should be
remembered that most typically it is bisexuality rather than ex¬
clusive homosexuality that is to be considered, for the active
partner at least (and the passive lover of the teens would become
an active lover in his twenties). Perhaps then homosexual love
simply has to be accepted as a "refined" taste.
As stated, all this is specific to the City-state, and quick¬
ly changes when the City-state starts to break down. That is seen
in the Roman Republic, and from the Hellenistic cultural heritage
(there are even indications of it in 4"th century Athens), even
without reference to the Principate or Sgypt. Most characteristic
is the re-integration of love and sex, and the rise of the love-
affair, passionate sexual love, as something that invades the
spheres both of marriage and of prostitution. With this, sexual
love becomes a supremely meaningful experience, far more import¬
ant than the morality of social or traditional expectations. This
transfer of sexual love from the realm of morality to that of
aesthetics is highly characteristic of the development of Graeco-
Roman culture. Yet it must be seen in the context of the re¬
integration of sex and love, a re-sexualization of love as much
as a re-emotionalization of sex; and above all, it is love that
has been deproblematized.
This is to take matters from a City-state starting point.
Considering now the Bureaucratic Kingdom, whether Egypt or the
Principate, it is remarkable how little different in ambience
they are from the Roman Late Republic - this despite the struct¬
ural differences, especially in Egypt. Possibly these societies
are more matter of fact in their assessment of sexual love; at
least they are not experiencing the same conflicts over it.
Again, lovers are perhaps typically on a somewhat more equal
standing; the division of love-roles noted above between protect¬
or and admirer is somewhat less evident. (As a heterosexual or¬
ientation that would seem most characteristic of the Late Repub¬
lic; though indeed it is seen in relations with young hetaerae
at Athens, though not as the basis of an enduring love-affair.)
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Again, "there is perhaps a calmer acceptance of love as transient,
and. of shifting and changing partnerships. Something of the patt¬
ern here can be seen in the Roman novels (which apparently have
Hellenistic forerunners), and even more in the Egyptian love-
poetry. This last, despite translation difficulties, is remarkab¬
ly accessible to a modern sensibility.
There are two general points that I would like to draw from
this discussion. The first is that the comparative considerations
presented here make it clear enough that City-state arrangements
cause a distortion of human nature, which springs back at the
first available chance. I have remarked elsewhere (especially in
ch 3) that it is possible to have too much methodological sophis¬
tication on questions such as this. We should propose a dialogue
between human nature and culture; it is not a necessity of the
sociological perspective to see humanity as totally malleable, a
cultural artifact ex nihilo. Neither is there serious danger of
biological determinism. Especially to be noted here is the const¬
ellation of emotional relationships between children and the
slaves who care for them, especially wet-nurses, between free and
slave children raised together, between men and their concubines
and their children by concubines. This constellation appears as
soon as the City-state weakens. It even seems to make an appear¬
ance in 4"th century Athens; though probably the democratic City
is harder against it than the oligarchic City. With this, it is
to be noted how far the cultural ambience of sex and love in the
Roman Late Republic and Principate (and apparently the Hellenist¬
ic world) resembles that in Egypt, despite the structural differ¬
ences and despite the cultural continuities of Graeco-Roman civ¬
ilisation. The interpretation of this seems to me to be unavoid¬
able.
The second point is closely related: it should not be thought
that civilization "learnt" anything essential for the long run
about sexual love from Athenian homosexuality. For one thing,
evaluative comparison cannot assume the same privilege for West¬
ern civilization in matters of love and sex that it can with
science and technology. Many would maintain that the West has al¬
ways compared poorly to the oriental civilizations in this field,
at least until very recent times. But beyond, this, Egyptian and
equally Roman culture both give clear evidence of their people's
experience of sexual love. This has perhaps not the same cultur¬
ally brilliant reflection as at Athens, but that is hardly the
pointr one's experience of sexual love is grounded in one's soc¬
ial relationships, not in one's cultural heritage. The truth is
that Christian civilization has found Athenian homoeroticism im¬
pressive precisely because it has always found love and sex prob¬
lematic too. Intellectuals should not fail to question this simp¬
ly because they make their living by intellectualizing rather
than by making lovei
Finally, I turn briefly to religion. In all Antiquity, them¬
es of sex, fertility, maternity, etc. are central components of
religion, linking together cosmology, nature, agriculture, animal
husbandry and human affairs. The imagery includes icihyphallic
gods and the phallus itself (though apparently not female equival¬
ents), as well as various female deities. These things are also
common concerns of art and literature, and show also in demotic
items such as amulets or, say, lamps and other household goqdar.
Religion also has other concerns, especially the state, and the
themes may be interwoven in many ways. Indeed, ancient polytheism,
and the origins of the Great World Religions in it, is a complex
and under-analysed affair: even Weber's treatment is very incom¬
plete (see Wber 1978 Part ii ch 6 passim). But it should be real¬
ized that the Judaic religious tradition is grounded in an attempt
to eliminate the themes and deities of sex and fertility and to
build the religion solely in terms of the god of the political
community. The underlying reason for this was the Jews' conflicts
with neighbouring peoples such as the Philistines. Too it should
be realized that this is historically quite unique. In time-it
found echo, of a kind, in Greek culture, where demographic con¬
cerns made sex and love politically problematic, as I have shown.
These two things together (more or less) made up the Christian
tradition, though with other, exogenous, elements such as Persian
theodicy (Manichean dualism).
The full analysis of these matters would require a compre¬
hensive consideration of Antiquity to ground it: the Ancient Near
East, Israel, the Hellenistic World, the Eastern Roman Empire.
Only some preliminary comments can be offered here (though there
is a further discussion in Appendix A part iv below). But the key
issue is that there is no single uniform development in the con¬
ceptions of sex and sexual relations in Antiquity, not even in
Graeco-Roman Antiquity. The Romans always had different ideas
from the Greeks, and were always ambivalent about ttreek ideas, in
these areas; as their culture developed, they moved rather to sim¬
ilar ideas to the Egyptians. The rise of the goddess I sis in the
Roman World is symptomatic of this. Against this, Christianity
develops first in the Greek East, and its ultimate triumph comes
with the failure of Roman culture, after the Principate ends.
This is, all of it, a most complex process with surely a great
deal to it that is historically contingent: one should not assume
that everything about the Jews and the Greeks is teleologically
oriented to the future shape of Western civilization. Nor should
one assume that Christianity marked a humane advance over Roman
culture - quite the reversel And not only in matters of women and
sex.
These things should be viewed in their World-historical con¬
text; ideally perhaps in contrast with Far Eastern culture and
religion, where the sexualized cosmology is retained and indeed
may be much elaborated, as for example with Taoism or Tantra.
Nothing of this can be attempted here. But I would see more hope,
as I have indicated before, in such a comparative sociological
approach than in for example a universalizing psychological app¬
roach such as Freudian Psychoanalysis.
What I have tried to do here, however, is only to show the
most basic contrast of societal types, as a sociological context
for further historical analysis. In this, the basic issue that
emerges is that City-states, especially in conditions of democra¬
cy, are repressive and controlling of sex and love, whereas Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdoms are permissive and unanxious about them.
Aggression
The sociological treatment of the aggressive instinct here
is something of an innovation. This. I indicated "before ( ch 3) in
my methodological discussions; pointing out however the resonanc¬
es of the aggressive instinct with the maturational cycle and the
individuation process. Aggression thus cross-cuts sexuality. It
also parallels it, as a primary instinctual channel. Accordingly
aggression like sexuality is to "be seen sociologically in terms
of instinctually driven and emotionally illuminated competences
in which skills and lore are acquired and transmitted, or may be
disapproved and withheld. The intention then is to focus on soc¬
ial action and relationships, and it should be stressed that the
centre of this is actual fighting, just as the centre of sexual¬
ity is actual intercourse: these are sociological, not biologic¬
al, things.
It should be realized at the outset that violence in society
entails social relations and technology, and training also, just
exactly as with the economy. With this, men's greater size and
strength is probably of no more relevance between the sexes than
the differences in size and strength among men are in the sociolo¬
gy of power. Squally, the potential of the typical female struct¬
ure and (if any) temperament for fighting might best be viewed in
the light of such arts as karate and aikido: victory does not
automatically go to the more muscular or more belligerent.* Fight¬
ing is a skill, which like any skill is capable of monopolization,
or of unequal social access. It is unsociological to argue from
a "state of Nature".
It is a very general sociological pattern that women are the
victims of violence, men the exponents. War is the best illustrat¬
ion of this: almost everywhere war is an exclusively male activ¬
ity. But it also conditions violence in society and the protect¬
ion of personal security generally, and also the judgement and
punishment of crime. These are matters which relate to the gener¬
al sociology of power: to the sociology of the state and the soc¬
iology of law as well as the sociology of domination. A key quest¬
ion in this is of course the location of the military factor in
* It might be interesting to compare the stereotypic feminine
temperament (and even physique) with that of the Far Eastern
peoples, and the virtues of the Buddhist religion.
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society, and. the ownership of the means of warfare; with this go
questions of citizenship and domestic authority and/or subject
status. These questions, and these themes, I will pursue in due
course. But the first need is to find a sociological ground for
the most general pattern, at the base of which is the exclusion
of women from the social relations of coercion, the monopolizat¬
ion of violence with its technologies and skills as a male dom¬
ain. It may be added that, so far as any ultimate theory of the
causes of women's oppression can be given, it is surely located
here, (it might also be added, incidentally, that this, the argu¬
ment that follows, is actually the origins of the present thesis,
the oldest stratum of argument.)
Curiously, the basic argument is in fact given to us by
Weber himself, although in embryonic form; he does not try to
ground a theory of gender on it. But he makes a point of the
incompatibility of charisma with routine economic activity,
stressing that the latter is entailed in the permanent sexual and
parental relationships of the family. Charismatic associations
tend to be communistic, and to have their own ad hoc economic
arrangements. Religious groups can be one case of this, but it is
also characteristic of coercive associations such as groups of
warriors. The use of force and its life and death implications,
and the co-option of the members themselves on this basis, pro¬
vides a transcendant character of specialness to the coercive
association (see Weber 1973 Part ii ch 9> esp. p 901 - 10; ch 14,
esp. p 1119 - 20; see also ch 3 & 4)« Of course there are widely
varying forms in practice. But even the most bureaucratized army
has morale as one of its most tangible features. Moreover it is
likely to locate many of its soldiers in barracks, with distinct¬
ive sexual arrangements; indeed the latter point is general for-
soldiers on active service. The argument is then that women are
excluded from the social relations of coercion because their
fertility is potentially subversive of the coercive association's
integrity, tying its members down collectively and severally to
routine economic activity for the maintainance of dependants,
especially children. Women are also potentially disruptive in
terms of causing conflicts of loyalty, internal closures, and
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attempts to monopolize membership: all faces of the institution¬
alization and routinization of charisma. With this, it should "be
noted that charismatically structured groups not only exclude
family; they also exclude entry by birth. There must always be a
"second birth", an individual initiation, even if only of confirm¬
atory kind.
This theory should not be seen in terms of a "historic de¬
feat of the female sex" located somewhere in prehistory; it
should be seen in terms of continuous and/or recurrent social
processes. Indeed, it is surely a basic requirement for the gen¬
eral theory of "patriarchy" that it must conceive continuous and/
or recurrent social processes, and moreover processes related to
the general processes of social change rather than continuity, if
it is to deal with the problem of the (apparent) universality of
"patriarchy" and its immunity to history in a way that avoids
biological determinism. To argue through the notion of charisma
meets this need at least in principle, as shown in my earlier
discussions of the Interpretive conception of social reality,
social continuity and social change (see beginning of ch 3; also
discussions in ch 2).
But however this may be, to develop the general theory of
the exclusion of women from coercive associations in the direct¬
ion of specific context and content here requires comparative
consideration of the social location of coercive associations in
relation to the general sociology of power. This returns us to
the arguments introduced above (ch 4) on the types of polity and
central institutions versus local community inter-relations. The
City-state is a consociation of (self-equipped and self-subsist-
ent) warriors: it is a charismatically structured coercive assoc¬
iation. That is what the political community is, with exclusion
of women and children from participation and their relegation to
a private sphere of domestic authority. The Eureaucratic Kingdom
by contrast is rather an extension of the king's household: the
soldiers are separated from the means of warfare (equipped from
the king's armouries) and the localities conduct their affairs,,
women and at least older children on an informal basis included,
under the supervision of the state officialdom. The implications
of "these matters for the apparatus of domination itself will "be
considered further in the next chapter. But there is here a sharp
contrast at the level of citizenship, and that is what is to be
discussed now.
Citizenship in the City-state comprises a nexus of political,
legal, military and economic rights and obligations. The City-
state is a closed community defined by its own law code: typical¬
ly this will feature the monopolization of land, houses, live¬
stock and slaves by the citizens. Type of military service is
graded by property-holding, and this defines a juridical order of
allocation of political and legal rights. Political and legal
institutions have little or no formal separation: indeed, they
are also basically military institutions. The basic organs are:
Council, magistracies and Assembly. Stratification conflicts may
result in the patrician monopolization of the Council and magis¬
tracies, and the reduction of the role of the Assembly to passive
voting or even acclamation - oligarchy. Alternately, the Assembly
may become the main arena for debate, and the magistracies and
Council open to all - the democratic pattern. Trials are held
before the Assembly, or the Council, or juries drawn from the
citizenry; magistrates "speak the law" but do not function as
judges. Again, they authorize litigation but do not prosecute.
The City-state has no state prosecutor; it leaves citizens to
bring their own cases, but permits certain types of cases to be
brought by any citizen, "in the public interest". (The word "in¬
former" is sometimes used, inappropriately, to describe this.) A
written law code is an early outcome of stratificatory conflicts,
but constitution and law are not distinguished.
Given all this, it should be realized that citizenship here
does not reside in the content of specific rights, but simply in
participation. The degree of participation varies according to
status and closure conflicts. But the basis of it is recognition
as a participant: the capability to appear in one's own interest
and person before the magistrates and in the Assembly, and to
claim protection from arbitrary action. Citizenship is personhood.
It should be realized that the foreigner has in principle no
rights: he cannot approach the Council, Assembly or magistrates;
indeed, strictly he cannot own property and is subject to enslave¬
ment. His presence in the City requires a citizen sponsor, and it
is this person who will act for him in all his legal affairs.
These arrangements become progressively institutionalized, as do
alliances and treaties with other Cities. Even so, the position
of women should be seen in the same light: they too like the for¬
eigner cannot approach the City's Council, magistrates or Assemb¬
ly; they require a male guardian to control their legal affairs
for them. Their property rights are similarly qualified: although
property may be vested in them, they cannot administer it them¬
selves, but their guardian must do so for them. Similarly, they
cannot transact for their household without their guardian's
authorization, although the wife is mistress within the household
itself. This guardian will ordinarily be the woman's father or
husband, or failing these, her brother; these are ordinarily the
men who have domestic authority over their womenfolk.
Women then do not have personhood; they are not recognized
as participants in public affairs. This is a sweeping principle:
not only can a woman not litigate for herself (far less bring a
case "in the public interest"), but also she cannot give evidence,
at least not in person before the court, and neither can she ord¬
inarily be tried for crime. The criminous woman is tried by a
family council, and she is punished within the family (whether
parental or marital).
Of course, there are exceptions and limitations. A woman
with no male kin must approach the magistrates in person to ask
for a guardian to be appointed; a woman's evidence might be acc¬
epted in an exceptional case, or subject to oath before the
priests; certain priestesses might be given a special quasi-male
status, etc. Also, women do have a residual citizenship in their
participation in religious festivals and processions, some of
which indeed may be their monopoly. Again, there are variations
between City-states; Athens may actually be a rather extreme
case, compared with other Greek Cities as well as with Rome. But
the basic pattern is quite clear: women are not citizens. As with
property, citizenship may be vested in them, but they cannot
"administer" it themselves; they do not in any meaningful sense
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"have" citizenship.
In the Bureaucratic Kingdom the conditions of citizenship
are quite different. Here the polity is defined hy the geopolit¬
ical extension of the king's authority, exercized through the
bureaucratic apparatus; in this, the local nobilities are supp¬
ressed and the village councils are incorporated as the basic
level of the state. This type of polity is not a closed community;
indeed the king's authority is in principle -universal, though it
may accept pragmatic limits. Neither is the polity characterized
by internal closure, in the sense of hard juridical statuses; nor
is there monopolization of property ownership as in the City-
state. With this, this type of polity has no political dimension,
at least, not at the level of the common people. Yet citizenship
here still has common characteristics with the citizenship of the
City-state: it is a matter of active participation. The basic
question is recognition of personhood, upon which protection from
arbitrary action on the part of neighbours or officials depends.
The basic forms this participation takes are: appearance in the
village council, both to present one's own affairs and to hear
the affairs of others; and appearance in one's own interest and
one's own person before the officials of the higher, state app¬
ointed, judiciary. This citizenship then is purely legal in char¬
acter.
In principle, recognition in these terms is universal, esp¬
ecially at the level of the state appointed judiciary. The vill¬
age council may distinguish between residents and incomers
(though perhaps not between free and slave); this is one reason
for speaking of citizenship rather than subjecthood. But as stat¬
ed, the polity is not closed and authority is in principle univer¬
sal: the foreigner does not require a citizen representative to
act for him. Nor does the woman require a male guardian: the
village council goes with minimal household authority, no more
than the control of parents over young children. Women come be¬
fore the state judiciary on just the same basis as men, in their
own persons and their own interests. Squally, they share in the
village council, both to present their own affairs and to hear
the affairs of others. Women then are fully recognized here as
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persons in their own right. This recognition goes beyond litigat¬
ion; it applies equally to testability and the laying of informa¬
tion, although since Bureaucratic Kingdoms do have state prosec¬
utors this last has not the same significance as in the City-
state. Again, the criminous woman is tried and punished by the
state in exactly the same way as a man; and her menfolk and fam¬
ily do not have the authority to do this themselves.
In short, women in Bureaucratic Kingdoms do have a real cit¬
izenship; like their property and economic rights, it is unrest¬
ricted. Citizenship in the City-state is both political and leg¬
al, and is held by men only; citizenship in the Bureaucratic
Kingdom is legal only, and is held by women and men alike.
At Rome, the development can be clearly seen from City-state
to Bureaucratic Kingdom. This comes in four elements. First,
there is the rise to prevalence of "free" marriage, the progress¬
ive attrition of the guardianship of women, and women's increas¬
ing control over their own affairs. Second, women's rights before
the older legal organs develop, their testability and their right
to bring a case in their own interest, and even certain restrict¬
ed categories of public interest, becoming accepted. Third, with
the development of new legal organs under the Principate - the
"extraordinary" jurisdictions - women are accorded the same re¬
cognition before them as men. Fourth, again from the Principate,
criminous women cease to be tried and punished in the family, and
come to be tried and punished on the same basis as men by the
state. It is especially to be noted here that Augustus' legislat¬
ion on adultery and fornication makes women's sexual misconduct
a matter for the state not for the family council. At the same
time as all this, as the Republic gives way to the Principate,
the political citizenship of men is of course progressively erod¬
ed. Thus at the end, both men and women have come to share a cit¬
izenship that is now purely legal in character.
Consideration must also be given to the question of the pro¬
tection of personal security. Here it must be realized that the
legal system of the City-state is not self-activating; it must be
activated by a citizen, acting in his own or the public interest.
If force is needed to bring an accused before the magistrates or
Assembly, it is the accuser who must supply that force, and of
course the accused can forcibly resist. The public use of force
then is commonplace, and it is not the state but clientage or
brotherhood organizations (or simply friends) which provide the
resources here. It is these which will protect a man against 1 -•
being kidnapped or enslaved, either by rescue or by prosecution,
or both. The situation of the woman, or the foreigner, or indeed
the slave, in this regard is not categorically different: they
must find their protector - guardian, patron, sponsor, owner, etc.
- who will guarantee them. But of course this is an unequal relat¬
ionship; it is not a mutual gue^rantee, and qualitatively their
protection and freedom will be far less. In the Bureaucratic
Kingdom by contrast the state is self-activating and anyone may
lay information, moreover only the state may rightfully use force.
The protection and freedom of movement of small people then is. in
principle unlimited. Indeed the public safety of women may (as in
Sgypt) be proverbial as a criterion for good order.
Beyond this lies the question of rape. In the City-state
world this must be seen in its geopolitical dimension, in terms
of war and slavery, together with marriage and prostitution in
the City-state. "Rape" in classical Antiquity often seems to have
the meaning of "carrying off" rather than simply "forced sex".
The point is that both lineage and City are closed communities
whose continuity is dependent on the legitimate fertility of its
womenfolk. To remove the women, or to subvert their fertility by
intercourse with outsiders, is to destroy the community in the
long run. It cannot be continued by non-members, and its own log¬
ic is that of agnatic descent. In war, then, women are a valued
but fragile resource; to enslave them and perhaps prostitute them
is the victor* s right, unless a treaty is made with the defeated
enemy.
bithin the City-state, rape and adultery are little disting¬
uished; both damage the integrity of the household, and the woman
cannot be exonerated. Indeed women, not being citizens, are not
thought capable of giving or withholding consent. Criminal pro-,
secution is brought by the menfolk; it is they who are the vic¬
tims. The action for the rape of a slave is not much different,
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although this is purely a question of property, and may relate to
the possibility of the slave running off to a lover.
Nevertheless, there is another aspect to the matters precis¬
ely for the general difficulties in the protection of personal
security in the City-state, unlawful force becomes a very serious
crime, and one where anyone can prosecute in the public interest.
This law can be invoked against rape, and gives women, even non-
citizen xtfomen, a degree of personal recourse, though this might
be negotiable in practice.
Contrasting the Bureaucratic Kingdom with this, the first
point is that rape is seen simply as forced or coerced sex; as
such, it is a crime against the woman herself, which she herself
prosecutes. Moreover it has no implications for her marriage.
This holds both in Egypt and in the Roman Principate. Egypt also
gives protection against the sexual abuse of power; that is, an
interdict may be obtained keeping a man's boss away from his home
and the woman who lives with him - this irrespective of marriage.
It is not wholly clear who can do this: the man certainly, and
presumably the Xtfoman also; at least if she continues to live with
him her consent is implicit. But perhaps any member of the comm¬
unity can bring the action: it seems that it is the community,
rather than a lineage or even household, that is being defended
against the abuse of official power.
But beyond all this is the point that the general pacificat¬
ion of the world, together with the atomistic orientation of bur¬
eaucratic monarchy which sees women as individuals not as resour¬
ces for political communities or lineages, all work tremendously
to women's advantage. The whole syndrome of war, slavery, marriage
and prostitution is ameliorated or even absent.
There are other aspects of aggression that could be consid¬
ered. For one thing, there is the training in fighting skills
that is a basic part of male education in the City-state, though
rather reserved for the actual soldier in the Bureaucratic King¬
dom. This training is not simply in weapons but in disciplined
manoevring in formation: this is the most important battlefield
skill. (That is well established for the classical era, but it
probably has some application too for Sgpyt and the Near East in
the second, half of the 2nd. millenium.) To this women have no acc¬
ess. Their access to gymnasia, and. to sports like wrestling and
boxing is uneven; some City-states did train their women, even in
weaponcraft (e.g. Sparta), others not. Bureaucratic Kingdoms
might open such facilities to women, and make them less mandatory
for men; the "basis for male education here is more typically lit¬
eracy. But all Antiquity is oriented to war. (incidentally, the
image of the warrior woman is very common in ancient religion -
Egypt and the Near-East as much as Greece and Rome.) It would be
interesting to compare all this with the sociology of fighting
skills (e.g. karate or aikido) in the Far East.
Another issue is the Roman Games. These admitted women as
spectators, though actual participation was rare, except where
criminal punishment was involved. Although the.Romans were cruel,
I doubt that this can usefully be called "sadism"; there seems
little specifically sexual about it. The Games, however, were an
occasion on which public demands could be expressed, to emperor,
prefect, governor etc., and this indeed became a most important
practical aspect of citizenship, especially in view of the attrit¬
ion of the Republican political institutions. Entry to the Games
was free to all citizens. In this, then, women shared equally
with men. It seems an appropriate point on which to end this dis¬
cussion.
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In the previous chapter, I have discussed the primary phen¬
omena of sexual polarity. Now, in this final theoretical chapter,
I turn to consider the secondary phenomena, of sexual divisions.
The methodological foundations for this were laid down before (ch
3); there should he no need to reiterate them here. The point is
that we have a set of sexually conditioned power phenomena, and
a set of sexually conditioned economic phenomena, givng rise to
comparable sets of sexual divisions in the two spheres. These
have to be discussed; at the same time, the analytic relation of
these sexual divisions with stratification also requires consid¬
eration. The chapter will be presented in three sections accord¬
ingly.
Power
Power is a notoriously amorphous concept, but the concern
here is with power-structures, especially as Vieber discusses them
in his Sociology of Domination. The term I have used in earlier
chapters, "polity", does not seem to be very widely used; we tend
rather to speak of "the. sociology of power". But my arguments
here will be in continuity with my earlier arguments on the pol¬
ity, and on heber*s intentions in regard to these matters (see ch
4 above).
The relation of the present discussion to that of the last
section of the previous chapter, on aggression, needs some clar¬
ification. There I consider the aggressive instinct as an aspect
of primary sexual polarity. But so far as the sociology of power
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is ultimately grounded, on the notion of political action, that is,
action, to whatever end, defined by the use or threat of force as
its means, the aggressive instinct would appear to be entailed.In
it. How, then, is an analytic separation to be maintained? The
first answer to this is: by the specific and narrow focus of the
present discussion on state power structures, in terms of rulers
and apparatuses. The previous discussion by contrast was mainly
concerned with matters of citizenship, law and the protection of
personal security: the relation of the individual to the state
and to the other individuals around him. Even war was considered
in this light. The structures of the state were really only con¬
sidered in regard to legal arrangements. Here however it is gen¬
eral administration that is in question.
Yet a deeper problem can be raised. In my first discussion
of the polity (ch 4 above), I identify four elements: ruler,
apparatus, field of authority (or political community), and in¬
ternal closure (or stratification); I contrast the traditional
and charismatic types of polity, arguing that the traditional
polity develops from a ruler and an apparatus (e.g. a Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdom), while the charismatic polity develops from a polit¬
ical community and internal closure (e.g. a City-state). It might
appear then that my discussions in this and the previous chapter
are asymmetrical: that the previous discussion was inherently
weighted towards the charismatic polity, as this present discuss¬
ion (dealing as it does with rulers and apparatuses) must be
weighted towards the traditional polity. There is indeed a degree
of truth in this, though less than it might seem: City-states do
have rulers and apparatuses - just as Bureaucratic Kingdoms have
soldiers and citizens. Beyond this, it can be held that there is
a real difference in kind and emphasis between the two types of
polity that requires to be fairly reflected.
More to the point however is the continuity in the argument
of the two discussions. For in discussing aggression, I propose
a theory of the exclusion of women from the social relations of
coercion, arguing that, so far as any ultimate explanation for
sexual inequality could be given, it should be located here. At
the same time, I concede that it is difficult to provide specific
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content and context for that theory. It seems to me that it is
through the discussion of the polity that this must be pursued.
Preliminarily this has been done in the previous discussion, in
terms of citizenship and legal personality. But the main thrust
of the argument should surely lie through the sociology of dom¬
ination. As I observed before (in ch 3), it is invidious that
women's subordination to male authority should be isolated from
the general sociology of power: one should surely seek for an
integrated treatment. Kith this, it should be self-evident that
in terms of general social theory, it would be a satisfactory
solution to ground women's oppression in the sociology of power.
It does not have to be grounded in the economy (or for that matt¬
er in ideology). Indeed the realm of power must always be a prob¬
lem in sexual inequality, even if the theory of sexual inequality
is grounded elsewhere. For all the arguments that I have raised
in earlier chapters (ch 4»5 & 6): on demographic issues, the con¬
trol of women in household and community, the control of fertil¬
ity, maternity, sexuality - all this is posited on a certain
pattern of sexual divisions in power in society, a pattern which
gives power to men. But the poiver structures of society cannot be
seen as external and supervisory to society. They are simply part
of the way that society is arranged, part of the pattern of gen¬
eral social arrangements. (Equally, society cannot be "derived"
from the family.) The absence of women from the power structures
of society is not because women have not been included; it is
because they have been excluded. The general exclusion of women
from the power structures of society, then, is the specific ex¬
pression in the polity of women's exclusion from the social re¬
lations of coercion.
This exclusion of women from structural power is not absol¬
ute and unqualified. There are factors which will exceptionally
put women into positions of power. Of these, perhaps the two most
obvious are personal charisma and residual inheritance (i.e. in
the failure of male heirs). However, both these invite sceptic¬
ism. Personal charisma certainly happens, for instance Joan of
Arc; but a succession of powerful women, as for example in the
18th Dynasty of Egypt, can hardly be explained on this basis. As
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to residual inheritance, this, as with property and indeed citiz¬
enship, may only vest the power position in the woman without
letting her exercize power herself. One has to look deeper to
find what factors control whether this does or does not occur.
Besides, it is difficult to accept that explanation ends with the
specific content of laws. One wants to ask, why these laws? These
points hold also for a third case, where a queen (or noblewoman)
acts as regent for her young son. Possibly this relates to laws
of residual inheritance but it is by no means always the mother
that is chosen as regent, and again, the position may be nominal,
actual power being wielded in her name by another.
However, there are a number of other factors beyond these
that consideration of ancient history suggests as putting women
into positions of power. First, there is the woman's position as
mistress of the household; this quite irrespective of the struct¬
ure of public life. This gives the woman experience and knowledge
as well as resources, especially where she also has the adminis¬
tration of her own property or of wider estates. Second, there is
the need of great houses (royal and noble) to make active use of,
and therefore give active involvement to, their womenfolk, due to
sheer lack of numbers. This can even affect a small City-state;
consider Plato's well-known comment, that a City which does not
use its women is misusing half its human resources. (I have dis¬
cussed elsewhere - in ch 5 - my scepticism as to the passive use
of women in Antiquity in terms of marriage alliances.) Third,
there is the system of property inheritance: where women have
been heirs to, and have had actual control of, large property,
this has been a source of power. It should be clear from earlier
discussions (especially in ch.5) that this arrangement is typic¬
al of Bureaucratic Kingdoms. These factors together have permitt¬
ed women in Antiquity to take advantage of, sometimes even to
manufacture, political crises, and to contend with men for power.
This is found in the Kingdoms of Egypt and the Near East, the
Hellenistic Kingdoms, to an extent in the patrician houses at the
close of the Roman Republic and the early Principate, and more
clearly again with the Severan women at the Principate's end. It
can be stated that these factors are cumulative. In the democratic
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City the first only appears; in the oligarchic City the second
appears also. However the military and communal character of the
City-state is generally against these processes. They have far
freer rein in the pacified and atomistic conditions of the Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdom; here all three factors appear together.
This is to deal with the actual holding of supreme poiver.
More important, however, is administration: the holding of posit¬
ion in the state apparatus. Here again there seems to "be the same
general historical pattern: a general exclusion of women modif¬
ied by certain factors. In actuality however it seems possible to
say that in Korld-historical terras, the main systematic basis of
women's presence in domination systems comprises just those fact¬
ors outlined above in conditions of private appropriation of dom-
inatory position. This general pattern becomes apparent from the
consideration of Antiquity precisely because the City-state and
patrimonial bureaucracy are those sub-types of charismatic and
traditional domination respectively where private appropriation
of position in the domination system is excluded - at least, ex¬
cept for the level of royalty or of hereditary Council (Senate)
membership. This is what distinguishes them from, say, feudalism
or non-bureaucratic patrimonial arrangements. As against this,
the routine inclusion of women in even state bureaucracies seems
to be specifically a factor of modernity - of rational-legal
domination. But this is to anticipate. The City-state and the
Bureaucratic Kingdom should each first be given their separate
consideration.
The apparatus of the City-state comprises its Council, mag¬
istracies and Assembly, as outlined before. This is not a "polit¬
ical" structure, for there is no civil service: these are the
organs of actual administration, political, legal, military et al.
It should always be realized that ultimately democracy is a soc¬
iological fact, not a political philosophy. In its ancient (or
medieval) setting at least it is a type of domination. As to the
relations of democracy to the City-state, this as I have pointed
out before is a matter of internal stratificatory closure and the
monopolization of the political organs - at least after the dev¬
elopment of Plebeian structure: territorially based citizenship.
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The Patrician City sees the Council and. magistracies monopolized
by the patricians, and the Assembly basically acclamatory. Olig¬
archy, patrician control in a Plebeian City, is closely similar,
though elections rather than simple patrician birth may now con¬
trol the holding of magistracies and Council membership. Democracy
sees power moved to the Assembly, and the magistracies and Council
opened to the plebeians, through elections and sortition. But the
point here is that in all cases and in all respects, the dominat¬
ion system of the City-state is an adjunct of citizenship. As
such, it is strictly confined to adult males. So far is this a
clear-cut principle that there is little more to be said: the ex¬
clusion of women is absolute.
One or two comments can be added. Priestesships in the
state cults (e.g. the Vestal Virgins) might convey a marginal
quasi-magisterial position; an extension of women's residual cit¬
izenship in the religious dimension. Also, despite women's exclus¬
ion from political life in the City-state, it is precisely the
City-state that questioned this exclusion, as part of its polit¬
ical culture. The specific content here differs with different
intellectuals - Plato, Aristotle, Aristophanes, Euripides - and
in this some scope for individual genius must be allowed. But
what is most significant is that the question was on the agenda
at all. The basis for this is apparently the general character of
ancient political commentary as a patrician reaction to plebeian
usurpation - notably these intellectuals are all Athenian not
Roman. As commented before, patrician strata in this situation
have an incentive to let their women actively participate in pol¬
itical life, in sheer lack of numbers. At Athens, it was women's
citizenship (i.e. at the Assembly) that was the most obvious
issue, but this implied office-holding.
The above are the basic considerations. But it must be added
that, as well as City-states comprising autonomous polities, they
are also found as semi-autonomous administrative units, especial¬
ly in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman Empire. These Cities
were overwhelmingly oligarchic rather than democratic in charact¬
er: in the Hellenistic world, and thereafter in the Eastern Roman
Empire, this was characterized by the private (and hereditary)
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appropriation of office. A lasting consequence of this is a small
but continuing number of women magistrates. Ths basis for this
has already been indicated. Interestingly, it does not seem to
have occurred in the Western Empire, though this is not wholly
certain. The specific magisterial functions in the East may have
become empty and the positions sinecural - there are administrat¬
ive differences between East and West throughout the Empire's
history. But the point may be added that the Roman Principate
also permitted women to act as patrons, not merely to individuals
such as their own freed slaves but to organizations such as art¬
isans' burial clubs (collegia). But this, though suggestive, is
power in the private sphere, not public power.
Turning now to the Bureaucratic Kingdom, here the main focus
clearly is on the bureaucratic apparatus itself. Yet the picture
is not quite so simple: at the head of the apparatus is a royal
house, and although such houses have already been considered,
there will also be a private bureaucratic apparatus through which
the royal household and estates are administered. This indeed was
the origin of the Roman imperial bureaucracy. Besides this, there
will also be religious bureaucracies in the temples. Indeed,
there may be two levels here: a secular bureaucracy administering
the temple's economic endowment, and a religious bureaucracy of
personal attendance upon the deity - the priesthood. In Egypt
especially these are distinct and separate. It should also be
borne in mind that the Bureacratic Kingdom too has citizenship in
its fashion, as discussed in the previous chapter, in terms of
membership of local tribunals or village councils and legal per¬
sonality before the state judiciary and officialdom. Although it
is the state bureaucracy that is the main focus of concern, these
points should be kept in mind. For again it is possible to state
at the outset that the overwhelming pattern here is of the exclus¬
ion of women from the state bureaucracy. This is surprising, in
view both of the general social context and of modern state bur¬
eaucracies, and it seems hard to account for it. It should then
be all the more clearly highlighted.
In matters of citizenship, men and women stand very much
equal, as the discussion in the previous chapter has shown. At
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the level of royalty, women have an active participation, and
even a chance to contend for supreme power. In private and temple
"bureaucracies, a general prevalence of men is offset by two fact¬
ors: first, that a female employer (queen, goddess, or whoever)
is likely to prefer female staff for a wide range of functions;
second, that female labour may attract female supervision. Beneath
this, two further factors appear: first, a tradition, though not
strongly marked in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, that women deal with
what is within the household, men with what is beyond it, i.e. in
the fields and workshops; second, the traditional sexual division
of labour. Both these things are negotiable. It should be noted
that there is a strong female presence in the temples, subject to
a sexual division of religious functions. In Egypt all deities
regardless of sex must have both male and female staff, that is,
attendants. Goddesses besides have female as well as male adminis¬
trators. At Rome, certain state cults required female staff only
- Vesta, and the cults of Roma and the Imperial women. The organ¬
ization of these temple bureaucracies is controlled by the state
and runs parallel to the state bureaucracy. But all this serves
only to highlight the absence of women from the state bureaucracy
itself, an absence which appears to be virtually complete.
It seems, as I have said, hard to explain this exclusion.
But one basic issue is that the state bureaucracy originates in
structural conflicts between king and nobility, and it is in these
conflicts that women's rights are established, as I argued in an
earlier chapter (ch 4)• In terms of these conflicts, the king has
no interest in giving bureaucratic office to women. If anything,
his interest would be in appointing eunuchs, though this was not
done either at Egypt or at Rome. For the bureaucracy is in effect
a subordinated nobility, prevented from appropriating their posts
and transmitting them to their sons. That women could do as much
as men (and incidentally to their daughters as much as to their
sons). Vvith this, the temples serve in great part as an organiz¬
ation of sinecures - especially the priestly functions themselves.
One part of their purpose is to absorb the surplus of the offic¬
ial class, and therewith to preserve the rationality of the state
bureaucracy, and the king's control over it. There is no shortage
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of skilled literate labour. It is in the temples then that women
of the official class are found. Beyond this, it is general to
Antiquity that there is no thoroughgoing separation of civil from
military administration and command, and a single career would
often include both. This is to be expected for a civilization
based on non-peaceful economic activity, where war, slavery and
imperialism are typical. It is, then, ultimately the military
factor that is being met with here again, as with the City-state.
This seems finally to be the explanation.
Other explanations might be devised. But the general point
should be grasped: that compared with City-states, the position
of women in Bureaucratic Kingdoms in all respects is so strong
that their exclusion from the domination system really stands out
by contrast. There is all the more reason why the attempt should
be made to deal with this in terms of an integrated general soc¬
iology of power.
To conclude, then, in this section I have been contrasting
two types of polity, the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom.
For the most part, I have contrasted their structures. But they
are sub-types of the charismatic and traditional types of polity
respectively, and these are named for the principles of legitim¬
ation of authority, which is diagnostic for structure. In the
City-state, authority is charismatically legitimated, in terms of
blood-charisma (patrician lineages), elections, selection by the
gods (i.e. sortition) etco In the Bureaucratic Kingdom, authority
is traditionally legitimated, the officials being appointed by
the king to administer for him in terms of established expectat¬
ions and norms. Something can perhaps be said then about these
principles of legitimation themselves: above all, that if char¬
ismatic legitimation bears an obvious relationship to charisma,
it should be realized too that legitimation and charisma are
themselves related concepts. All power is charismatic, in greater
or lesser degree. This, taken apart from the specific articulat¬
ion of military organization, might help to account for the gen¬
eral historical pattern of exclusion of women from domination
systems. Because of their fertility, the participation of women
is felt to compromise the freedom of action, the freedom from
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immediate necessity, and the ability to act, to control or at
least respond to events, of the authorities.
This is similar to the theory presented in the previous -
chapter. Again, it is difficult to provide specific content and
context. But it should "be reiterated that, from the point of view
of general social theory, it is in principle adequate to ground
the theory of sexual inequality ultimately in the sociology of
power. All pointers towards such a solution should be given
statement. Moreover, there is a prediction, or a broad generaliz¬
ation, here: that women's oppression will be greater under char¬
ismatic systems of domination, lesser under traditional systems.
Indeed, this can be stated quantitatively: the greater the degree
of charisma, the greater women's oppression. Of course, this
might have to be qualified in the light of other factors. In par¬
ticular, a charismatic community might be religious rather than
political - a Church. This would presumably apply especially to
medieval Islam and Christianity. But the prediction even so cer¬
tainly seems quite accurate for the Ancient Civilization as stud¬
ied here. I will take this up again at the end of the thesis.
Economy
The discussion in this section relies most heavily on two
chapters from the works of Max Weber: "Economic Theory and Anc¬
ient Society" ( I909 - "the introductory essay to "The Agrarian
Sociology of Ancient Civilizations"), and "Sociological Categor¬
ies of Economic Action" (1918 - 20; chapter 2 of "The Theory of
Social and Economic Organizations" - Part i of "Economy and Soc¬
iety"). Of these, the former has of course special significance
for the present thesis. It is accordingly given a separate precis
in an appendix below (Appendix A part ii). However, the more for¬
mal conceptual discussion of the latter provides a more useful
opening here. It should not need to be added that Leber's consid¬
erations on the ancient economy were deeply formative for his
general economic sociology and history.
Weber distinguishes two types of social action in relation
to the economy: economic action and economically oriented action.
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The former is defined, as action in pursuit of economic ends by
peaceful means. The latter has two cases: the consideration of
economic factors in action oriented elsewhere, and the pursuit of
economic ends by non-peaceful means. Although it is mainly in
terms of peaceful economic action that Weber pursues his economic
sociology here, the category of non-peaceful economic action is
highly typical of Antiquity. But in all cases, action is defined
by reference to "the economy". This is defined in turn in terms
of a demand for utilities - goods and services - and a continuous
provision for supply to meet that demand. Utilities, then, are
grounded in the social construction of material reality; nothing
is economic "of itself".
In my methodological considerations (ch 3 above), I base my
own treatment of sexual polarity on this model (although the anal¬
ogy of course is not precise), both in terms of a process of soc¬
ial construction of material reality and in terms of two types of
social action: sexually polar action, and action oriented to sex¬
ual polarity. Of the latter type of social action, one case is of
course where economic considerations and sexually polar consider¬
ations are involved together. .1 point out that there is no virtue
in pursuing typological elaboration for its own sake; the point
is simply that there is a realm of economic-sexually polar phen¬
omena to consider. But so also is there a realm of sexually polar
-economic phenomena, and a degree of analytic separation should
be maintained between the two. Demographic issues then and the
location of the mother-child subsistence unit in the household
have accordingly been dealt with elsewhere (ch 4 & 5)» and will
only be touched upon here where essential. The present discussion
will be limited to the economy as (more or less) conventionally
•understood.
Even so, the sexually polar conditioning of economic phen¬
omena has different levels, and it is essential here to start
from the socially constructed nature of the economy. For the
first and most obvious matter is the social construction of asp¬
ects of sexual polarity into the economic realm. Prostitution and
wet-nursing are the two basic cases of this. But sexual polarity
is socially constructed too, and so these things are extended
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into a range of what are culturally understood, to be typical
female sexual and childcare services. These may include for ex¬
ample erotic dancing or other artistic performance; or again,
nannying generally. It must be conceded that prostitution is not
necessarily female. It does however seem typically to be for a
male clientele not a female, whether heterosexual or homosexual.
The point should also be made that prostitution is not always
easily definable from an economic point of view. There is a whole
spectrum of sexual relationships, and most of them include some
kind of economic element, the gifts between lovers as much as the
common household of marriage. One follows a conventional definit¬
ion then (and with due scepticism), and looks for a continuous
craft or an explicit practice. Prostitution is a meaning given to
sexual intercourse. Mutatis mutandis, all this could also be said
of wet-nursing and nannying relations too (there are differences:
who feeds the wet-nurse's child? Her own milk may not be suffic¬
ient.) But the basic point that has to be made is that all this
shows at the outset the greater power of men than women in the
process of social construction. This must I think be seen in
terms of negotiated settlements in a conflictual process, not as
a unilateral imposition upon women by men. The sharing of mean¬
ings is a subtle and complex affair, in which texts can be diff¬
erentially written and read, as I have argued before (ch 3 above).
But this is not the place to pursue such methodological issues.
Eeyond these beginnings, Weber develops his economic sociol¬
ogy "by distinguishing two modes of orientation of economic action:
profit-making and wants-satisfaction. These in turn give rise to
two different types of economic organization: the enterprise and
the oikos. Both have compatibility with the market, though the
enterprise has a special elective affinity for it. But at this
point it becomes necessary to narrow the focus to Antiquity, and
to start to work more in terms of the text "Economic Theory and
Ancient Society. For the ancient economy in Weber's analysis is
characterized by the oikos in distinctive inter-relation with the
market, an orientation to wants-satisfaction and, perhaps above
all, by non-peaceful economic action.
As indicated earlier, a separate precis of this is presented
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elsewhere. Only a basic outline will be given here. The starting
point, then, is the oikos. This is the household, workshops,
lands etc. of the citizen, including the livestock, slaves and
other persons. At base, it is the peasant's farm, but it extends
to the whole property and following of a patrician or a'king (or
a god). Ideally, the oikos is self-sufficient, though it sells
off its excess produce. The market then is not the supplier of
essentials, but deals mainly in luxuries and in excess produce.
The urban proletariat of artisans and shop-keepers comes mostly
from migration; it is not self-reproductive. There are both slave
and free, citizen and non-citizen, elements here. The slaves live
as free but pay body-rent to their owners; on the whole, it is
the general characteristic of this economy to produce rents rath¬
er than profits. Trade, which is typically maritime, is discon¬
tinuous; war for slaves, booty and tribute, and "political capit¬
alism", for example tax-farming a conquered province or contract¬
ing to supply the army, are the typical forms of acquisition.
Slaves come partly from expropriation of the peasantry, partly
from foreign purchase and capture in war. Expropriation of the
peasantry is most pronounced in the Patrician City or in olig¬
archic City conditions; foreign predation characterizes the Pleb¬
eian City whether under oligarchic or democratic control. By con¬
trast, the Bureaucratic Kingdom is both relatively pacified and
relatively protective of its lower strata, both rural and urban.
Migration is less characteristic and the latter come nearer to
self-reproductivity. But the Bureaucratic Kingdom can undercut
its own economic basis, precisely by being too peaceful and pro¬
tective. These remarks must suffice for the meantime.
To take up again the question of sexual divisions, the first
point surely is that women are on the whole excluded from the
realm of non-peaceful economic action. On the other hand, they
are very much among its victims, in terms of slavery; this is a
common route into prostitution. The pacification of the Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom is then very much to women's advantage. Of course
it should be realized that a general restriction on women's chan¬
ces for acquisition is clearly entailed in this issue.
After this, the next issue might seem to be appropriation.
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There are three main routes to this: inheritance (and dowry),
gift and transaction. I have discussed inheritance and dowry in
an earlier chapter (ch 5)« The laws are various: at Athens, women
are largely excluded from inheritance (though they have dowries),
hut at Rome and in Egypt women and men inherit equally. Since
this was always Roman practice, it is hard to systematize this;
the differences between Athens and Rome cannot all be securely
attributed to that between democratic and oligarchic development
(what was earlier Athenian practice?).
But the angle of approach is false, for appropriation and
property are complex and many-levelled concepts. In the City-
state, a distinction is made between the constituents of the bas¬
ic oikos ("res mancipi" in Roman lav;) - land, houses, livestock,
slaves - and other property. Again, ultimate ownership is disting¬
uished from immediate possession, though this point does not seem
to be sexually weighted. Res mancipi however are protected by a
complex of laws. They are typically reserved to the citizens, and
free alienation and freedom of testacy may be slow to develop -
neither ever come at Athens. These laws include restrictions on
women's economic agency, an aspect of the guardianship of women
discussed before (ch 6 Aggression). There are two main faces to
this: first, res mancipi in the ownership of a woman must be ad¬
ministered through the authority of a male guardian; second,
though the wife is mistress of the household, she cannot transact
for the household with the outside world. These principles fall
into desuetude at Rome from the Late Republic, and there are al¬
ways detailed differences between Rome and Athens, but the basic
principles seem universal to the City-state world. The underlying
concern is the continuity of the lineage, and of its economic
basis. Women's inheritance and dowry systems could be fitted to
this in various ways. But women's economic agency is more diffic¬
ult: women are not legally answerable; they may have conflictual
loyalties to their own kin; they might be naive or open to seduct¬
ion; or they might simply have a clash of interests or of wills
with their menfolk. The possible consequences of mismanagement in
terms of expropriation and debt-slavery should be remembered.
(There is an interesting contrast with Mesopotamia, where there
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is a similar economy but different laws. See Bottero 1974«)
At any rate, Bureaucratic Egypt is a complete contrast to
all this, for there the categories of property are not distingui¬
shed, and there is no restriction on women's economic agency,
either on her own account or that of her marital household. The
continuity of property here is of no consequence, for there is no
continuity of lineage. I have discussed these issues before (ch 4
& 5).
Other considerations on women's property tend to follow the
above pattern: the restrictions are found in City-states only
(though the formal attrition in the Roman Principate is slow),
and centres on res mancipi and citizen women. Dowry is always ad¬
ministered by a male guardian. Women's property reverts to her
agnates - cognatic transmission comes at Rome in the 2nd century
A.D». Gifts to women which reduce a citizen patrimony may be pre¬
vented. The accumulation of large property in women's hands may
be considered politically undesirable, perhaps as enabling women
to play at political factionalism (perhaps rather as permitting
patrician houses to do so - but with the women too as active
players). But the difference, that Athens largely excluded women
from ownership of property while Rome permitted it freely, is
puzzling. Above (ch 5) I suggested that the underlying difference
is between the protection of plebeian small property at Athens
and of patrician grandfatherly authority at Rome. The Romans
seem to have been less worried about estates fragmenting, at
least at patrician level. Again, as I have said before, the Rom¬
ans were much more innovative with their legal system. The great¬
er chances for political acquisition, and the revival of class
conflicts and the expropriation of the Italian peasantry at Rome
in the Lata Republic, seem to fit in with all this. However, a
further and deeper difference for women is that Athens maintained
a rigorous system of guardianship, whereas Rome first softened
hers and then let it fall wholly into desuetude ( changing the
form of marriage also). This process ia a factor of the transfor¬
mation of the Roman City-state to Empire; it runs through the
Late Republic and the Principate.
Against all this, there is no formal differentiation between
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the sexes in matters of appropriation and property in the Bureau¬
cratic Kingdom of Egypt.
Turning now rather to sexual divisions in economic functions,
these must "be discussed in relation to "both the oikos and the
market. Moreover within the former, distinction should also "be
made between household, workshop and fields - though there may
in fact be no physical separation of workshop from household.
Against this it should be noted that many economic functions in
oikos and market are just the same. The orientation of the oikos
to self-sufficiency, and the presence in the market of slaves
paying body-rent, should show that. Some preliminary generalizat¬
ions then can be made.
Most artisanal work in Antiquity is male, especially work
with durable materials such as stone, metal, ceramics, wood, and
so on. Textiles by contrast are a field of mainly female labour,
though where this work moves into the market, men also enter into
it. This holds for linen in Egypt as well as for wool at Athens
and Rome, and it extends to fulling and dyeing as well as spinn¬
ing and weaving, and clothes making and mending too. Dealing with
foodstuffs and cooked food in the market again tends to be female,
though nowhere exclusively so and especially not baking in bulk.
In these latter areas, family workshops may be found, with an in¬
ternal division of functions between the sexes. Again, there may
be a tendency for men to make or grow or catch, while women sell
their menfolk's produce. Of course, these things have to be qual¬
ified by the practical restrictions on families at the urban
proletarian level.
Against this, specifically female crafts include beautician,
hairdresser and mid-wife. Here, the sex of the client is a con¬
ditioning factor. Again, entertainment is a set of crafts that
tend rather to be female, though by no means wholly so: singing,
dancing, playing musical instruments, and so forth. This is con¬
ditioned by a largely, though not exclusively, male clientele.
Even so, the amounts spent on the equivalents to these things in
modern times should warn us against too casual an assimilation of
this to prostitution. It should also be noted that Egyptian women
(i.e. in preclassical times) were proverbially skilled here.
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Indeed., singing, playing music and dancing were clearly recreat¬
ional activities for women of the more privileged strata in Phar-
aonic Egypt. This suggests that these skills were valued for
their own sakes, and that their performers enjoyed them too, and
this could well be of general application. As to prostitution,
this is always for a male clientele, and is predominantly though
again not exclusively female. Wet-nurses must be female of course.
As to literate crafts, such as secretary, librarian, teacher
or (perhaps) physician, positions in patrician households, in
temples and in the market might occur. As I have argued before
( ch 6 Maturation), literacy has a distinctive sociological locat¬
ion in Antiquity. In Bureaucratic Kingdoms it is above all an ad¬
junct of bureaucracy, but in City-states rhetoric is the function¬
al equivalent of this, and literacy is located in the closure
conflicts of the patricians and plebeians. It is on the whole
then in patrician households that literate crafts are practised
in City-states, and above all by slaves. Secretary and librarian
are typical functions. The sex of the slave here will be a factor
of the sex of the employer, and this has no bearing on the liter¬
acy of citizen girls. Beyond this, City-states have school teach¬
ers, apparently always male, but literate crafts in the market
are otherwise unusual. Physicians might be literate, though not
necessarily so; this too I have discussed before (ch 6 Fertility
and Maternity). Democratic Cities might have a few literate
slaves in state employment; these would be male. Against this,
Bureaucratic Kingdoms give a far wider scope for literate crafts,
and typically as free employment. Above all, there is the state
bureaucracy itself. Women are excluded from this, but there are
literate women in the temples and in private households, perform¬
ing similar administrative functions. Here again the sex of the
employer is typically a factor. Literate women are apparently
also found in the market, for example as letter-writers or draw¬
ers up of documents. Too, physicians here are typically literate,
and this craft is open to women.
In all the foregoing, there is much that is common to all
Antiquity, and much variation that is easily accountable, but
there are other variations that are hard to systematize. Thus for
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example in Egypt, men wash clothes: in Athens acting and athlet¬
ics are amateur not professional; in Rome, until late on at least,
Physicians have low status^ etc. Further examination might make
something of such differences, but only a first drawing of ideal
types is attempted here.
Many of the above functions are found alike in oikos and
market; indeed the placing of slaves in the market paying body-
rent is simply the oikos disposing of its surplus again. But of
other domestic functions, women tend to have the bulk of the
actual housework, in cleaning, drawing water, grinding meal,
cooking, care of young children and personal attendance upon
their mistresses. They also have the work involved in the making
and caring for clothes. Male domestic staff may be preferred by
the rich as cooks; they will look after older male children, and
will be personal attendants upon their masters. On the whole,
however, the tendency is towards female domestic staff. Here the
Bureaucratic Kingdom differs from the City-state chiefly in the
greater direct involvement of the mother in the care of her
children, and a generally reduced reliance upon slave labour.
Converse to this, the tendency is for the bulk of fieldwork and
the care of larger livestock to be done by men. The economic
functions of rural and urban households as households are little
different. But in Bureaucratic Kingdoms women may share in field-
work, subject again to a division of roles: for example men cutt¬
ing the harvest, women gathering it. Again, women may follow the
herds, to cook and provide other services for the men. The ab¬
sence of women from outdoor agricultural work in City-states is
perhaps due to the risks of abduction and enslavement. This holds
especially for the democratic City, where the use of slaves in
agriculture is limited. It would also limit adultery.
Mining and quarrying tend to be associated less with artis-
anship than with military conscription or criminal punishment.
For these reasons they are typically male, though women did grind
ore at the mines under the Roman Principate. Shipping again is
male, basically for its non-peaceful associations and insecurity;
however Egyptian women are seen on board ship. Again, entrepen-
eurial functions tend to lie in the direction of non-peaceful
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economic activity, and also to require legal answerability. In
the City-state, this restricts the investment of women's wealth,
as well as their engagement in person. But in Bureaucratic King¬
doms women are found in such roles, in. relation to peaceful act¬
ivities. These include small—scale banking, own—account trade,
producing and supplying goods on contract, etc.
Prostitution merits separate discussion. I have considered
it earlier in this thesis at many points (especially ch 4 and ch
6 Sexuality). Prostitution in City-states is located in demogra¬
phic processes of supply and demand, based on the socially con¬
structed economic pressures on fertility, and the associated
stratificatory conflicts. Expropriation of the peasantry, expos¬
ure of girl-children, and the capture and purchase of slave-girls
in war and other predation, are the main sources; prostitution is
thus intimately related to slavery. Conversely, the demand is for
sex-partners who constitute no economic liability, especially to
the citizen's patrimony, neither for themselves nor for their
progeny; only the immediate price. Expropriation of the peasantry
and exposure of citizen girl-children are typical of the Patric¬
ian City; the Plebeian City under democratic control ameliorates
these practices and turns instead to foreign predation. Under
oligarchic control, however, the older practices may be revived
in conjunction with external predation, as strikingly at Rome,
kith these differences, the patterns of sexual relations are also
in contrast. In the democratic City, the citizen uses prostitutes
supplementary to marriage, a cultured courtesan stratum is dist¬
inguished, and the man enjoys sexual intercourse without emotion¬
al involvement, perhaps reserving his love for a homosexual part¬
ner. In the oligarchic City, the citizen uses prostitutes before
or instead of marriage, prostitutes are all of one stratum, and
the man may build a durable love-affair which suspends or termin¬
ates the girl's prostitution. The contrast here also qualifies
the relations of non-citizen men with prostitutes: in both cases
they tend to follow the citizen pattern.
In Bureaucratic Kingdoms, all the processes here are amel¬
iorated, especially the economic pressures on fertility. Citizen¬
ship is not closed or entailed with property; the lower strata
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are relatively secure, and war and predation are limited. Thus
there is neither the supply nor the demand for prostitutes in the
same way. Moreover women have citizenship here, and protected
legal rights; they have recourse against attempted enslavement.
They also have economic agency and a greater range of economic
opportunities. Where prostitution does occur, then,' it is not
associated with slavery, hut is a free craft of choice. The clien¬
tele is prohahly mostly travellers. Eut above all, here the bal¬
ance of power between the sexes in socially constructing the econ¬
omy is far more even, and so prostitution tends to dissolve into
other types of sexual relationship, whether enduring or casual.
(The breakdown of the City-state sees the beginnings of this dev¬
elopment, but it requires the growth of a large state bureaucracy
to reach full force. This never happens at Rome.)
Against this background, the prostitute considered in econom¬
ic terms is simply an artisan: the brothel is a workshop. The rel¬
ation of prostitutes to their premises could be various, but the
brothel was usually a place of work only, not a place of resid¬
ence. However prostitution is also found at inns and taverns, or
simply in the streets and arches. Prostitutes might be slave or
free, citizen or non-citizen; they would all practise their craft
on the same basis. Typically, then, the slaves are living indep¬
endently and paying body-rent to their masters, like any slave
artisan - as I have said, the ancient economy produces rents
rather than profits. The owning of premises for prostitution was
a recognized business investment, and there were state brothels.
But the owning of prostitutes themselves is quite a different
matter. Typically, then, the prostitute would probably pay rent
for her premises, and would not be under direct supervision - the
direct supervision of artisan labour is not typical for Antiquity.
The prostitute would then be relatively free to choose her clien¬
ts, and her times, subject to paying her rent and other expenses
- prostitution was commonly taxed. It should be added that the
involvement of prostitution with slavery and clientage (in terms
of freed slaves) provides a degree of protection for the prostit¬
ute from pimps and bullies, and indeed from the law - prostitution
of course was not criminalized.
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Slave-prostitutes are objects of trade: there is both the
importation of captives for sale and the raising of the exposed
for sale. Although the former, for its non-peaceful dimensions,
excludes women as entrepeneurs, they certainly featured in that
role in the latter. Generally in Antiquity the artisan's ambition
is to buy a slave to keep him in old age - the artisans being
basically non-reproductive, they have no children to do this for
them. Prostitution is quite typical here. Exposed girls might be
given a cultural education. Girls might be sold or rented on long
contract; often the intention was to trap a wealthy young man
into falling in love with the girl, so that he would pay a high
price for her. However, a girl's owner might simply send her to
a brothel, and collect body-rent from her. The owning of prostit¬
utes carried civil disabilities, at least at Rome, and the magis¬
trates would typically refuse to protect the whoremaster's prop¬
erty right if the girl's lover abducted her. This seems to appear
early, perhaps before the beginning of the Late Republic. Indeed
there seem to be typical differences here again between Rome and
Athens. Again, later Roman law (in the Principate) protected a
slave-girl from being prostituted, other than as a punishment.
At Athens, there are two strata of prostitutes: hetaerae
trained to be cultured companions for the wealthier, and pornai
giving simple sexual intercourse to the poor. However there
should be no illusions as to whether the hetaerae gave sexual
intercourse too. At Rome, there are rather the categories of
prostitute and mistress; the latter often a former prostitute
who, having been bought and freed by a lover, has now parted from
him and lives by choosing her lovers and accepting gifts from
them. This is a more borderline case of prostitution. One conseq¬
uence of this is that at Rome, but not at Athens, actresses and
mimes are assimilated to prostitutes, for example in the Augustan
legislation on fornication and adultery. There came to be a
strong erotic content to the Roman popular theatre. Indeed that
is so of private entertainment in both Athens and Rome; whereas
there is no professional theatre at Athens, which makes the task
of comparative analysis more complicated. But the prevalence of
love-affairs on the borderlands of prostitution at Rome is clear;
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whereas I have warned above of the danger of too easy an assimil¬
ation of music and dancing to prostitution. These were skills
valued in their own right, even at Athens.
All this is to focus on the City-state. In Bureaucratic
Kingdoms the situation is far simpler, at least in terms of econ¬
omics. The girl is simply a free artisan, quite possibly owning,
or sharing in the ownership of, her own premises. These might be
her home, or she might work at an inn or tavern. Since she has
full citizenship and her craft is neither criminalized nor carr¬
ies disabilities, there is little more to say. Little indeed is
known of prostitution in Egypt. (The situation in Mesopotamia
might throw some light on it. See remarks on temple prostitution
in ch 6 Sexuality above; see also Bottero 1974«)
Finally, a comment on the exploitation of prostitution might
be in order. It is essential here to distinguish between the
girl's relation to her client, and her relation to her owner.
Exploitation occurs xtfhen the girl cannot get and keep her fee; a
factor of her relationship to those to whom she pays rent or
taxes. Again, the quality of her relationship with her client is
a factor of choice of client, choice of occasion, and the general
emotional ambience of sexual relationships. The position of the
wet-nurse should be contrasted: not only is her conduct, in for
example diet, hygene, sexual relations, likely to be strictly
controlled, but also her own baby is put at risk of malnutrition
or even exposure. Prostitution is not inherently a paradigm of
exploitation.
As to the wet-nurse, this might be a household slave, but is
most likely to be a woman of the urban proletariat, whether slave,
freed or free. The lack of women's work compatible with mother¬
hood underlies the practice, that is, on the supply side. The
demand might best be attributed to the insecurity of the mother-
child relationship; I have given indications on this above (ch 6
Fertility and Maternity). In any case, the preference was for a
"decent" girl not an ex-prostitute. The practice would as stated
certainly put her own child at risk, and indeed might follow its
exposure. However child mortality was in any case high. Voet-
nursing was common to both Athens and Rome; it became increasingly
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favoured at Rome from the Late Republic. As noted elsewhere (ch 6
Fertility and Maternity), there is little convergence between the
Roman Principate and Egypt in matters of motherhood. Viet-nursing
was not an Egyptian practice.
Other aspects of sexual economic divisions could also be
considered: divisions in consumption patterns, for example. Thus
women's preferences for jewellery, expensive clothing materials,
and other beauty culture - perfumes, cosmetics, coiffure - is
surely a way of holding and enjoying wealth in a situation where
women move between the households of men and do not have secure
claim to a household of their own. Against this, household furn¬
ishings will appear as a typical way for men to enjoy their
wealth. This is known for Rome. Such issues: should not be disreg¬
arded simply because "economic sociology" does not know what to
make of them. The discussions above on restrictions of women's
inheritance rights and economic agency, together with questions
of residence patterns, is surely their context.
However, I turn now rather to enquire whether on the basis
of the above account any summary statement can be made as to the
principles at work in the realm of sexual economic divisions.
Here it must be realized clearly that there are limitations inher¬
ent in the analytic frameworks "Antiquity" in this thesis is bas¬
ically a single economic order divided into sub-types by differ¬
ent systems of power. But granted this, I think that a number of
general points can be made, though some of them tentatively.
First, then, there is the unequal balance of power between
the sexes in the social construction of the economic realm. Vlith
this, there is the potential for constructing sexual polarity (to
which the same considerations apply) into the economic realm -
prostitution, wet-nursing, even slave-breeding so far as this
occurs, and their cultural penumbra. Second, there is the exclus¬
ion of itfomen from non-peaceful economic activity and the major
chances for acquisition with it, though they remain its victims,
especially in terms of slavery and of restrictions on freedom of
movement. Third, there are the demographic patterns: the social
construction of economic resources as plentiful or scarce, and
its impact on fertility. Scarcity, the City-state pattern, grounds
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a distinctive syndrome of: agnatic devolution of property, prot¬
ection of patrimony from female economic agency (the economic
guardianship of women), selective expropriation (female expos¬
ure;, and prostitution. Basically, all this is missing in the
Bureaucratic Kingdom, where economic resources are socially con¬
structed as plentiful.
To go beyond this, to the sexual division of economic funct¬
ions, is more difficult. Broad tendencies perhaps are: women work
in the household, men in the fields; men produce goods; women
sell goods and provide services; women provide cooking; cleaning
and childcare, men deal with hunting, fishing, extraction and
transport. Also, women deal with textiles, men with durable mat¬
erials (metal, stone, clay, wood). But there are plentiful except¬
ions to all this, and clearly many other factors enter. On the
whole, it is slaves who do menial work, and with this, the sex
of the slave is often conditioned by the sex of the person served.
Also, the migrant and non-reproductive character of much of the
labour force emphasizes broad rather than fine economic divisions.
Where both sexes work together in a workshop or the fields, finer
divisions appear: women spin while men x^eave; men cut the harvest
while women gather it; and so on.
Trying to account for the broad pattern here, I would again
bring in the conflict of charisma and routine economic activity
referred to above (ch 6 Aggression). As Weber himself describes
the "original" sexual division of labour, men seem to have the
charismatic activities such as hunting or metal-working, while
women have the routine, continuous activities such as crop grow¬
ing (Weber 1981 P 38-9)» (Oddly, Weber seems not to have seen
the point here himself.) In the Ancient Civilization, this seems
to be fairly simply modified on stratificatory lines: lower
strata men are forced into continuous labour, while upper strata
women are moved into supervisory roles. In this, the bulk of
heavy agricultural labour is transferred from women to men; but
this occurs in prehistory.
As to the economic exploitation of women by men, this is not
given in the sexual division of economic functions as such, but
depends on them being brought together within economic organizat-
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ions in specific ways. As I suggested in an earlier chapter (ch
4), this especially happens under conditions of traditional dom¬
ination, where the local community negotiates economic questions
with the central institutions: availibility of resources, intens¬
ities of labour, levels of exploitation, and so forth. In this,
the man strives to reserve'the labour of his woman and children
for himself, under his own control, to offset what is required
from him. But traditional bureaucracy has precisely the character
of breaking this down: of dealing with the woman at least in her
own person, and the children under joint control. Against this,
in the City-state slaves and the urban proletariat do not typic¬
ally have families at all, recruiting rather by migration (and
citizen households work their own resources for themselves). Thus
the general pattern for Antiquity is that women and men work and
are exploited side by side, their exploitation being articulated
through the factors mentioned above - especially slavery and the
demographic questions. The sexual division of economic functions
is unequal, but not I think inherently exploitative; indeed, it
seems to me to show, especially in Bureaucratic Kingdoms (and in
finer divisions where the sexes work together), a definite negot¬
iated character.
In conclusion, then, I end this discussion of sexual divis¬
ions in the economy with the judgement that the economic realm
appears rather to be receiving and embedding the forces of women's
oppression than giving rise to them. That must also be said of
the demographic realm, of course. This accords with the views
that I have expressed before (ch 6 Aggression; ch 7 Power), that
the sources of women's oppression lie in the sociology of power.
I will take this up again at the end of the thesis.
Stratification
Stratification theory is something of- a sociological battle¬
ground, so some introductory comment must be given here. In par¬
ticular it must be specified that, in keeping with arguments
presented earlier in this thesis (especially ch 2 & 4)> I
"reading" Weber's conceptions on stratification very much in the
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light of his considerations on Antiquity, and their place in the
development of his general sociology.
Initially, stratification itself can be defined as a set of
mediating structures that run (both ways) between the economy and
the polity, and have important consequences also in the realm of
culture. Leber's two basic stratificatory concepts are class and
status. Class is defined specifically with reference to the mark¬
et, and it must be recalled that Weber's economic sociology is
largely concerned with premodern civilizations where local and
perhaps inter-local markets co-exist with other economic organiz¬
ations. The development from this to the modern "market economy"
where the market in the abstract integrates all economic organiz¬
ations is very much what he is concerned to explain. In face of
this, and given that the central thrust of Weber's sociology lies
through the consideration of the economy and the polity as co¬
equal realms, status should not be assimilated to a functionalist
central values system or the Marxist notion of ideology. It be¬
longs rather to the non-market economy and the realm of power.
In view of the origins and development of Weber's sociology,
there can be little question that his first concern with the
notion of status was with the ancient City-state: the closure of
the political community that I have outlined elsewhere (ch 4> ch
6 Aggression; see also ch 9 & 10). The first statuses then are:
patrician, plebeian and proletarian, and with them citizen and
metic, free and slave. These are juridically defined categories
with precise political-legal force; their ultimate basis is if
anything military.Weber broadened this conception, almost cert¬
ainly first in consideration of the honestiores - humiliores
status distinction of the Roman Empire (see ch 10 below). Many
factors can ground status stratification, including such factors
as race, ethnicity, language or national community, so far as
they become reflected or embedded in the pattern of economic
arrangements. Moreover, status is often a persistent phenomenon
when the sociological forms have moved on and the conditions that
first gave rise to it are gone. Thus in existential sense one can
speak of "social honour" as the basis of status in general. But
the historical origins of specific status groups and status
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stratificatory systems can be various; very often they are milit¬
ary.*
As outlined in the previous section, Vieber distinguishes two
modes of orientation of economic action, wants-satisfaction and
profit-making, and derives from them two basic types of economic
organization, the oikos and the enterprise. The latter has a spec¬
ial affinity for the market, and it is in terms of the rise of an
entrepeneurial class that Vieber accounts for the development of
the modern "market" economy. A part of this process is the separ¬
ation of the enterprise from the household (Vieber 1978 Part ii
ch 4)• But the ancient economy comprises a distinctive inter¬
relation of the oikos and the market, as described elsewhere (see
especially Appendix A part ii below). The Ancient Civilization,
then, like all premodern civilizations, features an array of
classes and statuses.
Here, the orientation of the oikos to wants-satisfaction and
the overall orientation of the civilization to non-peaceful econ¬
omic activity should be borne in mind, together with the limited
role of the market. This is really only a market for goods, not
for labour (except as slaves), and only discontinuously for cap¬
ital. In the City-state, the basic statuses are as I have indic¬
ated defined by closure of the political community. Details vary,
and I have, following Keber, taken terms from early Rome for gen¬
eral sociological use. Patrician and plebeian confront each other
in status conflicts over citizenship. They also in certain eras
confront each other as classes in relations of usury and debt;
this is basic to the growth of large estates and the expropriat¬
ion of the peasantry. The urban proletariat is the status of the
excluded. It comprises various elements: landless peasants, res¬
ident foreigners (forbidden to own land), and slaves and freed
slaves. These all function in the market, as craftsmen, artisans,
shopkeepers. There is little real class-difference between them.
There may be a richer few, but their wealth will not get them
entry to the political community. Class conflict in Antiquity
*Vieber's other formative work on general stratif icatory consid¬
erations is his (untranslated; essay on the Social Conditions
of the Ancient Germans (keber 1924; see esp. p 554 - 5)*
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centres on the relations of debt as above. Slaves are also found
in the oikos and in the most various functions; the status does
not of itself define economically grounded life-chances.
In the Bureaucratic Kingdom, the chief difference from this
is the absence of a closed political community. This has consequ¬
ences for the status system: it becomes, if not simpler at least
softer, in the context of a basically universal legal citizen¬
ship. The Roman honestiores - humiliores division was simply a
rough division of rich and poor which had consequences in the
criminal law. Even the difference between slave and free began in
time to dissolve into this. In Egypt the situation was even more
amorphous. There were finer distinctions: between imperial and
provincial nobility at Rome; between scribe and priest at Egypt.
But generally the basic' matrix seems to remain between the rich
and the poor, and between the city and the countryside, locating
three strata: the rural poor, the urban poor, and the rich, who
transcend the division of rural and urban. Again, the urban poor
are rather defined by the market, and there is little class diff¬
erentiation among them, the more so as market wealth is no longer
excluded from citizen participation.
The main point then to emerge from this comparison is the
distintion between "hard" status, the juridically defined status
categories of the City-state, and "soft" status, less formal in
its definitions and consequences, though the lav? may still take
account of it, as in Bureaucratic Kingdoms.
This gives only an outline, but the question at issue is:
how is one to inter-relate sexual divisions with stratification?
Clearly this must be done at a number of levels. Preliminarily,
it should be pointed out that primary sexual polarity interacts
with stratification to generate demographic processes, which are
sui generis. It is only secondary phenomena that are being con¬
sidered here. But that stated, the first and most obvious point
is that male and female themselves are statuses, and this more¬
over generally in the sense of "hard", juridically defined, stat¬
us. That is explicit in the City-state, but it shows far more
widely in history, in the exclusion of women from power and from
military affairs, and very commonly also (though little in Anti-
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quity) in an explicit religious secondariness. This last typical¬
ly features exclusion from the priesthood. Generally, Bureaucrat¬
ic Kingdoms are the most moderate in sexual inequalities of these
kinds.
Beyond this, women are status-stratified into the same gen¬
eral stratificatory groups as men, But it should be noted that
the considerations here are not simply birth, sexual relationship,
common household, and the like. They are rightful birth, sexual
relationship and common household, in terms of marriage and leg¬
itimacy. These things (or their absence) are typically definitive
for status groups. Women then possess status in their own persons.
With this, a status differentiation among women also arises: that
between the decent woman and the whore. These patterns appear
general, but they are most clearly marked in societies of "hard"
status such as City-states. It should be stressed that here the
distinction of the decent woman and the whore can again be jurid¬
ical in character: the Augustan legislation illustrates this. In
Bureaucratic Kingdoms, however, the status pattern may come to
little more than the basic status distinction of the sexes, in
moderate form, together with a broad dual-sex status difference
of rich and poor on the lines of the Roman honestiores - humil-
iores. The distinction of decent woman and whore would dissolve
into this last.
Class is perhaps more difficult. The first point is the soc¬
ial construction of sexual polarity into the economic realm,
which underlies prostitution and related and comparable phenomena.
These cannot be defined with reference to the market alone, but
they have a positive affinity with it. Moreover in conditions of
the market it seems undeniable that this comprises a distinct
class, where life-chances are conditioned by factors of gender.
(There is homosexual prostitution too. But the overall tendencies
are for men to buy, for worn en to sell.) It should be stressed
that the shape and extent of all this is conditioned by the soc¬
ial construction of both the economy and sexual polarity: the
contrasts between the City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom are
strong. Also there is the relation between the class of prostit¬
ute and the status of whore; the latter is not limited to the
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market, but includes for example concubines. It should be noted
too that wet-nursing and nannying run parallel to this; indeed
they seem to assimilate to it.
The second point is the sexual division of economic funct¬
ions. This unquestionably is anterior to the market and indeed to
stratification itself,- though stratification, as I have suggested
in the previous section, may reshape it. I have described this
division as embedding power relations, a negotiated outcome of
conflict; as unequal though not antagonistic as between the sexes
in pattern. It seems undeniable then that the sexual division of
economic functions in conditions of the market must tend to pro¬
duce separate class positions for women and men. However, this
has to be qualified: the sexual division of economic functions is
not a clear-cut pattern but a set of tendencies, with many except¬
ions and many cross-cutting factors. Moreover, the market has
generalizing as well as discriminating functions; stratificatory
analysis is not to be pursued simply for the sake of the taxonom-
ical exercize. One is looking rather for relationships to some
kind of socio-historical causation, though the relationships may
be broad. Stratification is a principle of explanation.
Clearly, then, it is the suffragette and feminist movements
of the recent best that provide the immediate incentive to find
specific stratificatory identities for women, This indeed should
presumably be broadened in consideration of perverse phenomena
such as German women's support for Hitler or, more recently,
support among women for Catholic positions on contraception and
abortion. However, consideration of Antiquity shows that such
enquiry is not merely self-serving. Analysis of ancient polythei¬
stic religion, and its developments including the ultimate devel¬
opment into the Western Great World Religions, clearly demands
the stratificatory identification of women. This shows for exam¬
ple in the different specifically female cults and the sex-shared
cults. The former are female in their deities, symbolisms, con¬
cerns and followings; the latter at least in their deities and
symbolisms. At Athens, they include Artemis, Hera, Aphrodite, and
the goddesses of the Eleusinian Mysteries (Demeter ana Perseph¬
one}. Among these, Aphrodite the protectress of prostitutes and
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concubines, and Artemis the protectress of female biology and
health, are especially to be noted. In Egypt, the whole spectrum
of deities and functions here is covered by the two goddesses
Hathor and Isis, and at that, they are not wholly separate and
distinct from each other. At Rome, a pattern somewhat similar to
(and much influenced by) the Greek gives way in the course of
time to one far more like the Egyptian - strikingly in the form
of Isis herself.
The statuses of women in Antiquity I have already indicated:
woman itself; the grades, of the general status order; decent
woman and whore. This is clearest for the City-state; in the Bur¬
eaucratic Kingdom it tends to come down simply to woman, and a
simplified dichotomy in the general status order, into which the
distinction of decent woman and whore is dissolved. As to the
classes, I have said that the market in Antiquity generates
little real class differentiation. To this, I now add that women
perhaps provide the exception. This is meant specifically in
regard to the social construction of sexual polarity into the
economic realm: it is prostitution that makes up a distinct class,
together with its cultural penumbra of erotic dancing, mime, etc.
and its penetration into the general range of the paid female
entertainment of men. let-nursing is in principle a parallel
stream of the same phenomena; its cultural projection however
suggests that the two streams tend to coalesce in practice, de¬
spite their analytic differences. This then to my mind is the one
class that can perhaps be distinguished in Antiquity from the
general run of shopkeepers and artisans. This holds most espec¬
ially for the City-state, though it takes not only dissolution of
the political community but also strong bureaucratic development
to wholly eliminate it.
I cannot pursue the questions of ancient religion and its
evolution here, though I present some comments on it in an app¬
endix (Appandix A part iv). It is only an illustration. Another
point is that the stratificatory groups specific to women inter¬
act with primary sexual polarity to make up the sociodemographic
process, just as much as any other stratificatory units. Whether
women have distinct stratificatory identities then is really
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a matter of what questions we ask. The main points in this for
general stratification theory are: the analytic separation of
the household and the family, and the empirical relationship be¬
tween the household and the market as types of economic organiz¬
ation, in different conditions of social development. But the
initial presumption of stratification theory should he that women
possess stratificatory location, class and status, in their own
right.
I leave the discussion of sexual divisions and stratificat¬
ion there, and with it I conclude this provisional essay in the
sociological theory of sexual polarity. The essay is based, as
stated before (ch 2), on three comparative studies in the Ancient
Civilization: New Kingdom Egypt, classical Athens ana the Roman
Empire. These studies are presented now, in the final part (Part
C) of the thesis.
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Vihen the New Kingdom begins, Egypt is already a very ancient
civilization with two great periods of achievement (Old Kingdom
and Middle Kingdom) behind her, though both had ended in periods
of fragmentation (the 1st and 2nd Intermediate Periods). Geogra¬
phically, the structure of Egypt is centred on the Nile river,
whose annual inundations renew the fertile land. In the south,
the river valley is a narrow ribbon of fertility in the desert;
in the north, the delta is a wider region of fertility and marsh¬
land. Traditionally, these were the South and North Kingdoms
respectively, and they always remained separate administrative
regions. There is also a line of oases paralleling the river to
the west. The recurrent pattern of Egyptian history is that uni¬
fication proceeds from the south, for the south itself is easily
unified, whereas the north tends to remain fragmented. This seems
to have been the shape of the original unification, and again of
the re-unification that created the Middle Kingdom. The tradit¬
ional capital, Memphis, is placed where the valley and the delta
meet.
The New Kingdom (circa B.C. 1560 - 116o) was created by the
princes of the southern city of Thebes. Egypt was then fragmented
(the 2nd Intermediate Period) under many rulers, the most import¬
ant of whom were the Hyksos, Asiatic incomers who controlled all
the north. The Theban princes led a war of liberation, apparently
conciously nationalistic in character, against them and in due
course expelled them. This success was immediately followed by a
program of conquests, both south into the Sudan (Kush or Nubia)
and west into Asia. There were two distinct policies here. Kush
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was made in effect into a new region of Egypt itself like the
South and North Kingdoms. In Asia, however, only a hegemony was
established, the cities and princes paying tribute and accepting
Egyptian supervision. The limits of this empire were established
in conflict with the other great kingdoms of the region: Hatti,
Mitanni, Assyria and Babylon. Although periodic campaigning was
needed to maintain Egyptian authority, the empire lasted until
the migrations of the 12th century.
The structure of New Kingdom history seems to fall in two
halves, basically the 18th dynasty and the Ramessides. These are
divided by the "Amarna episode", when Amenophis iv Akhnaton (cir¬
ca B.C. 1365 - 1349) announced the solar monotheism of Aten, ex¬
propriated the priests and temples (especially those of Amon-re
of Thebes), and created a wholly new city Akhetaten (Tel-el-Araar-
na) as his capital. The Amarna period is associated with stylist¬
ically freer art and the official and literary adoption of con¬
temporary language - a change from Latin to Italian, so to speak.
Yet the episode should not be insisted upon too strongly,
nor the individuality of Akhenaton himself (see Aldred 1968).
There is apparently a longer term tendency for the re-establish¬
ment of the old solar religion and the identification of Pharaoh
with the sun-god after the fashion of the Old Kingdom. New King¬
dom Pharaohs ruled directly: they are soldier-administrators,
above all generals. But from Amenophis ii a change can be seen
from general to hero, and Amenophis iii did not campaign after
his youth. The Aten cult and the freer art both seem to start in
his time. Again, there was a longer term policy of curtailing the
power of Amon-re, who had been given tremendous endowments and
gifts by the Pharaohs - and whose city Thebes (unlike in the Mid¬
dle Kingdom) remained the empire's capital. Pharaohs had already
begun to advance Ptah (of Memphis, the old capital) and Re (of
Heliopolis) as counterweights.
Akhenaton's policies were spectacular failures. But in the
aftermath, although Amon-re was restored, the capital was moved
to Memphis, and later to Per-Ramesse in the delta, and the pref¬
erment of Ptah and Re continued. Later Pharaohs are not named for
Amon. Again, Horemheb and his successors in the 19th and 20th
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dynasties are generals, soldier-administrators as before.
The New Kingdom ends in the migrations and wars of the 12th
century. These destroyed all the civilizations of their time,
even Mycenaean Greece (see Sandars 1978). But Egypt under Merne-
ptah and Ramesses iii defeated her invaders; it was only her
Asiatic empire that she lost. Even so, Egypt itself collapsed
into economic and administrative confusion not long afterwards.
It is hard to say why, and with this, it is hard to say what real
contrast there is between the 18th dynasty and the Ramesside era,
and whether there was a genuine renewal post-Amarna or only a
slow decline. Caution towards the Amarna episode (and towards
cultural interpretations), and recognition of the general catas¬
trophe of the 12th century, suggest to me that the Ramesside re¬
newal was genuine, and that the basic causes of the fall of the
New Kingdom were exogenous! Pharaoh's loss of the ability to
trade abroad to advantage, and thence to pay the bureaucracy, and
thence to collect taxes, and thence to pay and equip the army,
etc. More than this cannot be said here.
At the time of the New Kingdom, the population of Egypt pro¬
per was of the order of 2.9 - 4*5 million, living mostly in cit¬
ies along the Nile and in surrounding villages (O'Connor 1983;
see also Janssen 1975)» The archaeology of Egyptian cities (and
other settlements) is very limited, and the degree of urbanizat¬
ion is not known.
Ancient Egypt has no historiographical tradition, though she
has annalists, and knowledge of the language and its writing were
lost at the end of Antiquity and only recovered in the 19th cent¬
ury. Against this, natural conditions for the preservation of
documents are quite exceptional, and it is largely from these
that Egyptologists have built up their knowledge of Egyptian civ¬
ilization and history. But Egyptology consequently leans towards
philology and archaeology, and tends to be somewhat remote from
the historiographical mainstream.
The Position of VIomen
State and Family
As already indicated, Egypt in the 2nd Intermediate Period
was a congeries of small princedoms, with the north under the
control of the Asiatic Hyksos. The New Kingdom was created by a
nationalistic war of re-unification and expulsion, leading on to
the conquest of an empire. In this, Pharaoh* - the princes of
Thebes - was able to expropriate a great amount of land and live¬
stock, together with its associated workforce, as well as acquir¬
ing much other wealth. He was also able to buy back old royal
offices of various kinds that had become privately appropriated.
On the other hand, he did not on the whole on the basis of this
wealth grant feifs to his lieutenants and supporters; neither did
he confirm powerful lords in their possessions in return for de¬
clarations of loyalty. On the contrary, the greater part of it
he either kept himself or else used to endow temples. The New
Kingdom is a bureaucratic not a feudal state.
The relationship between state and family, then, is in the
first instance a negative one, in that positions of power are not
monopolized and transmitted in terms of lineages and the heredit¬
ary ownership of large private wealth. To pursue this, attention
should first be given to the temples. The temples of Egypt should
be understood more widely as religious foundations. They might
centre on a god or a mortuary cult, especially of deceased royal¬
ty, or even sometimes on a cult of the living Pharaoh. The temple
consisted of a grouping of buildings, wholly or partly within a
walled compound, with a population supported from an endowment of
lands, livestock and associated workforce, partly local, partly
scattered all over Egypt. The population would include religious
officiants of various categories but also lay administrators of
the temple's material affairs; also artisans and craftsmen, ser¬
vants etc., not to mention peasants and herdsmen. In short, the
religious foundation is an oikos, in which a full range of econ-
* "Pharaoh" means "The Great House".
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omic activities is carried on, including inter-local if not for¬
eign trade and both agrarian and artisanal production for sale.
But this oikos has no mortal owner, and that is the point.
This system can be seen as a long-term device whereby Egypt
avoided the development of an independent nobility, or rather
whereby Pharaoh avoided it. It is this that throws greatest light
on the oft-quoted notion that Pharaoh is a god - not in itself a
very helpful statement, for there is always a relationship be¬
tween royalty and deity and besides, what is a god? Also, Pharaoh
does have a most important mortal side, especially as general -
the crown prince was often made commander of the army. But Phar¬
aoh is a god in the sense that he is the only living mortal to
possess outright his own oikos, exactly like the above foundat¬
ions and on massive scale. This has to be qualified: despite the
notion that Pharaoh owns all the land (which again, given differ¬
ent conceptual levels of ownership, is not in itself very inform¬
ative), there certainly is private ownership in Egypt. Again, the
great officials of the state and again the inner members of the
royal family will possess their own oikoi, and moreover will ex¬
pect to transmit them to their heirs. Even so, Pharaoh is not
only the greatest mortal property owner, but the only one whose
ownership is absolute: all other ownership derives in some sense
from him.
Above all, Pharaoh does not have to make peace with a hered¬
itary aristocracy: he is served by a bureaucracy instead. The
basis of this is simply the wars of reconquest, which permit to
Pharaoh the acquisition of wealth and the expropriation of the
great outlined above. Pharaoh cannot keep the whole realm direct¬
ly in his own hands but he can compel the great to serve him on
his own terms, setting up a taxation system and using the taxes
to pay salaries, and appointing those whom he wishes to reward
to official posts. Thus in effect the great are compelled to ad¬
minister their own wealth for Pharaoh, at his appointment and
under his control. This makes up so to speak the "private seotor"
of the Egyptian economy, running parallel to the "state sector"
of the temples and royal domains. The main functions of the bur¬
eaucracy are economic: the organization of the workforce, espec-
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ially the corvee for controlling the irrigation system and for
the harvest; the collection of taxation; and the administration
of the granaries, magazines and treasuries in which the taxes are
stored. The other major function is the administration of just¬
ice. The great of Egypt are defined by this system, and so far as
it cannot contain them, they are shunted off to religious sine¬
cures in the temples. The gods are the only nobility of Egypt.
The basic classes of Egypt are the scribes, priests, peas¬
ants and artisans. The scribes are the official class, serving at
all levels in the bureaucracy from the viziers down to very sub¬
ordinate local positions. Not all scribes were in state employ¬
ment; others were employed in the temple administrations or in
the great households, and probably some worked as letter writers
and drawers up of contracts and documents on the market. The
priests are basically the religious personnel of the temples;
these have various levels and categories. The major priesthoods
in the New Kingdom were organized as a national bureaucracy; in¬
deed, the building of temples of the gods in the New Kingdom is
paralleled only by that of royal mortuary endowments in previous
eras. But this must be seen in terms of Pharaoh's control over the
priesthood, not of the development of an independent Church in
potential conflict with the state. Pharaoh was apparently quite
free to re-allocate or even re-appropriate temple lands, and
though it is not certain (indeed it was probably a point of con¬
flict), the temples probably paid taxes. Again, Pharaoh appointed
the priests and also the administrators of the temple domains,
treating such posts (and also posts in the administration of his
own domains) together with those in the state bureaucracy as all
part of an undifferentiated scribal career. Besides these priest¬
hoods, there were also private mortuary endowments, whereby a
priest would perform services for the dead, being supported from
the endowment for the purpose. Strictly however this should be
the duty of the eldest son of the deceased.
Peasants worked under a variety of arrangements: as serfs on
the great estates whether royal, temple or private; as tenants on
the great estates on a share-cropping basis; or working on their
own land. The soldiers were drawn largely from this last class,
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and after Amarna times there is a policy of endowing soldier-far¬
mers with land-holdings, which are perpetual so long as the fam¬
ily continues to provide recruits.* But all these categories of
peasants appear to have lived together in villages, and to have
conducted their communal affairs on a basis of equality. Corvee,
the state conscription of labour, bore most heavily on the peas¬
antry, as it was mainly for agrarian functions, especially in
control of the inundations and the harvest. Artisans were located
in the great households, again whether royal, temple or private.
Of course this is typically a city rather than a rural function,
though the distinction is far from absolute. How far the attach¬
ment is physical and how far notional is hard to say. There
appear to be distinct artisans' dwellings, but not necessarily
artisans' quarters - so little is known of Egyptian cities. An¬
other difficult question is how far there were free artisans
working for the market. Our sources most probably under-represent
this dimension of the Egyptian economy. Yet it is clear that
artisanal work was done for the market. Finally, slaves should be
considered. These were brought in in fair numbers from the camp¬
aigns in Asia. Yet Egypt seems to be lacking in a law of slavery
(a point to be considered again in a later section). It was per¬
haps the law that only Pharaoh could make a slave, and debt-slav¬
ery seems only to exist as imprisonment and forced labour for the
evasion of tax or corvee. The Asiatic captives then quickly be¬
come assimilated into the free or semi-free native population.
The process of freeing a slave incidentally was by formal adopt¬
ion.
Citizenship in Egypt is basically a matter of access to the
*Helck (Helck 1975) says that this kind of arrangement runs all
through the New Kingdom, and is used for all sorts and condit¬
ions of people not just for soldiers. The land would generally
be located on the royal or temple domains, and hereditary ser¬
vice could be freely commuted for payment, especially in gold.
Helck regards the prevalence of this type of arrangement as a
definitive factor in the New Kingdom economy. Helck's work,
however, being in German, could only be consulted at a very
late stage. A substantial revision especially of this section
in its light would be most desirable. However the impact would
be to reinforce rather than to alter the thrust of the argu¬
ments that I present.
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courts, above all the local tribunal of townsmen or villagers.
No-one seems to have been excluded; in particular the local trib¬
unals seem to have admitted everyone on the basis of residence,
perhaps even temporary residence. Even slaves seem not to have
been excluded. Ethnocentric perceptions then seem to have had no
legal force. Also it should be stressed that the military prof¬
ession has no special implications for citizenship. Within this
overall homogeneity there is a broad distinction of two levels,
broadly similar perhaps to the honestiores and humiliores of the
Roman Empire. The upper level comprises the scribes and priests.
But there is no discrimination in the legal process. The main
point is that the upper stratum is exempt from corvee. Beyond
this, the law makes a point of applying equally to all. The
Egyptians indeed would have found the Roman terms and their legal
consequences unacceptable.
Transmission and inheritance in this situation must be seen
in terms of both property and office. In the latter regard, there
seems to have been a negotiable principle that the son should
succeed to his father's office, subject perhaps to the develop¬
ment of a career. This applies both in the state, temple and roy¬
al bureaucracies and in the priesthoods. It might be noted that
since there are posts for women in the temples at least, a princ¬
iple that the daughter should succeed to her mother* s position
should also hold, though we hear less of it. But formally at
least and probably in practice, all this is subject to Pharaoh's
confirmation. It should be realized that a great part of peasant
and artisanal labour is organized on the basis of appointment to
the relevant resources and tasks rather than direct ownership of
them. Although there is no formally hereditary principle even in
the crafts, the bulk of labour in these areas is probably recrui¬
ted in this way.
As to property, Egyptian law is little known, and much of
the documentation comes from later times; also practice appears
to have varied at different eras, at least in emphasis and detail
(Pirenne 1959; Theodorides 1971)« Something that is hard to say
is whether the Egyptians distinguished between real and movable
property, and if so what weight they put upon the distinction.
From what I have seen, they do not appear to have done so; cert¬
ainly there is no evident equivalent to the Roman category of
"res mancipi", with its restrictions on administration and alien¬
ation. But then the Egyptian political economy is not structured
in terms of privileged lineages and entailed property, "but of the
ultimate ownership of property "by Pharaoh and the gods (contrary
principles did tend to emerge in the Middle Kingdom and the Int¬
ermediate Periods). In Egypt there was always apparently free
alienation of property, and all property seems to be alienated by
the same straightforward enough process. Also it is clear that
wills were always known varying the laws of intestate succession;
that children could be disinherited and that special bequests and
inheritances could be made. As to family property, the law con¬
sidered this in three categories: the husband's property, the
wife's property, and joint property. This last had in turn two
cases: what was brought together into the marriage, and what was
jointly acquired after the marriage. The basis of the first was
the conjugal fund set up at marriage by the couple's families, ■§■
coming from the husband's family and -3- coming from the wife's.
The basic principles of intestate succession were that each part¬
ner's own property devolves to his/her children at his/her death,
and is divided equally amongst them. In the failure of children,
the estate would be divided among the deceased's brothers and
sisters. A will might vary this: in particular, a husband might
make his wife joint heir with his children or even sole heir in
the failure of children, though the reverse of this does not seem
to be known; again, the wife might benefit from a specific be¬
quest (Theodorides 1976 p 47 - 8). As to joint property, at eith¬
er partner* s death the conjugal fund is divided, ■§- going to the
surviving partner, the other % being divided amongst the child¬
ren; the surviving partner keeps the usufruct of the common acqu¬
isitions but these are entailed for division amongst the children
at his/her death. It should be noted that in all these matters
the children inherit in equal shares regardless of sex (Theodor¬
ides 1976 p 46 - 50).
The estate might continue to be administered as a unit after
devolution, unless one of the heirs raised an action for division.
This might indicate a continuing joint household; in any case one
person would be appointed to administer the estate. Traditionally
a son, usually the eldest, would have responsibility for his par¬
ents' mortuary cult, and might have a larger share in the inher¬
itance on account of this. Commonly, however, in the New Kingdom
a bequest was given to a mortuary priest - an "adopted, son" - to
perform this function, thus creating a religious foundation; the
unequal division of estates on this basis does not seem to have
been practised in this time. Mortuary cults in any case appear
commonly to have fallen into desuetude within two or three gener¬
ations, the endowments being peculiarly subject to private appro¬
priation. A point of tension to be noted in the inheritance laws
is the capability of the divorced woman to secure the inheritance
rights of her children against those of her husband by a later
marriage.
It can be seen that there is here a tremendous tendency for
property to fragment. Property, that is, does not have continuity
over time but a cycle of fragmentation and re-accumulation. This
is located in an economy whose strong tendency is to construct
its economic opportunities in terms of appointments rather than
possessions. This holds as I have pointed out for agrarian and
artisanal labour as well as for scribes and priests, though as
comprising the privileged stratum the latter have the greater
political importance. Indeed, these economic opportunities are
subject to private appropriation. Religious endowments in partic¬
ular seem to have been subject to this, and the religious found¬
ations could become quite hollowed out in consequence, turning in
effect into secular towns. This of course is characteristic of
Intermediate times rather than of the strong centralized kingdoms.
But Pharaoh seems to have used the creation of religious foundat¬
ions partly as a means of bringing marginal lands into use - the
marginality of land in Egyptian conditions being largely a factor
of the input of work. With this and the bureaucratized nature of
the economy as a whole there is no lack of economic opportunities,
of all kinds and at all levels, whether actually productive or
sinecural. It is indeed on the basis of such opportunities that
the re-accumulation of property seems to be made, though approp-
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riation of allocated, resources is also a factor. But especially
to "be noted is the wide availability of religious sinecures to the
privileged stratum, subject at least in principle to Pharaoh's
appointment and the actual ownership of the resources by the
gods.
In sum, the Egyptian economy is characterized not by closure
but by openness and even expansion. It is difficult to say what
controls the rise and fall of such an economy; probably Pharaoh's
tribute from empire is essential to keep the system working and
in balance. But the upshot of it is that neither as a whole nor
severally did the Egyptians experience economic pressures on
their fertility, neither in fact nor in subjective perception.
There are no constraints on family size at any level of society
of this kind. Especially the Egyptians do not appear to have
either sold or exposed their children.
The relationship between state and family, then, rather than
being simply negative might be described as formally negative but
substantively positive, in that the state does provide a support¬
ive economic environment, although it is more equivocal in legal
terms. In fact, the state does treat the family as a legal unit,
in accepting the son's claim to (if not right to) his father's
position, and generally in securing the laws of inheritance. Also
a family can apparently be held collectively responsible for a
tax default or an evasion of corvee, and be punished with the
imprisonment of all or any of its members. But equally the state
recognizes the rights of family members against each other, and
it does not appear to vindicate domestic authority over adults,
whether women or grown children. In the matter of their rights as
opposed to their duties, the state seems to recognize only indiv¬
iduals. As to the founding of a family, the state seems to have
had no hand in this (nor the temples); it was purely a question
of the couple setting up house together. Some kind of consent
from the girl* s family might be needed, and there was a property
endowment to the couple as dicussed above. Beyond this, the marr¬
iage was perhaps announced before the local tribunal and the
marriage contract registered with the central bureaucracy (Theo-
dorides 1976 p 21, p 44 - 5; Theodorides 1975 P 94 - 5)* But
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indeed, of marriage little more is known than that it could he
distinguished from concubinage, though what the difference was is
not clear.
The Egyptians practised monogamy, apart from Pharaoh him¬
self; moreover they seem to have had reciprocal expectations of
each other as to sexual conduct. Concubinage appears to have been
de facto marriage, commonly found among the lower strata where
there is less likely to be property or property considerations.
It is not clear what defines these issues. Marriage does not seem
to have been restricted in terras of laws of citizenship or even
of slavery - marriage to a slave gave the slave freedom - nor by
formal status considerations. Egyptian society is not structured
in these terms in the way that the Greek or Roman City-states-
are. It can probably be assumed that where a man of some standing
takes a concubine in preference to a wife considerations of in¬
heritance rights are a factor. She and her children will probably
be endowed in terms of bequests, with minimum impact on the in¬
heritance rights of children from another union. Generally this
will mean a previous marriage. It should be noted that it might
be the woman that prefers this arrangement: either or both part¬
ners may have children from previous unions. The concubinage
arrangement is not necessarily an asymmetrical one. However, con¬
cubinage might also be a matter of giving a recognized status to
the partner in a stable sexual relationship in the face of great
social inequalities. Common household would be an incidental
element here. Too little is known on all these matters for cert¬
ainty. But as to the master"s sexual access to the maidservants
in his household, much might be assumed, but one feels that the
wife would have something to say about it.
As to illegitimacy, it is not clear that this term can be
rightly used. There is apparently a stigma on fatherlessness, at
least at upper strata level. But this does not relate to the dif¬
ference of marriage and concubinage; it is rather a refusal of any
acknowledgement of the relationships. That could be at the will
of the mother as much as the father. The inheritance rights of
the fatherless child in relation to his mother's property and her
other children do not seem to be affected, at least so far as is
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known. But in relation to the inheritance rights of children from
their father (or from joint property), the differences "between
marriage and concubinage would surely rest on consent and con¬
tract, not on prescribed legal categories based on status differ¬
ence. That is, the concubine and her children will only be treat¬
ed differently from the wife and her children where the man has
both, and has made different contracts with each of them. (This
would be a matter of successive rather than simultaneous arrange¬
ments.) The concubine's children then are not illegitimate. Too,
it should be remembered that the property and inheritance situat¬
ions are basically symmetrical: it could be the man that is the
concubine. All these are complex issues however, and even Theo-
dorides does not really clarify them (Theodorides 1976: see esp¬
ecially p 26 - 7). Beyond this, however, there does not seem to
be any question of civil disabilities attending upon fatherless-
ness.
Only Pharaoh himself was polygamous. In the first place, he
had a Great Vsife. This was an office in itself, with a complex
position in the succession system, and could be transmissable
mother to daughter. The Great Wife possessed her own oikos, and
might hold other offices, especially in the priesthood, where she
might be titulary head of all the female staff of the temples, or
at least of the temples of Amon-re. Besides this, Pharaoh had
lesser wives. Some of these were daughters of lesser Asiatic
princes, and occasionally of a great king, for example of Hatti
or Mitanni. But although Harnesses ii apparently made a Hittite
princess his Great Wife for a time, no Pharaoh would ever give a
daughter in return. This, then, is not exactly dynastic intermar¬
riage. Again, Egypt having no nobility, there is no preferential
marriage with the nobility: a native Egyptian wife can only be a
commoner. Beyond this again, Pharaoh had a number of concubines.
Unquestionably out of this entourage Pharaoh had, or could
have, many sexual partners, and many women might bear his child¬
ren. But for the most part these are simply the female personnel
of a great household, working especially in textiles and in dom¬
estic service, and entertaining as dancers and musicians. The
women have male attendants and supervisors; it is not a stereo-
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typical oriental harira (there are no eunuchs in Egypt). It is not
clear then how far these women were forbidden other sexual relat¬
ionships. In all probablity Pharaoh's great servants and his ad¬
ult sons found their wives and/or lovers here, though this might
possibly be subject to his permission or gift.
All this again is to be seen in the light of the temples.
These all have their female complement, of adoratrices, chant-
resses, dancers etc., and there are always the god's wives and
concubines. But these names do not indicate a sexual function;
the Egyptians practised neither temple prostitution nor temple
virginity. These are simply the female personnel of a great hou¬
sehold. Often, though by no means always, they were married to
the priests or to other male functionaries. But the point here is
that a woman* s place in a household cannot always simply be told
from her sexual and reproductive relationships, nor vice versa.
The names of these offices is no guide to function. The oikos is
not simply a family household, and women have a place in it in
their own right as individuals. There will be more to say on
these matters later on.
Egypt's population is thought to have expanded slowly but
steadily all through ancient times, to a peak of perhaps about
7«5 million in Hellenistic and Roman times. The figure for the
New Kingdom of 2.9 - 4*5 million cited earlier can be located in
that overall process. There is some influx of captives from the
Asian campaigns, and some recruitment from the south and the ad¬
joining deserts to the police and the army. Also, Egypt used to
let nomads from Asia wander into the delta in times of hardship,
giving them construction work - there are stories in the Bible
that can be related to this. On the whole, however, the migration
process does not seem to define Egypt's demographic history in
the way that it does that of the Graeco-Roman world. In particul¬
ar, rural-urban migration gives the impression of having been a
balanced two-way process, not impelled by land expropriations and
with little difference in conditions and reproductivity at the
two ends - though one would expect urban mortality rates to be
higher. General low life expectancies and high mortality rates,
or perhaps naturally low fertility rates, seem to have made for
the comparatively slow growth of the Egyptian population.
Family and Community
"To found a household" is one of the common Egyptian ex¬
pressions for "to marry". This means the creation of a new house¬
hold, separate from either partner's household of origin. The
Egyptian family is not a lineage; the cult of the dead is not an
ancestor cult, and typically soon falls into desuetude. Moreover
the family property does not have continuity over the generat¬
ions. The devolution of property, as discussed above, occurs at
each parent* s death, subject to provision for the surviving part¬
ner, and there is equal division of property among all the child¬
ren. The economic endowment of the marriage even over the long
term, then, is likely to be based on the acquisition of (or app¬
ointment to) new economic opportunities rather than inheritances.
As to its immediate endowment, a conjugal fund is set up for the
couple at marriage on the basis of interim devolution. This comes-
-§■ from the husband's side and -J- from the wife's. Apparently the
girl has a legal right to demand this from her family (Theodorid-
es 1976 p 47 -8). The items will be recorded in an inventory.
The marital household centres on the nuclear family. It
might be extended by unmarried brothers or sisters or a widowed
or infirm parent, but it will not ordinarily extend to three gen¬
erations. Indeed, extension is if anything more likely to be lat¬
eral, in terms of a divorced or widowed sister and her children.
The household is however likely to include servile elements.
These might be slaves, originating mostly from the Asiatic camp¬
aigns, but as noted before, Egypt seems to lack clear-cut laws
of slavery such as would perpetuate the chattel status. Mostly
then the servile elements of the household appear to be formally
free, at least in the sense of being free to leave. In terms of
domestic authority, they appear to be rather the servants than
the slaves of the master and mistress. Most important of all, the
larger households at least place the servile dependants in their
own quarter of the courtyard, where they have households of their
own and can form their own families. This seems to have been typ-
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ical for Egyptian cities as well as for country houses, producing
a mixing rather than a separation of the strata. As to the size
of the Egyptian family, this is not known with certainty, but the
impression may be of slightly larger families than the 2-3
children of Graeco-Roman Antiquity. I will return to this issue
in a later section.
On Egyptian marriage, surprisingly little is known. As I
have noted above, a distinction is made between marriage and liv¬
ing together or concubinage, though it is not clear what the dif¬
ference is. Marriages are made young, both partners being about
14 or 15, though in the scribal class the boy might perhaps be a
little older. On choice of partner, some authors assume that the
girl's father chooses her future husband, but this view seems to
owe much to caution. The texts that speak most clearly, as is
generally acknowledged, are the love-poems, and these seem to
envisage a courtship initiated by the couple themselves (the boy
perhaps more actively than the girl), followed by an approach by
the boy to the girl's mother. The apparent location of this poet¬
ry as the literature of upper strata married couples reflecting
their own courtships surely makes this a credible view, and there
is nothing inherently unlikely about such a system. Theodorides
takes this view (Theodorides 1975 P 9& - 7)» He also notes the
value placed on good relations between the generations: parents
are more concerned to care for their children and to endow them
for adulthood than to discipline and chastise them. Indeed, there
are not the obvious structural reasons for inter-generational
conflict here that there are for example at Athens. As to the
consent to marriage, it is not clear if this could be withheld,
but Egyptian law does give children legal rights against their
parents (Theodorides 1975 P 117), and the girl as noted earlier
has a right to a marriage portion. Incidentally brother-sister
marriage was never practised in Pharaonic Egypt.
As to betrothals or engagements, no more is known than can
be inferred from the above: that the couple would decide themsel¬
ves and get the agreement of their families. Decision, agreement
and marriage itself would come in turn, but it is not known how
long all this would take - one would tend to assume a quick pro-
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cess. As to the ceremonies or rituals of marriage, there is noth¬
ing known with certainty. It appears to have been a family occas¬
ion, with no involvement of the temples and minimal involvement
of the state. Theodorides suggests that there was a family feast
with neighbours invited, and that the local tribunal might be
informed - this last is typical of Egyptian legal proceedings,
for example with an adoption. He also says that a marriage con¬
tract was probably obligatory; its form was set by the law and
could not be varied by the partners, and it would be registered
with the central administration (Theodorides 1976 p 21, p 44 - 5j
Theodorides 1975 P 94 - 5)• There are uncertainties in these mat¬
ters, but this is probably the best account that can be given.
These things might help to distinguish between marriage and
concubinage. However it is unlikely that concubinage really is
any one thing. Probably at least two different situations are
involved: the first a simple living together among the lower
strata where there are no considerations of property and there¬
fore nothing for a contract to govern; the second an arrangement
intended to protect a pre-existing pattern of inheritance rights
where either or both of the partners already has children. Again,
concubinage might give a degree of recognition short of full in¬
heritance rights where there are great social differences between
the partners. On analogy with other civilizations, these last two
cases might be governed by contract, and might even have the con¬
sent of the girl's family. In truth, in all the Ancient Civiliz¬
ation concubinage is hard to pin down. But whereas in the Graeco-
Roman City-states the key issues are citizenship and status, it
seems to me that in Egypt the central question is the problems of
the effects of remarriage upon inheritance. As to remarriage, I
see no question but that the partners arranged this for themsel¬
ves, irrespective of sex and at their own discretion.
The economic endowment of the household comprises various
elements. As noted before, there is the conjugal fund set up for
the couple at marriage, coming % from the husband's family and
from the wife* s. There could also be gifts from friends, neigh¬
bours or others at marriage, though this is not known. Either
partner may have movable or indeed real property ( so far as the
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distinction should he made), though devolution being a factor of
the parents' deaths, inheritances are likely to appear later.
More to the point, since estates are divided amongst all the
children, inheritances are likely to be small, and to play a lim¬
ited part in the household's material basis. For the long term,
then, the material basis of the household should be seen in terms
of the acquisition of, or appointment to, new economic resources,
rather than the simple ownership on the basis of inheritance of
land and livestock. This could mean appointment to bureaucratic
or priestly office; equally it could mean appointment to some
function in a household or workshop, or on the land or with the
herds. Again the employer could be of various kinds: the state,
a temple, the Great House or a private domain. It should be noted
in this regard that women are capable of appointment too, espec¬
ially in a range of temple functions and in household service.
These things condition the terms in which property is held by the
couple, and also the arrangements for the dissolution of marriage».
Family property, as I have indicated before, is considered
in different categories. Each partner keeps his or her own prop¬
erty; there is also the conjugal fund on which the marriage is
established; and there are the common acquisitions. It should be
noted that the separate reckoning of these categories is main¬
tained in practice. The marriage contract is drawn up in these
terms, providing for the eventualities of dissolution and main¬
tenance; the formula for this, as indicated before, is laid down
by the law and cannot be altered at will. An inventory of the
wife's contribution to the conjugal fund will be attached to the
contract. Admittedly documents of this kind, including documents
of divorce settlement, are mostly known from later times (Pestman
1961, 1969 5 Allam 1981), but the general pattern of the proviso-
ions is generally agreed to have run all through Egyptian hist¬
ory, though with variations in detail in different eras (see esp¬
ecially Pirenne 1959)« Indeed it seems likely that the later doc¬
uments were actually intended to protect Egyptian practice in the
face of immigrant communities and periods of foreign domination
- Theodorides takes this view.
In the event of widowhood, the deceased's own property is
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divided amongst the children, unless a will provides otherwise;
hut the surviving partner's property is unaffected. Joint prop¬
erty is split up: the survivor keeps ■§■ of the conjugal fund and
the usufruct of the common acquisitions, the rest "being divided
among the children. In the failure of children, the deceased's
property is divided amongst his/her collaterals, hut apparently
all joint property goes to the survivor. As noted earlier, hus¬
bands did commonly vary all these terms to their wives' advant¬
age, making them joint heirs with the children or sole heirs in¬
stead of the collaterals in their property, or simply making
special bequests to them. But basically this is compensation for
loss of incomes as noted before, it is appointment rather than
property that is likely to provide the family's material basis.
On widowhood, the wife will remain, in the marital household and
keep charge of the children. She will also keep charge of the
family property and the household's affairs, and will guard the
children's interests until adulthood.
Divorce appears to be quite unrestricted, and to consist of
simple repudiation at will by either partner. Marriage contracts
envisage this, stating typical causes for divorce as failure of
love or love for another. Theodorides suggests that the divorce,
like the marriage, may have been announced at the local tribunal
(Theodorides 1976 p 48 - 9) • There seems to be no question of any-
other parties having the right to initiate a divorce, or to ref¬
use consent to it (as in the Graeco-Roman civilization). The
settlement on divorce consists in each partner taking his or her
own property and a division of the joint property. The precise
terms for this will be set in the marriage contract, but the bas¬
is for it is that the wife will take her own share of the conjug¬
al fund and will moreover be given an agreed compensation for her
share in the common acquisitions. There may also be a specific
provision for her maintenance and that of the children. However,
if the divorce is at her initiative or is in response to her mis¬
conduct (e.g. if she takes a lover), then she may forfeit compen¬
sation and maintenance, being left only with her own property and
her share of the conjugal fund. It appears that in the event of
divorce, and regardless of fault or initiative, it is the wife
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that leaves the marital household.. It appears too that typically
she takes the children with her. The economic situation of the
divorced woman, like that of the widow, can he difficult. She may
go to live with a brother or sister, and it seems possible that
she might have difficulty in arranging a new marriage. Her former
husband's right of access to his children is not known, but this
is most likely to be a question of their visiting him. A question
of great tension in all this that can be treated as diagnostic is
the securing of the inheritance rights of the children against
their father's children by a subsequent marriage. This is a char¬
acteristic issue both of contract clauses and of litigation. The
mother's litigation for her child's rights also appears in relig¬
ious mythology, Isis and Horus, though the legal details are dif¬
ferent. I have suggested too that it is these issues that throw
most light on the nature of Egyptian concubinage. The situation
is in principle symmetrical between the sexes, but in practice
men have greater wealth, and the advantage will lie with the
woman and children who are actually in the household at the time.
It should be borne in mind however that regardless of their unen¬
viable economic situations, neither the widow nor the divorced
woman is under any kind of civil disability. Indeed their pro¬
tection, both categories alike, was a proverbial standard of good
rule.
Within the household the wife is mistress; indeed, "mistress
of the house" is her title. As such, she will have full control
over the storerooms, materials and provisions, and of the domestic
workforce. Given the nuclear basis of the household, she is not
subject to the supervision of a resident mother-in-law. There may
be ongoing relationships with both her own and her husband's
female kin, but these relationships should be co-equal. Given the
complex nature of the household property as discussed above and
its possible co-existence with income from office, it is hard to
be clear on a precise division of authority and functions. Theo-
dorides holds that the husband administers the conjugal fund and
operates the sharing of the common acquisitions, and that it is
not clear how far the wife is involved in this - whether she has
to consent or to be informed (Theodorides 1976 p 46). On the
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other hand, it is clear that wives did for example accompany
their husbands to inspect agricultural work on the estates, and
the general impression certainly is of joint affairs jointly
administered. Again, it is clear that the wife could act indepen¬
dently in the couple's joint affairs without restriction - a sep¬
arate reckoning being kept of what each partner acquires for the
couple jointly. With this of course the wife's own property, in¬
cluding her profit from her textile production, is entirely her
own affair. But beyond this, the wife probably simply controls
the household, leaving wider joint affairs in the hands of her
husband. If her husband has both property and office, however,
he will probably hand over the former to be controlled by a stew¬
ard. Women who hold office of course might do likewise. Beyond
these matters, it should be noted that the Egyptian wife is typ¬
ically involved in domestic work herself, especially in weaving
linen, in cooking and cleaning, and in child-care. The former
functions will be shared with a female workforce, but the Egypt¬
ian woman is very much mother to her own children, even when they
are of school age.
Although Egyptologists use the word "harim", the women's
quarters of the Egyptian household should rather be seen in terms
of the underlying property relations: the part of the house that
belongs to the woman, not the part that the woman belongs to (or
in). This will include the loom workrooms; what she weaves is her
own. There is no question of any seclusion of women in Egypt.
Women conduct business both for themselves and for their house¬
holds, and they receive guests both on their own account and as
hostess with their husbands. The household indeed is a focus for
social life, for dinner parties and banquets, for example» Both
sexes attend these together; interestingly, they are seated separ¬
ately for the latter. Privately, the family eats together as a
unit. There is no public social life from which women are exclud¬
ed; again, the public rooms of the household are not specifically
men's rooms. Also, there are games, a kind of chess for example,
that are played by husband and wife together, and other such
shared recreations, and indeed, the family also goes out for re¬
creation together, for example wild-fowling in the marshes.
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Women also move abroad freely: indeed, their ability to do
so unmolested (and unescorted) is a proverbial standard of law
and order. Women go to market both to buy and to sell, though the
hawking of goods round the doors is also common economic pract¬
ice. Women visit friends, and go to dinner parties and banquets,
as indicated above. They also go to the temples. Interestingly,
women are often shown on board ship in Egyptian paintings - the
Nile of course was used for both inter-local and foreign trade,
as well as for travel, fishing, etc. Public entertainments like
the Athenian drama or the Roman (James are little known for Egypt,
but we know of nothing of the kind that women did not attend.
Most importantly, women took full part in all the religious fest¬
ivals and processions. (Again, the principals in this may have
been sexually segregated.)
It should be added that women's position in the Afterworld
is taken to be precisely the same as in this one, though there is
perhaps a tendency to highlight the more conventional aspects -
to show how things "should" be rather than how they really are.
These comments may seem to have focussed on the more privil¬
eged — and therefore more evident - strata, but this is decept¬
ive. In actuality, they should apply mutatis mutandis to the bulk
of the peasantry and artisanate also, apart from the obvious
points about servants and property, for it is the privileged
rather than the impoverished style of life that is missing in
Egypt. The contrast should be with the temples and the great hou¬
seholds, especially the Great House itself, and here the point is
precisely that it is the privileged who are the servants. As I
have said before, it is the gods that are the nobility of Egypt.
But the nature of the service that privileged women perform is
mostly providing music and dancing, or else the organizing of
those who provide them, and of the menial staff that serve them
in their turn. Admittedly the royal wives in the Great House are
spoken of as "the secluded ones", though who they are secluded by
and what they are secluded from is not made clear. (But ambassad¬
ors visiting foreign princesses among Pharaoh* s wives complained
that they were not given access to them.) Possibly the term in¬
dicates those women of his household with whom Pharaoh does have
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sexual and reproductive relationships, and the phrase may not
mean what it says. But this is an exceptional case in any event.
For the rest, even slaves appear to have been free to marry and
to have children, on the same basis as anyone else in the same
substantive situation.
Egypt does not have any structure of clans or phratries in¬
tegrating aristocratic lineages or organizing their commoner
followings; if such a thing ever existed, it has been swallowed
by the state bureaucracy or dissolved into the temples. As shown
above, the Egyptian family is not at any level short of Pharaoh
himself a lineage. Again, the reckoning of kinship does not app¬
ear to extend beyond immediate family relationships. Its greatest
field of application is in inheritance law, though there are also
for example injunctions to state officials to treat their kin who
appear before them with neither more nor less than impartiality.
Against this, the state bureaucracy penetrates down to the
local level of Egyptian society, regardless of temple or private
ownership. This is largely for taxation purposes, and for the
registration for military service and corvee. Balancing this, the
administration of justice offers a system of recourse, and the
most basic level of this is the local tribunal or village coun¬
cil. This deals with all kinds of local disputes, complaints and
malfeasances. Women appear to have had full access to this on
exactly the same basis as men, with no restrictions on raising
complaints and actions against their own menfolk. Women apparent¬
ly also actually sat on the tribunals. Women are then individuals
and full members in their own right of the community. They are
not in any but the most immediate and pragmatic sense under the
domestic authority of men. The issues here will be further dis¬
cussed in later sections of this chapter.
Sexual Polarity
Fertility and Maternity
Egyptian girls married young, about age 14 - 15» Presumably
this was soon after puberty. Brought up in large, though nuclear-
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based, households with a reproductive servile staff there or
nearby, it is probable that their knowledge of their own biology
was good. At least there are no evident reasons for withholding
such knowledge from girls, and the possibilities for doing so are
limited. Again, there are strong sexual and reproductive themes
in the religion and mythology. Besides, as mistresses of their
own households without supervision from older female kin, their
access to information after marriage was in their own control.
In this situation, pregnancy and childbirth are likely to
have followed soon after marriage. For these, skilled assistance
was available: professional midwives whose training was associat¬
ed with that of physicians, and physicians, including women, with
knowledge of gynaecology. Egyptian medicine, though its treat¬
ments are not all practical, generally has a strong empirical
basis, and assistance and intervention here are likely to have
been of some effect. Childbirth was accomplished squatting "on
the bricks" - the function of these was to lift the woman off
the ground. This position should give the woman a good active
involvement in the childbirth process herself. In large house¬
holds at least, childbirth took place in a secluded arbour, and
the woman stayed there for two weeks afterwards, a purification
period. Within the limits of practicability this was probably
general.
On balance, in Egypt the child is the mother's. It is thought
to be she that names the child, and as I have noted, it is appar¬
ently she that keeps the children if the marriage is dissolved,
whether by divorce or widowhood. Against this, there is apparently
some social stigma attached to fatherlessness at least at upper
strata level, though there does not seem to be an identification
of illegitimacy as such. The Egyptians do not appear to have
practised infanticide or exposure, and neither parent has the
right to sell a child. With this, Egyptian women breastfed their
babies themselves rather than using wet-nurses, and they cared
for their children and looked after them themselves rather than
entrusting them to servants or slaves. The emotional commitment
of the mother to her children was strong, and mutual.
Children remain in the mother's overall care, both sexes
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alike, even after school age (it may be that it was mostly only
boys that went to school). Only when the boy starts to acquire a
craft or to work does he start to come more into his father* s
domain. But the father also is involved in childcare, at least to
the extent of common family meals and entertainment, and of hand¬
ling the children and playing with them. As noted earlier, the
relationship of parents to their children in Egypt is generally
caring rather than disciplinary.
The typical size of the Egyptian family does not seem to be
known. It seems clear however that children were welcomed and
valued: there is not the same fear of too many children as in the
Graeco-Roman civilization. Nor are there periods of population
decrease apparent in Egyptian history, at least until medieval
times. Perhaps the impression is of families above the 2-3
children typical for the Graeco-Roman civilization, but there
seems to be no question of an approach to the theoretical maximum
of 10 - 12. A guess would be 3 - 4 children at most. The populat¬
ion increase, though apparently steady, is slight. This seems to
indicate high mortality rates, including probably both child mor¬
tality and child-bed mortality. Yet it has also been suggested
that Egyptian women had low fertility (Masali and Chiarelli 1973
p 168), though the reasons do not seem to be known. One factor
that might be suggested is that lactation may have been prolonged
— one contemporary Wisdom text, that of Ani, speaks of the moth¬
er breastfeeding her child for three years (see Lichtheim 1976
vol 2 p 135 et seq). As noted above, the Egyptians did not use
wet-nurses. At any rate, if Egyptian families were of this order
of size then this highlights the difference between actual family
size and its subjective perception: one's family is large or
small in relation to one* s resource-s in the face of one's expect¬
ations as to life-style. The Egyptians were not worried about
their resources, for reasons that have already been examined. But
it is probably that lack of anxiety more than actual numbers of
children that marks the difference between them and the Greeks
and Romans.
As to family structure, it is hard to be clear if there was
any preference as between sons and daughters-. Such a preference
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does seem to have appeared in other eras when the eldest son was
responsible for his parents' mortuary cult, or among state offic¬
ials where the son might succeed to his father's office in a car¬
eer closed to girls. But in the New Kingdom the mortuary cult was
commonly passed to a priest, and the other point does not have
general application. Apart from the question of different social
levels and occupations, it can also be asked whether both sexes
had the same preference. Wives might have preferred daughters,
and there are transmissible offices and careers that are closed
to men. Again, the Egyptians do not seem to have much problemat-
ized the management of their daughters* fertility or the endow¬
ment of their marriages; conversely, they did not place special
value on the military profession. Also a daughter like a son-
could support her parents in old age, or bury them. Probably then
sons and daughters were equally valued. At any rate, the sex
ratio in the general population seems to have been basically in
balance (Masali and Chiarelli 1973 p 163), and since there were
no practices of selective female exposure and slave-prostitution
in Egypt as in the Graeco-Roman civilization, typical family
structure can be inferred from this.
Although they apparently did not practise infanticide, ex¬
posure or the sale of children, the Egyptians did use contracept¬
ion and abortion. Egyptian medicine, unlike Graeco-Roman, is
known not from literary texts but from papyri that are apparently
the notebooks of working physicians. For this reason, the compar¬
ison with Graeco-Roman medicine is difficult, and perhaps decept¬
ive. The empirical content, including the gynaecology, is quite
strong although knowledge is limited; also there is some impract¬
ical or superstitious content in the prescriptions. But there are
sound contraceptive prescriptions, for example spermicidal and
occlusive vaginal pessaries, and there is no reason to think that
access to them was limited. As to abortion, almost certainly the
main techniques were surgical, and therefore we do not have re¬
cords of them: surgery was taught as a craft, by apprenticeship,
not from texts, it seems. The effectiveness of these techniques
need not be questioned. Some authorities say, though without
offering substantiation, that the Egyptians made abortion illegal
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(e.g. Ghalioungui 1963 P 150). I doubt that we have that kind of
knowledge of Egyptian law. However, an ethical restriction on
abojrfcifacient drugs because of their danger to the patient seems
possible. A law of this kind was passed in the later Roman Princ-
ipate.
Finally, the conception of motherhood in religion is worth
a note. The Egyptians have deities who protect women's biological
functions, including childbirth, but the great image of mother¬
hood is Isis, the widow of Osiris and mother of Horus. This triad
is central in Egyptian religion, linking the cult of Pharaoh to
the cult of the dead. Isis goes in search of the body of her mur¬
dered husband, conceives his postumous child, bears and raises
him in secret, then declares him, litigates for him and contrives
for him to come into his inheritance. This is no passive protect¬
ress: Isis is a hero, who through her Quest secures the contin¬
uity of the World (the myth superimposes political themes upon
an agricultural cycle, with implications for life after death).
We should realize that, if we want to see motherhood through the
Egyptians' own eyes.
Maturation
Despite the extended nature of the Egyptian household, the
family unit remains nuclear, and it is the mother herself who
looks after the children. As discussed earlier, the mother-child
relationship seems to have been emotionally committed and warm,
and it may be added that this clearly holds for sibling, espec¬
ially brother-sister relationships also - "brother" and "sister"
were used as endearments between lovers. In the first years of
childhood, there appears to be little overt sexual differentiat¬
ion in the treatment of boys and girls. Interestingly, both sexes
appear to go naked until puberty. Toys and games are known for
both sexes: they include combat games for boys and dancing for
girls. But on analogy with their parents, it seems possible that
the sexes played some games together or shared some toys. Again,
as stated earlier, there is entertainment and recreation of the
family as a unit together.
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It is hard to he clear when real differentiation of the sex¬
es begins. Probably it is conditioned by the acquisition of adult
skills and the introduction to adult tasks, so far as these are
sexually differentiated. If so, it will probably begin in mid-
childhood. As against this, the development of sexual different¬
iation is not conditioned by an exclusively male military, polit¬
ical and legal citizenship as it is in the Graeco-Roman civiliz¬
ation. The teaching of crafts is simply by apprenticeship. In
this a boy may often follow his father's trade, but there is no
formally hereditary principle. Military training itself is simply
a factor of military service, which generally means following the
military profession.
Schooling seems to have been very much a factor of literacy
and literate skills. Some study of literature is involved, if
only in terms of copying exercizes, but mostly the focus is on
the practical skills of the civil servant. These would include
for example taking inventories, simple mathematics, surveying
and building techniques, etc. The thrust of this is towards the
career in the state and other bureaucracies. The scribal schools
seem to have been run by the state bureaus and by the temples.
The former were probably for boys only, but it seems likely that
the latter also accepted girls. At least, a certain literacy of
women is known especially among the temple personnel, and it is
known too that there were female scribes, though not apparently
in the state bureaucracy itself. This must then be thought to
have some systematic basis. Besides, the strong companionship
evident between husbands and wives at scribal and priestly level
suggest some element of common education. The temples also appear
to have trained physicians and mid-wives (the former at least
being a literate craft), and to have served as libraries. In the
schools of the state bureaus, education seems to have lasted sev¬
eral years, into the teens. But where schooling becomes employ¬
ment is another question: on all these matters too little is
known. How far access to the schools extended through society is
not known, but it should not be assumed to have been restricted
to a wealthy handful. An intensive bureaucracy entails a fairly
high degree of literacy. Besides the scribes and the priests and
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such others as physicians, there could also apparently be for ex¬
ample literate artisans.
The girl's training in household skills will include weav¬
ing, and commonly also it seems the playing of a musical instrum¬
ent. It would also extend to cooking, house-care and child-care.
It is hard to say what actual instruction the girl is given on
her own biology, but it seems most unlikely that knowledge is, or
could be, withheld from her# It should be noted that her skills,
weaving especially, will not simply and necessarily restrict her
to her husband's household. Equally the Egyptian girl will be
taught, presumably by her mother, how to handle her property and
to make transactions.
Prostitution is very little attested for Egyptian civilizat¬
ion at any period, though scribal candidates are warned away from
drink and girls. But marriage is young, for both sexes, and the
love-poetry indicates that the couple have their own choice of
each other and court each other freely. The indications are that
their courtship extends to sexual consummation: virginity does
not appear to be mandatory for Egyptian girls.
The introduction to citizenship, that is, to legal rights
and capabilities, is presumably learnt partly from the parents
and partly within the community. It should be noted that this
holds for boys and for girls equally. There is a coming-of-age
ceremony,* but it is not known if this must occur at a set time
or simply when the person is judged mature. It seems to take
place sometime during the teens (Theodorides 1975 P 91)• Marr¬
iage, which also takes place in the mid-teens, also marks a turn¬
ing point in the person's life (Theodorides 1975 P 94)»
Sexuality
Couples married young, both in their mid-teens, and I have
*It must be admitted that my authorities do not explicitly con¬
sider whether children or only boys have a coming-of-age cerem¬
ony. But in view of the strong individual status of Egyptian
women, the absence of any military or religious initiation for
men, and the shared citizenship of the two sexes, it seems a
reasonable interpretation that girls had this too.
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suggested above that they generally had their choice of each oth¬
er and a relatively free courtship. This must of course have been
so for remarriages, which are likely to have been common, though
perhaps easier for men to make than women, in view of the custody
arrangements as discussed above. Much depends here on what one
makes of the Egyptian love-poetry, but all Egyptian art and lit¬
erature are agreed on the strong affection and companionship
between husband and wife. This includes both a shared public soc¬
ial life, for example attending banquets, and intimate companion¬
ship, for example playing a kind of chess together, or she play¬
ing music for him in their own home.
To set this in its wider context for the moment, the Egypt¬
ians might have concubines, though often this simply means de
facto marriage, and certainly there are women, for example in the
temples or owning property, who may have great sexual freedom.
But there is very little known of prostitution, and the Egyptians
do not appear to have had either hetaerae or mistresses. This
seems to define the location of the Egyptian love poetry as be¬
longing to the same universe as marriage: whether read or sung -
the poems may be songs - it was apparently entertainment for ban¬
quets and dinner parties, that is, for men and women together,
mostly as married couples. Kith this, its content seems to re¬
flect the amours of its audience, and apparently typically in
terms of the courtship of the young. The poems are then, despite
the continuing uncertainties of translation, readily accessible
to a modern sensibility. (See translations in Lichtheim 1976 vol
2; Simpson ed. 1973). This really does reveal the married couple
as lovers.
The wider context of marriage as a sexual relationship seems
then to be one not of prostitution but of general sexual freedom.
In this, the question of adultery is problematic. Some texts,
both contemporary and in the later divorce documents, show a re¬
ciprocal expectation of fidelity, though it is easy - too easy -
to assume that fidelity was expected of the woman only. The pen¬
alties can hardly have been equitable, given the principle that
it is the woman that leaves the marital household on divorce.
There are indications in some tales that a woman's adultery was
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punishable hy her husband with death, perhaps by burning. This
however must surely reflect alien - Asiatic - intrusions: it is
quite incompatible both with the woman's legal position and with
the restrictions on the death penalty, which must be confirmed
by the vizier. In actuality, it seems clear that adultery simply
led to repudiation (see Eyre 1984; also Theodorides 1976 p 50 et
seq). It seems that (as with Attic tragedy) the Egyptian tales
cannot be taken as a guide to contemporary conditions, whereas
the love-poetry (like the Attic comedy) is specifically a contem¬
porary creation and reflection.
Incidentally, there is no obvious reason why some of the
love-poetry should not have been written by women. They are its
subjects, audience, performers, and they are literate. Also to
the point is the concern the poems show with the woman's thoughts
and feelings (though also the man's); this suggests that there
was a good degree of empathy between the sexes.
Besides adultery, I have commented already on the probable
practice of premarital sex in the context of courtship. Presumab¬
ly pregnancy here would simply precipitate marriage, or among the
lower strata especially, living together.
Concubinage can have this sense of de facto marriage, or it
can be something explicitly antithesized to marriage. Above I
have suggested that the main reasons are likely to concern inher¬
itance rights. The relationship of this to marriage will be one
of successive not contemporary arrangements» It should be rememb¬
ered that the relationship is not necessarily asymmetrical, and
that even where it is, it may be the woman who is the more priv¬
ileged partner - that is, it may be the man that is the concub¬
ine.
Prostitution is hard to identify, perhaps as much because of
the unfamiliarity of the economic forms as for any specific reas¬
on of sexual relationships and practices. What little evidence
there is suggests that the brothel is the typical location, and
presumably the girls are free and working on their own account.
The clientele might be scribal students, travellers (including
inter-local traders) and soldiers. But all this must be conject¬
ural; nothing seems to be known with real certainty. Even the
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Turin Erotic Papyrus, in Manniche's publication and discussion
at least* (Manniche 1987)» gives no indication of any payment
being made. Market and quayside scenes in art do not show prost¬
itutes, and even more, Asiatic slave women seem to have mostly
had craft skills in textiles, and not to have been destined for
prostitution. In sum, even scholars who look for prostitution
find nothing concrete, and the impression is that Egyptian women
had too much autonomy and too many economic alternatives for
prostitution to thrive. There was no prostitution in the Egyptian
temples, and that may be the most indicative thing of all.
Homosexual intercourse between men is recorded in the "neg¬
ative confession" of the Book of the Dead, and also is mentioned
as an aggressive act against a man. However it is not attested as
a preferred form of sexual practice or relationship. Nothing
seems to be known of lesbianism.
The general pattern of sexual relationships in New Kingdom
Egypt, then, emerges as one of physically and emotionally mutual
heterosexual relationships of some stability centring on marriage.
A free courtship leads into this, and adultery generally has sim¬
ilar consequences: a re-arrangement of partners. This may be
supplemented by more or less of promiscuity. What is missing is
prostitution, and the differentiations and asymmetries of physic¬
al and emotional relationships between marriage and prostitution,
and between men and women, characteristic" of the Greek and Roman
City-states. With this, there is a general absence of problemat-
ization of sexuality and of sexual love.
Sex in Egyptian religion and culture is on the whole treated
in a manner that is neither prurient nor prudish. The love-poetry
is about love, illuminated by sexual desire and sexual expression
where appropriate. There is a matter-of-fact linking of sex and
reproduction, which holds equally in the affairs of men, animals,
vegetation and gods. Even the legitimacy of one or two of the
Pharaohs is supported by accounts of their mother's intercourse
with the god Amon. One of the great goddesses, Hat-hor, is the
*There is a book-length publication and commentary on this pap¬
yrus in German (Omlin 1973); however this could not be used for
the present thesis.
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patroness of love and pleasure (or sex and drunkenness!)• She is
almost an avatar of Isis ("Hat-hor" means "mother of Horus";
"Isis" means "the throne"). She is favoured "by all women; there
is no Egyptian goddess specific to prostitutes or concubines like
the Greek Aphrodite. Women approach her to be given the man of
their choice, or to become pregnant. There are also icthyphallic
gods and phallic amulets: the significance of the latter is prob¬
ably protective or for fertility. A household god Bes seems to
protect sexual functions.
The sexual ambience of Egyptian civilization seems to be
characterized by an uncomplicated and positive attitude to both
sex and reproduction, and by good relations and empathy between
men and women (and indeed between parents and children). Both
love and material partnership are valued between the sexes. Above
all, this is characterized by a high degree of female autonomy
and an absence of obvious exploitation.
Agression
Like all the Ancient Civilization, New Kingdom Egypt is or¬
iented to war and to non-peaceful economic activity. Indeed, the
New Kingdom rises in war and falls in war, and maintains an imp¬
erial hegemony in Western Asia supported by periodic campaigns
which take tribute and captives in great quantities. This is bas¬
ic to the New Kingdom economy; the loss of the Asiatic empire
seems to underlie the final collapse. All this is an exclusive
male domain, and one which victimizes women, who may be enslaved
through it.
The Egyptian army is part professional, part conscripted,
and is bureaucratically controlled and equipped from Pharaoh's
armouries. There are soldier-families with special land-holdings
that are conditional upon the hereditary provision of recruits,
but even these are not self-equipped. Military training appears
to be a factor of actual military service. In form, the Egyptian
army in the New Kingdom seems somewhat to prefigure the Marian
legions of Rome, though with different weapons - chariot and bow
- and different special skills - combined land-sea operations.
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But the point here is that military service is not the adjunct of
an exclusively male citizenship: it is half profession, half cor¬
vee, though it is specifically male labour.
We have no Egyptian law-code. This may be indicative: writt¬
en law-codes in Antiquity seem typically to be the outcome of
class-conflicts, and to be concerned with the control of usury
and debt-slavery. I have noted earlier that Egypt lacks clear-cut
laws on slavery such as would perpetuate the chattel status, and
that slaves quickly disappear into the mass of the population.
All this may be one, in accordance with the view I have taken
earlier on the bureaucracy, the temples and the suppression of
noble lineages.* However this may be, the administration of just¬
ice is a basic function of the Egyptian state, conducted through
a series of tribunals ranging from the vizier's council down to
the local village council. This level seems to be made up of the
villagers themselves, though it is best known from an isolated
settlement of workers on the royal tombs at Deir el Medina that
could be atypical. But the basic point is that women have full
legal personality at all these tribunals, to bring any kind of
case in their own person or to testify in any kind of case. With
this, it appears that women were also actual members of the vill¬
age councils themselves (Cerny 1975 P 624)• Women's membership of
the more senior tribunals is apparently exceptional; Wenig ment¬
ions one example, but does not specify if this was during the
New Kingdom (Wenig I969 P 16)« It might perhaps have a systematic
basis, however, if the woman were an important priestess or local
land-owner; but this is conjecture. But besides this, women are
the bearers of rights, which appear to be in all regards the same
as those of men. There is no Egyptian equivalent to the Greek or
Roman guardianship of women. Again, it should be specified that
we know of cases in which women have litigated against their men¬
folk, even their fathers, successfully and with no accusations of
impiety. The Egyptian concept "Ma'at", which means truth, just¬
ice, fairness, the established order of things, has no implicat¬
ions of women's subordination or exclusion; on the contrary, it
*A full treatment of this issue would have to consider the full
range of Egyptian history, and that cannot be undertaken here.
includes women.
It might he noted that, although a woman can apparently he
taken into forced labour for her husband* s default on taxes or
evasion of corvee, a husband does not have the right to sell his
wife, nor a father his daughter, into slavery. Indeed, there
seems to be a principle that only Pharaoh can make a slave.
Equally, only the vizier* s court can give the death penalty, and
this should be sparingly applied. Earlier I commented on adult¬
ery, that tales which speak of the husband killing his adulterous
wife must be alien intrusions; that they speak of burning to
death suggests an Asiatic origin. Pirenne says that the Egyptian
husband does not even have the right to beat his wife (Pirenne
1959 P 74)« (Incidentally, in "The Tale of Two Brothers" the wom¬
an's crimes are not adultery but attempted murder.)
In the matter of adultery, the basic penalty seems simply to
have been repudiation, with loss of rights of maintenance and of
compensation for her share in the common acquisitions of the mar¬
riage. The underlying idea is that the couple live together free¬
ly, on an agreement of faithfulness that holds for both partners.
Whether the husband would actually divorce his wife for a single
isolated incident is another question. Again, the wife might
answer a charge of adultery by swearing an oath as to her innoc¬
ence. (This again indicates her citizen status.)
The courts also recognized enticement and sexual harassment,
especially by a man's foreman or overseer: the underling could
ask the courts to order his superior to keep away from his wife.
Here the wife is not accused of any crime. Her agreement to the
action is presumably given in her continued cohabitation, so far
as she does not act herself. But it seems clear that here the act
of adultery itself has had no effect on the marriage - and marr¬
iage contracts speak of loving another, not of acts of adultery,
as foreseen causes for divorce. At any rate, all this highlights
the state's basic lack of interest in adultery as such, in con¬
trast to for example Athens or Rome. Incidentally, the questions
of enticement and harassment seem to hold indifferently for marr¬
iage and for cohabitation. (See Eyre I984.)
It should be added that Eyre points out that the Egyptian
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word for "copulation" being used here means equally "rape", "sed¬
uce" or "make love with", and that the above matters may colour
the way in which rape is seen.
As I have noted earlier, Egyptian women moved abroad freely
and unescorted. It was a proverbial statement of law and order
that a woman could do this without fear of being molested. On the
other hand, rape certainly occurred. In contrast to the classical
civilizations, this means simply forced or at least coerced or
unfree intercourse, rather than carrying the implication of ab¬
duction, and it is most unlikely that the law would exclude any
woman, whether slave, prostitute or foreigner, from its protect¬
ion. The crime is seen as being against the woman herself5 she
brings the complaint in her own person, and has no difficulty in
doing so. The penalties however do not seem to be known.
A tomb painting of an agricultural scene shows two peasant
girls fighting - presumably as an amusing detail. Not much can
be made of this perhaps. But if fighting skills are acquired in
the fields and streets and courtyards rather than in exclusively
male training grounds and gymnasia, then Egyptian women may not




Egypt in the New Kingdom is a bureaucratically governed mon¬
archy, and the New Kingdom bureaucracy is remarkable for its rat¬
ionality of structure and for its degree of penetration through
the land (see Hayes 1973; O'Connor 1983 especially diagram on
p 208). For this last, the good communications offered by the
Nile are largely responsible. Pharaoh is chief magistrate and
administrator, and also chief priest for all the gods: all offic¬
ials and all priests are notionally his delegates. He is also
commander in chief, and often general in the field, of the army.
Pharaoh himself is usually male. The succession system is
complex. The chosen son will be made commander of the army, per-
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haps declared as co-regnant, perhaps legitimated "by the Amon
priesthood (at least in retrospect). He may be the son of the
Great Wife, or he may take her daughter as his own Great Wife.
The basis on which he is chosen however is not wholly clear, and
may contain elements of pragmatic power struggle.
The position of Great Wife is important. She has her own
oikos, and may hold office in the Amon priesthood as god's wife
and head of the female religious staff of the temples of Amon.
Moreover she may transmit her position to her daughter. On the
basis of this position, Egpytian royal women consistently play an
important part in the conduct of affairs, including foreign aff¬
airs. They can be' regents for their children or co-regnants with
their husbands, and can exceptionally become Pharaoh on their
own, especially at the end of a dynasty. The Great Wife (and her
mother or her daughters) is a great lord in her own right, then.
Other than on campaign it is possible that she is one of Phar¬
aoh' s council, though this is not clear. It should be noted that
Pharaoh ordinarily accepts foreign princesses only as lesser
wives, and that he never gives a daughter in return.
The state bureaucracy is mostly concerned with the assess¬
ment and collection of taxes, the maintenance of the granaries,
treasuries and magazines, and the registration and control of the
labour force for corvee and military recruitment. The system is
centralized, and is controlled by the viziers. There is also a
system of tribunals, down to local level, for the administration
of justice; the viziers are at the head of this also. Pharaoh's
own estates and household are controlled by a parallel bureaucra¬
cy, and so also are those of the temples; this last too is cen¬
tralized and under Pharaoh's control. In a sense the priesthood
too (mortuary priests aside) are a state department with a basic
centralization. All appointments across all these fields are
controlled in principle by Pharaoh, though with concessions in
practice to claims for hereditary succession.
These bureaucracies are the basic career of the scribes, the
literate officialdom. So far as is known, the state bureaucracy
itself is wholly male, and the bureaucracies of the royal domains
and the temples will have tended to follow this. So also perhaps
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will the administrations of private oikoi. Yet female scribes are
known to have existed. Apparently there is a tendency for women
to prefer women for at least some administrative and secretarial
functions; this would surely extend from royal and other great
women to goddesses. Again, a female staff may attract female sup¬
ervision, especially in regard to the female contingent in the
temples. These processes, then, and especially the first, appear
to provide countervailing tendencies. As to why women are exclud¬
ed from the state bureaucracy, the lack of a clear-cut separation
of civil and military administration, and indeed of corvee from
military service, are perhaps what underlies this. Again, the
dependence of Pharaoh himself upon predatory foreign income and
non-peaceful economic activity will have a similar effect for the
administration of his own domains.
The gods of Egypt both serve as local deities and are integ¬
rated into a functional pantheon. Local deities can be either
male or female; some of the goddesses then can be armed or lion-
headed or both. Others of the goddesses are protectresses; many
appear in both roles. All gods have both male and female attend¬
ants: the men provide personal service; the women are the god's
wives, or musicians, singers and dancers. The model for this
appears very much to be the personal household of a mortal lord.
The structure of the staff is the same regardless whether the
deity is male or female. Women personal attendants, that is act¬
ual priestesses, are more rare and apparently mostly for goddess¬
es; the principles for this have been indicated above. But only
the more senior positions in the religious hierarchy convey more
than a local sinecure. As noted, these offices are in Pharaoh's
gift, and will more ordinarily be given to men. As indicated ear¬
lier, the religious institutions of Egypt are firmly under Phar¬
aoh' s control.
Economy
There is a lack of specific studies of the Egyptian economy.
Even Helck complains that many of the relevant papyri are scatt¬
ered or even fragmented, unpublished and untranslated, and that
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an economic history of Pharaonic Egypt can accordingly only be
provisionally offered (Helck 1975 Foreword).* Janssen's "Prolego¬
mena" however is generally in support of the substantivist views
of the general economic historians of Antiquity (he cites Polan-
yi)(Janssen 19755 see also Polanyi I968, 1977; Polanyi et al eds
19575 see also Heichelheim 1958; Weber 1976). Helck's work itself
is clearly in line with this approach.
The state itself, then, is the greatest oikos, collecting
taxes and paying salaries, but others are Pharaoh's own domains
and those of the temples, and there are besides private estates,
generally gifts to the high officials or to members of Pharaoh's
inner family. There are local markets between city and country¬
side into which the oikoi also sell, and inter-local trade is
carried on by the temples and other major oikoi, foreign trade by
the Great House. The river of course carries foreign trade and
inter-local trade alike. There is also quayside private trade
between sailors and own-account small-traders. All transactions
are in natura; values are expressible in terms of gold, silver,
copper and grain, but there is no coinage. Craftsmen appear to
work on their own account for the market as well as in the royal
and temple and other great oikoi, at least on a part-time if not
a full-time basis. In sum, the economic arrangements fall within
the mixrture of oikos and market typical of Antiquity.
As to sexual economic divisions, the first point is that
women's rights of transaction, ownership and management are in no
way differentiated from those of men. There is no equivalent to
the guardianship of women in the classical civilizations. V» ith
this, it is hard to identify a conceptual distinction of real and
movable property, as I have commented before. The point here per¬
haps is that the referrent for such a distinction could not be
the entailed property of lineages in the Egyptian situation.
Rather there is the notional ownership of all land by Pharaoh,
and a general tendency to construct the economy in terms of app¬
ointment rather than ownership. With this, property fragments at
*As indicated earlier, consultation of this work was only poss¬
ible at a late stage, and a systematic revision of the chapter
in the light of it would be most desirable.
3
devolution owing to the multiplicity of heirs, and if the frag¬
ments are too small for viability they must be sold, and new
property that can be consolidated into a viable block bought in
their place. Given this process of circulation, land and build¬
ings would not be likely to emerge as a distinct property categ¬
ory. (incidentally one might note that it is land, buildings,
livestock and slaves that make up the special property category
of Graeco-Roman civilization - the res mancipi of Roman law.) At
any rate, there is neither an association of real property with
citizenship nor an exclusion of women from (active) citizenship
in Egypt, and there are none of the restrictions on women's econ¬
omic rights and capabilities that would go with this. In all
these matters the Egyptian pattern is quite different from that
of the classical civilizations.
Property of all kinds women can own without restriction, and
they can acquire, administer and alienate it likewise. Slaves can
apparently only be freed by adoption (though marriage to a free
person also frees a slave), but a woman is quite competent to do
this. In practice, ownership can come through inheritance, gift
or transaction. The inheritance laws have been discussed above.
Their basis is that each partner's property is kept separate, and
devolves to the children at death, being divided equally among
them. Here husbands and wives are not each other's intestate
heirs. In the failure of children the heirs are the collaterals.
In either event, males and females share the estate equally.
Joint property is treated separately, being shared between the
surviving spouse and the children, the survivor keeping -5- of the
conjugal fund and the usufruct of the common acquisitions. In all
these matters the sexes are treated exactly the same; however
wills commonly adjust matters in the wife's favour; for example
giving her a special bequest, or making her joint heir with the
children in her husband's property. Basically this is compensat¬
ion for loss of income. V.omen can make wills just the same as
men. Where an estate is inherited by a number of children, a
daughter as much as a son can be made its joint administrator, or
again the mother can act in this capacity until the children
reach adulthood. Again, a daughter as much as a son can raise an
action for the division of an estate.
As to acquiring property ty transaction, the woman has a
typical basis for this in her own property and her textile pro¬
duction. These she manages wholly at her own discretion. As to
joint property, it has been commented above that the division of
authority between husband and wife in the administration of this
is not wholly clear: it may be that the husband has a certain
priority. It is clear however that the wife can transact indepen¬
dently for the couple on her own account - what she acquires on
this basis is reckoned separately from what she acquires for her¬
self. It may indeed be that the husband's supposed priority is
simply a matter of his doing the same thing in his own sphere. At
any rate, ownership of property by Egyptian women in fact, in¬
cluding ownership of land, was apparently commonplace.
As to acquisition by gift, there are no obvious points rele-
vent to sexual divisions.
In terms of agricultural labour, women were included in the
work in the fields, though their functions might be specific:
sowing, carrying in the harvest, scaring birds away, for example,
while men do the heavier work such as ploughing and tend the lar¬
ger livestock. In principle both sexes seem to be liable for cor¬
vee - ushebti, spirit-servants who will take one's place in the
corvee in the afterlife, are put into the tombs of both sexes.
But in practice perhaps only men were normally called, except for
the harvest. Hen certainly do the heavy work of quarrying and
mining, which are often organized by corvee. But these activities
often take place in outlying regions, and are accordingly assim¬
ilated to military service. Viomen seem to have tended fruit
trees and kept flower and vegetable gardens. Again, the single
peasant woman, for example the widow, might well have to work her
own land.
In the household, women's work included weaving linen; also
grinding corn, and making bread and beer - these last are related
processes. They also did the bulk of ordinary cooking, though
male cooks are found in rich households. They also deal with
routine house-cleaning, hater carrying is another female funct¬
ion. Also of course women deal with child-care.
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Household and workshop cannot entirely he distinguished.
However the hulk of crafts are certainly male: work in stone,
wood, metal, leather, ceramics etc., and also building, heaving
in workshops with larger looms is also done hy men, and there are
also male large-scale bakers. Too, there are male laundrymen. But
it is not clear how far there might he family workshops, or how
far the wife might sell her husband's produce. It must he admitt¬
ed however that a system of workshops located on large domains
would probably militate against family workshops and for a sexual
division of crafts. Against this, it should be realized that the
woman's household labour outlined above is not necessarily re¬
stricted to her husband's household, and much of it is saleable,
especially her textile production.
Literate crafts include the physician's, which is apparently
open to women and without restriction to gynaecology. The mid¬
wife' s craft is associated with this; this is a specifically
female craft. Both physicians and mid-wives are apparently train¬
ed in the temples; indeed some types of physician are associated
with the priesthood.
Beyond this there are the scribes. Most evidently these are
the officials of the state bureaucracy and the bureaucracies that
administer the temple and royal domains. However there are sim¬
ilar organizations on smaller scale for private domains, and
probably there are also scribes working on the market, writing
letters for example, or drawing up contracts and documents. As
discussed before, the state bureaucracy is exclusively male and
so probably is the royal domains administration, but there may be
participation of women elsewhere, especially serving a female
employer such as a royal woman or a goddess. At least, women
scribes are known to have existed, though their location is no¬
where specified. Again there could be women scribes working in
the market. A question that might be asked here, and also in re¬
gard to such crafts as the physician's, is whether a father might
bring his daughter into his craft, especially in the failure of
sons.
There is also a large female complement in the temples.
Leaving aside the questions of administrators and priests, there
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are always the god's wives and concubines, chantresses, musicians
and dancers. There is also the supervisory staff for this entour¬
age, and equally there are its servants and attendants. Most of
the posts here are sinecural, but of course the temple is an
oikos with a full range of economic activities, and will have
both male and female workers in a wide range of occupations acc¬
ordingly. Many of the temple personnel will marry and form common
households with each other; but the women will commonly have
their own economic appointments even so. The sinecural positions
here are mostly for the privileged strata, though there is some
entry for the lower strata also. Mortuary priests in this period
appear always to be male. Again, the god always has a male staff
of priestly attendants, and their supervisors and their servants;
and the temple administration, as already discussed, is mostly
typically male too.
Foreign and inter-local trade are initiated by the great
oikoi, and are mostly both controlled and actually carried out
by men. There is room for exception here, especially in regard to
Pharoah's Great Wife, who has her own oikos, and perhaps the
greater female personnel of the temples. As to actual agency,
women are sometimes shown on board ships, or in trading booths
at the quayside, and again in trading booths at the market (how¬
ever these are not very common themes in Egyptian art). It is
clear then that Egyptian women are own-account traders, on the
small scale that is typical of Egyptian own-account trade. Their
goods might include textiles, footwear, foodstuffs and drink. As
typical female products, these suggest independent rather than
family dealings. (See Hayes 1973 p 386 - 8.)
Besides this, women could certainly travel their own crafts,
especially as musicians, singers and dancers: indeed they may
well have taken these to foreign lands. These are free women act¬
ing on their own account, not slaves; for these skills are learnt
by women of the upper strata, as noted earlier. It should by no
means be assumed that this is some kind of adjunct to prostitut¬
ion. Some dancing girls are shown with the figure of Bes, a hou¬
sehold god who guards sexual functions, tatooed or painted on one
thigh. But they are shown dancing for mixed company, husbands and
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wives together. These girls may well he sexually active, hut that
does not mean that they charge for sexual intecourse.
Of prostitution itself, as I have indicated earlier, very
little concrete is known: indeed, if we insist definitionally on
payment as a precondition for intercourse then nothing is really
known. Temple prostitution is seemingly hased partly on the rel¬
igious significance of sexual intecourse for crop and animal fer¬
tility, partly on the economic importance of the temples. Both
these things are evident in Egypt, hut there is no temple prost¬
itution; it is a practice of the Ancient Near East. Other factors
then, prohahly of sociodemographic kind, are apparently involved
(see Bottero 1974)« Again, female slaves from Asia are usually
skilled, generally in textile work: they are not made prostitut¬
es. So far as there are prostitutes, then, they must be assumed
to he free Egyptians working on their own account, in brothels
or possibly taverns, with a clientele of sailors, soldiers, trad¬
ers (including inter-local traders) away from home, and perhaps
minimally the young of the scribal class. But choice more than
economic necessity will condition this craft, and likely it might
better be described as promiscuity with gifts. Again, there is no
specific prostitutes' patron goddess in Egypt.
Our knowledge of the Egyptian economy comes partly from fun¬
erary art. As such, it expresses the oikos at the expense of the
market, the conventional at the expense of the actual, and the
south at the expense of the north. It also expresses the periods
of strong consolidation at the expense of the periods of fragmen¬
tation; the surviving documentary evidence, whether by chance or
for other reason, tends to do the opposite. Probably the Egyptian
economy is more like that of the Near East than our impressions
of it would have: Helck certainly takes that view, with special
reference to the New Kingdom. But there is a crucial difference
in the matters of usury and debt slavery: these things are virt¬
ually eliminated from Egyptian civilization, yet they are at the




Social stratification in Hew Kingdom Egypt is "based on the
typical ancient economic pattern of inter-related structures of
oikos and market. This typically gives a range of statuses in
terms of slavery, freedom, and grades of citizenship rather than
classes in terms of market location, though the processes of
usury and debt slavery can link the two. But beyond this common
basis, the New Kingdom stratificatory order is defined by on the
one side, a somewhat limited development of the market, on the
other, a strongly developed bureaucratic domination. The first
makes for a limited emergence of class; the second restricts the
field of status largely to a reckoning of social honour, as opp¬
osed to real political and legal privilege.
In all, as I have suggested earlier, although there is a
distinction for administrative purposes of scribes, priests,
peasants and artisans, the status distinction tends to come down
to two broad bands: the upper stratum comprises the scribes and
priests; the lower comprises the peasants and artisans. This
might be further shaped by wealth, a substantial peasant or fav¬
oured artisan being assimilated to the upper stratum while a
local village scribe or small mortuary priest slips into the
lower. But the most practical force of the distinction is the
exemption of the upper stratum from the corvee, and their co-
option onto the higher legal tribunals. But the same law-code
and taxation system apply to all.
ith this, the status differentiation of the sexes seems to
be minimal. Certainly there are no formal civil disabilities on
women, although they are absent from the armed forces and the
state bureaucracy. Equally, there seems to be little or no status
differentiation among women themselves on the basis of their
actual or imputed sexual and reproductive careers. There is cert¬
ainly no formal civil disability on this basis. Rather Egyptian
ideology seems to be weighted towards the lesser, to egalitarian-
ism and protectiveness and against arrogance; difference of weal¬
th and career being given matter-of-fact treatment. It should be
remembered that formally the privileged, men and women, are the
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servants of Pharaoh or the gods.
There is certainly a differentiation of economic chances for
the sexes: men have much the greater chance to hold office, and
therefore to acquire wealth and property. They also have the
greater chance of heavy and ill-rewarded labour, in the quarries
for example, and as to the crafts, while men have far the wider
range, this is not all pure advantage. But the pattern of sexual
divisions here also protects a specifically female sector of the
economy, which is by no means all service or all male-exploited.
It is a definite sphere of female economic autonomy. Strikingly
this is not based on either prostitution or wet-nursing: basical¬
ly neither are Egyptian practices.
Egyptian society does not produce stratification-based pol¬
itical conflicts after the fashion of Graeco-Roman society. The
main structural conflicts are rather those between Pharaoh, his
officials 'and the nobility. In this, women's rights and women's
power are certainly an issue. But the bulk of the population,
both sexes alike, clearly consented to the strong centralized
rule of the Pharaohs, and to their relationship to each other
within the framework it provided.
Conclusion
The position of women in New Kingdom Egypt stands, as will
be seen, in sharp contrast to that in the City-state civilization
of Greece and Rome, though somewhat less so to that in the Roman
Empire. There can be little question that the main reason for
this is bureaucratic monarchical rule. On the one side, this pre¬
vents the development of a ruling aristocracy, perpetuating it¬
self through the control of property, position and reproduction
in terms of lineage and marriage. It is Pharaoh who controls all
these things, and it is part of this that women have citizenship:
appeal to Pharaoh against the control of their menfolk. On the
other side, the system of taxation, rents, salaries and appoint¬
ments provides a controlled exploitation of the peasantry, in
which the basic standard of living of both peasantry and artisan-
ate is protected, expropriation and enslavement being prevented.
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At the same time, a range of harmless sinecures is created for
the privileged strata. This takes the pressure off over-reproduc¬
tion for all strata and makes fertility unproblematic: thus there
is no incentive to control women. It also gives to women a fair
range of independent economic opportunities. Broadly, the posit¬
ion of women in the different eras of Egyptian history can he
measured by these things: the power of Pharaoh and. his bureaucra¬
cy in the strong centralized realms versus the provincial arist¬
ocracies that spring up in the periods of fragmentation (see Pir-
enne 1959)•
As to the contrast of Egypt with the Ancient Near East
(which I have not considered in this thesis),, of course that civ¬
ilization is not all one. But the greater advancement of some of
the Near Eastern economies is a deceptive point. For one thing,
Egypt's economy in the New Kingdom at least probably was compar¬
ably advanced, as I have noted above. But more fundamentally,
the key issue in the ancient economy is not trade, money and mar¬
kets but usury and debt-slavery. It should never be forgotten
that the wider range of economic options open to the Mesopotamian
woman include being bought and sold as well as buying and sell¬
ing. Beyond this, the Near Eastern law-codes clearly give the
husband great power over his wife, and do not give her appeal to
the state against that power. Indeed her punishments are often
mandatory not discretionary. (See Mendelsohn 1949; Bottero 1974)«
The sources on Egypt lean too much to state and temple, to
Thebes and the south, and to funerary art and artifact. There are
other problems. I have been forced to suggest that in the litera¬
ture some of the tales show Asiatic intrusions, and to propose a
distinction between these and the love-poetry comparable to that
commonly made for Athens between the tragic drama and the comedy.
Again, the bulk of the marriage and divorce documents are from a
later time, and their bearing for the New Kingdom has had to be
established. But it must be stated without apology that the long
tradition of Egyptology has always stressed the strong position
of women as a distinctive feature of Egyptian civilization. "Cau¬
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The classical period of Athenian history runs from about
B.C. 510 - 340» and it should be stated at the outset that almost
all that we know about Greek civilization and history up to the
end of that time comes from texts written at Athens or by Athen¬
ians in the classical period, and that with this, it is only
classical Athens itself that is really capable of empirically
secure analysis. Even so, something of the location of classical
Athens in the wider, and deeper, Greek world should be indicated.
The Hellenes ("Greeks" is the Roman name for them) were an
ethnic community, identifying themselves by common language, rel¬
igion and customs. They reckoned themselves in three legendary
branches, Ionian, Aolian and Dorian (plus some oddments), which
had supposedly migrated in separate waves into their present
lands, and which traced a common genealogy through legendary her¬
oes to the gods. Their present lands were the Greek and Turkish
coasts and islands of the Aegean - somewhat south and east of
modern Greece. However, colonizatory emigration from the 8th
century had created a plethora of new City-states (about 1,500 in
all, most of which are virtually unknown), ranging from Sicily to
the Crimea (with a few beyond), and that is the Hellenic world.
Its time-period ranges from about B.C. 1100 - 340, and is divided
into Dark Ages, archaic and classical periods. The Dark Ages end
with the time of Homer, the first half of the 8th century.
However, there is an older civilization, the Helladic, in
the 2nd millennium, culminating in the Mycenaean civilization
(cB.C. 1600 - 1100). It is this civilization that supposedly
fought the Trojan Wars about B.C. 1250, and was destroyed by the
Dorian Invasions not long after; both events are historically
somewhat insecure. Homer names these people Achaeans, and that
name seems to occur in Hittite and Egyptian annals of their own
time, for example among the Sea Peoples that Merneptah and Harnes¬
ses iii defeated (Sandars 1978). The relationship of Achaians to
Hellenes is problematic, but there is tremendous continuity in
religion, mythology and legend. Homer exemplifies this. Homer
himself apparently wrote in the Ionian Islands in the 8th century.
Yet though there are remembered Mycenaean elements in his poems,
he had no understanding of the nature of Mycenaean civilization -
a congeries of small bureaucratic City-kingdoms - and rather gave
a mixture of contemporary conditions and recalled conditions of a
century or so before (that is, a mixture of late Dark Ages and
early archaic conditions).-
All this is confusing. But it has to be realized that the
Greeks had both a strong awareness of the depth of their own his¬
tory and a hopelessly confused and mistaken conception of its nat¬
ure. Scepticism about this goes back to the Greeks themselves;
indeed it is, quite literally, the beginning of the Western hist-
oriographical tradition. But it is only since the decipherment of
Linear B - Cretan and Mycenaean writing - that matters have begun
to be decisively clarified.
There are two reasons for going into this here. One concerns
the sources on women's position in classical Athens. The Attic
tragic drama of Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides is almost
without exception concerned with retelling Mycenaean legendary
history, subject to the tradition of distortion laid down in Hom¬
er. This is probably completely unusable as a source on contemp¬
orary Athenian conditions. (As against this, the comedy of Aristo¬
phanes is specific to its contemporary context, and is highly
usable as a source. Ehrenberg has demonstrated this - Ehrenberg
1951.)
The second reason concerns the origins and institutions of
the polis (City-state): phylum, phratry and genos. A long-standing
tradition of scholarship, going back to e.g. Morgan and Pustel de
Coulanges, has associated these with the kinship systems of primi¬
tive peoples, arguing that the Greeks in their Dark Ages were in
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comparable condition, prior to the formation of their City-state
civilization. The City-state then originated in these structures,
and in time superseded them. This view is not compatible with
what is known either of Mycenaean or of Homeric society. Moreover
it is hard to reconcile it with society in the classical period.
For the less civilized up-country states that did not develop the
polis but are termed "ethne" do not have these structures. They
are specific to the City-state; moreover they do not fade away
in the course of the City-state's history. It may be added that
Vieber pointed all this out (he was also on the right lines as to
the nature of Mycenaean civilization). These matters are further
discussed in Appendix A part iii below.* (Also, see Finley 1985;
1983 p 44 - 5*) But the point for us here is to identify the
phylum, phratry and genos as sui generis arrangements of ancient
City-state civilization, belonging to the realm of political
macro-structure, and relating to the position of women through
the polis and citizenship, not through the family and marriage.
This will be expanded in due course.
As to Athens itself, although actually a Mycenaean foundat¬
ion, it does not come centre-stage in Greek City-state history
until late. Sparta and the Ionian states of the islands and Turk¬
ish coastline are more prominent in archaic times. But Achaemen-
id Persia, rising in the mid-6th century and expanding to the
Aegean coast, came into conflict with the Ionian states, leading
to actual invasions of the Greek mainland (B.C. 490; 480 - 479)»
Athens became the main naval power opposing this, with Sparta the
main land power. Following the Persian Wars, Athens created a
naval alliance (the Delian League) against the Persians among the
Ionian Islands, which she quickly converted into an empire. But
this in time brought her into war with Sparta (The Peloponnesian
'Wars, B.C. 431 - 421; 413 - 404)» in which she was defeated and
her empire destroyed. However, Athens kept her autonomy, and even
rebuilt her empire in time, though without wholly recovering her
previous wealth or power. In the meantime, Spartan power failed.
*There is a definitive modern study of these matters - Roussel
1976. Unfortunately, however, this could not be used for this
thesis. See review by Gauthier ( 1978).
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Fourth century Greece is a period of shifting hegemonies and all¬
iances and of internecine wars, under the shadow of greater king¬
doms. In B.C. 338 an alliance of City-states led by Athens and
Thebes was defeated at Chaeronea by Phillip of Macedon, father of
Alexander the Great. This ends the classical, and indeed the
Hellenic, era.
As to internal affairs, Athens had apparently suffered typ¬
ical social conflicts over usury and debt-slavery in the archaic
period, leading to a program of political and economic reform
devised by Solon and imposed by the Peisistratid tyrants; this in
the 6th century. The expulsion of the tyrants in B.C. 510 led to
the institution of the Athenian democracy: the reforms of Cleis-
thenes. Athens maintained and broadened her democracy, with brief
interruptions during her wars with Sparta, until after Chaeronea.
The economic aspect of the reforms of the 6th century include
state support for the introduction of vines and olives to replace
barley - their value is greater, but they do not bear in their
first years. Corn now becomes mostly imported wheat, imported
under constant state supervision. In the early 5th century, sil¬
ver deposits were found at Laureion in Attica; silver coins be¬
came an important economic asset. But tribute from the empire is
basic to the Athenian economy: it is redistributed to the citiz¬
ens as military pay and also pay for civic duties such as attend¬
ing the Assembly. The enfranchisement, military service, and
state support for the poorest citizens is distinctive to Athens,
a factor of her naval character. Yet this system becomes increas¬
ingly difficult to support as it grows in the 4th century. Agri¬
culture, damaged in the Peloponnesian Wars, is never wholly re¬
stored. Athens increasingly involves herself in trade - not as
producer and exporter but as emporium, for the sake of the reven¬
ues. With this go increased rights for raetics, and there is also
an increasing use of foreign mercenaries.
Athens was a very big City-state for its time, both in area
and in population. Attica was about 800 square miles, with a tot¬
al population of about 340,000. Of these, about 130,000 were
slaves, and 40,000 metics (resident foreigners). Athens itself
with its port Piraeus was the only city; together their populat-
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ion was about 130,000 in the 5th century, rising to 170,000 in
the 4th - that is, 33rising to 5C$> urbanization (Roberts 1984
p 21, p 38 - 40; Finley 1977 P 54 - 8, p 71 - 3).
Classical Athens has a tremendous contemporary literature,
which includes both historiography and political-social analysis.
There is no lack of sources, then, though as the focal point of
a wider and deeper Greek culture some of these can be difficult
to use - in particular, I have pointed to the problems of the
Attic tragedy.
The Position of Women
State and Family
Athens (her empire apart) is a fairly typical ancient City-
state: a city located near the sea with a compact hinterland.
Despite its size, no point in Attica is more than 30 miles from
the city itself, an acceptable journey for the times. In all
ways, military, political, economic, cultural and religious, this
is a city-centred civilization.
The characteristic institutions of the ancient City-state
(the polis) are: the Council of Elders, the magistrates who act¬
ually wield power, and the popular Assembly. The continuum of
democracy and oligarchy is only a question of the balance and
inter-relations of these elements. The development of the Athen¬
ian democracy will be discussed in due course, but there are some
general fundamental points to be considered first. To begin with,
there is the rule of law. Power should be exercized under rules
and not arbitrarily. However this does not really develop into a
notion of the law operating on two levels, one of which supervis¬
es the other - a constitution. In Athens early in the 4th century
such a notion begins exceptionally to half-emerge. Next, politic¬
al and legal institutions are not separated. The Assembly is both
parliament and law-court; though at Athens jury-courts comprising
quora draxm from the Assembly were developed. Next, rule is dir¬
ect citizen power. The magistrates do not head a civil service
but take the place of a civil service. Equally, there is no state
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prosecutor. More will be said on these heads later, but it should
be realized now that the polis does not make for professional
politicians or lawyers, and that where the state is not monopol¬
ized by a wealthy class it becomes open to a polemic to which we
are now all too sensitive. In particular, the "demagogue" and the
"informer" (the Greek word is "sycophant") are simply actively
engaged citizens, with no presumption of vexatiousness. But dem¬
ocracy in Antiquity is always seen as tyrannical and illegal, and
attacked as such. This is perhaps the most fundamental point of
all: that ancient democracy is a sociological fact, a type of
domination. It is not a political system far less a political
philosophy.
The institutions of the polis also include the phylum, phrat-
ry and genos. As I have indicated above, there are problems here
(see e.g. Andrewes 1971 ch 5, Littman 1977 j Finley 1985, 1983 ch
2; see also previous footnote): these structures should not be
interpreted in terms of a recent emergence from the primitive;
but neither should we be drawn too deeply into reconstructions of
the early polis. Chariot warfare in archaic times apparently made
for aristocratic clans: the genos inter-related the aristocratic
lineages and the phratry organized their commoner followings -
especially perhaps as the hoplite infantry developed. The polis
is created by a fusion of neighbourhoods; the phyla are created
for the sake of a division of powers to reflect this. That is one
view. But I have commented elsewhere on the priority in historic¬
al analysis of sources over origins: the place to start with this
is the reforms of Cleisthenes. However, aristocratic lineages
(the eupatridae) survive through the classical period, as do the
genos and the phratry - though these are now private associations
disengaged from the state, and the genos no longer controls the
phratry (if it ever did).
The reforms of Cleisthenes (c508) institute the Athenian
democracy, and open our period. It is not easy to discuss them
without discussing what they reformed: the older institutional
arrangements and the earlier reforms of Solon, although since
that entails reconstruction it is preferably avoided. At any
rate, Cleisthenes expanded the Council of 400 (created by Solon
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as counterweight to the Areopagus Council) to 500, and made it
the steering committee - the Prohoula - for the Assembly; more¬
over he made the Assembly the ultimate location of power. With
this, he also rearranged the phylae from four to ten, and changed
their basis: dividing Attica into about 140 demes (villages or
city wards), he brought these together in a complex arrangement
that mixed city, coastal and inland demes together in each phyl¬
um. The demes were the units of local government and kept the
citizen registers; the phyla provided 50 members each to the Pro-
boula and put forward the candidates for office - these would be
finally chosen partly by election, partly by sortition. With this
again, the genos and the phratry are disengaged from the politic¬
al system: they survive as private associations only.
These reforms create the moderate democracy. Following the
Persian Wars and the rise of naval power, the radical democracy
emerges: the (older) Areopagus Council declines to become only a
special court for homicide, and the Proboula takes over its func¬
tions; the nine (older) archon magistrates, from whom the Areo¬
pagus is recruited, decline in importance, and boards of magis¬
trates drawn from the Proboula or the Assembly itself take their
place. Of these, the most important are the ten strategoi (admir¬
als/generals). With this, the holding of office becomes open to
the hoplite class (the zeugetes), though not to the urban poor
(the thetes). Broadly, this remained the shape of Athenian dem¬
ocracy thereafter.
The polis is a consociation of warriors. As such, it is a
legally defined community with its own laws: membership in the
community is citizenship. Citizenship is hereditary: that is the
basic relationship between state and family. Citizenship compris¬
es a nexus of political-legal rights and duties, property owner¬
ship especially in farming property, and military service. All
military service is in principle self-equipped; typically there
is a status order in terms of the degrees of political-legal
rights and duties and the type of military service, based on the
size of property holding. At Athens four grades were established,
from the time of Solon: pentakosiomedimnoi, hippeis, zeugetes,
and thetes. The measure here (medimnos) is the yield of corn, oil
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or wine; the levels are: 500+, 300 - 500, 200 - 300, 200 or less.
The topmost class bears the major leiturgies, the public burdens
which largely take the place of a tax system: for example, equip¬
ping a warship. The hippeis provide the cavalry; the zeugetes are
the hoplites, the heavy infantry; the thetes provide the peltasts
(light-armed troops) and above all, the rowers of the fleet. The
holding of magistracies is monopolized by the upper two classes
in the moderate democracy, and is extended to the zeugetes under
the radical democracy. In all other political and legal matters,
the four strata stand equal. As I have indicated, state income
from the empire and from war was divided among the citizenry,
especially in the form of pay for military service, attending the
Assembly, sitting on the jury-courts, and other such citizen
functions. This permitted a degree of citizen participation to
the thetes - the urban poor - that is exceptional for an ancient
City-state. It is a factor of Athens' naval power and dependence.
Besides citizens, Athens also had metics and slaves. The
metics were mostly of zeugetes or thetes level. They were liable
for military service but had no citizen rights; they must have a
prostates, a citizen who would act for them. Also, they paid a
special tax. Much of Athens' trade and finance was in metic hands
- metics were forbidden to own land or houses. But in the 4th
century conditions on all fronts were made somewhat easier. As
to slaves, these were mostly war captives or else bought in the
north and east: Thrace, Scythia and Phrygia. The influx is con¬
stant; Athens did not breed her own slaves. It should be noted
that a freed slave a*t Athens becomes a metic, his former owner
his prostates.
Citizenship is hereditary: it is transmitted through agnatic
lineages of property owners. The term for such a lineage is
"oikos" (although sociologically this term is used more widely).
This does not mean "family"; there is no exact equivalent for
that (and indeed, "family" has more than one meaning in English).
"Oikos" means a household, including its personnel and its live¬
stock - the slaves rather being counted with the latter - and
also the house and the land itself. The concept should also ex¬
tend to funerary property, the graves of the lineage* s ancestors,
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on the ancestral land. The term "oikos" groups with three others:
"kleros", "kyrios" and "kyreia"; there is also a related term
Mepiklerate". The kleros is the share in the agricultural land,
in principle owned by all full citizens. In the 5th century emp¬
ire, Athens created kleruchies, military colonies in allied lands
(mostly Ionian Islands), partly to pacify them and partly to give
land, and with it zeugetes status, to some of her landless thetes.
The kyrios is the head of the oikos, the owner/master. Kyreia is
his relationship of ownership/domination over his property and
dependants; it can be translated as "guardianship", especially in
relation to women. There will be more to say on the guardianship
of women in later sections. In principle it is the kyrios of the
oikos who is the full citizen. As stated earlier, it is only
Athenian citizens who are permitted to own land and houses.
Property is transmitted basically in terms of intestate
succession. That is, there is no freedom of testacy; wills are
made to make bequests only, and even here there are limitations,
to protect the integrity of the estate. Again, wills are used to
specify the terms of division of the estate between heirs. But
the heirs are the sons,, and they cannot be disinherited. Daught¬
ers ordinarily have a dowry, in place of inheritance. Failing
sons, the daughter inherits; this is the epiklerate - the "inher¬
ited daughter" - to be discussed below. Failing all legitimate
children, the heirs are the agnatic kin, in a hierarchy that con¬
siders the males of each degree before the females. There is no
inheritance to wives or cognates. The only means to avoid these
intestate arrangements is by adoption, that is, the adoption of
an adult, usually male. But the point to be grasped in all this
is the continuity of the oikos itself: it is considered a great
misfortune both for the individual and for the polis that an oik¬
os should die out, and everything possible is done to avoid this.
But with this, in the simplest case, where the sons succeed their
father, the division of the estate creates a new oikos for each
son. Thus the number of the City's oikoi should tend to increase
over time; it is not a fixed quantity.
The epiklerate, the daughter (or daughters) who inherits in
the failure of sons, are the subject of special laws: the man who
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marries her does not take her into his oikos, hut enters that of
her (deceased) father, and the children continue that lineage.
The father's male kin must provide either a husband or a dowry
for her. Again, the law provides that the husband of an epikler-
ate must have intercourse with her at least three times a month.
Presumably this is to protect the girl from fortune seekers, and
to ensure that the lineage will be perpetuated. Schaps sees here
only a desire to see that all Athenian girls are married (which I
find dubious on general grounds), but most commentators see here
the desire to perpetuate the oikos left without males. (Again,
Schaps says that the epiklerate arrangement would not achieve
this; that adoption is the only means that would, but I am not
clear on his logic, at least in regard to the former point.)
(Schaps 1979 p 32 -3, 39 - 42.)
To return however to the simplest case, the inheritance by
sons, the point must be made that the devolution of property does
not take place at the father's death but at his retirement. This
usually occurs at age 60, when he becomes no longer liable for
military service. He does not forfeit his citizen rights, but he
hands over his affairs to his son(s), and becomes a dependant in
his own household. The converse of this is that the son only
achieves full adulthood at age 30. This is when he attains full
citizen rights, and it is only now (as a rule) that he marries.
This as will be seen is basic to Athenian household structure.
But during early adulthood - typically age 18 to 30 - the son
lives as a dependant in his father's household, subject to his
authority and strictly, with his father actual owner of all his
property. There is in all these arrangements considerable scope
for inter-generational conflict.
The transmission of citizenship is as stated basically her¬
editary in terms of citizen lineages. Initially, the rule was
that the child must have an Athenian citizen father, but Pericles
passed a law (B.C. 451) that the mother must be an Athenian cit¬
izen too. This is often said to be intended to ensure that Athen¬
ian girls were not left unwed, though perhaps another reason can
be suggested. But first, there are two other things to be consid¬
ered: illegitimacy and concubinage. It is difficult to say much
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that is definitive on either head; that indeed is part of the
point. But there were apparently Athenians who at least had a
claim to citizenship yet whose parents were not married. There is
a tradition that Cleisthenes removed the illegitimate from the
citizen rolls as part of his reforms, though this does not speak
for later practice. Points to note here are: first, the lack of
properly controlled centralized citizen registers, and second,
that in Athenian law, a person who falsely exercized 'citizenship
was liable to enslavement. These points will come up again in a
later section. As to concubinage, this can mean many things, and
although legally recognized it is not legally defined. But broad¬
ly, it is a relationship of common household with a woman with a
view to the procreation of free children - free, not citizen. The
status of the woman might be various: she might be a slave (in
which case her children would be freed), or a metic, or an Athen¬
ian citizen. In any case, the children would be illegitimate. But
the point is that here is a relationship which is like marriage
but is not marriage. I am unclear as to exactly how the Athenians
themselves defined these things in relation to each other, and
indeed it may well be that they never really did so. Certainly
marriage was a private compact between oikoi; it was not a func¬
tion either of the state or of the public religion. But the ques¬
tion is: are the children of an Athenian citizen concubine citiz¬
ens?
I believe that the best answer to this question, and the
best understanding of all the matters in the above paragraph,
comes from consideration of the status stratification of the Ath¬
enian citizenry, and the background of social conflicts between
the strata. On the one side, an aristocracy does not willingly
accept status equality with the common people, and one of its
main resources in this is to distinguish between sexual unions
among themselves, and the children born of them, and sexual unions
formed with the common people, and the children born of them.
Only the former are considered to be "marriage" and "legitimate".
On the other side, the polis is a community, a consociation of
warriors, in which the common people will insist upon an ultimate
equality of status of all citizens. Again, in this the touchstone
£9 7
will "be the legitimacy of sexual unions and of the children horn
of them. The balance between the strata in these conflicts is
largely decided by military factors, especially the rise of hop-
lite infantry formations. Eut it was common in Antiquity for
Cities to interfere in each others' affairs, or for warring fac¬
tions to call in external aid. In particular, it is a common
resource for aristocracies to intermarry with foreign aristocrac¬
ies.
In sum, what I am suggesting here is that concubinage is (or
at least is decisively shaped by) a union between aristocrat and
commoner. Thus it has the characteristic that, while the children
do not have full inheritance rights, the woman does have a pro¬
tected status and, most importantly, the children have citizen¬
ship. Kith this, a broad principle is established: that in the
last analysis the arbiter of rightful birth is the citizen comm¬
unity as a whole not the aristocracy, and that a child cannot be
disqualified from citizenship on the basis of a refusal of recog¬
nition by the father or his kin. Illegitimacy is never much spok¬
en of in classical Antiquity. Marriage is not the condition of
citizenship and, as- stated, is a private compact between oikoi
only. In time, with Pericles' law, this extends to a recognition
that the mother plays a part in conveying citizenship, and also
to interdict the aristocracy from intermarriage with the aristo¬
cracies of other Cities, compelling them to intermarry within
their own City. This should be seen in the context of the consol¬
idation and development of the Athenian democracy (though this in
turn occurs in the context of developing empire and continuing
inter-City struggles). But the processes are general to Antiquity,
and something similar can also be seen at Rome.
Concubinage, whatever its background in terms of status un¬
equal unions within the citizenry, is also found as a union
across the status differences of free and slave, and of citizen
and metic. This indeed is apparently the common form of concubin¬
age in the classical period. In both cases, marriage is forbidd¬
en; in the former case, the children would ordinarily be freed,
and therefore would be metics. Although little concrete is known
of concubinage, it seems that in the 4"th century especially some
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citizens were taking concubines in preference to marrying. The
relationship and status are legally recognized: for instance,
concubinage is covered by the laws on adultery just as marriage
is.
From one point of view, the oikos can be regarded as the
material basis of citizenship, in particular, in terms of land,
livestock and slaves - farming property. The Solonic classes were
defined on this assumption, as I have already indicated, though
in fact the lowest class, the thetes, were typically the urban
poor, often owning no more than a garden plot at best (leaving
house ownership aside). The Solonic reforms themselves are not
securely known, but as I have indicated earlier, they were intend¬
ed to resolve typical social conflicts over usury and debt slav¬
ery. Apparently they freed the enslaved and possibly cancelled
debts, though they did not redistribute land. But in the Peisis-
tratid tyranny that followed, state support was given to increase
the income from small fanning, in terms of substituting olives
and vines for barley (which became increasingly replaced by im¬
ported wheat). The point to grasp here, and it is general for
ancient City-state, civilization, is the marginal position of the
small peasant. At best, his citizenship depends on his being able
to equip himself as a hoplite; at worst, economic misfortune -
and the denial of justice - can expropriate him and lose him and
his wife and children their freedom. In this situation, reproduc¬
tion is precarious: under-reproduction may result in the oikos
dying out, but over-reproduction can result either immediately in
too heavy demands on the economic resources (which cannot absorb
the extra labour), or subsequently in the sub-division of the
oikos between heirs into units too small to support dependants.
The ideal situation of the peasant citizen is to have one son
only, or two to insure against the risks of war and disease. He
must also have a wife, and a daughter to exchange for the wife of
his heir, but in principle the womenfolk are at least as much a
liability as an asset. This is the location of Hesiod, a Boetian
peasant of archaic times, and this is the explanation of the
misogyny which he introduces into Graeco-Roman culture (it is
also in Jewish culture, and for similar reasons).
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At Athens in the classical period all this is background.
Usury and debt-slavery are in the past, and the zeugetes and even
the thetes are recognized as militarily essential and have a
strong political and legal position. Moreover there is state pay
for military service and performance of citizen duties such as
attendance at the Assembly - the basis of this being profits from
war and tribute from the empire. It is this that enables the zeu¬
getes and thetes to exercize an active citizenship in practice;
it also makes war attractive, and peace unattractive, for these
classes, especially the urban poor. However it should be realized
that this does not radically alter the situation of the peasant
citizen. It ameliorates his condition in that now the worst he
faces is declassment to thetes level; a change in both political
and military conditions, and perhaps a move from the country to
the city. In practice, peasant citizens will have generally
transmitted the farm to the elder son, and let the younger son
go to the city to become a thetes. But though the pressures are
lessened, the situation of the peasant, and his ideal response to
those pressures, are exactly what they were. It is the condition
of the urban poor that has radically changed.
The urban poor are typically artisans, craftsmen and shop¬
keepers - wage labour is uncommon. All these activities are shar¬
ed indifferently with slaves. Indeed, so far as an active citiz¬
enship implies a certain degree of leisure, the tendency is to
have slaves in these activities. State pay then for military ser¬
vice and performance of citizen duties was important. The basis
here was simply that the political community should divide its
spoils: as stated, the polis is fundamentally a consociation of
warriors. But the significance of this additional income goes
somewhat beyond questions of citizenship. Ordinarily, the urban
poor of ancient Cities are not a self-reproductive class; this by
reason of the generally poor hygene of cities, compounded by pov¬
erty, squalor, and a lack of women's work compatible with preg¬
nancy and motherhood. The recruitment of the urban poor comes
mainly from immigration from the countryside - the pressures that
drive this should be clear from the foregoing paragraphs. The
other major source is the importation of slaves. Indeed, the two
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■things are related, for if debt-slavery is eliminated, then im¬
portation on whatever basis must become the source of the slave
supply. At Athens, both inputs to the urban population are found
- as the great size of the city suggests. But it also seems
clear that the thetes themselves contributed to the city's repro¬
duction: unlike the urban poor of most ancient Cities, they did
marry and raise children (although mortality rates may have been
high). It should be noted however that state pay is for adult
males only, and takes no account of dependants. Although product¬
ive property and its division on devolution are not factors here
as they are for the peasant, nonetheless the economic pressures
to have few children are overwhelming.
As to the upper Solonic classes, these are basically owners
of property, farming and urban, including slaves, living off
rents and the produce of their estates (trade and finance are
metic activities). On the face of it, these should be free from
the kinds of pressures discussed above, but that is deceptive.
The need is to maintain a status, and therefore the economic bas¬
is for that status, in the face of limited chances for the acqui¬
sition of new wealth. Therefore the pressures on the division of
patrimony, and for the limitations of the numbers of children,
are essentially the same as for the peasantry. Vihat is most in¬
teresting here is that an aristocracy will usually try to meet
this situation by distinguishing between legitimate and non-leg¬
itimate sexual relations and procreation, limiting the division
of patrimony to the former. I have already discussed the issues
involved in this. At Athens, the common people insisted on an
ultimate conubiura restricted to the citizenry.
In sum then, the pressures on all citizen strata are to few
children. Especially the pressures are to few daughters, for
daughters must be dowered, and moreover are generally not very
productive economically (as will be seen later). But also, as
stated earlier, the ideal is to have one son, plus one in reserve
perhaps. This is to consider the raising of legitimate children
within the citizenry only. The obvious recourses then are infant¬
icide and exposure. These indeed are taken for granted throughout
classical Antiquity (and indeed all the Ancient Civilization);
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perhaps for that very reason, it is difficult to say anything
concrete about them specifically at classical Athens. But the
point can be made that it is exposure of children that is the
attested practice, and that this is one of the inputs into the
slave trade: in particular, exposed girl-children are often found
and raised as slave prostitutes. Prostitution itself offers a
further recourse against over-reproduction, in that the reproduc¬
tive outcome (for the man) need not be considered. This will be
taken up later.
As to the non-citizen elements of the population, these are
metics and slaves. In the classical period, slaves are mostly
imported or war captives, the sources usually being to the north
and east: Thrace, Scythia and Phrygia. The women were mostly used
in domestic service; many of the men worked in the silver mines
at Laureion, though some worked in the city at crafts and trades,
often living independently from their owners. But slaves even in
this category did not usually have families, and the Athenians
did not try to breed slaves or to encourage slaves to breed. If a
slave-girl had children by a citizen father (which was not unus¬
ual), the children were usually freed. A freed slave became a
metic. Most metics however were immigrant, or of free immigrant
origin; mostly other Greeks, but in the 4th century also for ex¬
ample Phoenicians or Egyptians. Most metics were of zeugetes or
thetes level, but they were forbidden to own land or houses. Some
made their living as artisans and shopkeepers like the rest of
the urban poor, but their significance was especially in trade
and in finance, which were largely in metic hands. But although
both the economic and the civic position of the metic are distin¬
ctive, it is doubtful that this would result in distinctive fam¬
ily practices. The proverb "when in Rome do as the Romans do" is
general to classical Antiquity. As against this, many of the het-
aerae of Athens were metics; again, Athenian men might take metic
girls as concubines (marriage with them being forbidden). There
will be more to say on this later.
The classical period at Athens is really too short for much
to be said about population movements. The city itself certainly
grew tremendously, especially in the 5th century, though this
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probably reflects rural-urban migration and the slave-trade more
than simple increase of the citizenry. Mortality always tends to
be episodic; Athens was not well provided with clean water and
sewers like a Roman city, and the civic splendour of her public
buildings contrasts with private squalor in her streets and hous¬
es. There was a severe plague at the beginning of the Peloponnes-
ian Wars. Also it is interesting that after the classical period
many of the richer families began to die out for lack of children
- this also happens at Rome at the end of the Republic. However
it is outside the scope of the present chapter.
bhat should be mentioned is that some scholars have suggest¬
ed that the sex-ratio at Athens was out of balance, perhaps to
the extent of two males to every female. Pomeroy considers this
to hold throughout classical Antiquity; Guttentag contrasts Athens
with Sparta (Pomeroy 1975 Appendix; Guttentag and Secord 1983 ch
2). It is doubtful if there is evidence capable of resolving this;
also, exposure of girl-children, which is cited as a major factor,
would not have this result if the girls were taken and raised as
slaves (nor is it certain that exposure was practised at classic¬
al Athens). Broadly, however, a sex-ratio imbalance among the cit¬
izenry at Athens does at least make sense; it is a possibility
that should be borne in mind.
Family and Community
The oikos, as well as being the lineage and its material
endowment in land and livestock, is also in direct sense the hou¬
sehold. As such, it typically centres on a small nuclear family
plus a few slaves. This picture must be qualified by the system
of property devolution. As I have indicated earlier, Athenian men
do not come to full adulthood until age 30, and they continue to
live in their parents' household until that time, but the father
generally retires at age 60, and passes control of his oikos to
his son. If he has more than one son, there is a division to form
new oikoi. It is only now, as kyrie of their own oikoi, that the
sons will marry. The adult son, then, does not bring a wife into
his father's household. However, the retired parents will go to
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live as dependants in one of their sons* households. But it is
only in this limited sense that the Athenian household extends to
three generations. Moreover authority is clearly with the kyrios,
not with the eldest male, and it is the nuclear family that is
"basic. It should he realized also that the frequency with which
this situation actually occurs is subject to high mortality rat¬
es*
Men's marriages were ordinarily deferred until the attain¬
ment of full citizenship, but girls were married young, about age
15* Formally, the man might act here for himself (though his fath¬
er might decide the matter for him), but for the girl, the marr¬
iage is arranged by her kyrios - father, brother, or whoever -
and she may not even be informed in advance, far less have to
consent. This holds especially for first marriages; on remarriage
the woman might perhaps at least make her voice heard. In pract¬
ice, marriages are generally arranged, often through go-betweens
(generally older women), and considerations of property and in¬
heritance are often paramount; the partners are often within the
anchisteia, that is, the hierarchy of kin relations which (on the
father's side) determine the laws of inheritance. (Thus the part¬
ners are at least likely to be known to each other.) This offers
some protection to the property of the lineage against repeated
divisions and fragmentation. There are incest laws limiting this,
but they permit marriage even as close as half siblings. Agaiir, I
have mentioned that the epiklerate must be either married or dow¬
ered from within her anchisteia. At the level of the eupatridae
of course there is a wider and more long-standing principle of
inter-marriage at one's own social level. This practice is like¬
ly to differ a little from that of the lower strata, in exchang¬
ing property between lineages and in reinforcing the solidarity
of the upper strata. It would at least be a question of genos
rather than of anchisteia.
Legally, marriage is a private compact between oikoi. It is
not a function of the state or of the public religion, as I have
said before. Again, the definitions that distinguish it from con¬
cubinage (so far as there are any) are not wholly clear. But the
basis of legal marriage is the betrothal, made before witnesses,
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at which the purpose of hearing legitimate children is specified,
and the dowry is agreed. This ordinarily takes place shortly he-
fore the marriage itself. The marriage too is ceremonially mark¬
ed, culminating in the procession that takes the couple from the
wife's parental household to the marital household (and later
puts them to hed with each other); and so also is the day after
the marriage, on which the dowry is handed over. But all these
are family affairs, and the religious dimension of the ceremonies
is at the level of the household gods and shrines, not those of
the City. It should be realized that the crucial public ceremony,
political, legal and religious, is the son* s coming of age. It is
then, not at his birth or at his parent's marriage, that his
right to citizenship is established. This will be discussed in a
later section.
The wife's dowry is set against her inheritance portion -
women's inheritance rights at Athens are quite restricted, as
will be discussed later. The dowry might be in property or in
cash. It is intended for the girl's maintenance throughout her
life, and whoever controls her dowry is responsible for her main¬
tenance. For the dowry is not in her possession but in that of
her husband; if the marriage is dissolved, then it is passed to
whoever her kyrios now is - her father, brother, or other male
agnate. But the dowry cannot be used at their discretion or for
their own purposes; she has a definite right against it. Dowry is
not essential to marriage, but it is important, and kin have a
responsibility for it; indeed the provision of dowries for the
poor can be a public benefaction. Again, the size of dowries is a
controlling factor making for marriages at the same social level.
In addition to dowry, the woman may have a trousseau of personal
movable property, probably of small size.
Divorce is basically unrestricted, on the initiative of the
husband or, initially, of the wife's father; he however loses the
right to dissolve the marriage when the first child is born. As
to the wife's right to divorce, formally she can do so freely, by
presenting a written deposition before the polemarch magistrate.
In practice however, women were largely illiterate and largely
secluded, as will be seen, so that there are real difficulties
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here, and besides, the woman must have somewhere to go. In effect,
one can assume that she would have to have the support of her
male kin. It should be noted that in the event of adultery the
man must divorce his wife; he has no choice in this. Also, a re¬
cognized cause for divorce is the wish to marry an epiklerate,
especially a rich one. Against this, regardless of any question
of initiative or fault, the divorced wife's dowry is never sub¬
ject to confiscation oiv fine. It is always handed over intact to
her new kyrios.
In the event of dissolution of marriage, whether through
divorce or widowhood, the wife will return to her family of orig¬
in. Her dowry is her maintenance. Her children however will re¬
main with her husband or with his kin, and if she is pregnant at
the time of dissolution, this child too will be handed over some
time after birth. Moreover, the wife does not have a right of
access to her children: they are her husband's children, not hers.
As against this, remarriage is common; the divorced or widowed
woman does not expect to stay single. However, her marriage again
will be arranged.
Within the household the wife is mistress, despite her youth
(especially relative to her husband). It is possible that her
husband's mother may also be in the household, but the basic fam¬
ily is nuclear, and it is the wife who shares with the husband in
the household cult, who controls the slaves and young children
and girls, allocates work and materials, and holds the keys to
the storerooms. Commonly however the husband will keep her under
his tutelage in these matters for the first year or two of their
marriage - perhaps till after their first child is born. But it
is in the above terms that the wife's role in the household is to
be seen: even the poorest families are likely to have had a slave
housemaid, and the bulk of housework and of childcare are so far
as possible devolved to slaves. The wealthier will even employ
wet-nurses, in preference to breast-feeding their babies themsel¬
ves. Among the most important household duties are spinning and
weaving: the wife will engage in this and also teach it to her
daughters. Bread is bought, though most other cooking is done at
home. But the wife's functions are centrally to bear children -
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not to raise them -, to oversee the workforce - not to do house¬
work herself and to be chatelaine of the household's stores
and contents. But with this, Athenian house structure is defined
by a strongly marked separation of public quarters and women's
quarters, and women are confined to the latter - possibly even
locked in at night by the kyrios.
In keeping with this, the position of women in the community
beyond the household is negligible. An exception must be made
here for the thetes women, who must sell their wares in the agora.
But above this level women seem to have been largely secluded.
Even shopping was dealt with by the menfolk or by slaves. And all
public life in terms of political, legal and military affairs was
for men only. Only the religious festivals and processions involv¬
ed the citizen women in the life of the City. It is not certain
how far this includes the drama - this was performed at the fest¬
ivals of Dionysus. Women may have attended the tragedy but not
the comedy. In private life, women might visit kin or neighbours,
especially for the birth of a child. Again, drawing water was
women's work, and the wells might have been meeting places for
women. Also there are women's public baths, though these have
nothing of the place in social life that they have at Rome.
Broadly, however, although the dictum in the speech that Thucyd-
ides constructs for Pericles (Thucydides 1962 p 122), that a wom¬
an should so conduct herself, that nothing is said of her for good
or for ill, is usually quoted out of context (it referred only to
the expression of their grief for the dead, on that one occas¬
ion), it does seem an apt generalization: that beyond the poorest
stratum, Athenian women had no place in communal or public life.
In keeping with this also, the domestic household is not a
centre of social life. On the contrary, social life is conducted
where men meet: in the agora, at gymnasia, etc. Men were members
of thiasai (dining clubs), and would eat and meet with their
friends there rather than at home, where only women, children and
slaves ate together. Otherwise, if the domestic home were used,
it would be the public quarters (literally, the men's quarters),
while the womenfolk remained in the women's quarters. Wives neith¬
er played the hostess nor accompanied their husbands as guests.
Where "there was female company, it took professional form: flute-
girls, dancing girls and hetaerae. But symposia - dinner parties
- would often go into talk on public affairs, or (what was relat¬
ed) into sophistry or philosophy or other cultural matters, which
were assumed to be beyond the competence of women. It is a strong¬
ly marked characteristic of Athenian society that men and women
are not companions to each other, especially within the citizenry
and within marriage. This colours the pattern of family relations,
and also of sexual relations, both with hetaerae and with homo¬
sexual love. Again, I have pointed earlier to the contrast be¬
tween splendid public buildings and cramped and squalid resident¬
ial streets and houses.
All this is to deal with the citizenry, and with the proviso
that for the thetes level arrangements must have differed some¬
what. This leaves metics and slaves to be considered. For the
former indeed, I have suggested that the principle "when in Rome
do as the Romans do" held, at least for ordinary families. Howev¬
er, it should be remembered that hetaerae were often metics; and
indeed, a brothel or an inn (often little different) is a house¬
hold too. But to turn rather to slaves, many male slaves were at
the silver mines at Laureion; as against which the usual house¬
hold slave was female, though there were also male house-slaves.
The Athenians did not encourage sexual relations between their
slaves; on the contrary, they tended to lock up their female
slaves in the women's quarters, on the same basis as their wives
and daughters. On the other hand, sexual relations between the
free men of the household and the slave-girls were taken for
granted. Indeed, given that adult sons were remaining as single
dependants in their fathers' households until age 30, such relat¬
ions were favoured, and the son might be bought a slave-girl
specifically for this purpose. This is one of the forms of con¬
cubinage; as I have said earlier, the children (if any) would
usually be freed. Presumably at marriage the girl too would be
given her freedom - for these relationships were often emotion¬
ally committed. Indeed, in the 4th century especially some citiz¬
ens appear to have preferred these relationships to citizen marr¬
iage, and there is little question that emotional warmth is the
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reason (this can also he seen, much more clearly, at Rome). How¬
ever, this is not the only source of concubinage. More will be
said on this later.
This is for the city households. For the country, less can
be said, although slaves do not seem to have been much used in
agriculture. But generally the position of female slaves in coun¬
try households is unlikely to have been different from the town;
the Athenians did not typically use female labour in the fields,
except perhaps at harvest time, when extra labour was likely to
be on temporary hire. For slaves, a greater difference is likely
to have been for those in the city practising their crafts indep¬
endently and living away from their owners. In most respects,
these would simply be part of the urban poor. But both because
almost all crafts are male work - therefore such slaves are male
- and for poverty (slaves have no state pay of course), it is
hard to envisage slave families in this location. Rather these
men will have formed transient relations with prostitutes - the
only equivalent female craft, and one with little scope for preg¬
nancy and motherhood. To an extent, this is also likely to have
held for the poorer element of the metics, though they, should be
paid for their military service. Broadly, then, it is only in
regard to the citizen element of the urban poor that Athens is
atypical in providing the conditions in which they can maintain
dependants and raise families. For the rest, as in most ancient
City-states, this was not generally possible.
Metics pay the metic tax, and they have no political-legal
citizenship; they must have a citizen sponsor, a prostates, to
act for them and answer for them. A freed slave became a metic,
his (or her) former owner his prostates. But the duties of freed
slave to former owner are limited, indeed may be non-existent.
Patron-client relations are not really a feature of Athenian soc¬
iety. More important are private associations, such as the dining
clubs (thiasai) mentioned earlier, and the phratries. These last
were, as I have said, disengaged from the political macro-struct¬
ure by the reforms of Cleisthenes, which now based the phylae on
the demes; again, if formal links had subsisted between the phra-
try and the genos, these are now lost (genoi being limited to the
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eupatrid lineages). But the phratries remained important: in par¬
ticular, they kept account of marriages and births and comings of
age, so that the evidence of the phratry could he important if
there was a legal challenge to one's right to citizenship. (The
unrightful exercize of citizenship was punishable with enslave¬
ment.) Yet it was generally to one's demesmen that one turned for
testimony as to one's character in legal proceedings. The force
of these points will be seen more clearly later when the legal
system is discussed. But the central point is that Athens has no
state prosecutor and limited policing arrangements: the legal
system functions on the basis of citizens* self-help. In this, it
is important to have friends or kin who will act to protect one
and see that everything is done legally.
As to actual kinship, the basic structure, as indicated be¬
fore, is the anchisteia. This seems to centre on one's siblings
and half-siblings and their descendants - in the case of half-
siblings, common father is considered before common mother- -; and
it extends out as far as either children of cousins or children
of second cousins - it is not certain which. For inheritance pur¬
poses the anchisteia is only reckoned agnatically, but for other
purposes no distinction seems to be made between agnates and cog¬
nates. These purposes would include for example vengeance in the
case of homicide. Again, provision of dowries or burial of the
dead would be provided by the anchisteia, and as I have mention¬
ed, marriages are often within the degrees of the anchisteia, in
order to protect property against fragmentation. However, it
should not be thought that because here is a structure, the Ath¬
enians must have done everything on the basis of it. Even legal
self-help groups and supporters might be drawn from one's phrat¬
ry, deme, neighbours (one does not necessarily live in the deme
where one is registered), or just friends. The anchisteia is more
important as a set of conceptions built into the law than as a
blueprint for actual acting groups of people.
In all these matters - prostates relations, private associa¬
tions, kinship - the central point to grasp is that the division
between public affairs and the private household remains absol¬
ute, and that public affairs are the domain of men only. This
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holds at the level of the local community as much as at that of
the state. Women are confined to the domestic sphere and are kept
within the authority of their menfolk, with little qualification.
So far as this is softened, it is as much at the level of the
state - religious festivals and processions, even the written
approach to the polemarch for divorce - as at the level of the
community - mainly the wife's continuing relations with her kin,
and presumably some informal contacts with neighbours. The sit¬




Men marry about age 30; women about age 15* The purpose of
marriage is specified as the procreation of legitimate children,
and pregnancy and childbirth will typically come soon after marr¬
iage. Having been brought up in a small nuclear family, where the
slaves do not usually have families, the girl's knowledge of her
own biology may well be limited. On the other hand, since the age
of marriage is near that of puberty, there is no obvious reason
to withhold knowledge, and Greek mythology draws heavily on them¬
es of sex and fertility. On the whole, it does not appear that
Athenian girls were wholly ignorant or misinformed, though they
may have been naive. Again, the young wife is mistress of her own
household; she is not under the authority and supervision of the
resident female kin of her husband, though it is possible that
her mother-in-law is in the house. If she is initially under sup¬
ervision, it is likely to be that of her husband. But she is rel¬
atively isolated, even from her own female kin, moreover the fe¬
male slaves are her husband's rather than her own, and also may
not be very fluent in Greek. On the whole, the young wife does
not have much positive female support, nor good access to depend¬
able information.
Childbirth itself is something which does involve female kin
and neighbours. These will include an experienced midwife who will
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assist at the birth. On the other hand, this is apparently remote
from the physician's profession, and pregnancy and childbirth are
unlikely to have actual medical supervision. Childbirth takes
place lying down in bed, a position and location which emphasize
the woman* s passivity. There will certainly have been both infant
and childbed mortality, but their rates cannot be assessed.
The child's birth is publicly announced at once, by display¬
ing on the doorposts of the house a laurel wreath if the child is
male, a strip of wool if female. But it is not until five days
later for a boy, seven for a girl, that the father normally acc¬
epts the child. Five days after that, the child is named, and the
mother's post-natal purification is completed. It is not certain
whether exposure was practised at classical Athens, but formally
at least the father seems to have had the right to decide whether
the child should be exposed or raised, and also to have been the
one to name the child. For the child is part of his lineage; as
noted earlier, it is he who keeps custody of the children if the
marriage is dissolved. The wife will not even keep a right of
access. The basic orientation is to the perpetuation of the hus¬
band' s oikos.
Young children are in the overall care of their mother, and
are kept in the women's quarters. This lasts until the age of 6
or 7 for the boy, after which he passes into his father's hands;
for the girl, it lasts until her marriage. The boy's education is
the father's resposibility, but it is the mother who sees to the
girl's, and who oversees her conduct. But in actuality, the bulk
of child-care is the work of slaves - even the poorest households
will have one or two domestic slaves, whose duties will include
these functions. The better off will also use wet-nurses, rather
than breastfeed their babies themselves. These may be slave or
free, but in either case are likely to come from beyond the house¬
hold - that is, to be brought in for the duration of their con¬
tract. Typically the relations between wet-nurses, and childcare
slaves generally, and their charges were warm and enduring. But
the mother's emotional involvement with her children is likely to
have been limited, though possibly less so with her daughters.
The wife's function, as I have remarked, is to bear children, not
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to raise them. Yet divorce never became as casual at Athens as it
did at Rome.
Slave families are not typical for Athens, but there were
certainly families based on concubinage. Here the pattern of
mother-child relations is likely rather to have followed that of
wet-nurse and childcare slaves with their charges, for the relat¬
ionship is more secure: the children, being illegitimate (and
usually free) are not part of the father's lineage, and whatever
property settlements are involved will be in terms of bequests
not of inheritances. The greater (and more uncomplicated) emot¬
ional warmth here is, as with the sexual relationship itself,
apparently the major attraction.
Athenian families are small: typically 2-3 children. This
is general to all classical Antiquity, and the kinds of reasons
for it have already been discussed. But the means by which the
limitation is achieved is another matter, in which it must be
remembered that what is being considered is not the number of
children the wife bears, but the number of legitimate children
the husband raises. There are then four obvious ways of limiting
family size: infanticide, exposure, contraception and abortion.
For the first two, I have already commented that in Antiquity
children are generally exposed, with a fair chance of being found
and raised, rather than actually killed outright (or thrown to
the dogs, as apparently in the Ancient Near East), and also that
we cannot be sure whether this was practised at classical Athens.
However, probably prostitutes and similarly placed women did have
to abandon their babies. This might (logically at least) be the
background for some wet-nurses, though the preference is general¬
ly for a woman of good character not an ex-prostitute.
As to contraception and abortion, there are again difficult¬
ies, for our main sources are medical and similar texts, and this
may not be wholly appropriate. In the first place, Athens is not
a centre for Greek medicine; the Ionian islands of Cos and Cnidos
are the centres. Secondly, classical Greek medicine is largely a
matter of trying to relate the subjective report of symptoms to
the systems of natural philosophy, without engaging in dissection.
Its anatomy and physiology then are limited, and its gynaecology
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is frankly eccentric. Only briefly at Alexandria in Hellenistic
times does a true medical science appear in Antiquity. The best
that can be said is that Athenian citizen men do not seem to have
wanted contraception and abortion for their wives. On the other
hand, there will certainly have been a lore among midwives and
prostitutes on contraception and abortion methods. As with Egypt¬
ian medicine, this lore could have had strong empirical elements.
Beyond this, there are sexual practices that do not lead to
pregnancy, for example anal or oral intercourse. It seems clear
that the Athenians used these whether or no with their wives. But
it seems hard to avoid the view that on the whole, Athenian men
adjusted their sexual intercourse with their wives to the needs
of procreation, and otherwise used other women, especially prost¬
itutes. This will be taken up in a later section.
Maturation
Families were small: 2-3 children in a nuclear household,
with slaves but probably without slave children. Babies were
swaddled; this might suggest something about cultural attitudes,
though it presumably has no bearing on personality development.
For the first years, boys and girls seem to have been little dif¬
ferentiated, apparently sharing the same toys, games and pets.
They are cared for by slaves and kept in the women* s quarters,
under the overall care of their mother. Sexual differentiation
comes in the 6th year, when the boy is handed over to his father's
care, and starts school. The girl meantime continues at home, in
the care of her mother in the women's quarters.
Greek education has a complex history, but only some basic
points need to be presented here. Boys go first to grammar school;
there they are taught reading and writing, poetry (especially
Homer) and mythology, music (especially the lyre), and dancing -
display-dancing, that is, not dancing with a partner. Physical
training comes at a later stage, in adolescence. This takes place
at the gymnasium, and is where the boy acquires the basis of his
later military skills as a soldier. Principally this means as a
hoplite: it is not clear how far down the social scale education
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extended, "but it probably did not include the urban poor, either
at gymnasium or grammar school. Literacy even among men seems to
have been well short of universal. .
There is a higher level of intellectual education that ent¬
ers Athens in the mid-5th century. On the one side, it comprises
teaching in the citizen skills of public speaking, often taught
by alien intellectuals (sophists); on the other side, there is an
Athenian response of critical analysis of such speeches and the
issues they deal with. These, as rhetoric and philosophy, event-*"
ually became the two pillars of Graeco-Roman education. Initially
however the Athenians were rather hostile. Mainly, this higher
education was taken up by (or aimed at) young adults-, that is,
young men in their twenties. However, there were often paedagogic
relationships between this age-group and adolescents at the gym¬
nasia, introducing them into citizen affairs: this is the classic
location of Athenian homosexuality. I will return to this in the
next section.
At age 18, the father introduces his son into his phratry,
at a ceremony called the apatouria; and he is also registered as
a citizen with his deme. After a year as an ephebes, the young
man becomes liable for military service. But he is still a depend¬
ant in his father* s household, under his father* s authority.
The son will have sexual relationships, with prostitutes or
hetaerae or with a concubine, a slave-girl in his father's house
(with his father's consent). But not until age 30 does he marry
and come into his inheritance, taking over his father's oikos or
founding his own. And only at age 30 does he acquire Assembly
rights, to vote, speak, hold office, and so on, and become a full
adult citizen.
At the level of craft skills, training is mostly by induct¬
ance into the workshop, whether as child of the family, apprent¬
ice or slave. The workshop and the household were generally litt¬
le differentiated, and free and unfree labour worked side by side
indifferently. But much of the recruitment of the City's crafts¬
men came from the influx of trained and skilled slaves. It must
be said that prostitution probably recruits in these ways too, at
least at its more basic levels. The brothel or inn is simply a
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workshop/household, arid the prostitute an artisan. The education
of the hetaera however might "be a different matter. But the cit¬
izen girl should "be considered "before taking this up.
Girls remain at home in the women's quarters, and in their
mother's care, until marriage. That is, they pass directly from
childhood into adulthood. Their education in this time is limited,
above all to spinning and weaving. They might learn something
about household management and the control of slaves by observat¬
ion, and they might be told something about childoare, and about
their own biology. Again, they must have some knowledge of myth¬
ology, to take part in the City's religion - festivals and pro¬
cessions. In particular, Artemis guards women's lives and funct¬
ions: childhood, virginity, menstruation, childbirth, sickness
and death. The girl must then learn something about this. However
literacy among women was probably rare. Even so, the paradox
should be grasped, that the control of a big household demands
literacy in a way that the Assembly does not.
The girl's marriage is about age 15; menarche is probably
about age 13. Whatever knowledge she has, the girl will be a vir¬
gin. On the eve of her marriage, she dedicates her childhood toys
and clothes to Artemis, and her childhood ends.
Hetaerae are often metics: Corinth and Cyprus are the two
great centres of prostitution in the Greek World, not Athens. Yet
girls (usually slaves) are also brought up to become hetaerae,
perhaps foundlings or bought as children, with the purpose of
enabling the madarn-hetaera to retire. In some ways, the education
of these girls resembles that of citizen boys, especially in
terms of dancing and music (though here this means the cithara,
flute and voice). There might also be some knowledge of literate
culture, though this might rather be acquired by an older woman.
"Hetaera" means "companion"; there was little companionship be¬
tween husband and wife. The hetaera was also taught social deport¬
ment and conduct; indeed one senses a certain resonance here with
the upbringing of the citizen girl, for Athenian men apparently
liked shyness and naivete in their sexual partners (this shows
also in homosexual love). But above all the hetaera is a sexual
companion; she will be taught skills of lovemaking, and probably
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also of fertility control. The madam's ultimate ambition may be
to sell the girl, or at least to let a patron buy her freedom»
There will be more on these matters in later sections»
Sexuality
Men marry about age 30, to girls about age 15« The man will
already have sexual experience, for example with prostitutes; the
girl will be a virgin, and although not necessarily wholly ignor¬
ant of sexual matters, is probably fairly naive. These points I
have already discussed. But the quality of the sexual relation¬
ship in marriage, so far as it can be assessed, is probably
grounded less on these matters directly than on the location of
marriage in the legitimate perpetuation of the lineage and the
citizen body, subject to the pressures on fertility discussed
earlier: there must be children, but not too many. I have suggest¬
ed that the basic way in which Athenian men achieved this was by
not using their wives as their main sexual outlet, but orienting
the marital sexual relationship to the needs of procreation. This
does not necessarily mean that no sexual harmony was established,
but rather that it would tend to be of brief duration, lasting
for the first year or two only (perhaps until the first pregnan¬
cy). Beyond this, husbands would have relations with prostitutes
or hetaerae. It seems that generally, husband and wife did not
sleep together, but the menfolk would often sleep in the public
(men's; rooms of the house. However, there seems to be no denial
of the existence of the wife's sexuality: no conception of femin¬
ine "purity31. There is a public interest in the marital sexual
relationship: in the event of adultery, for example, the man must
divorce, and any citizen can prosecute the wife's lover. Again,
the husband of the epikleros must have intercourse with her at
least thrice per month (incidentally, that figure surely says
something about the expected frequency of sexual intercourse in
marriage). The rituals of marriage entail strong pressures to the
defloration of the bride on the wedding night, indicating that
their sexual relationship is not simply their own affair.
Adultery at Athens means sexual intercourse with any woman
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within another man's kyreia. This could include his wife, daugh¬
ter, sister, or even widowed mother, or again, a concubine living
in his household. The woman is publicly disgraced - if his wife,
he must divorce her - and the man may be killed on the spot, or
prosecuted before the Assembly. In face of this, and given the
seclusion of women, there is limited scope for love-affairs be¬
tween citizens. As to women indeed, rape and seduction are little
distinguished; seduction is considered the greater crime in that
it corrupts the woman's mind as well as her body (and may put the
husband's property as well as his progeny at risk). But both are
crimes against the husband, and neither exonerates the woman her¬
self. (The oikos being a religious community, it would be sacri¬
lege for a stranger, that is, an illegitimate child, to offer
sacrifices to the ancestors or to the household gods.) As to men,
extra-marital sexual relations are with concubines or hetaerae,
or with other men. There is besides of course the more or less
casual use of the household slave-girls.
Concubine, hetaera and prostitute rather form a continuum.
Concubinage may be difficult to legally distinguish from marriage,
as I have argued earlier, but as a sexual relationship it is dis¬
tinguished by its private and voluntary character and therefore
the absence of all the pressures on marriage discussed above. The
girl might be citizen, metic or slave; she might be taken by arr¬
angement with her family on terms essentially similar to those of
marriage, including a dowry. Generally the understanding seems to
be that the relationship is for the procreation of free children;
this and common household distinguish the concubine from the het¬
aera and the prostitute. But indeed, the girl may have been a
hetaera or a prostitute, sold by her owner or consenting as a
free person herself. It could be the ambition of a hetaera or a
prostitute to become a concubine, for the sake of security and
love; again, it could be the ambition of those who brought up
such girls to sell them as concubines. But in truth there is a
lack of hard knowledge as to concubinage, and some of the points
above are hard to reconcile with the slave-girl bought for the
young man of the house. There is, then, more than one category of
concubinage; it is part of a continuum.
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As to prostitution, the hetaera and the porne should he dis¬
tinguished, though again this is a continuum (and there are many
Greek terms for prostitutes). "Hetaera" is literally "companion";
"courtesan" is the conventional translation. The term indicates
a degree of cultural refinement, though the companionship in
question is certainly sexual: the evidence of literary anecdote
should be taken with the orgy scenes of the vase-painters. As
against this, the porne is the common prostitute of the brothels,
inns and streets, offering simply sexual intercourse, and probab¬
ly to a less refined clientele. Generally the clientele of the
hetaerae were more affluent, while that of the pornai were the
urban poor (including slaves) and visiting sailors. Neither
clientele, it should be noted, specifically includes the young.
In terms of background and status, hetaerae were often metics, or
the slaves of metic hetaerae; important centres from or at least
through which they might have come are Corinth and Cyprus. Pornai
are more likely to have been slaves, often from the north-east:
Thrace, Phrygia and Scythia. Yet there are probably also poor
citizen girls here. Exposure of baby girls is a classic source
for recruitment into prostitution. Graeco-Roman comedy from Men-
ander onwards uses the theme of the young man in love with a
courtesan that he cannot marry, until the amulet she has worn
since babyhood is found to prove that she is of citizen birth.
But this begins just after our period ends, and as I have said
earlier it is not clear whether this happened at Athens itself.
After the ending of debt-slavery most of Athens' slaves come from
predation abroad.
Prostitution will be discussed again, under the head Sexual
Divisions in the Economy. But considered here in the realm of
sexual relationships, it is perhaps the compatibility with court¬
ship that should be stressed, for the young hetaera at least.
This could lead to her becoming a concubine, or having her free¬
dom bought and being set up in her own establishment as her pat¬
ron' s mistress. From this she might progress to running her own
establishment, and raising and training girls herself. But the
hetaera's household is basically a brothel; hetaerae do not mere¬
ly accompany their clients to dinner parties. Again, the activit-
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ies at brothel and inn are probably not much different, even if
the company is less refined. As I have said, this is a continuum.
Homosexuality, as 1 have indicated earlier, is most charact¬
eristically a relationship between a young man in his twenties
and an adolescent boy, and is directed to forming the boy's char¬
acter. This indeed is fairly general in archaic Greek civilizat¬
ion, the forms being adapted to local conditions. There is a dis¬
tinct ethos here, distinguishing the roles of lover and beloved;
for the latter, to be pursued was cause for pride, but to surren¬
der was cause for shame - at least, to surrender too easily.
Again, the lover would give his beloved gifts, but a citizen who
prostituted himself lost his citizenship. Yet the affair did come
to consummation. The mode of sexual intercourse was interfemoral
(between the thighs); this should be a favour that the beloved
grants to his lover, while making a point of remaining unmoved
himself. The lover's role was also not unequivocal: he should be
moved by love and beauty, not simply by sexual desire. But indeed,
the location of homosexuality in Athens is equivocal. There are
other forms, for example male prostitution; and men who were
preferentially homosexual rather than bisexual, and. kept this
orientation into later life, might be regarded with contempt.
Older men were kept away from watching boys at the gymnasia.
With this, it is possible that the homosexual culture at Athens
was a factor of eupatrid discontent with the democracy, and an
admiration of and desire for alliance with Sparta - despite the
rivalry and even wars between the Cities.
Of lesbianism, virtually nothing is known. (Sappho herself
lived in archaic times, on an Aolian island; besides, very little
is known about her.)
The treatment of sex in Athenian culture is not altogether
easy to assess. There are strong themes of sexuality and fertil¬
ity in the mythology and religion, and this shows in for example
monumental sculpture on the temples, as well as in the tragic
drama. Yet as I have said earlier, much of this is grounded in an
older and little understood civilization, and the classical Ath¬
enians were not wholly at ease with it. As against this, the com¬
edies of Aristophanes are sexually outspoken, largely for purposes
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of political satire. There is little love-poetry. There is how¬
ever a discovery of the female nude, especially in the 4th cent¬
ury, and also an interesting evolution in vase-painting, from
general orgy scenes to scenes of isolated couples, shown with
some tenderness.
In religion, it might be specified that Aphrodite is the
goddess of sexual intercourse, rather than of "love". She is ass¬
ociated with Adonis, in what seems to be basically the same myth
as links Demeter and Persephone with Iacchus/Dionysus - these are
the deities of the Eleusinian Mysteries. But it is the transience
of their love, and its lack of issue, that is emphasized here.
Aphrodite's cult is especially favoured by prostitutes and con¬
cubines: she can probably be taken as their own self-image.
The sexual ambience of Athenian culture I have already tou¬
ched upon, both in regard to hetaerae and to homosexual relat¬
ions. Athenian men seem to have enjoyed pursuing naive and shy
partners, who surrendered with reluctance (but did surrender).
Beyond this, they seem to have regarded sex as physically uncom¬
plicated pleasure, but love as something to be both desired and
feared. There is a curious stress, especially in homosexual re¬
lations, on keeping one's self-control. In heterosexual relations
at least there seems to have been an acceptance that even an un-
free partner must be willing. For example, the game of kottabos
(throwing the wine dregs) played with hetaerae at parties was
used to give them their choice of partner. There is no sado-maso¬
chism evident in Athenian sex (and bestiality is a theme of myth¬
ology only). But on the whole, the Athenians seem to have found
it difficult to reconcile mutual love and sexual enjoyment; the
lack of physical mutuality in their homosexual love is as strik¬
ing as their lack of emotional mutuality in heterosexual inter¬
course. This is ultimately due, I judge, to the reproductive
pressures on citizen marriage, and was best met ultimately in
terras of concubinage. The 4th century especially shows this.
Aggression
Classical Athens was strongly oriented to war even by the
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standards of the Ancient Civilization: warfare is continuous
throughout the classical period. What is more, the welfare of the
common people was dependent on war: state pay for military ser¬
vice and civic duties, derived from booty and tribute. Too, war
is directly or indirectly the source of slaves. As such, war
victimizes women, as well as excluding them. Military training
itself is not merely a matter of weaponcraft but also of infantry
tactics, manoevring in formation. Also of course there is galley
rowing. Some Cities would teach their women basic weapon skills,
for the last defence of the City in the event of siege and sack¬
ing; Athens however never did this. But there was nowhere any
question of women taking the field, or to the seas. At Athens in
fact men seem to have monopolized virtually all physical sports
and games.
Citizenship, then, as a nexus of political-legal rights and
military service is a realm which completely excludes women. Only
as members of the religious community of the polis do they have
an active citizenship, attending the festivals and processions.
This is what the guardianship (kyreia) of women means: that a
woman is life-long in the authority of some man, father, husband,
brother, adult son, who must act for her in all public matters.
This includes control of her dowry, and of any property she may
have, and also of any economic transactions she undertakes be¬
yond the oikos involving values beyond one medimnos. This is not
a negligible amount, perhaps half a week* s grain for a household,
but it is interesting that the reckoning should be made in terms
of natura not of money. All this will be discussed in a later
section. Besides this, the woman's guardian (kyrios) must act for
her in any legal matter: a woman cannot approach the Assembly in
her own person, other than exceptionally by special invitation.
What access a woman may have to the magistrates is les"s clear.
The approach to the polemarch for divorce has already been men¬
tioned, and thetes women traders and shopkeepers must have deal¬
ings with the magistrates who oversee the market. But generally
it seems that women could not deal with magistrates directly, but
only through their kyrios. Again, women seem to have had no app¬
eal against their kyrios' conduct to either magistrates or Assem-
bly, but would have to approach their kin on the matter. However
a woman with no kin would approach the magistrates to have a kyr-
ios appointed for her. As against this, it is interesting that a
metic woman with no male kin in Athens would be "kyrios of her¬
self" - though she would have a prostates, of course. Even so, it
is questionable how far the Athenians really believed women nat¬
urally incapable; these were simply the local laws.
Ancient City-states do not really separate their political
and legal systems. The Assembly (or Council) is both parliament
and law court, and the magistrates are both leaders and law off¬
icers - though trials are decided by juries not by judges. At
Athens juries were drawn on a quorum basis from the Assembly,
though the Areopagus Council dealt with homicides. Again, ancient
City-states have no state prosecution service. Instead, while
certain categories of cases can only be brought by those affected,
others can be brought by any citizen - the citizen prosecutor
(sometimes called an "informer")* This gives a distinction rough¬
ly equivalent to that between private and public law, or perhaps
between civil and criminal law. I have mentioned earlier that a
man who committed adultery could be prosecuted by any citizen. It
might be added that Athenian law, though less sophisticated (and
certainly less well known) than Roman, does undergo some system¬
atic development, especially at the end of the 5th century, when
a codification of the law is undertaken. But Athenian law is al¬
ways much more under the influence of the forensic orator than of
the jurisconsult.
Women had no capability to bring cases under this system,
neither for themselves nor as citizen prosecutors. On the other
hand, cases might be brought for them by a citizen prosecutor
where appropriate, not only by their kyrios. The testability of
women seems to be exceptional, although the testimony of female
slaves - extracted, like all slaves' testimony, under torture -
seems to have been accepted. As to the criminousness of women, in
some cases at least this was for the jury-trial; there are cer¬
tainly known prosecutions of hetaerae. But the usual penalties
for crime, fines and exile (imprisonment was not used), do not
seem appropriate to citizen women. Adultery seems to have been
dealt with privately, so far as the woman was concerned. Her pub¬
lic punishment is to be barred from the religious festivals and
forbidden to wear ornaments in public, and she can be assaulted
with impunity if she violates these restrictions. But although it
is hard to be clear on this, even though women's conduct is ex¬
pected to be controlled within the household, their menfolk do
not seem to have had the right of life or death over them.
Athenian law involves elements of self-help, to bring an
accused person before a magistrate, or to hold him while a magis¬
trate is brought. This might involve entering another citizen's
house by force - or forcibly preventing such entry. The role of
the police (the Scythian archers) in this was very limited.
Again, since the laws provided that a foreigner who stayed in the
City longer than a month without registering as a metic and tak¬
ing a prostates could be enslaved, or again, that anyone who
exercized citizen rights without being a citizen could be enslav¬
ed, kidnapping in the streets was not uncommon. The laws against
kidnapping and false enslavement were most severe, but there was
a need for personal protection, in terms of citizens who were
prepared to act for one's protection. This need might be met by
friends, neighbours or kin; at Athens there is little scope for
patron-client relations, due presumably to the democracy. But
most important here-were the phratries, especially as they kept
records of births, marriages and comings of age, separate from
the citizen rolls kept by the demes. But there would be little
protection from these directions for women, of whatever status,
and the streets of Athens were not safe for women, especially by
night.
Rape in Athens is- considered a crime against the kyrios,
like seduction, from which indeed it is little distinguished: the
woman is not exonerated for her lack of consent. However, there
is also the law of hybris. This means something like "assault" or
"arrogance" - "treating a free man like a slave" has been sugg¬
ested, but this law protects slaves, and women, as well as free
men. It is a crime for which any citizen can prosecute, and it
carries the death penalty. This law is rather a 4-th century in¬
vention, and convictions may have been difficult in practice to
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get; perhaps it had a political purpose in curbing the arrogance
of aristocratic youth. But it could be used for example to pro¬
secute the rape of a metic woman. Probably however the Athenians
would consider that a prostitute or a slave could not be raped;
certainly these were sometimes temporarily abducted. (Yet as I
have argued earlier, the Athenians looked for sexual consent in
their partners. Abduction is not rape, though it is often the
sense that "rape" is given in classical Antiquity.)
A man who committed adultery could be killed there and then
by the kyrios if caught in the act. Otherwise the kyrios was en¬
titled to physically abuse him, short of wounding him with a
weapon, before the Assembly (pushing radishes up his anus was




Throughout our period, Athens is a democracy, save for two
brief oligarchic episodes during the Peloponnesian Wars that are
too short-lived to require consideration. There are developments
in the form of the democracy: after the Persian Wars, the older
Areopagus Council and the archon magistrates are increasingly
displaced in favour of the Proboula and the nexfer magistracies
drawn from it and from the Assembly itself; moreover the magis¬
tracies become open to the zeugetes. Again, after the Peloponnes¬
ian Wars there is the rise of the "demagogues" - leaders who lead
by speaking in the Assembly rather than by holding magisterial
office. But regardless of these changes, it remains a constant
factor that women are wholly excluded from the political system,
Councils, magistracies and Assembly together. This indeed is
probably universal to ancient City-states, and is a factor of the
military character of citizenship. Yet the Athenians are remark¬
able in that they did comment on this and discuss it. I will re¬
turn to this below.
The ancient City-state has no civil service: the magistrates
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perform all such functions directly themselves, with the assist¬
ance of a handful of public slaves. Taxation is mostly in the
form of leiturgies, that is, the rich undertake the relevant ser¬
vices. Actual money taxes are farmed (the Athenians say "sold")*
Public moneys are deposited in the temples. A small force of
slaves - the Scythian archers (theoretically 300) - comprise the
police force; their main duty is to keep order in the Assembly.
At the level of private administration, there seems to be a
clear-cut division that puts the woman in charge of the house¬
hold, and the man in charge of everything beyond the household -
most simply the fields, but also workshop or raining interests,
rented property, and so on. Athenian estates are not typically
very large or complex (nothing by Roman standards) and this, with
a comparative absence of women's property and a strict system of
guardianship of women, makes for a fairly straightforward situat¬
ion.
However there is another dimension to the matter: the polis
is a religious community. There is a religious dimension to cit¬
izenship, and so also there are priesthoods and priestesships.
There are two levels here, though due to the democratic character
of the City they are not wholly separated. There is the cult of
the patroness of the City herself, Athene, and her closest assoc¬
iates, Zeus and Apollo; and there are the cults of salvation, of
which the Eleusinian Mysteries are the most important. The festi¬
vals of Dionysus appear to link the two; these were the setting
of the Attic drama. For the state cults, that Athene was female
resulted in her having priestesses rather than priests, and in
women performing certain rites for her. But the priestesships
carried neither power nor wealth. For the Eleusinian Mysteries
the position is similar; the cult centres on the two goddesses
Demeter and Persephone, and they have priestesses, but without
influence. All these priestesships seem to have been monopolized
by certain eupatrid families. Generally, priestly office at Ath¬
ens is part-time, amateur and unpaid, though the temples themsel¬
ves have lands (rented out) for their upkeep. As to the festivals
of Dionysus, their use as settings for the drama may have result¬
ed in women being present at least for the tragedy, though the
■5 2&
issue is debated. The cult of Athene was for citizens only, but
the Eleusinian Mysteries were open to all, including metics and
slaves - and including women. The cults of other deities are
followed electively by different categories of people, for exam¬
ple on the basis of craft, as Aphrodite for prostitutes. Artemis
is followed by women generally. (However the functional division
of the pantheon is only one aspect of the matter; the different
gods are also, for example, the patrons of different Cities.)
The political exclusion of women at Athens is commented on
both in drama and in philosophy. These are both directly politic¬
al arts: drama as being performed at the City's religious festiv¬
als, under state patronage; philosophy as hostile (or at least
sceptical) aristocratic commentary on the democracy. Both are
inclined to look to Sparta. There is no point in trying here to
identify the specific sympathies of individual intellectuals -
Aristophanes seems particularly hard to classify. But what is in¬
teresting is the way that the issue of citizenship itself is seiz¬
ed as essential - ifhether for satiric, Utopian, or serious policy
purposes. Plato in particular focusses clearly on the question of
military service, and the training for military service: he re¬
gards it as essential for his Republic that women should share
these equally with men. It should be remembered here that back¬
ground to this is the Greek experience of founding colony Cities;
Plato is not just day-dreaming about impossible social change. In
a world that is not politically closed, he intends a state not a
commune. Again it is interesting that Aristotle responds to this
in commonsense terms, and in terms of the concrete realities of
actual City-states. That is, there is nothing of misogyny in his
response to Plato's "feminism". There is certainly creative miso¬
gyny in earlier Greek culture, especially Hesiod, but in classic¬
al Athens the force of this seems spent. Again, though some see
feminist sympathy especially in Euripides, I cannot see active
misogyny in any of the Attic dramatists. Possibly what is most
interesting of all is Aristophanes* treatment - ivhich surely sim¬
ply reflects that the citizenship of women is a matter for polit¬
ical satire. What he says about it is far less significant than
the fact that he talks about it at all.
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It is not obvious why women's citizenship should have been
up for discussion in this way. Certainly it is not due to action
on the part of women themselves, for at Athens (unlike Rome)
nothing of the kind occurs. On the whole, one judges that the
interest here, like the literature itself, is basically aristo¬
cratic: it looks to the role of (mainly aristocratic) women in
legend and to Sparta, a comparatively aristocratic society where
the role of women is far stronger than at Athens. And this surely
is the point: a narrower political community must give a more
positive role to its womenfolk, to compensate for its lack of
numbers, and an aristocracy (or an oligarchy) is, simply, a narr¬
ower political community than a democracy.
Economy
The basis of the Athenian economy, as with all the Ancient
Civilization, is the complex inter-relation of oikos and market
in a context of non-peaceful economic action. The specific form
this takes in classical Athens- is conditioned by a number of fac¬
tors. As a Plebeian City under democratic control, the oikos here
is typically not the estates of the great but the property endow¬
ment of the ordinary citizen, especially in land, houses, live¬
stock and slaves. This is compounded by the broad nature of the
democracy, based on naval power, and the sharing of public wealth
with the citizens among the urban poor, especially as pay for
military service and civic duties. It is also compounded by em¬
pire: by Athens' income from tribute and booty; and by the fact
that she imports rather than grows much of her foodstuffs. Like
all ancient Cities, Athens is a consumer, not a producer, and
while the securing of essential resources is a matter for foreign
policy, there is no commercial policy, for trade and finance are
in the hands of metics not citizens. In this situation, the ideal
of the citizen remains economic self-sufficiency and a degree of
leisure. Of this, the more substantial peasant may be the exemp¬
lar, but the urban poor of artisans, craftsmen and shopkeepers
who sell their wares in the market are not wholly excluded, un¬
less they are metics or slaves.
Against this "background., the discussion of sexual divisions
in the economy must start from citizenship: that is, from the
guardianship of women. In principle, this simply restricts the
field of competence of women's economic actions to the oikos. All
property that she owns, including her dowry, is controlled "by her
kyrios (though not small personal movable property), and she is
not permitted to transact "beyond the oikos beyond one medimnos'
worth - roughly a household's corn supply for half a week. That
this is reckoned in natura rather than in money again indicates
the restriction of women to the oikos, the realm of self-suffic¬
iency. Yet the rule does not mean quite what it says, for women,
at least thetes women, did transact on the market, and might well
exceed this limit. The point seems to be, then, not that women
are forbidden to transact beyond this value, but that the trans¬
action is not legally guaranteed: a woman cannot commit' her oikos
beyond this amount. The rule then is for the protection of the
lineage's patrimony. There are similar rules permitting the pub¬
lic control of a spendthrift or a madman - or one under the in¬
fluence of a woman (presumably a hetaera or concubine). Whether
this is due to women's supposed incompetence, or to possible con¬
flicts of loyalties between her husband and children and her kin
is not clear. But the historical background of class conflicts
and debt-slavery should be remembered.
As to property, for women this comes into three main categ¬
ories. All are based on inheritance, for women's chances to ac¬
quire property by transaction are very limited. First, then,
there is dowry; as indicated earlier, this basically takes the
place of the woman's inheritance portion. But secondly, inherit¬
ances to women do occur; the rules of intestate succession give
a hierarchy of degrees within the anchisteia, and although at
each level the men come before the women, even so, in the failure
of males females are considered before turning to the next level*
(Succession however is agnatic, thus a woman's property will re¬
vert to her agnatic kin.) The ownership of property by women then
is by no means unknown, though neither is it commonplace. Again,
in all these cases, the property is controlled by the woman's
kyrios, though she still has rights against it, and might expect
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to be consulted in decisions affecting it. In particular, as
indicated before, the woman has an inalienable and lifelong right
to be supported from her dowry (or by the kyrios who controls
it). The third category represents a further limiting factor: the
epiklerate. Here, the property owns the woman, and although she
transmits the ownership to her children she is not really its
owner herself. It might be noted that in all these matters the
metic woman may be in a slightly different case: if she has no
male kin in Athens, then she may be "kyrios of herself". Moreover
her ownership of slaves she has brought with her into; Athens, and
her right to sell or free them, is respected. (Slaves are of
course an important category of property.)
Within the oikos, women's economic functions are basically
focussed on the household itself, including basic household tasks
such as cleaning etc. Childcare is women's work; so also is food
preparation, though with the men eating publicly this will mostly
be for the women, children and slaves. Bread, especially in the
4th century, tends to be bought in. Fetching water from the well
is another important element of housework. And above all, spinn¬
ing and weaving are women's household work. Of course, the bulk
of all this will be done by slaves - most household slaves are
female - and an important element of the citizen wife* s work is
to oversee this, and to control the materials and supplies. It is
this, with spinning and iveaving, that should be main occupations
of citizen women.
In the country matters are probably not much different.
Women's labour is not much used in the fields except perhaps at
harvest time, and indeed slave labour is apparently not greatly
used in agriculture; rather temporary paid labour would be taken
on at need. The greatest bulk of male slaves is at the silver
mines, or else practising crafts and trades in the city on a
"living away" (i.e. from their master's household) basis.
In the market, most crafts and trades are male: work in met¬
al, stone, ceramics, wood, etc. This indeed is common to all the
Ancient Civilization. Women's work tends rather to follow the
pattern of the household: textile work of all kinds, for example
clothes-making and mending, laundering; or again the provision of
330
cooked food (including the taking of tread). Besides this, women
appear as shopkeepers and vendors, selling such things as perfum¬
es, garlands and garden produce - probably made or grown by them¬
selves. They might also sell the craft products made by their
menfolk, b'omen are cafe-keepers; also wet-nurses and mid-wives
(so far as the latter is a paid craft). It should be noted that
women in these functions might be citizen or metic, or (perhaps
more rarely) slaves. It should also be noted that there appears
to be virtually no scope either for women's entrepeneurship or
for women's literacy. Against this, selling in the agora must
have involved some direct contact with the City's magistrates.
Again, as noted earlier, the limit on women's transactions to the
value of one medimnos cannot have been observed in practice (esp¬
ecially not for wholesale purchases).
It is broadly against this background that prostitution has
to be seen. Discussing this earlier, I have pointed to the two
categories of hetaera and porne, though rather as poles of a con¬
tinuum. The hetaerae are rather companions to the more substant¬
ial, receiving them at their own homes or accompanying them as
guests, whereas the pornai are the .girls of the brothels and
inns, with a clientele of the urban poor, including slaves, and
(especially in the Piraeus) visiting sailors. It is to be noted
that neither category caters specifically for the young. In stat¬
us, hetaerae were often metics; if slaves, they might be the
slaves of metic hetaerae, brought in with them. Common origins
were Corinth and Cyprus (incidentally, temple prostitution is not
found at Athens and indeed is not a Greek practice, although it
was apparently found at these two places). Pornai were more like¬
ly to be slaves from the uncivilized north and east, though they
might also be poor Athenians. But these are only tendencies, not
hard and fast rules. Again, as pointed out before, hetaerae as
much as pornai sold sexual intercourse. Hetaera and porne are not
discrete categories.
The organization of prostitution, like all crafts in Antiqu¬
ity, is heavily conditioned by slavery. In this indeed it is an
area of female entrepeneurship, especially at the level of the
hetaerae, for these might take to raising and training girls for
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sale, either to become hetaerae or concubines. Possibly the sour¬
ces lay outside Athens, as I have discussed before. But indeed,
the picture is broadly common to prostitution everywhere: the
artisan's ambition is to buy a slave to take over his work and
keep him in his old age - evidence of the general lack of famil¬
ies among the urban poor. This is general to classical Antiquity.
But beyond this, owning brothels and owning prostitutes (i.e.
pornai) are both recognized forms of investment - though possibly
the latter is not wholly respectable. There were also state bro¬
thels at Athens. (Reputedly, these were created by Solon. The
role of Solon in resolving the class conflicts at Athens, and the
original location of prostitution in those class conflicts, should
be remembered.) Most commonly, the girl would probably rent a
room at a brothel or an inn, though in the latter case she might
be attached to the premises. The girl could solicit in the agora
or the streets; there is no reason to think there were closed
houses. Again, direct supervision of labour is not characteristic
of Antiquity; probably the slave-prostitute is "living away" from
her master, and will pay body rent to him. She will then work
independently under her own control on the same basis as the pro¬
stitute of citizen or metic status. Thus she will have some con¬
trol over her times, frequenoies and choice of client. Again, the
prostitute in Athens (as in Antiquity generally) is not apparent¬
ly typically subject to exploitation by pimps or bullies. Of
course, prostitution is not criminalized.
The hetaera will differ from the above mainly in working
from her own or her "mother* s" house. As to prices, this is al¬
ways difficult for Antiquity (i.e. all prices), but it appears
that sexual intercourse typically cost about the same as a day-
labourer' s wage - say 2 drachma. One might pay far more for an
outstanding hetaera of course. Also, prostitutes were taxed, at
the rate of one client's price per day. This tax was farmed. It
was a common fiscal resource in Antiquity.
There are also flute-girls and dancing-girls. These were
often foreign; troupes of them would travel the known world,
often slaves. At Athens, they would display for hire in the agora;
in the 4th century, their hire would be arranged by lot within a
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maximum price, rather than by auction. Their skills were real and.
were valued; this too is general to Antiquity. Yet at Athens they
do seem broadly assimilable to prostitution, probably in virtue
of the similar skills of hetaerae. Even so, there could be a dis¬
tinction: the price arranged with the owner is on the face of it
the price for their skills, and if there are also sexual favours,
these might have to be negotiated separately with the girls them¬
selves. This is an aspect of the ancient economy that I suspect
modernity regards too cynically.
Stratification
The complex inter-relation of oikos and market is again bas¬
ic to the stratificatory order of the ancient City-state, giving
on the one hand a range of political-legal statuses, on the other
a market location which tends in itself to be undifferentiated,
though this needs qualification. As to the status order, first is
the distinction of free and slave, then of citizen and metic, and
last, the grades within the citizenry. At Athens, this means the
Solonic classes, but for general sociological purposes, the Roman
terms, patrician, plebeian and proletarian, seem most useful. The
last of course reflects the market location itself. As to the
market, it has to be recorded that, while the market does not
really differentiate life chances in terras of occupations, yet it
may do so in terms of property or capital. Thus, ancient civiliz¬
ation does experience a phase of class struggle, in terms of the
conflicts over usury and debt-slavery. But beyond this phase, the
stratificatory conflicts of Antiquity are basically status con¬
flicts, over closure of the political community. In these terms,
as I have said, the proletarians - the market location - are one
status.
Given this, the basic relationship between sexual divisions
and stratification should be in terms of status, in which the
central question is the citizenship - the political-legal status
- of women as compared to men. Here clearly the difference be¬
tween the two sexes is absolute, as I have shown: the status dif¬
ference between male and female is comparable to that between
533
free and. slave. In classical Athens, there is no development on
this point: the situation stays constant throughout the period.
This difference of status clearly holds as much in the mar¬
ket as elsewhere, although as stated the market itself does not
seem to generate class differences. With this, there appears to
be a broad status-differentiation among women, in terms of the
oikos location versus the market location. The interest of this
focusses on its inter-relation with the status distinction among
women in terms of sexual-reproductive career, between the wife
and the prostitute or concubine. The question was: should the
thetes woman selling her craft wares or garden produce in the
agora be assimilated to the citizen wife in the oikos or to the
prostitute selling herself? In the event, the former course was
taken, but there was conflict over it at the Assembly (and in
Aristophanes)•
Although the Athenians gave critical consideration to women's
rights and women* s citizenship both in the drama and in philoso¬
phy, there was apparently no response to this on the part of wom¬
en themselves. For this, the isolation of women from each other
in the oikoi is one reason, but it does not hold for women in the
market. Here it is surely the lack of common status that is the
explanation: clearly the citizen shopkeeper would not make comm¬
on cause vrith the slave or metic prostitute over the question of
citizenship, and neither would the citizen and the slave wet-
nurses do so.
Conclusion
Classical Athens is the great window through which we see
Greek civilization and history, at least up to the end of class¬
ical times. Yet we have a wider and deeper awareness: some con¬
crete knowledge and certainly some cultural material from other
times and places. How then does the position of women in classic¬
al Athens fit generally with Greek civilization? The impression
is that in Dorian states like Sparta, women were much freer. As
to the Ionian states, the islands and Turkish coastline passed at
least for a time under Persian rule, but we do not know the posit-
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ion of women in Achaemenid Persia.* There is, however, a general
impression that the aristocratic past xtfas freer than the demo¬
cratic present. With this also, there is a good certainty that
the position of Greek women in the subsequent era of the Hellen¬
istic World - seen mainly through Alexandria - was much freer
than in classical times. In all, it is hard to avoid the viexv
that classical Athens marks a low point in women's history, even
by Greek standards. Why is this so?
The main points to make here are: first, the tightly integ¬
rated military-political character of the polis, which wholly
excludes women from citizenship; second, that in the polis, wom¬
en's position balances between the political community and the
oikos, so that exclusion from the one can to an extent be compen¬
sated by the importance of the other. It is, then, the democracy
and the empire of Athens, and the inter-relation between them
whereby empire permits extreme democracy inclusive of the urban
poor, that makes women's position in Athens so weak, for it is
the military income from the political community rather than the
domestic economy of the oikos that is the essential basis of cit¬
izenship and subsistence for much of the poorer citizenry. With
this, the compulsion of the aristocracy to form a common commun¬
ity with the ordinary citizens, practising conubium with them
rather than with the aristocracies of other Cities, yet a commun¬
ity exclusive of foreigners, metics and slaves, made for strong
controls on women's conduct and freedom, extending even to actual
seclusion. That is the price of a general citizenship.
As to development of women's position at classical Athens,
there does appear to be a little movement in the 4th century,
prior to the Macedonian conquest. This however centres not on
citizen marriage but on a preference for concubinage. It should
perhaps be considered with the characteristic 4th century devel¬
opments: the increasing- use of mercenaries in the army and the
fleets, and the increasing privileges (or reducing disprivileges)
*It should certainly not be assumed that this will compare with
the Greeks as the modern Middle East compares with the West. In
Antiquity, the contrasts usually run the opposite way, as the
studies in this thesis illustrate.
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offered to metics. In short, it is a blurring of the boundaries
of the political community. For this, the failure of Athens' wars
- above all the Peloponnesian Wars - is probably the underlying
cause. In the 4th century the polis survives, but it is overshad¬
owed by neighbouring kingdoms.
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Roman history, after shadowy beginnings, comes in four main
phases: the Early Republic (B.C. 510 - 202); the Late Republic
(B.C. 202 - 31); the Principate (B.C. 31 - 235 A.D.); and the
Dominate (284 A.D. onwards). Traditionally, we regard the Empire
as the period of the rule of the emperors, that is, the Principate
and the Dominate (and the 3rd century inter-regnum). However, the
imperium of the Roman people, Rome's possession of overseas prov¬
inces, starts from the second Punic War (B.C. 218 - 2C2). In this
chapter, it is the Late Republic and the Principate that are con¬
sidered.
After periodization, it is necessary to consider East and
West. In the East, Rome took over the Hellenistic kingdoms, Cit¬
ies of Greeks with (mostly) surrounding Asiatic subject populat¬
ions. Here, Rome enforced the separation of Greeks and Asiatics
and progressively took the Greeks into partnership. In the West,
Rome was mostly conquering barbarian lands, and settling them
with new Cities of Italian immigrants. Here the barbarians were
quickly incorporated and Romanized (as were also the few Cities
of Phoenicians). The Greek and Latin halves of the Empire were
always unalike, and though far less is known of the West in ab¬
solute terms, it is a much simpler and more unified situation.
This chapter considers the 'Western Empire only: the arena for
"women in specifically Roman society.
Roman history is complex, and the inter-relations of East
and West do have to be considered. Although the acquisition of
provinces around the Mediterranean gathers pace through the 2nd
century B.C., it is only in the 1st century B.C. that the provin-
ces in the East are finally institutionalized, and that the con¬
quest of N.W.Europe is undertaken. Critical figures here are Pom-
pey and Caesar, circa B.C. 70 - 50. But it is the impact of emp¬
ire on Italian society that has to be grasped. At the end of the
Early Republic, Rome was a City-state, structurally Plebeian in
type though oligarchic in character, dominating an alliance of
City-states that extended throughout peninisular Italy. The im¬
pact of empire was to destroy the balance between the social
strata, the balance within the ruling stratum, and the balance
between Rome and her Italian allies, leading to a century of pol¬
itical turmoil and civil war, from the tribunate of Tiberius
Gracchus (B.C. 133) to the final victory of Octavian/Augustus at
Actium (B.C. 31). The processes are complex. On the one side,
exploitation of the provinces brings the ruling stratum enormous
wealth, with which they build up vast estates in Italy, worked by
chained gangs of slaves; slaves made in the wars of conquest are
brought into Italy in great numbers for this and other service;
the citizen peasantry, ruined by constant military service and
denied legal protection of their land rights, are expropriated
and flee. On the other side, the expropriated peasantry come to
the cities, especially Rome itself, where they become an urban
mob supporting revolutionary politicians, or else raise war
against Rome for the Italian cities, or else become the military
following of popular ifarlords who promise them land. The resolut¬
ion of these processes comes through a mixture of foreign and
civil war. It takes the form of a massive emigration of Italians
into northern Italy and the western lands together with a univer¬
sal grant of Roman citizenship to all Italians, while the ruling
stratum continues a more limited exploitation of the Eastern
provinces and keeps a continued authority throughout the Empire;
and all this under the supervision of the popular warlord turned
emperor.
Understanding the creation of the Empire, it is possible to
comprehend its fall, at least as a process centring on the Princ-
ipate and the West. The inter-relation with the East is again
complex, and accounts for the temporary revival of the Empire as
the Dominate (this is further discussed in Appendix A parts i and
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ii below). For in the 1st century A.D. the Empire in Europe is
expanded, to natural frontiers on the Rhine and the Danube. This
is the process of pacification and of movement inland, away from
rivers and coastlines, which destroys the fundamental conditions
of the Ancient Civilization, its basis in maritime trading Cities,
and forces a change in character to a manorial system with a nat¬
ural economy. Again, the processes are complex. On the one side,
a crisis of agrarian labour as pacification erodes the slave
supply leads to the decline of slave-worked ranches and the rise
of share-cropping arrangements with semi-free tenant families -
the colonate. On the other side, the practice of attributing the
richest strata of the Empire (the senatorials and equestrians) to
Rome itself, with exemption from local municipal burdens, leaves
a relatively poor provincial patriciate (the decurions) to prov¬
ide the finances of the Empire's Cities; becoming progressively
more unable to do this, they withdraw from the cities to the coun¬
try (eventually, country estates - manors - were to replace Cit¬
ies as the basis of the Empire's administration). The consequences
are the failure of the money economy and taxes, leading to a fail¬
ure of both capability and loyalty in the army. This all develops
during the 2nd century A.D. ; the Principate collapses in the 3rd
century, in 5C years of civil wars and barbarian invasions (235 -
284 A.D.), until Diocletian creates the Dominate.
The Roman Empire is a congeries of semi-autonomous Cities
within a loose system of provinces. In the West especially this
is in broad constitutional continuity with Rome's earlier expan¬
sion through Italy, and is accompanied by a steady expansion of
the Roman citizenship, until the Edict of Caracalla (212/3 A.D.)
gives the citizenship to all free persons in the Empire. But
Italy itself is never a province: after Augustus, it becomes an
extension of the City of Rome, with exemption from land-tax and
poll-tax. In the Republic, the provinces were controlled by the
Senate; in the Principate, there is a division between Princeps
and Senate, under the Princeps' overall supervision. State bur¬
eaucracy is slow to develop, and makes little real distinction
between imperial provinces, senatorial provinces, and the Princ¬
eps' personal estates (which might lie in either). Indeed, its
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origins lie in the latter, and the Princeps' household slaves.
Rather than "bureaucracy, there is a hierarchy of magisterial jur¬
isdictions. The Princeps' own role is "basically supervisory and
appellate in character - and he is commander-in-chief of the
armed forces.
At its height, in the 2nd century A.D., the Roman Empire
extends from lowland Scotland to the borders of Persia, about 1.6
million square miles. Its population is about 60 million, of whom
7 million (including 3 million slaves) lived in Italy itself, and
perhaps 17 million in the Western provinces. The city of Rome it¬
self held about 1 million; other very large cities include Anti-
och, Alexandria, and in the ¥est, Carthage. But most cities were
of the order 10 - 15,000. The degree of urbanization is usually,
given as about 1Ofo, though in Italy itself at least it must have
been higher - perhaps nearer 3C/£ (guessing all other cities to¬
gether to equal Rome). (See Christ I984 App. 2.)
Finally, it should be realized that Roman historiography
begins only at about the time of the Punic Ears; its view of the
Early Republic is retrospective. Ancient writers always contrast
the Early Republic, as an age of simplicity and Roman virtue,
with the decadent and luxurious ages of Greek and Oriental influ¬
ence that follow. The position of xtfomen, in all its aspects, is
deeply part of that discourse.
The Position of Piomen
State and Family
Originally, Rome was a City-state (the Latin word "civitas"
is equivalent to the Greek "polis"), xtfith institutions broadly
similar to those of Athens, though there are important differen¬
ces. Rome was always oligarchical in character, patrician domin¬
ated though Plebeian in structure and, perhaps because of this,
patron-client relations were always important. In particular, a
freed slave became not a metic but a citizen, and his former mas¬
ter' s client. Again, Rome developed a very distinctive system of
alliances with neighbouring Cities, based on a kind of reciprocal
citizenship. This "became "basic to the formation of the Empire.
The ancient City-state, as discussed before, is a closed
community of agrarian warriors, defined by its own law-code, mem¬
bership - citizenship - in which comprises a nexus of political-
legal rights and duties, property ownership especially in land,
livestock, etc., and military service. There is a status-order
grading the degrees of political-legal rights against the type of
military service, in terms of the size of property holding - the
soldiers being self-equipped. At Rome, there is the typical div¬
ision of cavalry, provided by the richest stratum (the equites),
heavy infantry, provided by the more substantial peasantry, and
light infantry, provided by the poorer peasantry and perhaps the
more substantial urban strata. The poorest citizens provided mil¬
itary artisans or did not serve at all - at Rome, naval service
never became a factor. Broadly, the active political function,
the magistracies and Senate, were monopolized by the cavalry
class, the equites, the lower strata possessing voting rights in
the Assembly and legal rights only. The system saw many develop¬
ments, political and military, in the Early Republic, but it was
still basically in place when the Late Republic begins.
But in the Late Republic and Principate all this changes. On
the one side, the cavalry class becomes far richer, and ceases to
provide cavalry service but only the upper military command. At
the same time, this stratum disengages into two elements, senat-
orials and equestrians. The basic distinction is simply in degree
of wealth, but a complex of rules linking the holding of magist¬
racies to senatorial status, and forbidding senatorials to engage
directly in commerce, creates an alternative commercial career
for the richest equestrians, mainly in tax-farming and military
provisioning contracts. In the Principate, two separate orders
are institutionalized, with separate careers of administrative
office and military command (now salaried) for each. On the other
side, the legionary class of substantial peasants is very largely
ruined, and the property qualifications for service become unten¬
able. Military service then first becomes the personal followings
of warlords, and then in the Principate a salaried profession
open to all, though with a more privileged stream, the legions,
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reserved for freedom citizens. In between the richest strata
(senators and equestrians; and the mass of the poor, there arises
in the Principate a new class, the decurions, the provincial aris¬
tocracy. These are the "senatorials" of the provincial Cities,
holding their magistracies and bearing their public burdens, for
the senatorials and equestrians of the Empire are all held to
belong to Rome itself. The decurions in the later Principate be¬
come an impoverished class, bith these changes, the status-order
of the later Principate comprises simply two basic grades: the
honestiores ("more honourable") - senatorials, equestrians, dec¬
urions and legionary veterans - and the humiliores ("more base")
- the rest.
Citizenship is hereditary: that is the basic relationship
between state and family. Eut even in the Early Republic Rome is
no simple City-state, but the mistress of an alliance of City-
states that comes to extend throu^iout peninsular Italy. This has
a complex history, but the basic conception is that while Rome
controls foreign policy and military command, the Cities govern
their own affairs, and there is a kind of reciprocal citizenship
that depends upon residence. Although following the ¥ar of the
Italian Allies Rome gave the Roman citizenship to all peninsular
Italians, she also used the older conceptions in building up the
Empire, especially in the best. As I have said, the Roman Empire
was a congeries of Cities.
However, there is development, fragmentation and change of
meaning in all the basic elements that I have outlined above:
citizenship, political-legal rights, military service, property
ownership - these and all their components. This is what has to
be discussed in the present section.
By the beginning of the Principate, five different ways of
acquiring the Roman citizenship have developed: birth, emancipat¬
ion, military service, block grant to a community, and grant on
individual merit (viritane grant). These will be discussed in
turn.
Citizen birth is a factor of the parents' status, and of the
nature of their union. This must be an iustae nuptiae (or iustum
matrimonium - the terms seem to be indifferent); that is, a ro.arr-
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iage within the ius civile, the law of the Romans. The rules gov¬
erning the iustae nuptiae require that the man have the Roman
citizenship, and the woman have either the Roman citizenship or
conubium, the right of recognized intermarriage. This point de¬
rives from Rome* s relation to her Italian allies, though it comes
to have a broader application, as will be seen. Given an iustae
nuptiae, the child follows the father's status; otherwise, it
follows the status of the mother. It should be noted that this
controls whether the child is free or slave, as well as whether
it has the Roman citizenship. It must be added that there is
apparently a problem here with the question of illegitimacy and
citizenship. It is surely the eligibility for iustae nuptiae,
rather than the actual fact of marriage, that conveys citizenship
to the child, the more so as marriage is a private compact between
families, and not a state function. Certainly there are illegitim¬
ate citizens. Again, a further rule is that a citizen mother's
child by a slave or an unknown father does have the citizenship.
Probably the underlying issues here are the status conflicts over
closure of the political community: iustae nuptiae must be con¬
trasted with concubinage as well as with peregrine (foreign comm¬
unity) marriage. This will come up again later.
Emancipation: the freed slave of a Roman citizen acquires
the Roman citizenship. As noted, this is a Roman peculiarity. The
freed slave becomes the client of his master (or mistress), who
becomes his patron. The status of freed slave, libertini, is dis¬
tinguished from that of free birth, ingenui, and entails some
disabilities. However the liberti do possess conubium, pace the
Augustan laws.
Military service: from the time of Augustus, honourable dis¬
charge from the auxilia, the fleets, or other non-citizen milit¬
ary units brought the Roman citizenship. There is more to say on
this below.
Block grant to a community: generally this means the recog¬
nition of a City in the Empire as municipium or colonia, terms
coming from Rome's expansion through Italy in the Early Republic.
It would usually accompany or follow settlement by veterans or
Italian emigrants, and might come in two stages, giving the cit-
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izenship first to the local magistrates or curia (senate), later
to all inhabitants. It is largely by this means that the Roman
citizenship in the Empire grows, especially in the best in the
1st and. 2nd centuries A.D.
Viritane grant: this was often given to City magistrates in
the Greek East. It was the main means of expanding the Roman cit¬
izenship there, until the Edict of Caracalla.
The Roman citizenship was extended to all Italians in the
1st century B.C., and grew steadily throughout the Principate,
especially in the West; the Edict of Caracalla (212/3 A.D.) gave
the Roman citizenship to all free persons in the Empire. Watson
suggests that this may have mainly benefitted women (Watson 1969
p 136 - 7); at any rate, some of these routes to the citizenship,
especially military discharge, certainly favour men. A regular
census of citizens was held in the Republic, men registering at
adolescence. Prom the time of Augustus, women and children may
have been registered too - indeed, this may have started from the
registration of the Italians after the War of the Italian Allies.
Full revisions of the census ceased later in the 1st century A.D.
However Augustus instituted a registration of births, and that
continued throughout the Principate.
However, as it is expanded, the Roman citizenship becomes
progressively emptied of content. Initially, citizenship involves
the rights of participation in Rome's political affairs - voting
in the Assemblies on laws, motions, and for the elections of mag¬
istrates - and legal rights in terms of the ius civile, the law
of the Romans. This could be very exclusive: for instance, in
principle only a Roman citizen can own property, or can marry.
But this exclusivity was long compromised by relations with the
wider world, and besides developing commercium (reciprocal econ¬
omic rights) and conubium with her Italian allies, the Romans
also began to develop the ius gentium - a sort of Romanized
trans-communal law that recognised the de facto rights and cust¬
oms of peregrines. This conception advanced tremendously during
the Late Republic and especially the Principate. Citizenship also
meant protection from the arbitrary power of Roman magistrates,
the right to appeal to the Roman people or to another magistrate
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- especially, for the lower strata, a tribune. In the Princip-
ate, this becomes the right to appeal to Caesar. But, St. Paul
notwithstanding, this is neither restricted to the Roman citiz¬
ens, nor is it guaranteed to all Roman citizens. Rather, there is
a general tendency towards a less arbitrary and more humane use
of power, extended to all. As to the political dimension, in the
Principate this was overshadowed by the introduction of new in¬
stitutions, especially for the administration of Italy and of
Rome itself, and the Assemblies and elections fell out of use,
though the magistracies and the curiae continued, especially in
the provincial Cities.
In sum, with these developments the distinction between cit¬
izen and peregrine faded, and the broad status distinction of
rich and poor progressively took its place, to be formalized in
the 2nd century A.D. in the terms "honestiores" and "humiliores"
- the honestiores were senatorials, equestrians, decurions and
legionary veterans. The law-code prescribed different ranges of
penalties for the two grades - for example, capital punishment
for a humilior meant execution, but for a honestior, exile. Ult¬
imately, the Roman citizenship for a humilior seems to have meant
(eligibility for the legions aside) little more than the right to
transmit the Roman citizenship to one's children - or at best to
be a synonym for free.
The material basis of citizenship is the "familia", a term
that should be considered with two others: "paterfamilias" and
"patria potestas". Easically, these are the Latin equivalents of
the Greek terms "oikos", "kyrios" and "kyreia". "Familia" then
does not translate "family"; as with Greek, there is no Latin
equivalent for this. Rather "familia" has various meanings: a
lineage; or a whole household, including property and certain
livestock; or a group of slaves. The paterfamilias is the head of
the familia; potestas is his authority/ownership over its various
components. But what is distinctive here is that, where the var¬
ious senses of "familia" once lay together and implied each other,
by the Late Republic they have already become separate things. To
put the point another way, the term missing is "kleros" - the
"share" or specific parcel of land. There is a Latin equivalent,
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"fundus", but the familia is no longer tied to this. However, a
legal distinction does still subsist, and persists throughout our
period, between two categories of property: res mancipi and res
nec mancipi. Res mancipi are: land and houses on Italic soil,
slaves, and the traditional basic farming livestock. All other
property is res nec mancipi. A point here is that a colony City
in the Empire can have its soil declared Italic: the term is de¬
fined in terms of Italians not of Italy. But the basic issue is
that res mancipi can only be alienated through a special legal
process, whereas other property can simply be handed over in re¬
turn for its price. It is only in regard to res mancipi that a
woman's guardian (tutor) can intervene. It might be added here
that in principle the familia should include funerary property
also, but in practice this becomes a type of property sui generis
by our period, with special problems as to its devolution. This
need not detain us.
Patria potestas is a most distinctive feature of Roman cust¬
oms, for this power is lifelong and absolute. Indeed, it extends
to the power of life and death over all dependants, although this
is not used arbitrarily. The key point here is that the Roman
paterfamilias does not retire, and by the same token, his son's
majority (or full citizenship) is not deferred. Instead, the pat¬
erfamilias retains his position until he dies, and his children
remain in his potestas. This gives rise to basic legal categor¬
ies: aliena iuris and sui iuris - under another's authority or
under one's own authority. However the "other" may be a tutor or
a husband; I will return to this later. An adult son in potestate
might hold a magistracy or a military command; yet his paterfam¬
ilias still has full authority over him in all matters other than
his public functions. Again, it is the paterfamilias who owns all
his adult children's property, even the property they acquire
themselves. However, in practice this is softened. Adult children
are given a peculium, an allowance or interim possession of prop¬
erty, and typically set up their own households, in which they
have (interim) authority themselves. From the Late Republic, this
applies to adult daughters as well as sons. For daughters marry
sine manu, that is, without passing into their husband's author-
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ity, and. their paterfamilias emancipates them into the control of
a tutor - whose duties are nominal. These matters will be discus¬
sed more fully later on.
The Roman law of inheritance is very complex. Viills could
apparently be made from very early times. A distinction is made
between inheritance, the division of the estate between the
heirs, and bequest, a specific gift taken out of the estate be¬
fore division. Eut here it is only the most basic law, the law of
intestate succession, that can be considered, at least so far as
inheritance is concerned. Here, the basic lav? is equal division
of the estate between the heirs, on the paterfamilias' death. The
heirs will ordinarily be the children, sons and daughters alike.
The position of the wife depends on the type of her marriage: if
she is in her husband's authority, she ranks among the children,
but if she is not, then she is not among her husband's heirs at
all. In our period, this last was much the most common arrange¬
ment. The estate, after devolution, might continue to be adminis¬
tered as a unit, unless one of the heirs raised an action for
division. But it should be realized that here, as at Athens (even
more than at Athens), the tendency is for property-holdings to
fragment over time. In a society oriented to farming and war,
which lacked paid employment, and where trade is mostly handled
by peregrines, the acquisition of new wealth to compensate for
that fragmentation is always problematic.
This situation is typical of ancient City-state civilizat¬
ion, and it leads to typical consequences: a tremendous pressure
on the property-owning strata to limit the numbers of their chil¬
dren. Since property controls the status-grading within the cit¬
izenry this applies at all levels: it is a question of relative
rather than absolute scarcity. One common way of achieving this
limitation is by exposure. This is not simple infanticide, for
the children are often found and raised, either as free or as
slave. There were customary places for leaving exposed children,
and this is one of the sources of slaves. Exposure of girl child¬
ren was more common, since they are of less economic use, and
have to be dowered. Exposed girl-children slaves are often raised
to become slave-prostitutes.
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All this is hard, to quantify. But in ray introduction, I have
outlined the history of the expropriation, emigration, and re-
endowment of the Italian peasantry, and also of the rise and fall
of the slave-trade. The demographic history of Rome is very much
the history of the migration process, and that is also the hist¬
ory of the Roman Empire. This is the historical narrative into
which the demographic mechanisms fit. True, the senatorial and
equestrian orders are able to acquire nexv wealth, initially
through the exploitation of the Empire, later through the career
in the imperial service, which is salaried. To an extent this
also applies to military, at least legionary, service, especially
where promotion to the centuriate is achieved. But in sharp con¬
trast to Athens there is little sharing of the profits of empire
with the common people: the corn dole at Rome itself is the only
exception, although there are various kinds of gifts from the
Princeps or other rich individuals to certain categories of peop¬
le. In particular, the decurions are involved in the costs of
the Empire, rather than the profits. The capability of the peas¬
antry to raise children at all is severely curtailed in the last
150 years of the Republic, though it recovers in the Principate,
at least outside Italy. But the converse point is equally import¬
ant: it is through migration, rather than by internal fertility,
that the urban artisanate is reconstituted. This includes both
expropriated peasants and incoming and freed slaves. The capabil¬
ity to raise children among the urban poor is very limited; this
basically for reasons of poverty and squalor. Again, this is most
severe in the Late Republic, and is ameliorated in the Princip¬
ate, though possibly this amelioration holds for Rome and Italy
as much as for the provinces. The decline of the Roman peasantry,
later the freeborn citizenry in Italy, is a matter of explicit
policy concern throughout our period, for these were the legion¬
aries, the basis of Rome's military strength.
The conditions of military service are radically reformed
twice in our period, by Marius circa B.C. 100 and by Augustus
early in the Principate. Marius' reforms removed the property
qualifications for military service, and also the property grad-
ings for the different types of service. All citizens were now
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concentrated, in the heavy infantry, rank being awarded by ability
and experience. Cavalry was no longer provided by citizens but by
allies. The great power of the Roman legions came from their art¬
isan skills, especially in siege-works and fortifications; it is
Marius* reforms that are the basis for this. He also seems to
have instituted the eagles, the focus of the legion's loyalty.
Augustus* reforms divided the armies into two elements: the leg¬
ions, for freeborn citizens and commanded by senatorials; and the
auxilia, for freedmen and peregrines and commanded by equestri¬
ans. The fleets were on the latter basis also. There is a similar
division of the units based at Rome or in Italy, such as the
Praetorian Guard and the City batch. Augustus also introduced
fixed terms of service, salary, and gratuity on retirement from
service; these were at rather higher rates for the legions than
for the auxiliary units. Thus military service becomes a career,
a chance to share in the Empire's wealth, and a chance too for
social mobility, for promotion especially in the legions was
quite open, and could lead on retirement into the decurionate or
even to equestrian status. More than this, honourable discharge
from the auxiliary units brought with it the grant of Roman cit¬
izenship. Thus it is now military service that brings property
and status and even citizenship, though the citizen soldier re¬
ceives preference.
From Augustus, all types of military personnel were forbidd¬
en to marry during their service - this includes matrimonium ex
iure gentium among peregrine units. It is hard to say why this
was done, but it was soon by-passed: soldiers began to form de
facto marriages with women i-rtierever they were stationed, marrying
them formally after discharge. This became an area of development
of the law: auxiliary veterans come to be given conubium for
their wives as well as citizenship, so that their children will
be Roman citizens. Initially, this granted retrospective citizen¬
ship to existing children at marriage, but in the later 2nd cent¬
ury A.D. this was restricted to children born after marriage.
Oddly, this restriction was not extended to the fleets. Perhaps
the reason here was a shortfall of recruitment to the auxilia.
Again, soldiers' children, though illegitimate, were given inher-
itance rights; equally, the soldier's peculium became treated as
his actual property, for him to transmit by will. It should be
noted that the grant of conubium does not actually give the wife
herself citizenship. Finally, soldiers were permitted to live
with their wives, from the end of the 2nd century, though probab¬
ly this does not in itself entail the grant of conubium. The an¬
omalies of the area are only finally ended by the Edict of Cara-
calla and universal citizenship. But a point to note in all this
is that the legionary veteran who marries a peregrine woman by
matrimonium ex iure gentium does not get conubium for her, nor
are their children citizens. The guiding principle seems to be
that citizen men will marry citizen women (or at least women with
conubium in their own right).
Towards the end of the Principate, a distinction arises be¬
tween limitanei - fixed frontier units - and the mobile legions,
and there is also local provisioning in kind rather than provis¬
ioning and payment through the money economy. Thus at the end,
the soldiers, at least some elements, become a peasant militia
again.
Concubinage requires consideration. It is a legally recog¬
nized relationship, and generally seems to parallel marriage,
though the children are illegitimate and follow the mother's
status (thus a slave-cocncubine's children are slaves). There are
sanctions against bigamy and possibly also against adultery.
Again, a slave-concubine and her children are not subject to sei¬
zure for a man's debts. Often concubinage occurs where there are
legal barriers to marriage, for example if one partner is pere¬
grine or slave, or if there are big status differences between
the partners. Here it is not always the man who has the higher
status. The soldiers' marriage discussed above is a special case.
But concubinage can take numerous forms: de facto marriage among
the lower orders (simple living together) for example, or the
favourite household slave-girl or the freedwoman mistress of the
rich. Often a concubine is preferred after widowhood or divorce,
to avoid putting a step-mother over one's children, or conflict
between half-siblings. The relationship and status were not stig¬
matized. Actual definition of concubinage is difficult, and in
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probability (and on analogy with Athens) no hard boundaries with
marriage ever existed (though absence of dowry might be indicat¬
ive). This is probably so because of the earlier status conflicts
between patricians and plebeians over closure of the political
community, in which conubium is an issue. Patricians might try to
reserve their status for patrician partners,married by a special
patrician rite; but plebeians would not accept that the child of
a plebeian girl seduced by a patrician man could be denied citiz¬
enship, even if they could not compel him to marry her. It is
surely because of this that marriage is a compact between famil-
ias only - there are ceremonies and rituals, but they have no
legal status - and that illegitimacy is never highlighted in
Graeco Roman-Antiquity. In Rome, as noted earlier, the child of an
unknown father has citizenship. The three forms of Roman marriage
seem to fit with this view - they will be discussed in a later
section.
Augustus passed laws controlling marriage between the orders,
and also controlling adultery and fornication (see Lefkowitz and
Fant 1982 p 180 - 9; also Brunt 1971 App 9)* These have many pro¬
visions, but centrally they forbid a senatorial to marry a freed-
woman, actress, prostitute or ex-prostitute; they also forbid a
senatorial woman to marry a freedman.. Note that the bar is spec¬
ifically on marriage. Single status and childlessness are also
penalized (though the latter provision is soon repealed): such
men and women are debarred from receiving inheritances. Remarria¬
ge must follow within a set time after widowhood or divorce. Con¬
versely, the father of three children is given preference in his
public career, and the mother of three children is exempted from
guardianship. This provision extends to freedwomen or women in
Italy with four children, or to women in the provinces with five,
as well. The adultery laws interdict sexual intercourse with or
by another man's wife: this now becomes a public crime, penalized
with exile and partial confiscation of property. The husband must
divorce his wife, or risk prosecution himself; and any citizen
may prosecute if the husband fails to do so. This law takes the
punishment of the wife's adultery out of the hands of the famil-
ia into the public courts, though it is not really clear what had
actually happened to the adulterous wife in the Late Republic. A
later section will consider this. The law on fornication inter¬
dicts sexual intercourse with any free girl or widow who is not
a recognized concubine or registered prostitute; the penalties
are apparently similar to those for adultery. This law also cov¬
ers homosexual intercourse with a citizen partner; this carries
the death penalty. It should be stressed that these laws are kept
in force throughout the Principate.
This is often referred to as Augustus' "moral" legislation,
but its purpose is uncertain. It is surely not a matter of "free-
floating" ethical or traditional values. It applies only to the
citizenry, and most of it only to the upper strata, as the pre¬
scription of exile rather than death shows (the penalty for homo¬
sexual intercourse then is exceptional). Again, its focus is on
sexual intercourse between citizens; it "protects" prostitution
and concubinage as well as marriage. But coming after the civil
wars, one guesses that the intended target is the factionalism of
the upper strata rather than their licentiousness - though this
seems evident enough in the last century of the Republic, as will
be discussed later. Here one might point out that the original
practices of the patrician stratum in the Early Republic were
surely geared precisely to maintaining communal solidarity, and
preventing the development of factions and the creation of marr¬
iage alliances between lineages: the wife and her children belong
wholly to the husband's familia and her kin have no interest in
or protection over them. This remains a hostile environment for
alliance by marriage. Perhaps the tremendous growth in the size
of dowries among the upper strata in the Late Republic is intend¬
ed to offset this - though even these dowries are not large by
broader comparative standards (Sailer 1984). But marriage as
alliance at Rome never worked: marriages were made and broken so
freely as to be meaningless. Moreover, in principle at least a
man could disinherit the children he no longer favoured. It
should be noted that Augustus was related to Julius Caesar by
adoption: this was how durable alliances could be made. The pur¬
pose of Augustus' legislation, then, is perhaps to restore the
communal solidarity of the upper strata, compelling them to marry
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among themselves indifferently and not for advantage. That fath¬
ers could "break up their sons' and daughters' marriages for their
own political advantage may be part of the reason why so many had
avoided marriage in favour of liaisons of various kinds. But
above all, the purpose is to secure the relationship not between
husband and wife but between father and children. It should be
grasped that if Augustus' intentions were of the kind that I have
tried to indicate, then he was quite successful. At least the
factional conflicts are brought decisively to an end.
Augustus' purpose may also have been in part demographic,
for the decline of the Roman peasantry was paralleled by a dec¬
line in the upper strata. Apparently this was at least partly
voluntary, through avoidance of marriage and legitimate procreat¬
ion, though there were also heavy losses in the political con¬
flicts and civil wars of the 1st century B.C. If this was part
of Augustus' intentions, however, then he was less successful,
for the decline of the patricians continues under the Principate.
But however this may be, in the 2nd century A.D. the emperors did
create public support schemes for the children of poor citizens:
the alimenta (see Duncan-Jones 1974 P 288 et seq; see also Pomer-
oy 1975 P 202 - 4> P 227 et seq). There is little question that
the purpose was to build up the numbers of freeborn citizens,
especially for the legions. These schemes came to extend through¬
out Italy; some small private schemes in the western provinces
are also known. The surviving inscription at Veleia gives rates
of support at 16 sesterces per month for a legitimate boy, 12 for
a legitimate girl, 12 again for an illegitimate boy, and 10 for
an illegitimate girl; the allowances apparently continued to age
18 for boys, 14 for girls. 300 awards are known, of which only 36
are for girls. It is thought that awards were given for one child
per family only, and that the figure 36 represents the number of
families with girl children only. If so, it can be calculated
that 12yo of families with only girls corresponds well with the
binomial probability 0.125 for all girls where family size = 3, a
figure that corresponds to what we know of the size of the Roman
family. This is an unsophisticated calculation, but it does sugg¬
est that the sex-ratio is in balance here, and that practices
such as the selective exposure of girl children are no longer
being used.* The field of application would be centrally Italy in
the 2nd century A.D. - after this the collapse of the money econ¬
omy overtakes the alimenta schemes. However, if one takes the
alimenta schemes to be symptomatic rather than causitive, then
the picture might be generalized more widely to the western pro¬
vinces of the Principate and perhaps the 1st century A.D. too*
Some small alimenta schemes specifically for girls were
created by the later 2nd century empresses.
Family and Community
The Roman familia is equivalent to the Athenian oikos in its
political-legal bearing upon citizenship, but it does not have
the same direct relationship to household structure. It has been
suggested (Lacey 1986} that the underlying reason is that the
Romans made patria potestas the key issue, rather than the oikos
as the Greeks did. This might go with patrician interests and the
continuing patrician dominance at Rome?, arguing these matters
above (ch 5)» I suggest that Rome strikingly failed to develop
practices for the protection of small plebeian property, whereas.
Athens quite successfully did so. At any rate, the differences in
practices are striking.
Thus the Athenian father retires at age 6O5 his son, now 30,
takes over the oikos, attains full Assembly rights, and marries,
and his father becomes a dependant in his household. If the oikos
is to be divided between sons, this happens now. At Rome, by con-
*Significance testing would be the obvious development. But
there are other points. Modern experience suggests that the
sex-ratio is not naturally exactly equal: more boys are born
but their mortality is higher. Another point is that family
size = 3 is the upper end of the range 2-3 considered typical
for Graeco-Roman Antiquity. Against this, if the allowance is
the same for a legitimate girl and an illegitimate boy, and
moreover continues longer for the latter, and again if there
are other schemes specifically for girls, then the actual num¬
bers of girls are likely to be greater than represented here.
The numbers of claims for illegitimate boys and girls might
help to assess this. But the whole issue really needs a length¬
ier, and deeper, treatment than it can be given here.
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trast, patria potestas is lifelong; the familia is divided among
the children of both sexes (and the wife if in manu) at the pat¬
erfamilias' death, and each son becomes paterfamilias of his own
familia. But the children do not wait for their father's death
before marrying or setting up their own households, or taking up
their political rights. Rather the paterfamilias gives his adult
children a peculium, an allowance or interim possession of prop¬
erty, on which basis they conduct their independent lives. In our
period this seems to apply to adult daughters as well as to sons;
the bearing of this will become clear in what follows.
The typical household structure then is a nuclear family
plus a few slaves - similar to Athens, but not quite for the same
reasons. The household does not usually run to three generations,
for the grandparents continue in their own household. Marriage
is generally made young, age 18 - 20 for boys and 14 - 15 for
girls. There are in fact legal minima here: 14 and 12 respective¬
ly. Family size is small, 2-3 children; however sometimes there
are slave children too.
Marriage is a compact between familias; it is not a state
function. Originally there were two ceremonial forms: confarreat-
io, a ritual before priests; and coemptio, a notional sale. These
appear to have been the patrician and plebeian marriage forms
respectively. But there was also usus, cohabitation; apparently
this was on analogy with ownership established not by sale but by
simple possession. Viith this form, only after a year did the wife
pass into the manus of her husband, and even then not if she
spent three nights running away from his household. This was the
origin of marriage sine manu. In the beginning, this may have
been preferred in marriages between patrician and plebeian, to
keep patrician property out of plebeian hands. But by the Late
Republic this had become the commonest form of marriage for all
strata, though the other forms did continue - in particular, cer¬
tain priesthoods were tied to confarreatio.
It should be noted that all this bears upon the earlier dis¬
cussion of concubinage, for all these forms of marriage are att¬
ested from the times of the status struggles quite early in the
Early Republic. But marriage sine manu is the focus here: it is
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the typical form of marriage throughout our period, and its mean¬
ing must he made clear. "Manus" is the husband's authority and
control over his wife and her property, subject (notionally at
least) to the potestas of his own paterfamilias. Married with
manus, the wife passes from the potestas of her father to the
manus of her husband. Inheritance rights are affected by this:
she no longer ranks among her father's heirs, but is included
among her husband's heirs as though one of his children. Marriage
sine manu, then, means marriage without any of these consequen¬
ces. The wife remains in her father's potestas, and continues to
rank among his heirs. She has no inheritance rights from her hus¬
band - and her own property devolves back to her family of origin
- and indeed, husband and wife are forbidden to make gifts to
each other. This again is to protect the property of the respect¬
ive familias. It is in view of this arrangement that the force of
the adult daughter's peculium can be grasped, as also the pract¬
ice, mentioned earlier, of the father emancipating his adult dau¬
ghter to the control of a tutor. These things will come up again
in later sections.
Marriages, at least first marriages, were made young, al¬
though remarriage after divorce or widowhood was common. Betroth¬
als were also made, and a marriage below the legal age counted as
a betrothal. The girl in this case might be taken to live in her
fiance's household. However, the vagaries of patrician or imper¬
ial practice should not be given too much weight (and this is
surely not the place to find prepubertal sexual intercourse'.).
Usually marriages were arranged between paterfamilias, though the
man might act for himself, as might a woman remarrying. Consent
to the marriage is required from both parties, although the girl
has only restricted grounds for a refusal. More to the point is
that a very young girl probably could not resist pressure. But by
the same token, an older woman could expect to make her views
heard. On the other side, a marriage initiated by the partners
themselves must have the paterfamilias' consent, but refusal could
be appealed to the magistrates.
The legal definition of marriage focusses on living together
as man and wife, or later even on maritial affection, though
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there is apparently an older substratum of meaning in terms of
the procreation of legitimate children. There would be a contract
and inventory dealing with questions of property and compensation
etc. There were also ceremonies and rituals. But nothing of this
appears to be of the essence; nor does consummation seem to be
required. Indeed, although secondary works give descriptions of a
Roman wedding, they also admit that very little is really known
about this. Earlier I have suggested that it was citizenship not
marriage that was the ultimate criterion of rightful sexual and
parental relationships.
Dowries, though traditionally quite small, grew to quite a
fair size (of the order of 1 million sesterces) among the upper
strata in the Late Republic. Above I have suggested that this
might have been an attempt to secure factional alliances between
lineages, the marriage practices themselves not much favouring
this. Dowry does not remove the wife's inheritance rights from
her family of origin, and indeed is often not the whole of her
property: she may have inheritances from elsewhere also. The dow¬
ry is administered for her by her husband, even if she is married
sine manu. Typically it is invested in land, and the income used
for her maintenance. A contract will be made at her marriage gov¬
erning the amount and terms of payment, conditions of return,
etc. (Augustus made laws settling the terms of return of the dow¬
ry.) Typically three years are allowed for payment or for repay¬
ment. In the event of divorce, the dowry is returned, but sub¬
tractions are made for the maintenance of the children (who re¬
main with the father, as at Athens): l/6 for each child up to 3
children; and moreover, the wife may be fined for misconduct, up
to ■§- in the case of adultery. Thus she can lose up to •§ of her
dowry. The dowry remains important as a basis for remarriage. On
widowhood, similar provisions would obtain (though presumably the
question of misconduct does not arise). The wife's personal mov¬
able property at marriage (her parapherna) would be protected
from all this, by inventory and contract (though records of this
from Roman Egypt might be due to older Egyptian practice). In our
period, the husband does not give a gift to the wife at marriage.
Divorce seems to appear first not long before the end of the
5(o^
Early Republic; it quickly becomes commonplace and legally unre¬
stricted, although the woman's right to instigate divorce seems
only to appear a few years before the Republic ends. Importantly,
the paterfamilias of either partner can dissolve the marriage,
and in the political manoeverings of the upper strata in the last
century of the Late Republic this was commonly done. Eventually,
a law forbidding a father to break up a happy marriage was passed,
late in the 2nd century A.D. Surprisingly, Gardner holds that
until late in our period, divorce in marriage without manus must
be made through the father, especially for the wife; only those
sui iuris could divorce for themselves (Gardner 1986 p 11, p 86 -
7). Other authorities do not appear to suspect such a restrict¬
ion, and though Gardner's study is the most recent, this does
seem out of keeping with the general pattern, at least as a real
(rather than theoretical) practice. At any rate, no reasons for
divorce needed to be given, and it could be by consent of the
partners or unilateral by either of them. The Augustan laws re¬
quired a divorce to have seven witnesses, but this was because of
the adultery and fornication laws, to give proof of marital stat¬
us. It was not a restriction on divorce as such.
On divorce, the children remained in the custody of the
father; if the wife proved to be pregnant at the time of the di¬
vorce, the child would be handed over to the father some time
after birth. In the event of widowhood, the wife might leave her
husband's household under similar terms, his kin retaining the
children, or she might remain and bring the children up, or rath¬
er oversee their upbringing, herself. Possibly the form of marr¬
iage would have some bearing on the course of action here. But
whether she is married with or without manus, her children belong
wholly to her husband's lineage, and the wife's part is tradit¬
ionally to bear - not to raise - children. If she leaves her hus¬
band' s household, for whatever reason, she does not keep access
rights. With this, it is indicative that household furniture is a
type of luxury possession favoured by men. Women by contrast fav¬
our jewelry.
Within the household, the wife is mistress. Although she is
married young, the household does not run to three generations,
and though her first years of marriage might he in the nature of
an apprenticeship, she is certainly not under the constant super¬
vision of a resident mother-in-law. By tradition at least, she
controls the workforce and holds the storeroom keys (though not
perhaps those to the wine-cellar), allocating work and materials.
This holds regardless of whether she is married with or without
nanus; that conditions her dealings beyond the household only.
The designations are different: married with manus the wife is
materfamilias and matrona; married without manus she is filiafam-
ilias uxor and puella.* But little seems to hang by this. She
seems in any case to take part in her husband's household cult.
The traditional work of citizen women is spinning and weaving;
the bulk of housework is seen to by slaves. This includes cook¬
ing. Ghildcare is seen to by slaves also, until the children
(both sexes) are old enough to go to school. The wife then is
neither housewife nor mother. In the Late Republic, the tradit¬
ional picture is changed with the introduction of wet-nurses, the
commercial making of clothes and baking of bread, and even the
commercial provision of cooked food. (The Roman insulae - flats
- have no cooking ranges.) But even more, it increasingly becomes
the practice for women to pass control of their household affairs
to a housekeeper, and to occupy themselves with their business
affairs and their social l.ives.
The household has no women's quarters; the wife's place is
in the middle of the house, with everything happening around her.
Lives conduct business with their agents, wives receive visitors,
both in their own right and jointly with their husbands, they are
commonly present with their husbands at dinner parties, both as
hostess and as guest. Otherwise the family eats together. The
household then is central to social life, not separate from it as
at Athens, and women play their full part. Lith this, wives are
cognisant of their husbands' political and business affairs; they
also share much the same education. The Roman wife is very much
her husband's companion. This pattern becomes increasingly pron¬
ounced through the course of our period, but indeed it is estab-
*filia = daughter; uxor = wife; puella = girl.
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lished quite early.
Women's social life and movements are "basically unrestrict¬
ed. Women walk in the streets (or are carried in litters), they
go visiting, go to temples, shops and libraries. They go to the
public baths, an important centre of social life. There are sep¬
arate baths (often adjacent) for the sexes, or else different
times, and there is also a somewhat different range of facilit¬
ies: in particular the baths do not seem to provide the same
sports areas for women as for men. But there are shops, cafes and
libraries, as well as beautician and massage facilities. The main
sports grounds seem to be largely for men only; an extension
probably of military training. Women go to all the public enter¬
tainments: wild beast shows, the Games, gladiatorial contests,
the theatre and the chariot races. At most of these the sexes are
segregated; in the amphitheatre women are placed at the back, in
the upper tiers. But at the chariot races (the actual "circus",
and by far the most popular entertainment) the sexes sit togeth¬
er. Incidentally, all the public entertainments are free; also
they have an important political dimension in the Principate that
will be discussed in a later section. Roman cities have public
toilets (Roman public engineering in water and sanitation is out¬
standing) ; oddly (to our eyes) these do not appear to have been
sexually segregated.
Women are escorted in public by slaves, but usually female
slaves, and this seems to be a mark of status rather than for
chaperonage or protection. Clothing is usually differentiated.
Women do not go veiled or (in the best) with their heads covered,
but respectable dress is full-length. There is a distinctive
dress for prostitutes: they wear the toga, often in bright col¬
ours and flimsy materials. Generally, a woman's social status in
terms of her sexual career can be told from her clothing, though
there is perhaps some room for statement of personal identity
amid the conventions.
The picture that I have drawn in this section is centred on
urban patterns and on property ownership. But it is not on that
account the picture of an aristocracy; it is the picture of a
citizenry. The City of Antiquity includes rather than excludes
the countryside, culturally as well as politically, and the own¬
ership of property and of slaves both extend far down, the social
ladder, though on diminishing scale. There is certainly a fall
and rise of the Italian peasantry in the Late Republic and the
Principate, as I have described above. But broadly the pattern
that I have outlined here seems to typify Roman civilization: all
adhered to it who could, including Romanized barbarians and freed
slaves from the East. Those who could not do so, the urban prol¬
etariat (partly comprised of expropriated Deasants), could not
maintain families at all; again a characteristic mainly of the
Late Republic, ameliorated in the Principate. In the country
estates, slaves did not have families, but were kept chained in
barracks, though they might be given sexual access to each other.
Any resulting children would add to the master's wealth; as slav¬
es, they would be attributed to their mother only. Similarly, the
slaves, male and female, who followed the herds would have sexual
relations with each other, and bear children likewise. The bail— ~
iff however would have a wife; together they would run their
household very much on traditional Roman lines. Then, as the
Principate ends, families of share-cropping tenants come to make
up the agrarian workforce.
Again, in urban households slave families are sometimes
found; the marital relationship is called conternubium. It has no
legal status, and requires the master's permission. Here too the
children are attributed to the mother only,, and share her status.
Yet the families here are apparently stable, and similar in patt¬
ern to those of the free. Often the partners would try to buy
each other's and their children's freedom, or indeed, one partner
might own the other as a slave.
But domestic slaves were often not living in their master's
household but boarded out in lodgings, and so formed in effect
part of the urban proletariat of free and unfree artisans and
shopkeepers. The ability to maintain families here was limited
above all by poverty: women were forced to live by prostitution
and children were exposed, and thus recruited into the slave
trade. Conditions had probably been less difficult in the Early
Republic (though this too had its early phase of social con-
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flicts), and were apparently ameliorated to an extent under the
Principate. But the pattern here is general for Antiquity; it is
Athens not Rome that is the exception, due to the democratic
sharing there of the spoils of an empire based on naval power. At
Rome, and only in the city of Rome itself, the corn dole echoes
this, and it starts only as the Republic is ending.
The familia is an agnatic lineage, and in the background
there are the structures of tribes, curia and gentes. But these
are the political macro-structure of the early City; by the Late
Republic even the gens seems to have lost any private function.
Nor does there seem to be preferential marriage in terms of the
degrees of inheritance to give an equivalent to the Greek anchis-
teia, at least not at plebeian level, (it is very general for
aristocracies to have patterns of intermarriage and reciprocal
property exchange.)
More to the point are patron-client relations: clientela.
This is basically an exchange of loyalty for protection, through
which the great families acquired their followings; more general¬
ly, a freed slave became his master's client. Patron and client
cannot litigate against each other; they are on a basis of good
faith. The relationship is similar to that between paterfamilias
and adult child, homen can be patrons, though their tutor will be
involved. Indeed, women can be patrons for associations such as
collegia, the burial clubs of the urban proletariat, as well as
for individuals such as their freed slaves.
There is then in Roman society an important division between
public and private spheres. But as with the familia itself, it
bears no straightforward relationship to the household - consider
marriage sine manu - and women are certainly not simply kept in
the private sphere of authority of their menfolk. In the Princip¬
ate especially (e.g. the Augustan legislation) women increasingly
come to be the concern, on precisely the same basis as men, of




The Roman wife married young, age 14 - 15» Pregnancy and
motherhood would generally soon follow. The question then how far
she would understand or he ahle to control these processes must
he considered. In this, there is in the first place her background
situation. Although she is brought up in a small nuclear family,
this is set in a wider household of slaves, who may have families
too. This is one possible source of knowledge. Again, the cultur¬
al environment for exampie in mythology and religion draws heavily
on themes of sex and reproduction. Moreover, with marriage close
to the age of menarche, there is no obvious reason to withhold
knowledge from girls. Secondly, there is her current situation.
She is mistress of her own household, with no resident female kin
to supervise her, though she may have a continuing supportive
relationship with for example her mother. Also, she has her own
female slaves, possibly including some taken from her own house¬
hold with her at marriage. This is a source of knowledge under
her own control. For that matter, little bars her in practice
from consulting her own gynaecologist. Broadly, then, the young
wife's understanding of her own biology seems likely to be quite
good.
Pregnancy and childbirth would be medically assisted. Gyn¬
aecology and midwifery were both recognized paramedical profess¬
ions, though like all medical crafts in the Roman world they were
not of very high standing. Gynaecologists were usually women -
when women physicians are met with, this is usually what is meant.
The main medical writers also discuss gynaecology; Soranus (2nd
century A.D.) especially wrote a "text-book" for mid-wives. But
as with contraception and abortion (to be discussed below), this
literature has to be treated with reserve. Literature and medicine
in Graeco-Roman Antiquity are quite distinct activities. Child¬
birth was usually accomplished seated on a special birthing stool,
with a midwife and two assistants. In this position the woman
herself is presumably not wholly passive. There will certainly
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have been childbed, mortality but, despite attempts to work with
commemorative inscriptions, this cannot be quantified (moreover
this data is urban only).
Children are born into their father's lineage, and they be¬
long wholly to the father. It is he who decides whether to acknow¬
ledge the child, whether it should be raised or exposed; it is he
who names it. (However the registration of birth introduced by
Augustus might equally be done by the mother.) It is he who
keeps custody of the children if the marriage is dissolved - the
wife does not even keep a right of access. These practices sure¬
ly condition the mother's degree of emotional involvement with
her children - as Hopkins argues, this is not simply a factor of
child mortality rates (see Hopkins 1983 p 222 - 6). In actuality,
the raising of children up to school age (and looking after them
outside school hours) is generally entrusted to slaves. Again,
from early in the Late Republic women who could afford it increas¬
ingly preferred using wet-nurses to breastfeeding their babies
themselves. The Roman wife's role (traditionally) is to bear
children for her husband's lineage, not to raise them. As to wet-
nurses, these might be slave or free, and might be hired or al¬
ready in the household. Their contracts typically restrict their
conduct, in terms of diet and sexual contacts. Eut the relation¬
ship created between nurse and charge was often close and endur¬
ing, as indeed were relations generally between children and the
slaves who cared for them. So also were mother-child relations in
slave families or families based on concubinage, for in both
cases the children are legally attributed to the mother only, and
the relationship is consequently more secure.
The Roman family is typically small, 2-3 children. The
general reasons for this, in terms of the pressures of fertility
on the property basis of citizenship and status, have already
been indicated; they are general to ancient City-state civilizat¬
ion. So also has the typical absolute inability to raise children
at the level of the urban proletariat, which likewise is general.
At Rome in our period there is also a marked short-fall of child¬
ren at the level of the richest strata; indeed, it has even been
speculated as to whether some factor such as lead poisoning from
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the water supply caused this. But generally it is considered that
the outcome was willed. In considering this there are two things
that have to be sharply distinguished: the man's desire to limit
the number of legitimate children he raises, and the woman's
desire to limit the number of children she conceives or bears.
This last concern must always motivate for example prostitutes.
But in the political raanoevrings of the Late Republic, upper
strata women are often players rather than pawns, and it is quite
probable that some of them tried to take unilateral control of
their own fertility. But there is a reluctance in both sexes at
this level to marry or raise legitimate children in this period,
as I have indicated earlier in discussing the Augustan legislat¬
ion. These matters will come up again later.
Exposure, infanticide, contraception and abortion are the
main means of limiting the numbers of children. Of these, although
outright infanticide is little attested, exposure is taken for
granted throughout Antiquity. There were traditional places at
Rome for leaving babies; they would be taken and raised either as
slaves or free. This was a major source of slaves, especially
slave-prostitutes, the exposure of girl-children being more comm¬
on. If the child could later prove freeborn status it could re¬
claim its freedom; again, if the parents could later recognize
their child they could reclaim it. Amulets left with the child
often served these functions; possibly they were left with the
child by (or on behalf of) the mother. Exposure was probably the
resource of the poorest women; one guesses also that some wet-
nurses might have exposed their own babies. But precisely for
being taken for granted throughout Antiquity, all this is very
hard to quantify. Even so, there is unlike Athens no doubt that
exposure was common Roman practice.
Contraception and abortion are considered in Roman medical
writings. Hopkins has discussed this in a classic article, argu¬
ing that this might have had some impact on the restricted fert¬
ility of the upper strata in the Late Republic (Hopkins I965/6;
see also Eyben I980/I). But it is surely doubtful how far these
medical writings can guide us as to the actual state of ancient
knowledge. Indeed, the whole literary-philosophical character of
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Graeco-Roman medicine is surely deceptive for, despite real pro¬
gress at early Hellenistic Alexandria, this is not medical scien¬
ce. Rather these writings are merely compendia of lore culled
from other sources, and they are primarily a contribution to lit¬
erature rather than to medicine. Contraception and abortion tech¬
nology are known from for example Pharaonic Egypt. Indeed, the
best that can be said is that ancient technology was capable of
contraceptive and abortifacient intervention, though never very
disciplined about keeping sound knowledge and nonsense separate.
The surgical means of abortion were certainly quite effective,
and apparently were less dangerous than the drugs. The lore of
contraception and abortion then would surely have been widely
known to physicians and midwives. throughout the Roman Empire, and
these services would have been generally available to the popul¬
ation.
Abortion was always legal in Roman times. Although Septimius
Severus (193 - 211 A.D.) passed a law against giving abortifac¬
ient drugs, this was apparently only to protect women against
quackery. Surgical abortion was not similarly interdicted. The
ancient texts indicate a lack of systematic distinction between
contraception, abortion, and indeed natural miscarriage. In all
cases, measures are typically taken by the woman. But rightfully,
the decisions here should be the husband's, just as with the
decision to raise or to expose the child. There is longstanding
traditional condemnation of the woman who unilaterally acts to
destroy her husband's child. Again, the husband acts not only for
himself but has a duty to produce children for his lineage and
for the citizen body. These things provide the setting for the
social ethics of contraception and abortion. (Christian polemic¬
ists indeed tend to give contraception the heavier condemnation.
But that goes beyond our period and our area.)
Maturation
Children are brought up in the care of slaves, from the out¬
set if a wet-nurse is used, and they are also often brought up
together with slave children. The emotional relationships here,
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including those between free and slave children, are commonly
close and enduring - slaves raised in the household were thought
to be specially amenable and loyal.
Apparently babies were swaddled as in Athens; here again
this may say something as to cultural attitudes, for all its lack
of direct bearing on personality development. Initially there
seems to be little overt sexual differentiation of children. By
tradition, they remain in the mother's care until age 7; the son
enters his father's care from that time. Traditionally too the
mother will teach her daughter household skills, especially in
spinning and weaving. But by our period, the mother's direct in¬
volvement in childcare and housework were limited; she might not
possess the skills to teach to her daughter herself. Besides this,
it was long-established Roman custom to send children to school.
This includes both sexes, and extends to a wide range of social
levels.
Roman education has a complex history, marked in our period
by an ambivalence towards Greek culture, which accordingly goes
through a definite rise and fall. By the 2nd century A.D. educat¬
ion in the West has returned to being centred on Latin, and in
this time too state support for schools becomes general. Educat¬
ion was at three levels. Primary school, teaching reading, writ¬
ing and simple arithmetic, - lasted about five years. Secondary
school, teaching mainly syntax, grammar and literature, lasted
about two to three years. These first two levels were shared by
both boys and girls, learning together, though the teachers were
apparently always male. The curriculum was very conservative.
Tertiary education is for men only, and deals with public skills
such as rhetoric. It is for young adulthood,- and would often en¬
tail studying in a distant city such as Athens. Jurisprudence (as
opposed to forensic oratory) was learnt in personal relationship
to a jurisconsult. All this is closed to women, but they did
occasionally study philosophy.
Physical training is not part of childhood but of adolescen¬
ce; it relates to military training, and accordingly is rather
for men. As noted earlier, the sports grounds were for men, and
the baths gave different kinds of facilities to the two sexes.
Yet exceptional women athletes and even gladiators were known in
Flavian times (69-97 A.D.), and there were also attempts to
introduce girls' events in the Greek-style Games at this time
(but the Romans never took to the Greek Games). Other physical
recreations included dancing. Eut in all these matters the Roman
ambivalence towards Greek culture must be noted. Generally, where
the Greeks believed in participation the Romans believed in spec-
tating; performance was unworthy of citizens. The Roman theatre
too was professional.
For girls, childhood ends with marriage. This is timed to
correspond roughly with the menarche, which is thought to have
occurred about age 13 (Amundsen and Diers 1969)« If is at marria¬
ge that the girl dedicates her toys and childhood clothes to the
gods. As indicated, her training in traditional skills may have
been limited. Her mother however will have taught her social
skills, and possibly instructed her as to her own biology. But
broadly, the Roman wife was expected to be a companion to her
husband, not simply bearer of children and manageress of the hou¬
sehold after the Athenian fashion. She has broadly the same educ¬
ation and interests, and indeed, failure of companionship is
sometimes cited by men as cause for divorce. I have noted already
the place of the household and the participation of the wife in
social life at Rome. Rome has prostitutes but not hetaerae.
For boys, puberty begins a period of adolescence. The legal
minimum age for this is 14» The father gives the boy his toga of
adulthood, and registers him with the "tribe" as a citizen. The
boy now begins to be introduced to public affairs, and to begin
physical training preparatory for military training. He may also
begin to go to brothels. Military service begins at age 17 - 18;
the age of marriage is about the same. In the Principate, milit¬
ary service becomes a salaried career. It also becomes incompat¬
ible with marriage, though I have discussed the alternatives
above. Augustus introduced a quasi-military youth organization,
the Augustales, for boys. But the final age of adulthood for men
is not until 25« It is at this age, for instance, that an orphan
finally ends his guardianship, and it is generally only at this
age that a man is considered capable of conducting his own - or
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public - affairs.
As outlined in previous sections, the son does not finally
inherit or become free of paternal authority until his paterfam¬
ilias' death. However his adulthood is not deferred on that
account. Rather he is set up in his own household with an interim
devolution of property or an allowance, at about age 18. It is on
this basis that he marries. For the next few years he acquires
increasing autonomy and involvement in public affairs, until age
25. In our period, the arrangements for daughters are not dissim¬
ilar, for the girl married sine manu does not pass under her hus¬
band' s domestic authority. But typically neither does she remain
under the authority of her father. Rather he will emancipate her
to the control of a tutor, and he will also give her an interim
devolution or an allowance in the same way as an adult son. (How¬
ever her husband will control her dowry.) The elements- of control
here are something of a formality, and she is given increasing
involvement and autonomy in the management of her own affairs.
The age 25 then has something of the same significance for a
woman as for a man.
These comments focus on the citizenry. At the level of the
urban proletariat, craft skills are reproduced at least partly by
the influx (and freeing) of trained slaves. Beyond this, workshop
and household are little differentiated, and training comes sim¬
ply through inductance, whether as child, slave or apprentice.
Household and farm slaves will have learnt their work in the same
kind of way. Presumably this applies to prostitution also, for
the brothel is simply a workshop (as an inn is a household). How¬
ever, some girls were given a more sheltered and cultured upbring¬
ing, to fit them to be mistresses or concubines.
Slave-girls brought up in their masters' households are lik¬
ely to have started their sexual-reproductive careers at puberty,
either with the sons of the household or with other slaves. This
would be favoured rather than controlled, since it increased the
master's wealth, and made for a more amenable workforce. The
arrangements of slave families and concubinage have already been
discussed.
Sexuality
Discussing marriage above in relation to citizenship and
legitimacy, I noted its character as a private compact between
familias, and also the lack of a clearly defined boundary with
concubinage. In this discussion, the focus is on the marital sex¬
ual relationship, but these wider factors are still relevant. T'he
traditionalist view of marriage as being for the procreation of
legitimate children is at best obsolete by our period. Rather it
is the companionship between husband and wife that requires to be
stressed: they are educated into the same culture and share a
common social life, there being no seclusion of women and the
domestic household being used as a place of entertainment. Roman
men would generally have sexual experience prior to marriage,
with prostitutes and/or mistresses. But this would not continue
during the marriage. Rather Roman men built sexual relationships
with their wives and indeed, seem to have done this on the model
of their relationships with their mistresses, stressing mutual
emotional commitment and love. For their side, Roman wives seem
to have responded by learning skills of lovemaking, and techni¬
ques of fertility limitation, bhen Roman wives are accused by the
traditionalists of lasciviousness, it is probably this rather
than actual adultery or promiscuity that is in question. The mar¬
ital relationship however probably does remain coloured by the
husband's greater age and experience.
Adultery and fornication I have already discussed in the
context of the Augustan legislation. Broadly, this interdicts
irregular sexual relations between citizen partners, while leav¬
ing sexual relations of whatever kind with (or between) non-cit¬
izen partners unregulated. Though citizen women's conduct is more
narrowly controlled than men's, they are left free, for example,
to take a male concubine, even one of low status. (They also have
sexual access in practice to male slaves within the household,
whatever the law may say.) The point here is that in the Late
Republic, the Romans were no longer distinguishing between the
various kinds of sexual relationship: marriage, adultery, love-
affair with citizen or non-citizen, mistresses or concubines, etc.
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Almost all of Roman love-poetry comes from this period; for a
time it "becomes a typical face of Roman culture. Yet it is im¬
possible to specify who it is and is not written for. As I have
noted, the character of the marital sexual relationship is per¬
manently affected by this state of affairs.
Men also had concubines and mistresses. There are a whole
range of forms here: quasi-marriage with a non-citizen or a cit¬
izen of very unequal status; an older man with a favourite slave-
girl in his household; a slave-prostitute rented on long contract
from her owner, or bought outright and set up in her own house¬
hold, under the care of slaves provided by her lover; a love-
affair with an actress or mime in which economic exchange might
be more or less of a formal element, etc. Again there are other
forms: the soldiers' marriage discussed earlier, and indeed, sim¬
ply informal unions between low status persons. All these relat¬
ionships might be emotionally committed and lasting, and also
they might be productive of children. They remain a permanent
feature of Roman society. The Augustan legislation certainly had
no intention to eliminate them, only to keep citizen marriage
distinct.
Prostitution, like marriage, rather shades into the above.
Rome has no hetaerae, as I have commented before, but some slave
girl-children were brought up to become mistresses, given a cult¬
ural education comparable to that of the citizen girl. If a rich
young man fell in love with such a girl, he could be made to pay
a high price to buy her. This is a common theme in the Roman
theatre, though it comes from Hellenistic and Athenian New Com¬
edy. The situation however seems to have been common to both the
Hellenistic and the Roman worlds. More commonly, however, pros¬
titutes at Rome were the girls of the brothels; also inns, tav¬
erns, cooked food shops, the baths, and simply the streets and
arches. Their clientele were mostly the poor, the young, and the
itinerant (e.g. sailors). The girls themselves were mostly slav¬
es, freedx\Tomen, and the poorest citizens. Although the sources
generally speak of Greeks and Orientals, it is possible that they
"protest too much"; in the Late Republic there was certainly an
influx of destitute Roman and Italian citizen girls to the cities,
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and little other way for them to survive. Despite the squalor of
their conditions - common to the urban poor in the Roman world -
what impression we have, for example from the Pompeian graffiti,
suggests robustness rather than misery (however this is somewhat
later, 1st century A.D»). Prostitutes were registered with the
magistrates (indeed, for a short period after the Augustan legis¬
lation was introduced, some high status women sought to evade it
by registering as prostitutes). Prostitution will be considered
again in the discussion of sexual economic divisions below.
Homosexuality is a matter which strongly illustrates Roman
ambivalence towards Greek cultures- initially it was very much
condemned, though it came to be more accepted in time. In the
Late Republic, the law basically forbade homosexual intercourse
between freeborn citizens, but permitted it with a slave or freed
partner. The Augustan legislation reinforced this by prescribing
the death penalty - most exceptional, since "capital" punishment
for those of high status was usually exile. In practice, however,
homosexuality became openly practised by the 2nd century A.D.,
including apparently by certain emperors, for example Hadrian
(117 - 139 A.D.)» Male brothels.and homosexual prostitution were
always common, as were favourite household slave-boys. Eunuchs
often were favoured; Domitian (82 - 97 A.D.) forbade castration
liithin the Empire, but the importation of eunuchs (e.g. from
Persia) continued. All this illustrates a lasting characteristic
of homosexuality in Graeco-Roman Antiquity, that it was conceived
not as physically mutual but as an active partner's use of a
passive partner. This is in contrast to heterosexual intercourse:
erotic art often shows the woman astride the man. Domitian also
interdicted the prostitution of boys aged under 7« Inter alia,
this suggests to me that sex with girl-children was not a Roman
predilection. Again, I have not heard of cliterodectomy in the
Roman world. Of lesbianism almost nothing is known.
The treatment of sex in Roman religion and culture has dif¬
ferent levels, which are not always easy to identify and define.
There are strong themes of sexuality, fertility and reproduction
in the religion and mythology, and these also inform for example
literature and theatre. This holds for the indigenous Roman forms
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as well as for later imported Greek and oriental material. On the
other hand, Roman monumental art tends to be rather sexually
reticent, and this extends to comparable literary work, such as
Virgil's Aeneid. Roman ambivalence towards Greek culture shows
again here: for the Greeks, nudity was the mark of divinity,
while the Romans were rather shocked and embarrassed by it. But
the boundaries are hard to draw: drama, for example, turned in¬
creasingly from a performed to a written art as the Republic
ended, though older plays continued to be staged, especially the
comedies of sexual intrigue which I referred to above. Mime and
farce became increasingly popular; they often used sexual and
erotic themes. Love-poetry almost all comes from the last century
of the Republic; I have outlined the context above. This in the
end fell foul of Augustus* disapproval. In all this, the emper-
or's role as People's Tribune must be remembered: this dignifies
the demotic arts such as mime and farce and makes them a state
function, while rather keeping purely literary culture with its
patrician overtones at arms-length. In private entertainment, the
Romans enjoyed for example erotic dancing girls. Again, household
artifacts such as lamps have paintings of lovers on them. On the
whole, then, sexual themes, though deemed inappropriate to cer¬
tain kinds of context, feature strongly in Roman culture.
Sexual ambience is hard to discuss itfithout undue subjectiv¬
ity. Nevertheless, some points seem clear: the Romans from the
very beginning of the Late Republic developed a preference for
emotionally committed and physically mutual heterosexual relat¬
ionships, whether in marriage or out of it. They accepted an
asymmetry of power - the slave or even the freedwoman was not
really free to refuse her master - but they did not believe in
absolute or arbitrary power, and I doubt that they would have
valued an unconsenting partner. This probably applies even in
homosexual relations. However it is very much to the point that
the Romans preferred heterosexual intercourse because of its
physical mutuality, and because a female partner was (for them)
an active partner. (V-hy they made of homosexuality what they did
is another question.) It may be added that, though the Romans
could be immensely cruel, they do not seem to have had a specif-
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ically sexual cruelty. Cruelty is rather an outgrowth of their
military and legal arrangements. Something on this can be said
in the next section.
Aggression
All the Ancient Civilization is oriented to war, but at Rome
in our period this has two contrasting phases: the expansions and
conquests of the Late Republic, and the defensive consolidation
of the Principate. Ultimately, as I discuss elsewhere (Appendix A
parts i & ii below), this last is the pacification, and therefore
the ending, of the Ancient World. The slave-trade rises and falls
with these two phases; pacification is much of the reason why the
slave-trade fails, starting with Pompey's elimination of the Med¬
iterranean pirates.
Warfare is an exclusively male domain, based on training
above all in disciplined infantry formation movement, though also
in weaponcraft. Women are victims of war, especially through be¬
ing taken and sold as slaves. They are also similarly victims of
piracy and coastal raiding; these indeed are the major sources of
the slave-trade. The pacification of the Roman world then is very
much to women's advantage, permitting greater freedom of movement
as well as greater security at home. This develops progressively
from the last half-century of the Republic, and peaks in the 2nd
century A.D.
From the Late Republic, public entertainments came to have
increasing importance at Rome, and in the Cities of the West.
These are of various kinds: chariot-racing, theatre, wild beast
shows, gladiatorial fights, etc. Of these, chariot racing ttfas by
far the most popular and frequent - this in fact is the Roman
"circus". These public entertainments were free to all. Initially
they were provided by the rich and powerful, later almost wholly
by the Princeps himself, at least at Rome. They were sometimes
used for the execution of criminals of lower status: by wild
beasts, by fire or by weapons. Women were included in this, but
specifically sexual cruelty does not seem to have been typical.
However, bestiality is a theme in Graeco-Roman mythology, and
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attempts might have "been made to stage it. Besides this, volunt¬
ary women gladiators are exceptionally found in Flavian times
(69 - 97 A.D.); they may have fought with dummy weapons. More
significant than this is the attendance of women at the public
entertainments, for the presence of the Princeps (or the provinc¬
ial governor) was an opportunity for petitions and public demands.
This is a growing dimension of citizenship in which women have a
practical share, (indeed, it is apparently - especially in the
theatre - the origin of the later Blues and Greens of Byzantium.)
Citizenship as such, as noted earlier, is a complex of pol¬
itical-legal rights, property ownership, and military service,
and in principle this is something that should, as at Athens,
exclude women entirely. Indeed, in theory, women are subject to
lifelong guardianship, of their menfolk or an appointed tutor,
incapable of any legally valid act and answerable for their con¬
duct to their familias. In Rome, however, all this has already
begun to erode by the start of our period. Marriage sine manu
takes the wife out of her father's household without putting her
under her husband's authority and again, most paterfamilias
passed control of their adult daughter's affairs to a tutor. The
tutor's duties are only to intervene in transactions affecting
res mancipi; other transactions are at her own discretion. Besid¬
es, women soon aquire the right to approach the praetor to have
their tutor's interdict over-ruled, or to have another tutor
appointed. In time, the guardianship of women becomes an empty
form; the jurisconsult Gaius, writing in the 2nd century A.D.,
derides it.
There is a corresponding development of legal personality.
In the Roman Republic, as at Athens, there is little distinction
of legal and political institutions. One brings a case by approa¬
ching the praetor, who legally defines the issues and appoints a
panel of judges. There is no state prosecutor, and the difference
between private and public law is rather that between the cases
that one may only bring in one's own behalf, and those that any¬
one may bring "in the public interest", that is as citizen pros¬
ecutor. Sulla (circa B.C. 85) also introduced permanent (standing)
jury courts for certain laws which any citizen prosecutor could
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approach; the system was kept, and the Augustan laws were of this
kind. Initially, women could not bring cases in their own person.
But in time, this was softened: the principle became accepted
that women could bring cases where the matter concerned themsel¬
ves or their families, and indeed that women could even act as
citizen prosecutors in certain matters such as treason. These
developments come in the course of the Principate; some time be¬
fore this, the testability of women seems to have been establish¬
ed. But most significant of all is the development with the early
Principate of the "extraordinary jurisdictions": the hearing of
cases by the Princeps, the provincial governors, or the new mag¬
istrate-administrators of Rome and Italy, the prefects. All this
could be on appeal, on referral, or on first instance. Here women
appear to have had just the same access as men, and on cases of
all kinds, and they did in fact make up a very fair part of the
business (see e.g. Millar 1977 P 546 et seq).
Corresponding developments can be seen in the matter of
women's criminousness. Initially, this was a matter for the fem-
ilia not for the state, not only in such matters as adultery but
also in public crimes such as treason. The matter would be heard
by a family council. Even if a public trial was held, the woman
would still be handed over to her menfolk for punishment. But in
the Late Republic this appears to become largely unworkable,
presumably because of the changes in household authority and
guardianship, and Augustus made no attempt to restore it: his
moral legislation puts even women's sexual conduct into the pub¬
lic sphere. In the Principate, women generally faced the same
courts and magistrates as men, and the same range of penalties -
fines, exile, the mines (where they ground ore), the arena. In¬
cidentally, the avoidance on shedding women's blood - execution
by strangulation or starvation - also appears to become obsolete
from this time.
Rape and abduction in Roman society are only considered a
crime against menfolk where a slave is at issue - and this can
entail a woman owner. It can also be a matter of the voluntary
absconsion of a slave, for example to live with a partner. Pith
a free woman however the charge for rape is vis, unlawful force.
43S/
The woman herself can bring the case, or any citizen prosecutor
may do so. This is so at least since the time of Julius Caesar.
However, it remains a fact that at Rome the small person needs a
patron. There was also at least a legal argument of Republican
times that prostitutes and actresses could be legally abducted.
However the collegia of actresses and mimes acted here to protect
their members' personal security.
Sexual Divisions
Power
As I have indicated earlier, the Roman Empire is basically a
congeries of semi-autonomous City-states, within a loose overall
provincial system, whereby the Roman military commander also has
a supervisory jurisdiction over the local City magistrates. There
is historical development. Sulla separated the provincial govern¬
orships from the Roman magistracies, creating proconsuls and pro¬
praetors. Augustus, while basically continuing this system, kept
control of the frontier provinces, and the supreme military comm¬
and, in his own hands -the office of proconsul, with the tribun¬
ate, is the constitutional basis of the Principate. He also, in
effect, made Italy into the City-state of Rome, controlled through
a small number of prefects under his own control, the Roman City
magistracies becoming largely nominal. The Senate too becomes
increasingly acclamatory rather than advisory in character with
the development of the Principate. But the major point is the
hierarchy of jurisdictions into which, as noted in the previous
section, the new structure of the Principate became incorporated.
This far more than bureaucracy typifies Roman administration.
The developments in citizenship I have outlined in the pre¬
vious section. The process might be described as, on the one
side, loss of the military and political dimension of citizenship
for men, on the other side, gain of the legal dimension of citiz¬
enship for women. But here the rise of the extraordinary juris¬
dictions, and of the "extraordinary political expression" at the
public entertainments, should be remembered. As to magistracies,
these apparently remained entirely male. A small number of women
magistrates are known from the provincial Cities of the East, and
this had also occurred in Hellenistic times, but our source of
knowledge here is local coin issue, and we do not have this sour¬
ce for the best. Moreover in both their political location and
their institutions and offices the Cities of the East are some¬
what different: the Cities are initially at least islands of
Greeks in seas of Orientals, and the gymnasium with its office of
gymnasiarch is (or was) central. It is this office that women
sometimes held, apparently on the basis of their wealth. But with
incorporation in wider kingdoms and assimilation to the surround¬
ing peoples the Cities' institutions often became empty forms,
and the offices sinecural. By contrast, the Western Cities and
their magistracies remain very much the basic legal and administ¬
rative structure for all the people of the Western Empire. The
presence of women magistrates here would be remarkable.
The emperors themselves were invariably male, and their
womenfolk had no political function as such, only religious func¬
tions. Again, intermarriage with imperial women apparently had no
significance for the succession (nor was there intermarriage with
foreign, for instance Persian, royalty.) The women of the Severan
era (193 - 235 A.D.) are exceptional in their overt political
involvement, but individual (historical) rather than sociological
factors seem to be at work here. Again, the provincial governors
and the prefects in Italy and P.ome are invariably male. Here, as
with the Princeps himself, these offices lie in a career struct¬
ure that is interfused with the offices of military command.
There is no specifically non-military administrative career - a
heritage from the City-state, of course, though more widely a
factor of the orientation of the Ancient Civilization to war and
to non-peaceful economic activity. Thus there is no question of
a participation of women.
Bureaucracy at Rome was slovr to develop, and never becomes
extensive during the Principate. The Republic, like Athens, had
no bureaucracy. The beginning of the state bureaucracy iv'as simply
Caesar's household slaves; later those of Augustus. In the time
of Claudius, specific bureaus were developed for various state
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functions, manned, now by imperial freedmen. In the 2nd century, a
career service manned at its upper levels by equestrians was in¬
stituted, but it remained tiny, a few hundred posts only. In all
this, no systematic distinction was made between the imperial
provinces and the Princeps' own private estates, and these in
turn might lie in either imperial or senatorial provinces. The
Princeps* officials then might be used as inspectors or be given
special commissions within the senatorial provinces; this was
part of the reason why the senatorials hated the imperial freed¬
men so much. Eut again, all these officials are invariably male.
The underlying principle seems to be that estate supervision
beyond the household is a male domain. Only household supervis¬
ion, or supervision of a workshop of female labour, is the domain
of women. This is a reflection of the sexual division of labour
in the oikos. This principle would apply even when a woman was
the estate owner.
Religion at Rome divides between state cult and popular sot-
eriologies, though with the tribunary nature of the Principate
the distinction becomes hard to maintain. But despite this, Rome
never has a state-sanctioned soteriology comparable to the Eleus-
inian Mysteries at Athens. In fact, the Princeps was also chief
priest of the Roman state cult: pontifex maximus. The priestesses
of the state cult were originally the Vestal Virgins, Vesta being
the hearth goddess of the City. Their status was quasi-magister¬
ial (in some respects at least), though their sexual conduct was
strictly controlled". In the Principate, the state cult was exten¬
ded (in the West) by the cult of Roma and the emperor's genius,
and also the cults of deified men and women of the imperial hous¬
es. This created priesthoods and priestesships at both City and
provincial level. Besides this, there were also the soteriologic-
al cults. These tended to be Eastern imports, and they also tend¬
ed to syncretize, broadly equivalent deities from different reg¬
ions becoming equated and assimilated to each other.
Prominent here are the goddesses of sex, fertility, mother¬
hood and agriculture: Magna Mater, Cybele, I sis, et al. For a
time I sis becomes one of the most important deities of the Empire
(favoured mostly by wives and mothers, incidentally, not by cour-
tesans). There are male equivalents, notably Mithras (favoured by
soldiers and administrators, and largely exclusive of women).
There is no Church here, only local cults (the Church is a Chris¬
tian innovation, based probably on the Jewish Diaspora). All this
has imperial acknowledgement, although it never becomes state
religion - there is no such thing, until Christian times. But
although even female deities tend to have priests as well as
priestesses, there is something of an advance in female power
here, until Christian times. But Christianity made no advance in
the West within our period.
Economy
I present an outline of the basic structure of the ancient
economy elsewhere (Appendix A part ii), and at the beginning of
the present chapter I have given an outline of Roman economic
history. In particular, I have pointed to the contrast of the
expropriation of the peasantry and marginalization of the urban
proletariat in Italy in the Late Republic with the re-establish¬
ment of the peasantry and amelioration of conditions for the urb¬
an proletariat throughout the West in the Principate, relating
this to the rise and fall of the slave-trade and the slave-worked
ranch, and likewise of Roman political capitalism. These things
affected the position of women mainly in terms of demographic
processes, and this I have already discussed in earlier sections.
They also condition sexual economic divisions, which is the focus
here: divisions especially in property and in labour. Here howev¬
er it is the basic structural categories of oikos and market that
have the greatest importance, and the fundamental changes (also
outlined earlier) are the separation and disengagement of the
several senses of "familia", and their remoteness from actual
household structure. These changes are already in place when our
period begins.
The first issue is the guardianship of women. This, as in
all classical Antiquity, is a concommittant of a citizenship of
military-political-legal character based on the property endow¬
ment (especially in farming property) of the lineage. Citizenship
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is initially a sphere from which women are wholly excluded in
their own persons, as I have already shown. Yet with this it
should "be noted that strictly the control of the lineage's econ¬
omic affairs is solely in the hands of its head - kyrios or pat¬
erfamilias. Roman forms in particular highlight that it is not
only women whose competence is restricted: so also is that of
adult sons. But however that may he, at Rome from the beginning
of the Early Republic the principle that a woman's economic act¬
ions are limited to the oikos, that she cannot transact between
the oikos and the wider world, is progressively eroded. In the
first place, it is only dealings in res mancipi that are so re¬
stricted - land and houses on Italic soil, slaves and some categ¬
ories of farming livestock. All other transactions she can make
at her own discretion, although again her dowry is always managed
for her by husband, father or guardian. But this does not apply
to property acquired by inheritance or through her own transact¬
ions. Secondly, the form of control, especially with the rise of
marriage sine manu, is not direct constant supervision by husband
or father, but only that a tutor is appointed who may intervene
in her transactions when needful to protect her familias' proper¬
ty. With this, women soon acquire the right to appeal to the mag¬
istrates against their tutors' decisions, and also acquire a
degree of choice and control as to who their tutor should be.
Thirdly, the Augustan laws freed some categories of women alto¬
gether from guardianship, and other provisions and individual
grants widened this. In all, then, as I have said before, by the
2nd century A.D. the guardianship of women is an empty form -
although the form itself does persist.
Guardianship aside, the property rights of Roman women were
little restricted. The basic Roman inheritance laws (intestate
succession) divided the estate between the sons and daughters in
equal shares, although marriage cum manu ended the daughter's
inheritance rights in her familia of origin. Married sine manu,
however, her dowry did not affect her inheritance rights, though
it might have to be taken into account in the division of the
estate. The equal inheritance of daughters was always Roman prac¬
tice, and it is hard to say whyj again, there was no epiklerate
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at Rome. Possibly one should look at Greek practices as adjust¬
ments to the limited land supply and the pressures to equitable
sharing. Roman expansion and continuing patrician-oligarchic dom¬
inance would make for a different outcome. At any rate, consider¬
able fortunes began to come into women* s hands in the aftermath
of the 2nd Punic War; a law restricting inheritances to women was
only a brief and unsuccessful experiment. Wealthy women are comm¬
on in Roman society throughout our period. As to the devolution
of their property, the initial principle is agnatic inheritance:
the woman's property goes back to her familia of origin. Rut in
our period, both the woman's right to make a will and inheritance
by cognates - her husband and children - come to be established,
more particularly in the 2nd century A.D. when the process of
making a will is simplified. In this century, inheritance even
for illegitimate children (i.e. from their intestate mother) be¬
comes established. Perhaps however we should see this as less a
change from agnatic to cognatic principles than from collective
to individual principles, in view of the wider pattern of changes
in women's position.
Women* s work within the household includes wet-nursing and
child-care, kitchen help and general domestic service, care of
clothes and personal attendance. All of this is typically done by
slaves, and since an element of status and conspicuous consumpt-?
ion is involved, precise functions cannot always be identified.
Public aquaducts limit the needs for water-carrying; again, bread
and clothing are both produced in the market as well as in the
household. Cook slaves tend to be male, though again cooked food
is bought in the market by the poorer (whose flats typically lack
cooking ranges). Literate slaves include secretaries and librar¬
ians. These might be female, especially for a woman owner; gener¬
ally the sexual division of labour is cross-cut by the woman's
preference for women slaves in certain functions. A large house¬
hold might have its own midwives. In the country estates, the
household functions are basically the same, while men do the bulk
of the field-work. But women may do a limited amount of field-
work too, and certainly women accompany the men who follow the
herds, as their cooks and camp attendants.
Women in business on a large scale are known; they include a
haulage contractor and a lead pipe works owner. Renting out prop¬
erty and money-lending at interest are also known, though women
were forbidden to engage in large-scale banking. Claudius encour¬
aged women to fit out ships for the Roman corn trade, offering
freedom from guardianship to those who did so. All these cases
are a matter of freedwomen (mostly) directly engaged in affairs,
not citizen women merely investing in them.
In the market, women's work includes: spinning, weaving,
dyeing, fulling, making and mending clothes. (An unanswered ques¬
tion, for all Antiquity, is: who made the sails for ships?) Women
were also beauticians and hairdressers, midwives and physicians -
the latter often specializing in gynaecology. (Physicians however
do not have high status at Rome.) Women also ground grain; indeed
they ground ore at the mines, though that is typically a criminal
punishment. All of this is conditioned by work in the household,
and often these are slaves "living away" and paying body-rent, or
freedwomen practising the same crafts as they had as slaves in
the household. Either way they are still part of the familia. Of
all these crafts, only spinning, ladies' hairdressing and midwif¬
ery seem to be actual female monopolies. Workshops of mixed lab¬
our, apparently on a family basis, are known in for example text¬
iles. Women in the market are also shopkeepers, selling clothing,
fish, meat, vegetables, dyes and perfumes, sometimes nails and
other craft products made perhaps by their menfolk; also cooked
food, wine and girls.
Prostitution is simply part of this. The girls themselves
might be slave, freed or free; girl children exposed by citizen
parents were often taken and raised for prostitution. Again, in
the Late Republic the women of the expropriated Italian peasantry
must often have been forced into prostitution by lack of alterna¬
tives; the sources surely "protest too much" in insisting upon
Greeks, Syrians and Egyptians, although slaves and migrants from
the East certainly became common. Again, in the Principate slave-
prostitutes were imported from Persia and India. As to work plac¬
es, the prostitute might rent a room at an inn or a brothel, or
she might be attached to the premises; again, she might work at
a tavern or cooked food shop, or at the baths, or simply in the
streets and arches. She might either await custom or actively
solicit: prostitutes wore distinctive clothing, the toga, often
in flimsy materials and bright colours. The workplace itself is
basically simply a household/workshop; there is nothing distinct¬
ive here except perhaps a demand for privacy. Direct supervision
is not characteristic of Roman labour; probably the slaves here
are "living away" and paying body rent, and thus are effectively
on the same terms as the freed or free women. Again, the brothel
seems to be a place of work rather than a place of residence, and
there do not seem to be closed houses. There are also male homo¬
sexual prostitutes. Ancient prostitution is not criminalized and
is not characterized by "protection"; rather at Rome clientela is
very much part of mainstream society. Slave-prostitutes may be
owned by women; indeed it is the common ambition of the artisan
in classical Antiquity at least to buy a slave to take over one's
work and retire.
Owning brothels was a recognized business investment, but
owning prostitutes carried civil disabilities. Again, in the mid-
2nd century A.D. a law was passed forbidding the sale of a slave-
girl to a whoremaster without cause. Oddly, there are similar
provisions in regard to gladiators, providing both civil disabil¬
ities for the owner and protection for slaves against sale to
such without cause. Prostitutes were taxed, at the rate of one
customer's price per day. This tax is known only from the time of
Caligula, but a prostitutes' tax is a common fiscal resource in
Antiquity. A register of prostitutes had always been kept at Rome
by the magistrates. But the prostitutes' tax in the Empire was
farmed, as was the usual ancient practice.
The prostitutes' register included mistresses, but not act¬
resses, mimes, flute-girls or dancing-girls. These should not be
assumed to be prostitutes in disguise: they might make love and
they might accept gifts, but their own crafts were quite real and
were valued, whereas sexual intercourse itself was quite cheap.
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S tratification
The economic structural division of oikos and market is bas¬
ic to the stratificatory system of the Roman world, the oikos
grounding a set of status-categories and the market a basic class
location. It is doubtful if there is a real differentiation of
classes, in the sense of a real differentiation of life-chances
in terms of market position. Rather success in the market leads
to leaving the market, as when the profits from a successful
trading venture are invested in land. The urban proletariat of
Antiquity is basically one class, though divided by status con¬
siderations, in particular those between free, freed and slave.
Against this, the market does create property classes, and with
them class struggles over usury and debt-slavery, and the exprop¬
riation of the peasantry. This has bearing for the Italian peas¬
antry in the 2nd century B.C. But mostly stratificatory struggles
in Antiquity are status struggles, over citizenship.
As to the status order, this in the City-state is firstly
the divisions of free, slave, and foreigner, and secondly^ the
grades of citizenship: equites, assidui and proles. (The terras
I have used for general sociological purposes, patrician, pleb¬
eian and proletarian, actually derive from early Roman history;
this is a source of potential confusion. The above are equival¬
ents for the beginning of the Late Republic.) As the City-state
develops to Empire however, the status system changes, as I have
indicated before: equites separate into senatorials and equest¬
rians, a provincial aristocracy of decurions emerges, and below
this level, the distinction of citizen and foreigner largely dis¬
appears, except in regard to the legions. In all, the distinction
that emerges in the Principate is that between honestiores and
humiliores, the former comprising senatorials, equestrians, dec¬
urions and legionary veterans; the latter comprising the rest.
This distinction, though perhaps not legally defined, nonetheless
has legal consequences, for example in the forms of legal penalt¬
ies: an honestior would be exiled where a humilior would be exec¬
uted in the arena. More broadly, the honestiores are the politic¬
al-military citizens of the Empire, although a purely legal cit-
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izenship is now universal.
Relating sexual divisions to the above, it is perhaps hard
to find class differences. Life-chances on the market do not seem
to be much affected by sex, for all that there is a sexual divis¬
ion of labour. Prostitution and wet-nursing are the major except¬
ion to this, especially in the Late Republic, when they are loc¬
ated in actual processes of class-struggle. Rather it is status
difference that is obvious: the exclusion of women in the Roman
City-state from citizenship. Man and woman, then, like slave and
free are statuses, and strongly differentiated as such. But it ia
precisely this that changes as the City-state develops into the
Empire: on the one side, the political-military citizenship of
men erodes; on the other side, women increasingly acquire legal
citizenship. Thus status differentiation as between men and women
is progressively dissolved. This is more true at the level of
the humiliores, who have only a legal citizenship, and less true
at the level of the honestiores, who still have some elements of
a political-military citizenship. But the overall tendency is to
status equality of the sexes.
Corollary to this is a change in the status distinctions
specific to women themselves: those between the citizen wife and
mother and the concubine, mistress and prostitute. This resonates
with the distinctive class location of prostitutes and wet-nurses
noted above. Again, it is this status distinction that the Augus¬
tan legislation is directed to preserving. Even so, it seems that
the distinction very much dissolves into the broad distinction of
honestiores and humiliores. Compounding this too, the resolution
of the class struggles with the Principate tends to dissolve the
distinctive class location of the prostitute and wet-nurse; they
simply become humiliores women in the market.
It may be commented finally that political action in Antiqu¬
ity, where it is not centred on land redistribution and the can¬
cellation of debts, is very much focussed on political-legal
status and citizenship. Women's liberation is always conceivable
in classical Antiquity, though its touchstone, as Plato saw, is
actually putting women in the army. Short of this, Rome in our
period made a very fair and increasing range of concessions. This
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(coming on top of the earlier status distinctions among women) is
probably why there is no development of a women's liberation mov¬
ement in Roman history.
Conclusion
The position of women in Roman society is hard to evaluate,
due to the depth and complexity of Roman history. The basic in¬
stitutions are originally those of a City-state, but very little
is known of the history of Rome at that time. When a secure hist¬
ory can be established, say from the 3rd century B.C., Rome has
already become very much more complex. Again, the developing
Empire is made up of diverse elements, and there is above all the
difference of the Greek East and the Roman West, in social arran¬
gements and in culture. And again, Roman history goes on beyond
the period that I have considered here, into the Dominate and the
Christian era. So far as this develops rather from the Greek
East, and indeed from the preceding Hellenistic world, I have
said little of it. Broadly, though, it appears that women's pos¬
ition in the Dominate deteriorated, and that Christianity contri¬
buted to that deterioration.
But the main point that I want to make here is that it is
possible to make a false evaluation of the condition of Roman
women by comparing certain obvious factors of the 1st century
B.C. - the prevalence of marriage sine manu, the love-poetry, the
political activities of certain upper strata women - with the
reconstructed early City-state, or simply with Roman historio-
graphical tradition on the Early Republic. Equally, it is possib¬
le to disillusion oneself by exposing the falsity of this eval¬
uation. As against this, what I have tried to do here is to est¬
ablish what were the actual basic institutions of the secure per¬
iod of Roman history, the Late Republic and the Principate. in the
Roman West, especially as regards political, legal and military,
arrangements, citizenship, its property basis, its conditions of
acquisition and transmission, etc. And I have tried to set this
in the context of economic and demographic history.
Broadly, I find that the position of Roman women is not a
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matter for scepticism. Especially contextualizing this study with.-
studies of "both Athens and Egypt, it can "be seen that there is a
pattern to the Roman developments - no question of "decadence".
And it can he seen that the emancipation of Roman women is not
located in an ephemeral superstructure that is contradicted hy
material realities. Very simply, it is a question of citizenship,
and they got it.
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Conclusions
In a sense, this thesis does not reach conclusions: it is
simply an exploration. Its project is to see what can be done in
the way of gender theory using certain methodologies and resour¬
ces, centrally the sociology of Max Weber. There is no claim that
anything definitive has been achieved; on the contrary, this is
only a preliminary reconnaissance within a restricted substantive
arena. Still, for the sake of completeness something in the way
of a conclusion should be provided.
Basically, then, what I have done is to propose two types of
society, in terms of contrasting syndromes of gender arrangements:
reproduction societies and procreation societies. In the first,
the human biology of sexual polarity is made problematic, requir¬
ing to be controlled and contained; in the second, it is made un-
problematic, taken as nature and accepted. I have traced these
contrasting orientations through a.wide range of social practices
in regard to motherhood, childhood and adolescence, sexual relat¬
ionships, etc. With this, there goes in the first case a sharp
social differentiation of men and women, and women are kept with¬
in male domestic authority and dependence within the household
and out of public life. In the second case, the social different¬
iation of the sexes is softer and women are more independent, and
are citizens and participate in the community on much the same
basis as men. The pattern of division of economic functions be¬
tween the sexes is shaped to accord with these alternatives# But
these are differences ultimately of degree: there is a universal
exclusion of women from military and political affairs and from
administration which underlies both patterns.
I have identified these two contrasting syndromes with two
major contrasted types of historical society: the City-state and
the Bureaucratic Kingdom. This is within the substantive limits
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of Antiquity. But I have further identified the syndromes on
theoretical grounds through these societal types with two broad
streams of general societal typologization: polities of charism-
atically legitimated domination (charismatic polities) and polit¬
ies of traditionally legitimated domination (traditional polit¬
ies) . I have given some indications as to how the structural con¬
flicts of each of the two types City-state and Bureaucratic King¬
dom lead over into each other, or into other types of society not
yet studied. The implication is that the Weberian approach to
gender should be pursued in terms of a general typology of domin¬
ation systems - patrimonial states, feudal states, etc.
I have also considered the political conflicts within City-
states of patrician and plebeian dominance - oligarchy and demo¬
cracy. I have shown that patrician dominance makes for an inform¬
al political participation of patrician women with an attendant
introduction into the community, and a permissive attitude to¬
wards sexuality centring on prostitution - a softening of the
characteristic reproductive pattern.
As to the overall position of women in the Ancient Civiliz¬
ation itself, the basic point that I would make is that it all
seems terribly familiar. The patterns of social arrangements, and
their contrasts, developments and changes, seem to be broadly of
the same order as those of the recent and modern world. I have
discussed some of the methodological and theoretical issues en¬
tailed in this above (chapter 2); it is now possibly to be more
definite. It is doubtful whether the position of women in modern¬
ity is unique. Women's emancipation occurs as a factor of bureau¬
cratic domination, and this has arisen in various World-historic¬
al locations. If there seems to be anything distinctive about the
modern case, this is surely because the rational-legal polity
gives greater scope to bureaucracy than the traditional polity
does, though bureaucratization may come as a fairly late develop¬
ment. It also gives less scope to charisma than does the charism¬
atic polity, since the political community is now rational-legal¬
ly defined, and again, since the political parties themselves
tend to be bureaucratized. As against this, most of what I earl¬
ier termed the "cliche factors" of the sociological diagnosis of
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modernity - democratization, industrialization, secularization,
etc. - seem to have no fundamental bearing on the matter. This
should be qualified: in view of the Judaeo-Christian tradition
on women and sex (see Appendix A part iv above) it is reasonable
to adduce secularization as a secondary factor in modern women's
emancipation. But as to democratization, the comparative histor¬
ical record indicates that of itself, democracy is inimical to
women* s autonomy. It appears rather that it is bureaucratization
that has brought women's penetration of democratic structures in
modernity, and this indeed is rather the trailing edge of modern
women's emancipation.
As for Capitalism, this apparently has nothing to do with
either women's emancipation or women's oppression: Capitalism is
indifferent to patriarchy and will survive equally well in any
gender environment. So also it is with the long term of socio¬
economic history: the position of women does not appear to be a
factor of the mode of production. Nor can this be by-passed by
invoking the realm of ideology.
It may as well also be spelt out that the traditional thesis
that tries to locate a decisive moment in the history of women's
oppression in terms of the transition from the primitive to the
civilized appears quite nonsensical in the light of actual study
of women's position in the Ancient Civilization. Egyptian women
are not oppressed in that kind of way, and Athenian society is
quite remote from the primitive; equally, the emancipation of
Roman women shows that no moment was decisive. The thesis is pure
speculation, and owes its survival entirely to the divisions
between sociology and anthropology - that and sheer inertia. As
an approach to the substantive record it is worthless.
The theoretical approach that I have developed works with
the material triad of power, demographics and the economy. In
this, the economy appears to play only the part of the anvil; it
is not an active factor. Different power systems entail different
demographic regimes, in accordance with their typical structural
conflicts: that is the heart of the matter. Central here is the
migration process, grounded in expropriation and itself the
ground for prostitution. The most simple case is rural-urban mig-
ration, but there is equally colonizatory emigration, and again
there is migrant including slave labour. The patterns of the two
types of society are in contrast in these matters: reproduction
societies emphasize the processes whereas procreation societies
ameliorate them. But the processes themselves can occur at any
level of economic development, at least wherever there are cities
and stratification systems within the geopolitical arena. As to
modernity, it is doubtful whether either the population explosion
or industrial technology makes any fundamental difference. At
least this should not be assumed, though further study might com¬
pel the modification of the views just expressed. The present
study, being located in the arena of Antiquity, is bound by the
category of non-peaceful economic action.
Even so, the overall orientation here as I have said is that
the key to women's history lies in a general typology of dominat¬
ion. "Patriarchy" is part of the sociology of power, on both his¬
torical and analytical grounds. As I have said, there is a univ¬
ersal exclusion of women from military, political and administra¬
tive affairs. I have tried to make this basic to gender sociol¬
ogy. I have also tried to account for its origins, in terms of an
embryonic conflict in the material triad: the economic, sexual
and parental arrangements of military groupings. It is a conflict
situation that Weber himself identifies, though he never tries to
base gender theory on it (Weber 1978 p 1119 - 20).
All this requires World-historical study, and in that anom¬
alies will certainly appear. The comparatively demilitarized,
rational-economic character of the medieval European Cities, and
the non-intensive character of the Imperial Chinese bureaucracy,
are two probable cases in point (see Weber 1978 p 1348 et seq;
Weber 1968 p 47 et seq). But staying here with modernity, the
"power thesis" does suggest a comparative structure rather than
a single category. For the typical Western polity of Rational
Capitalism can be seen very much in the light of the City-state,
which indeed comprises a distinctive and essential element (though
not the only element) in its aetiology. With this, the political
conflicts and the emergence of modern democracy itself can be
seen in the light of the conflicts of oligarchy and democracy
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in ancient and medieval City-states. Into this, "bureaucracy ent¬
ers as a late and intrusive element, with "Advanced" Capitalism.
By contrast, the State Socialist societies of Eastern Europe are
more comparable to premodern Bureaucratic Kingdoms; indeed many
of them arose out of Bureaucratic Empires on the threshold of
modernity (Austria, Russia). And with increasing bureaucratizat¬
ion Rational Capitalism too is developing in the same direction.
This structure then provides a "prediction" of the structure
of the history of modern women. On the one side, there is a grad¬
ual long-term change from the reproduction to the procreation
type in Rational Capitalist society on the time-scale of bureau¬
cratization - about the last 100 years. Overlying this long-term
development, there is an on-going cycle of oligarchic softening
and democratic hardening of the reproductive pattern, reflecting
the continuing political struggles of the strata. On the other
side, there is a long-established though developing procreation-
type situation in State Socialist society, characterized by the
absence of overlying cycles and by greater stability. The repro¬
ductive type features the exclusion of women from public life to
male domestic authority; the procreational type features women's
citizenship and participation in the community. A point that
might specially be noted here is the contrast of an exclusively
male citizenship of political participation with a citizenship of
legal rights and personality shared between the sexes. I would
suggest that contrasts and transformations here can be seen in
modernity much as in Antiquity. The cycle of oligarchic and demo¬
cratic dominance has impact primarily for permissiveness and re¬
pressiveness towards sexuality, focussing especially on prostit¬
ution, pornography, etc. However the procreational type is also
and more generally sexually permissive. The superimposition of
short-term cycles upon longer-term development accounts for the
difficulties in relating women's liberation and sexual liberation
in Rational Capitalist society - this indeed can be projected
back through all Western history. It should also be noted how
both women' rights and sexual freedom, like bureaucratization
itself, are only obliquely related to serious political discourse
- though they are certainly all targets for polemic.
All this is very rough; it would have to be qualified at
least by consideration of the differential impact of Protestant,
Oiatholic and Orthodox Christianity, and indeed perhaps Islam,
although most of the societies here would now be considered as
secularized. But the overall picture has I think a certain prima
facie validity - it seems to fit.
I leave the consideration of the "power thesis", and indeed
of the "material triad", there. As to long-term cultural develop¬
ment, there is less that I can say. Women's oppression is not an
ideological phenomenon and the Ancient Civilization is not ideol¬
ogically determined. Consequently, there is little systematic
consideration of ideological factors in the body of the above
text. The studies I have presented here may be basic for the
analysis of the development of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on
women and sex, but they are not enough to generate that analysis.
I have attempted a brief outline treatment of the issues in an
appendix, however (Appendix A part iv). But the religious tradit¬
ion has more bearing for medieval and early modern Europe than
for secularized modernity.
What should be considered for modernity is the "rationaliz¬
ation and bureaucratization" thesis - the death of value-oriented
politics. This indeed should be given fundamental reconsideration
in the light of gender theory, for gender is an important dimen¬
sion of social structure, and as such locates distinctive social
groups which participate in the struggles for control of the
state and for cultural presence (see above especially ch 7 Strat¬
ification). But while I can state this issue, I cannot as yet
resolve it.
The above remarks, however, are of necessity provisional in
character, for all that I have tried to give them clear and def¬
inite statement. For the present thesis is as I have said no more
than a first exploration of the possibilities of gender theory in
Weberian perspective. The study really needs to be carried
through on World-historical scale. In terms of Max Weber's work,
this comprises four major sectors: Antiquity, the Oriental civil¬
izations, medieval Europe and modernity. (The project of expand¬
ing Weber's historical base is another, though quite valid, ques-
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tion.) It is a basic methodological requirement that focussed
studies must be made before the corpus of comparative historical
statements can be built up: comparative historical sociology-
requires comparative historical study. A further point is that
there is long-term sociological development to consider, as well
as comparison.
My own judgement as to strategy for this is that, while fur¬
ther studies in Antiquity are essential, focussing especially on
the Eastern region where Judaism and Christianity arose, the next
major sector to be taken on should be the Oriental civilizations:
India and China. The reasons for this are of a piece with those
for which Antiquity was chosen here: the need to break through
the limits of conventional scholarship. The first target is evol¬
utionism. But an ethnocentric historical sociology of Western
civilization is equally at all costs to be avoided. This could
indeed all too easily be accomodated into a conventional evolut¬
ionism; whereas it is the ultimate methodological status of the
comparative historical method, and the need to use this to theor¬
ize gender de novo, that must be insisted upon.
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The Sociology of Antiquity
i. Introduction
The comparative historical component of this thesis is re¬
stricted to the Ancient Civilization. In chapter 2 above, I ex¬
plain the considerations underlying this and make some introduct¬
ory comments, but for the most part the various aspects of the
Ancient Civilization are dealt with piecemeal as the successive
discussions of the various chapters require. It seems desirable,
then, to supplement this with an appendix giving a more focussed
discussion of the sociology of Antiquity. This is what is presen¬
ted now.
It must be made clear that the overall sociological orient¬
ation here is drawn almost exclusively from Max Weber. The main
texts are: "The Agrarian Sociology of Ancient Civilizations"
(Weber 1976); "The City" (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16); and passim
"Economy and Society" (Weber 1978); also "Ancient Judaism (Weber
1952), though I have no specific focus here on the Jews. In the
background are the older "Roman Agrarian History" (Weber 1982)
and the essay "The Social Causes of the Decay of Ancient Civiliz¬
ation" (Weber 1970a/1976). As against this, I have not involved
myself in debate with attempts to build alternative sociological
approaches. The basic reasons for this I have already set out (in
ch 2): the lack of continuity of scholarship and of explicit de¬
bate with Weber, the rehearsal of familiar themes and topics, or
their revision to fit with preconceived theses or preferred sets
of values. If earlier I criticized Polanyi, here I would single
out Anderson and the historian Ste Croix (Anderson 1974; de Ste
Croix 1981; see also criticisms in Shaw 1984), my point being
that the project of reconstructing a Marxist sociology of Antiqu-
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i"ty really calls for evaluation by the criteria of Marxist recon¬
struction, and I am not interested in this. (Moreover neither
author has any focus on the Ancient Civilization prior to Hellen¬
ic Greece.) My purpose is to use Antiquity as the arena for an
innovative sociological enquiry: gender in Weberian framework.
Granted this purpose, there is ample vindication for Weber's soc¬
iology of Antiquity from modern historiography.
On the other hand, as the comparative historical chapters
above will have made clear, I have undertaken some reading in the
modern historiographical (and other) literature; I have not simp¬
ly stayed with Weber. Indeed, there are methodological problems
here that again I have touched on earlier (ch 2), especially the
discontinuities in both sociological and historiographical schol¬
arship. In sociology, any concern with ancient history is fairly
rare, and even Weber scholars have neglected "The Agrarian Soc¬
iology of Ancient Civilizations" and the older works on Antiquity
(see Love 1984). In historiography, Weber has for most been a
relatively recent discovery, and mostly only among classical his¬
torians. Besides, there is the more orthodox problem of genuine
scholarly advance since Weber. This mostly concerns Egypt and the
Ancient Near East (excepting possibly the Jews); the study of
these was still fairly new in Weber's time. So far as Egypt is
concerned, there has been a quite general re-evaluation: the civ¬
ilization is now considered to have been much less death-obsessed
and priest-ridden than was first thought. I have accordingly
leant towards a more secular analysis of the Egyptian state, and
a more materialist analysis of the Egyptian temples, than did
Weber, (indeed, it can be suggested generally that theocratic
tendencies are more typical for the decayed kingdoms and the
World-Empires of the 1st millennium B.C. than for the strong auto¬
nomous kingdoms of earlier times.) And of course this has to be
reflected in the general approach to Antiquity as well as in the
analysis of Egypt itself. On the other hand, Egyptologists have
never really discovered economic history: the only modern full-
length study is in German (Helck 1975» though see also Janssen
1975). Here one is very much thrown back to Weber (though also to
Heichelheim - Heichelheim 1958)• These problems, orthodox in
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themselves, compound those of the discontinuity of scholarship
referred to above, and it has been difficult to know what to do.
However, since my concern is above all with the ancient civiliz¬
ations themselves, the course I have decided on is synthesis: to
interpret the modern literature through Weber's sociology (and
add it to Weber's history) except where clearly impossible. Bas¬
ically that means: where the literature is conciously oriented
to a contra-Weber purpose; where the literature leaves a ^acuna
that only Weber can fill; or where Weber is clearly wrong or mis¬
informed.
It should be understood, then, that what follows is of the
same general order as the comparative historical chapters above:
a compound of Weber's sociology with more recent scholarship. It
is not simply an exegesis of Weber's sociology of Antiquity,
though it is I think very close to Weber for long passages and
at most points.
It is correctly ancient civilization in. the West that is in
view: geographically centred on the great inland seas - the Medi¬
terranean, the Black Sea, and (perhaps less so) the Red Sea and
the Persian Gulf - and with them, the great rivers, especially
the Tigris, Euphrates and Nile. This is not intended inclusively,
but of the Indus Valley civilization for example very little is
known. However it does exclude the continental landmasses of
Asia, Africa and Europe. In time, this civilization extends from
before the rise of Sumer (the scholarship available to Weber
over-estimated the antiquity of Egyptian civilization) to the end
of the Roman Principate - say roughly 3,500 B.C. to A.D. 250. As
Weber early pointed out, the end of the Ancient Civilization and
the fall of the Roman Empire are two different things, though
historians may speak of a "Late Antiquity", running from say the
end of the Principate to the rise of Islam. But it is the charac¬
ter of the Ancient Civilization that defines it and gives it its
unity: a civilization based on cities located on (or near) coast¬
lines and navigable rivers, each dominating a relatively compact
agrarian hinterland, and engaging in trade by sea. War and non-
peaceful economic activity are this civilization's hallmarks. So
also is the inclusion of the countryside in the city, which is
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either an independent City-state or City-kingdom or the local
administrative centre of a larger kingom or empire. In the latter
case the same formal political structures are often retained.*
The ending of this civilization comes when the Romans penetrate
and settle inland away from coastlines and navigable rivers, esp¬
ecially in southern Europe; the Cities decay, and are replaced by
a manorial system, the beginning of the medieval civilizations.
More will be said on all these matters later.
The bulk of this chapter will be concerned with the general
sociology of Antiquity. But first, some comments on the sociolog¬
ical location of Antiquity are required. It must be made clear
that there is no intention either to define "civilization" or to
account for its rise. It must be understood that Weber's approach
to the Ancient Civilization is neither that of a developmental
anthropologist nor that of an evolutionary sociologist; it is
that of an ancient historian. As such, it is tied to the position
that history begins with sources not with origins, and to the
awareness that sources often come late in history, though they
may speak (with greater or lesser comprehensibility) of earlier
times. A degree of synthetic reconstruction of earlier periods is
thus sometimes possible, though only where there are materials
that will sustain it (see especially Weber 1976, especially p 77
-9)* Purely speculative reconstructions Weber refused, not cert¬
ainly out of reluctance to consider ethnographic material, for he
does so freely, but rather because he saw too many possibilities
and no way to choose between them. That is, he saw no way to tell
which had occurred in which situations: Weber was no unilinear-
ist. It should be added that neither does Weber put any thresh¬
old between the primitive and the civilized as types of society.
Rather he treats all of human history as a continuity, subject to
♦There is always confusion between the City-state - polis or
civitas - and the urban centre - astoi or urbs. I have used
"City-state" or "City" for the former, "city" for the latter.
But in bureaucratic conditions or in complex empires, where
the city is rather an administrative centre, with perhaps in¬
itially at least a population of immigrant conquerors, the
distinction is less clear-cut and a consistent usage harder
to maintain.
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our knowledge of it.* As I have argued "before (oh 2), Weber does
not accept an institutionalized division of sociology and anthro¬
pology. It might be specified here that Weber does not seem to
regard literacy as definitive or even symptomatic for civilizat¬
ion (c.f. Goody ed. I968, especially articles by Goody and Wells
and by Gough; c.f. also Street 1984)» though of course it has
tremendous significance in terms of historiographical resources.
The point apparently is rather that literacy is of the essence of
bureaucracy, whereas rhetoric is of the essence of the City-state.
Literate culture in the City-state appears to be a factor of
class-struggle: patrician closure in the face of plebeian press¬
ures, after the concession of a written law-code. The patricians,
that is, use the written word as an inner line of communication
among themselves. But to draw the points together, what Weber
gives us is, essentially, a broad-minded but cautious historian's
approach to a universal sociology, in which he regards the pre¬
history of civilization, the millennia of the neolithic revolut¬
ion, as discernible in broad outline but not recoverable in any
detail. In face of this, he sets himself to lay down the analysis
of the Ancient Civilization as the essential foundational strata
for a consistent and coherent sociological treatment of World
History.
The narrative of ancient history is far too complex for sum¬
mary here; it is an immense sweep of time and space. But the
point should be made that it is narrative; neither in itself nor
in its place in World History does ancient history have a "mean¬
ing", in metaphysical or meta-ethical sense. There is a slow
accumulation, of population, technology, secular knowledge and
"spiritual knowledge". There is also the "decay of ancient civil¬
ization"; it should never be forgotten that, if there were a
*For this reason, there can be no "historic defeat of the fe¬
male sex?' in the Weberian universe. It might be added that,
while we do not know the position of women in prehistory,
their position in the earliest civilizations capable of study,
Egypt and Mesopotamia, lends no support to that conception,
especially when later ancient civilizations such as Israel or
the Greek City-states, where women's position is much weaker,
are considered. See Histoire Mondiale de la Femme vol 1.
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metaphysical pattern here, it could as well he cyclic as evolut¬
ionary. However, Weber shunned all such conceptions. Perhaps the
most fundamental question lies in the relation of Weber's sociol¬
ogy of Antiquity to his enquiry into the Economic Ethic of the
World Religions, and the bearing each has on modernity. For Weber
approaches Antiquity mainly through the concept of non-peaceful
economic action; but the Economic Ethic enquiry is mostly directed
at the medieval civilizations of the West and the Orient, and the
rise of modernity from the former. As such, it is oriented to a
cyclic view of the World Religions, at least (or initially) in
the West, their rise and fall; and this leaves, as I have argued
before (ch 2), comparabilities between Antiquity and modernity as
materialistic ages. I discuss these issues again below (section
iv). But the point here is that, given this cyclic conception, it
is hard to see how Weber's overall strategy in World History can
be equated with a unilinear progressive disengagement of societal
sub-systems.
Finally, a comment might be made on the significance of the
Greeks for the long-term development of secular culture. I doubt
that Weber saw this as very significant, though he does note (as
significant for lack of religious rationalization) the weakness
of priesthoods in ancient City-states. But rational secular cult¬
ure is more widely characteristic of the Ancient World: consider
Hellenistic Alexandria. Again, there is no comparability with the
European Enlightenment, for ancient religion is not organized in
Churches possessing general cultural hegemony. Besides, there are
more important cultural heritages from ancient times: Jewish (and
Christian) religion, Persian theodicy, Roman law. In the matter
of Greek secular rationality, we should beware of having our
prejudices and ethnocentrisms flattered. (But I have noted my
divergence from Weber on the importance of religion in the pre-
classical civilizations.)
However, I turn now from introductory remarks to specific




The Ancient Civilization (see especially Weber 1976 part i;
Heichelheim 1958; Finley 1973) is as stated a civilization of
coastal and riverine Cities, centring on inland seas and navig¬
able rivers. It is a City-centred civilization: its basic macro-
unit is the City and its agricultural hinterland - originally a
coastal fortress and agricultural hinterland, as will appear in
the next section. The characteristic settlement pattern is of a
single city and surrounding villages; neither towns nor isolated
homesteads are typical. The City dominates and politically and
legally includes its hinterland; it is the nexus of agriculture,
trade and war. Trade, transport and communications are maritime,
not overland; the Ancient Civilization thus excludes the contin¬
ental land-masses, though their barbarian peoples and later the
Asian civilizations (e.g. Persia) are a constant background and
conditioning factor. Economic activity is typically non-peaceful:
that is, it is constantly conditioned by political - administrat¬
ive, legal, and especially military - factors. On the basis of
their political domination, over agrarian hinterland, other Cit¬
ies and peoples, or overseas possessions, the Cities import, both
luxury goods and essentials. They do not produce for export
trade; they are consumer not producer Cities.
Overall, this macro-unit provides three basic class-locat¬
ions. First, there is an urban patriciate, owning large rural
estates but living in the city, where they control the political,
legal and military institutions. This will include foreign trade,
which may take the forms of piracy, slave-raiding, outright wars
of conquest, or the collection of tribute and taxation. Second,
there is a peasantry. This may be a class of free smallholders,
who may share, though unequally, in the political-legal-military
affairs of the City with the patricians; or it may be a semi-free
serf population, share-cropping on the patricians* estates; ex¬
ceptionally it may even be a work-force of imported slaves. A
recurrent feature of all Antiquity is the expropriation and en¬
slavement of the peasantry by the patricians through relations of
usury and debt-slavery. Reaction against this may come either in
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the form of class-conflicts or of a protective order imposed by a
king; in either case, written law-codes seem typically to result.
Lastly, there is the urban proletariat, a class of small traders,
shopkeepers and craftsmen, whose origins are mostly in the ex¬
propriated peasantry, though their numbers may be swelled by im¬
ported and/or freed slaves. (Slavery itself is a legal status,
not an economic class position.) A major divergence of type aris¬
es if there is a king: the patriciate will then be excluded from
political dominance, and rule will be exercized through a bureau¬
cratic apparatus, to the general protection of the lower orders.
This will be taken up in the next section.
In all this, the basic micro-unit is the oikos. Fundamental¬
ly, this means the self-sufficient household, producing to meet
its own needs. There are differences of scale, from the peasant's
smallholding to the estates of a prince. The oikos can include
economic assets of all kinds: land, workshops, mines, and equally
livestock and slaves; the oikos is neither rural nor agrarian by
necessity. But the basic orientations are always to wants-satis¬
faction and to self-sufficiency: excess production is sold for
profit, but on a one-off not a continuous basis, and ideally no¬
thing is bought that can be produced. Ultimately the guiding
criteria for economic action are political: autonomy and leisure,
rather than simple gain. In principle, even the artisan's or the
shopkeeper's business seeks to be on this basis, as much as the
peasant's farm or the patrician's estates. These things also hold
for the estates and workshops etc. of the temples (more especial¬
ly in bureaucratic conditions), the personal estates or indeed
the whole realm of a king, or the communal affairs of a City.
As to the temples, Weber, as he himself admits, has initial¬
ly no special focus on them (Weber 1976 p 78 - 9)> though a later,
historically more wide-ranging, discussion seems to cover the
issues (Weber 1978 Part ii ch 15)« Indeed, in strictly economic
terms there is surely little to be said: the temple is simply an
oikos. Its significance is rather on the political side: it is
mainly in the preclassical civilizations of the Ancient Near East
and Egypt that the temples have their full importance, and this
is surely a factor of the king's bureaucratic domination and dis-
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placement of the patricians. The temple is a bureaucratized pat¬
rician oikos, where the noble lineage has been replaced by an
immortal deity with an appointed, salaried staff. This at least
is the view that I have developed (see ch 4 & 8 above), and to me
it does not suggest that these preclassical civilizations are in
any real way incommensurate with Graeco-Roman civilization. Esp¬
ecially one should remember here the persistence of such temples
in the Hellenistic kingdoms and the Roman East; and indeed the
eventual economic endowment of the Christian Churches.
The oikos co-exists with the market, but in view of its own
character gives it limited scope - the orientation of the oikos
is to buy nothing that can be self-produced, and to sell off
excess production only. Shop-keepers and craftsmen sell their
produce on the market, but the strong tendency is for trade, esp¬
ecially long-range sea-borne trade, to be in luxuries not in
essentials. Most especially, where the City cannot feed itself
from its agrarian hinterland, the importation of corn will be
made a matter of political action; it will not be left to the
market. This may also hold for essential raw materials such as
wood for ship-building: economic policy, so far as there is such
a thing, is directed to acquiring raw materials not markets. As
stated earlier, the Cities are consumers not producers. But the
market itself has above all the character that it is a market for
goods. It is not a market either for labour or for capital. Wage-
labour is atypical in Antiquity; the typical forms are either
self-employment or slavery. As to capital, the investment of this
is above all in land. Where capital is invested in trade, it is
done on a one-off basis, and the profits where possible are put
into land. It is not done on a basis of continuous re-investment.
Slavery has two main sources: the expropriation of the peas¬
antry, and capture in war - this includes piracy, coastal raiding
etc. The two are inter-related, and the slave-trade was consider¬
able (at least in most eras). Slaves were used to displace the
free peasantry in agriculture, to work mines and quarries, in
domestic service and in the urban trades; these last two are gen¬
erally the most typical. They could also be used in administrat¬
ion, even imperial administration - a highly privileged position.
Often slaves were set up independently as craftsmen or shopkeep¬
ers in the market, "living away" from their owner's household and
owning their own property, and paying a body-rent or a share of
their income to their masters. A slave might use his savings from
this or some other source to buy his freedom; possessed of freed
status, he might continue in the same profession and in substant¬
ially the same relationship to his former owner. All this is
still part of the owner's oikos; it is "selling off the excess",
so to speak. But in agriculture especially, only a very rich
slave-supply could support slave-gang worked ranches; this was
only found relatively briefly at Carthage and at Rome. Otherwise,
the tendency was for the slaves to become serfs, living semi-
independently on a share-cropping basis on large estates, with
their own families and some control in. terms of traditional ex¬
pectations over their own work contribution. The free peasantry
also tended in bureaucratic conditions to fall to this level.
The Roman Empire indeed ended on these terms (see Weber 1982 ch 4>
Weber 1976 part ii ch 7> as well as Weber I970a/l976).
Capital might be owned and invested by the patricians, but
the active conduct of finance and trade in City-states at least
was typically in the hands of resident foreigners. These in turn
would be excluded from owning land, the most favoured form of
investment. They were also excluded from political participation
- one major reason why ancient Cities did not develop an econom¬
ic policy, except in terms of military considerations. But inves¬
tment in trading ventures was, as stated, typically "one-off",
not continuous; the profits of the venture would be invested in
land. However there is also "political capitalism": contracting
to the state for road-building, supply of the army, tax-farming
especially of a conquered province, etc. This would be restricted
to patrician citizens. But as an adjunct of an imperialist pol¬
icy, political capitalism would in time tend to lead to regulat¬
ion or even outright replacement by a state bureaucracy. It is in
this sense that bureaucracy stifled capitalism in Antiquity, esp¬
ecially at Rome. In bureaucratic conditions, kings and temples
would conduct trade, through their own agents or foreign merch¬
ants, largely with each other. These transactions would be polit-
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icized in accordance with geopolitical relationships: reciprocal
gifts between equals, receipt of tribute from unequals, the re¬
lationships being constantly negotiated. I see no virtue, incid¬
entally, in associating this, after Polanyi (Polanyi 1968, 1977),
with an earlier stage or type of the economy; it is surely within
the broad spectrum of politically conditioned economic activity.
Non-peaceful economic activity covers a spectrum, from pira¬
cy and coastal raiding to the outright conquest and sustained
exploitation of foreign lands. Through slavery and booty, war
could always be turned to gain, though wars did occur for other
reasons, such as the encroachments of migrating barbarians. Again,
the foundation of colony Cities by the Greeks and Latins (though
possibly less so the Phoenicians) was not a matter of economics
but of demographics: the numbers of citizens outrunning the land
supply. But imperialism, war for profit leading to permanent
domination and exploitation, was inherent in the character of the
ancient City-state, above all in its stratificatory conflicts.
Imperialism was a way of buying off the urban mob; of returning
a degree of citizenship to the urban proletariat. This was seen
variously at Athens and Rome, where the profits of empire were
distributed among the poorer citizens in the form of payment for
military service, performance of civic duties (e.g. attendance at
the Assembly), etc., or simply the corn-dole.
Taxation in Antiquity (see especially Jones 1974a) again
bears the mark of the political relationships of equality or sub¬
ordination; the basic principle is that subjects are taxed, cit¬
izens are tax-exempt. For subjects, tax is basically tribute: it
may take the form of poll-tax or land-tax or a fraction of pro¬
duce. This is typical for bureaucratic conditions. In the City-
state by contrast citizens are only taxed exceptionally, for ex¬
ample in a war emergency. Public burdens are rather met as a duty
- leiturgy - imposed upon the rich, and this is supplemented by
taxes on non-citizens: harbour dues, tax on goods sold in the
market, poll-tax on foreign residents, etc. Typically these taxes
are farmed. All this remains characteristic of "adminstrative"
Cities within empires, for example in the Hellenistic and Roman
worlds. In bureaucratic conditions, tax is often taken in kind
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rather than in money, and forced labour (corvee) is also typical
practice. The collection, and organization, of this is of course
a great part of the bureaucracy's function.
The history of the Ancient Civilization covers an immense
sweep of time, of the order of 3,500 years, and at that, both
Sumeria and Egypt seem to be well developed when we first get
sight of them, though Egypt is still fragmented. There is devel¬
opment through Antiquity: even basic technologies such as build-
ding in stone or metal-working are still emerging, and the range
of agricultural plants and domestic animals is still being built
up. (However the introduction of more profitable forms of farming
into the classical world - olives, vines, wheat, cattle-ranching
- is due to political-economic not technical factors.) Again,
means of exchange are still being developed: coined money only
appears about the 7th century, although the measurement of value
in terms of weights of various metals is far older. Indeed, in
terms of trade and exchange methods, the economy of the 2nd mill¬
ennium Near East especially seems well developed, even by the
standards of later Athens and Rome. At any rate, Weber does not
use a sequential classificatory system, such as Bronze Age and
Iron Age, for Antiquity. Rather he uses the basic societal types
City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom, and although the City-state
is best attested for the 1st millennium B.C. (but it is also hin¬
ted at in the 3rd millennium Near East), the overall impression
is rather cyclic than developmental. The Roman Empire, and indeed
the Hellenistic kingdoms before it, are Bureaucratic Kingdoms
like those of earlier Egypt and the Ancient Near East.
As to the ending of the Ancient Civilization (see Weber 1982
ch 4, Weber 1976 part ii ch 7> as well as Weber 1970a/1976), this,
though it may be associated with the end of the Roman Principate,
is not the same thing as the fall of the Roman Empire. For this
does survive into medieval times, especially in the East (see
Jones 1966). The project of explanation is therefore complex and
has to distinguish between different levels. But basically, what
is in question is the ending of a City-based coastal and riverine
(and maritime) civilization, and the rise of an inland rural (and
land-bound) manorial civilization in its place. Many factors are
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at work in this, but the most basic of them is simply the Roman
military penetration inland, away from coastlines and navigable
rivers, and the settlement of a mainland empire. With this also
is the introduction of pacification and humane rule into the
Roman World; this destroyed the main opportunities for exploitat¬
ion and booty, and also the slave supply. Besides this, there is
the continued attribution of the wealthiest strata to Rome itself
rather than to the provincial Cities, whose poorer provincial
aristocracy were forced to bear the provincial municipal burdens
(or to put it another way, the rich opted out of the tax system).
This is much of the reason both why the (relatively) wealthy left
the cities to live on their estates, and why rural estates came
of necessity to be used instead of the Cities as the local admin¬
istrative units of the later Empire. Collapse of the money econ¬
omy and taxation, collapse of the pay, morale and loyalty of the
army, civil war and the military collapse of the frontiers (with
great destruction to the cities) were the consequences, in the
disastrous 3rd century A.D. Other factors can be mentioned: the
rise of share-cropping serfs to replace chain-gangs of slaves on
the great estates in face of the failure of the slave supply; the
rise of taxation in kind and forced labour in face of the failure
of the money economy; the binding of craftsmen to their fathers'
professions; the imposition of leiturgies on the collegia, the
binding of serfs to the estates of their birth. Apart from the
first, these are mostly factors of the later Empire (the Domin¬
ate), and of early medieval civilization. But the questions, why
Rome declined as an ancient civilization and why Rome transformed
into a medieval civilization, do require a degree of analytic
separation. So also do the questions why that civilization failed
so soon in the West though it survived well in the East, and in¬
deed, why it survived for so long in the North-East but failed
with the rise of Islam in the South-East. But out of these quest¬
ions, it is the decline of the Ancient Civilization that is the
focus, both for Weber's sociology and for this thesis»
A note might be added on demographics. Weber has no formal
treatment of this as such; what I have tried to develop in the
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chapters above (especially chapter 4) is my own innovation. On
the other hand, Weber does repeatedly give a good deal of consid¬
eration to demographic issues: the non-reproductivity of the
city, especially the urban proletariat; rural-urban migration and
the expropriation of the peasantry; the slave-trade and the large
scale use of imported slaves in agriculture; the reproductivity
of the agrarian workforce (see Weber 1982 ch 4j Weber 1970a/1976,
Weber 1976 part i, Weber 1978 ch 16 "The City", p 1237 and pass¬
im). Most importantly, Weber builds these issues into his explan¬
atory structures; he does not merely describe them. To my mind,
all this is tremendously illuminating for all the Ancient Civil¬
ization, though the uptake of Weber's ideas, as I have noted
before, has been mostly in Graeco-Roman historiography rather
than the preelassical disciplines such as Egyptology. However it
is really only with the Roman Empire that an empirical demograph¬
ic regime and its transformations can be described (see especial¬
ly Salmon 1974)* Weber's focus is more on the migration process
than on the processes of fertility and mortality, or on overall
population increase or decrease, but this is to use migration as
the key to the overall situation, not to beg the general quest¬
ions. Fertility and mortality rates for the countryside in Anti¬
quity are nowhere known. Nor indeed is there much known about
changes in population level; a slow increase over the long term,
though probably with significant reversals, seems most likely.
The inadequacies of the data compel one to adduce a pattern on
general considerations (c.f. McEvedy and Jones 1978 passim).
There is a thesis that the sex-ratio in Graeco-Roman Antiqu¬
ity was out of balance, men outnumbering women by perhaps as much
as 2 : 1 (Pomeroy 1975 P 227 - 8; Guttentag and Secord 1983 ch 2).
Social practices favouring differential survival are adduced for
this, especially female infanticide and exposure (though not for¬
getting child-bed mortality). The thesis cannot be empirically
proven; notably, it seems to be argued more on consideration of
Greece, although Roman data are far better. My own analysis of
social processes suggests that the thesis might have some weight
for City-states, especially at acute stages of class-struggle,
but is contra-indicated for more settled periods of City-state
history and for Bureaucratic Kingdoms generally (see ch 4 above).
Moreover at best the thesis confounds exposure with infanticide
and forgets its relationship to slavery and prostitution, and
indeed forgets the importation of slaves. A sex-ratio imbalance
among the citizenry would be another matter.
iii. Power
In discussing the Ancient Civilization, it is always diffic¬
ult to maintain the analytic separation between economy and pol¬
ity. Following Weber (Weber 1976 part 1), the above outline has
tried to give only the most generalized picture. Weber focusses
this by identifying a number of types of ancient polity, each of
which conditions the economy somewhat differently. More accurat¬
ely, he identifies two trajectories of development, each of which
has a number of possible stages. Their major types are the City-
state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom. Both arise from a common
origin, where a lord in a coastal castle engages in maritime
trade and dominates the countryside, bringing in artisans to form
a town. The trajectories then diverge according as the lord's
soldiers reduce him to their own level and constitute themselves
an aristocracy, or as the lord suppresses his soldiers and rules,
with the support of the rural folk, through an apparatus of dep¬
endent officials. This reveals Weber's typical three-cornered
power-struggle, between ruler, apparatus and subjects, and the
beginnings of his systematic typology of domination; issues that
are taken up and developed in "Economy and Society".
The methodology here might also be noted: it is to see the
various substantive civilizations of Antiquity as developing on
different time-scales, and thus showing different stages on a
unified (though two-pronged) developmental pattern, according as
the sources reveal them to us (Weber 1976 p 69 et seq). This is
a synthetic approach; it is not a speculative reconstruction, (it
may be pointed out that Weber was on the right lines as to the
nature of Mycenaean civilization, long before the decipherment of
Linear B - see Weber 1978 "The City1* p 1282.)
The City-state and the Bureaucratic Kingdom are the major
types, and should form the major concerns here. But before pursu¬
ing them, there is another set of issues that require to be con¬
sidered, though they are much more difficult and uncertain. These
concern the relationship of the ancient polity to the antecedent
and environing political arrangements, and the bearing of this
for the ancient polity's own structure. This question is a life¬
long concern of Vieber's, from the "Roman Agrarian History" of
1891 (Weber 1982) to the "General Economic History" of 1920 (Web¬
er 1981; see especially ch 2). The question is, what kind of par¬
allels are there between, on the one side, the early history of
the German peoples and their development from tribalism to medie¬
val feudal and City civilization, and on the other side, the de¬
velopment of the City-civilization of Antiquity from its anteced¬
ent barbarism?* It might be added that Weber was also concerned,
as any German of his time must be, with the question, what com¬
prises national identity? The parallels here might be closest
between the Germans and the Greeks, for the Greeks too have a
legendary history of tribalism and migration (though the relation
of this to Mycenaean civilization is not clear). One can ask "what
is a Greek?" just as one can ask "what is a German?" (I speak of
this briefly in ch 9 above).
The questions here (c.f. Poliakov 1974» see also Smith 1984,
1986) involve what might be termed continental as opposed to
transatlantic issues: ethnicity in terms of nationalism rather
than post-imperial immigration; race in terms of Aryan, Semitic
and Altaic rather than white, black and brown. The point is that
ancient history, like much of World History, commonly presents us
with names attributed to collectivities of persons - e.g. Hyksos,
Sea Peoples, Achaians, Etruscans - often telling us little or
nothing about them. It becomes necessary to ask then not just who
*Weber's (untranslated) essay of 1905 on the Social Conditions
of the Ancient Germans (Weber 1924) seems to mark a re-orient¬
ation from his earlier Roman Agrarian History (Weber 1982).
Prom now on he disengages the problems of the early Germans
from those of the early Greeks and Romans; he comes to include
the preclassical civilizations in the Ancient Civilization; and
he comes increasingly to disengage the City from tribalism, in
both the ancient and the medieval West.
these people were, hut what is the status of these names? What
kinds of reality lie behind them? One obvious question is, who
names? Is it the bearers' name for themselves, or a name that
someone else gave them? If so, what did he, or they, know about
them? Again, what is the relationship between people's name and
place-name? Which is named for which? Are the people settled,
nomadic, or in migration? If the latter, are they named for their
place of origin, their final resting-place, or somewhere they
passed through on the way? And again and not least, how and with
what significance do these names change?
Clearly there are many possibilities here. But perhaps we
can suggest two polar types: the self-identifying group of per¬
sons, and people merely living near each other and given a coll¬
ective name by others. Of course, these things (especially the
former) can make for a growing process of political closure. But
perhaps the first point should be that it is the inherent tenden¬
cy of scholarship, including ancient scholarship, to impose a
coherence on the situation (whatever situation it is considering)
that it does not necessarily possess of itself. With this, though
I am not competent to judge questions of archaeological methodol¬
ogy, it could also be said that it is hard to see how assemblages
of material culture can be related to sometime, transient, or
even illusory political identities. It is hard enough relating
them to forms of social organization (c.f. Binford 1983). This
point might also be made in relation to linguistic archaeology
(c.f. Littleton 1982). But it should be a familiar issue in soc¬
ial theory by now that polity is not to be confounded with soc¬
iety.
There are difficult, and probably unfamiliar, matters here,
and Weber is both reserved and flexible in his handling of them
(see especially Weber 1978 Part ii ch 5» also ch 9) • A key point
is that he sees ethnicity, its putative grounding in common de¬
scent, and its relation to the premodern polity in essentially
the same light as the nation, its putative grounding in the lang¬
uage community, and its relation to the modern polity. Both cases
he regarded with some scepticism. Another key point is that Weber
knew well that the original "tribes" were the sub-divisions of
the Roman City-state ("tribus" is Latin for and nothing to do
with primitive or barbarian conditions. He cannot have been happy
with the way that contemporary anthropologists were projecting
their classical educations onto the ethnographic record, far less
with their reconstructions of prehistory. Yet another point is
that Weber had some idea of the difficulties of reconciling Hom¬
eric society with Mycenaean society (see above ch 9)*
In face of these issues, Weber makes two moves. First, he
maintains a sharp distinction between society and polity and in¬
deed, maintains a distinction too between the polity and the
state. Second, he argues that political identity arises out of
common political action, not out of common descent, shared cust¬
oms, shared language, or physical characteristics such as skin
colour. Ideas of race or nation arise on this basis of common
action, and this includes the gamut of ethnic identifications -
tribe, folk, people, etc. Such political identity remains a poss¬
ible basis for future political action, and the memory of past
political action may remain as a most persistent presence, but
all this does not necessarily or even typically indicate active
ongoing political organization, especially at any level of com¬
plexity. But this said, it must be added (see especially Weber
1978 Part ii ch 4) that household and kinship systems and also
settlement patterns also inter-relate with these matters in ways
that almost wholly escape historical interrogation. Military fac¬
tors may enter into it, such as the prevalence of men's houses of
warriors. In particular chariot warfare seems to have made for
the universalization of patriarchal households across the Euras-
african landmass in the later 2nd millennium B.C. - although such
households might be found already among the older civilizations.
But generally Weber finds the relationships between kinship and
polity obscure, especially so far as common descent is an ethnic
fiction.*
But what most needs to be grasped here is that Weber does
not see the Ancient Civilization as "evolving" out of agrarian
*Discussing these matters above, especially in chapters 3 and. '
4, I draw attention to the somewhat similar views of A.L. Kroe-
ber. See Kroeber 1952 a & b.
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barbarism. On -the contrary, he sees it as arising as a new and
conflictual element: coastal trading war-lords. As I have said
before, there is a distance between Weber's account and at least
some anthropological theories of the state (e.g. Service 1975;
Cohen and Service eds 1978; Krader I968; see also Boserup 1965»
1981). Weber sees the antecedent conditions in terms of loose
ethnic identities gathered, more or less, around patriarchal
chieftains or perhaps aristocratic clans; but the developing Cit¬
ies conflict with and absorb all such structures. Above all, for
Weber the "tribal" arrangements of the ancient City-state - the
phylum, genos and phratry of Athens, the tribus, gens and curia
of Rome - are specific to the sociology of the ancient City-state
and most certainly are not "survivals" from previous conditions,
which they do not necessarily even much resemble. Here Weber
stands in flat contradiction to the kind of evolutionism that
must see the ancient City-state in terras of a progressive erosion,
of an older organized tribalism (see e.g. Gouldner 1967 part i).
His two points are, first, that the older tribalism did not poss¬
ess a comparable degree of organization, and second, that the
structures in question do not erode during the course of the
City-state's history. It might be added that these are urban not
rural structures, and that besides, the ancient City includes the
countryside. (See Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16 "The City" p 1253 et
seq; Weber 1976 p 145 et eq; also previous references.) Classical
scholarship has been slow to take up these points,* (see Finley
I985), and I do not know if sociological (or anthropological)
scholarship has ever yet done so. But Weber combines great hist¬
orical scholarship with great sociological acuity; he sees clear¬
ly that the history of the ancient polity is just as many-levell¬
ed and deceptive as that of the modern polity, and he is deter¬
mined to single out for attention those structures which actually
were decisive in the event.
The argument is most easily made for the ancient City-state.
*There exists a modern study of this, Roussel 1976; however
this could not be used for the present thesis. See review by
Gauthier (Gauthier 1978).
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This is formed through a fusion of neighbourhoods, and creates a
new political community into which the existing tribes are dis¬
solved and reformed - this indeed is decisive for the character
of the occidental City. Initially, however, the City has the
character of a consociation of aristocratic clans, whose members
alone have full citizenship, and which each have their commoner
followings. But on the other side, the Bureaucratic Kingdom too
tends to dissolve rather than to generate both aristocratic clans
and ethnic tribes, at least within the limits of geopolitics.
For the first, aristocratic clans will be suppressed as politic¬
ally dangerous to the ruler; for the second, the extent of the
king's authority, as I have argued earlier (ch 4)» is not defined
with reference to "natural communities" in ethnic or similar
terms, but only pragmatically, though this itself might give rise
to a sense of community in time. Outcomes here are negotiated,
but the most powerful and centralized realms such as Egypt see
the complete dissolution of all such structures. So far as local
loyalties remain, it is the cities that are their bearers (local
gods suggest this). I have already said (ch 4) that I see here,
in the antithesis of the self-defined political community and the
pragmatically defined realm, the basis of the types charismatic
and traditional domination, although Weber does not spell this
out. At any rate, both City-state and Bureacratic Kingdom mark a
discontinuity, and essentially the same discontinuity, with what
has gone before.
I have considered these matters at some length because they
are both unfamiliar and heterodox, and because ray own theoretical
explorations in gender above (especially chapters 4 &5) have of
necessity sought to look at the wider parameters of Weber's soc¬
iology of polity - especially issues of state and local commun¬
ity, public and private affairs. The "tribal" structures of the
ancient polity are immensely confusing in their sociological loc¬
ation, especially if they are approached as "kinship" (compare
Finley 1985 and Littman 1979)* However, I return now, though in
somewhat brief form, to the central ground of the ancient polity:
the antithetical types City-state and Bureaucratic Kingdom.
The ancient City-state (see especially Weber 1978 Part ii
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ch 16 "The City") is definitively a consociation of warriors; it
should be noted that they are self-equipped warriors. As such, it
retains and indeed sharply focusses the political-military struc¬
ture of tribes and clans. Typically, this is given a threefold
structure, though the relation between the elements is matter for
interpretation, and varies over time and in different locations.
The tribes (to use the Roman terras) seem to divide all the citiz¬
ens, the gentes to be specifically patrician, and the curia to be
of commoners only. But whether the gentes ever led the curia, and
again, how far each structure functions in the political or the
military fields (e.g. whether the curia was ever a purely milit¬
ary unit), are different questions, and the answers would not
necessarily be the same for example at Rome and at Athens - or
for that matter in different eras. (Weber came to consider the
curia to be originally military, and to pre-date the City-state
- see Weber 1978 Part ii ch 16 "The City" p 1286 -7*) More to
the point is that all political-military power is mandatorily
relocated into the City, which dominates and includes the coun¬
tryside, and a new political community is constituted. It should
be noted that this process is not a fusion of tribes, but a fus¬
ion of neighbourhoods (synoikism) with a sub-division into trib¬
es, however these may relate to older structures. In the course
of political development, this constitution may be radically re¬
formulated, as with Cleisthenes' reforms at Athens (see ch 9)5
this may well echo the process whereby the City was first found¬
ed, especially with a colony City. But it is with the Plebeian
City that the tribes reach their full importance, as a territor¬
ial basis for all citizens,
The ancient City differs from the medieval City (especially
of the inland North) primarily in military regards. In medieval
times the militarily dominant lords remained in the countryside;
the City excluded the countryside and was relatively de-militar¬
ized, and it organized itself on the basis of trade and craft
associations - the guilds. Yet it is still a consociation: it
still constitutes a new political community, in disregard or de¬
spite of the antecedent and environing arrangements. This is the
common definitive characteristic.of the occidental City - the
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City-state. By contrast, the oriental city remains integrated in¬
to and divided among the tribes and clans of the countryside, or
else is a military and administrative centre of the ruler. It has
no separate identity as an autonomous political unit.
The ancient City-state is initially aristocratic: it is con¬
trolled by the patrician clans, whose members alone have full
citizenship. These exercise control through a formal system of
magistracies and assemblies, in which the ordinary citizens of
the commoner followings may have a minimal participation. The
relations between patrician clans and commoner followings is
probably best seen in terms of clientage. There is a firm status
division between patricians and plebeians and recurrent stratif-
icatory conflicts between them, over patrician monopolization of
power and the law, the reality of common citizenship and plebeian
participation. In some eras these conflicts take the form of
class-struggles, when the patricians use the devices of usury and
debt-slavery, together with monopolization and manipulation of
the law, to reduce the plebeians to proletarian or slave status.
Otherwise, and more generally, they are status conflicts. The
conflicts may be expressed through secession of the plebs as well
as by insurrection; they may result in compromise and constitut¬
ional adjustment or in revolution, or both. The temporary handing
over of power to a law-maker, or a period of popular tyranny,
protective of and supported by the lower orders, is also typical.
In particular, a written law-code is a characteristic consequence
of the class-struggles. As against this, the purely economic
demands for the redistribution of the land and the cancellation
of debts are typically resisted.
Military factors largely control the City-state's political
development. Just as the Patrician City is a factor of chariot
and cavalry warfare, so the rise of hoplite infantry determines
a development to democracy: the Plebeian City. It should be re¬
membered that the citizen-soldier is self-equipped, and therefore
must have the economic substance to maintain his citizen-soldier
status. Of itself, the development of hoplite infantry most aff¬
ects the plebeian peasantry; it has little impact for the urban
proletariat. However, further military development in the direct-
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ion of naval power can draw these into active citizenship also,
through drawing them into military service as rowers in the gall¬
eys (the ships being provided for the state hy the rich). Athens
is the classic example of this. In constitutional terms, the mag¬
istracies and assemblies become more open to the participation
of the lower orders, and in particular, protection is obtained
from the patrician monopolization and manipulation of the law,
though the patricians retain a political pre-eminence, even at
Athens. With this, the system of tribes and clans is also affect¬
ed, as indicated above: the patricians are compelled to join the
tribes, which now provide a territorial basis for the state. The
old personal clan state of the patricians is dissolved. The comm¬
oner followings disengage (if they were engaged) from the patric¬
ian clans, to become brotherhoods of the lower orders; and with
this, clientage too becomes less pervasive. But while these
things go their full length at Athens, at Rome they go only a
moderate way, and then are contained. Paradoxically however it
is at Rome that the territorially based state endures.
This outlines the basic City-state. It may be contextualized
in wider diffuse ethnic loyalties or in inter-City alliances; it
may develop through a policy of imperialism; but it remains al¬
ways a basic political omit. But I turn now to the other main
type, the Bureaucratic Kingdom.
In the ancient Bureaucratic Kingdom, it is patrimonial bur¬
eaucracy that is in view: bureaucratic administration in the con¬
text of traditionally legitimated domination. This is best under¬
stood not by insistence upon a single ideal type but through the
consideration of typical structural conflicts (see Weber 1978
Part ii ch 12, but also ch 11 & 13). These can be taken in two
main dimensions: the struggles between ruler and apparatus; and
the geopolitical dimension - the extension in space of the rul¬
er* s power. Here it should be noted that simple size is not a
criterion in distinguishing the Bureaucratic Kingdom from the
City-state. The City-kingdoms of Mycenaean Greece are no larger
than the City-states of Hellenic times, and such City-kingdoms
are also found in the Ancient Near East and in the Intermediate
periods (and probably in pre-dynastic times) of Egypt. On the
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other hand there seem to he City-states at least in the Ancient
Near East also.
But the point is, initially, monarchical rule through an
apparatus of dependent officials, and here the conflicts are typ¬
ical: struggles over the control of the means of administration.
The officials try to appropriate their positions, to exercize
authority unsupervised, and to take their living directly out of
the resources they are in charge of, passing on the excess only
to the king. Against this, the king tries to keep his officials
dependent upon him, and to maintain overall control, on the Basis
of a centralized system of taxation and salaries with a career
structure in terms of defined offices. It is of course very much
to the point here that the appointments system of bureaucracy is
specifically anti-hereditary, whereas the appropriation of posit¬
ion typically goes with its hereditary transmission. On the
whole, outcomes in Antiquity favoured bureaucracy, and in Egypt
especially this could present a highly rational character. As to
the temples, I have argued that the king's endowment of land and
other wealth, and his appointment of priests to live off that
endowment (and perhaps a distinct bureacracy to administer it),
is to be antithesized to an aristocracy with hereditary estates.
It is the break-up of the nobility not in royal employment. It
should be noted too that the army is bureaucratized: it is bur¬
eaucrat ically raised and commanded, with salaries and a career
structure,, and is equipped from the king's armouries. This stands
in sharp contrast to the self-equipped citizen-soldiers of the
City-state.
As to the geopolitical dimension, these conflicts can be
related to the initial conflicts between the castle-lord and his
soldiers, where the trajectories of City-state and Bureaucratic
Kingdom diverge; they seeking to reduce their lord to their own
level and become an aristocracy, he seeking to suppress his sold¬
iers and to rule through a dependent officialdom. The extension
of the king* s realm in space basically recreates these conflicts
at the margins of his realm: the king strives to bring the local
lords into dependence upon him, to make them into or replace them"
with dependent officials; the local lords strive to assert their
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autonomy and status equality as kings in their own realms (see
here Weber 1978 p 1051 et seq). Unified kingdoms and congeries of
petty princedoms may both result here, alternating or co-existing
with each other. The former is more typical of Egypt and the lat¬
ter of the Ancient Near East, though there are exceptions in both
cases (including the Egyptian hegemony in the Near East in the
New Kingdom). The situation differs from feudalism precisely in
the absence of fealty, the relation of status-equal subordinat¬
ion. The geopolitical relationships are pragmatic and constantly
negotiated; here again, scholarship must beware of attributing a
coherence that the empirical situation does not possess. The dif¬
ferent outcomes in the two regions are probably due to geograph¬
ical factors: Egypt's strong natural frontiers and good internal
communications on the river. As to structures of tribe and clan,
as I have said, these tend to dissolve rather than crystallize
in the conflicts just outlined, and in a strongly centralized
realm such as Egypt, the dissolution is apparently complete.
Weber cites bureaucracy as one of the great historical forces for
destroying such structures (Weber 1981 p 46; see also Weber 1978
P 1044 - 51)•
On the whole, the cities within a Bureaucratic Kingdom are
simply administrative centres, similar to the City-state primar¬
ily in that the city dominates and includes the countryside, and
is perhaps the bearer of local loyalties; at least, city gods
seem to suggest this. In the Roman, and to an extent the Hellen¬
istic, worlds however the situation is made more complex by the
founding of Cities of Greeks and Romans. Partly this process is
informed by the older practice of using cities as administrative
centres in Bureaucratic Kingdoms, but partly too it is informed
by the older practice of the City-state world of founding colon¬
ies, new and independent Cities of expatriates. The Cities of the
Hellenistic and Roman worlds are semi-autonomous: within limits
they conduct and control their own internal affairs, and they
have their own institutions and citizenships. They are thus
broadly assimilable to the occidental City at least for purposes
of immediate analysis. But in the long run, the tendency is for
these Cities to become simply administrative centres; for their
institutions to be eroded and their citizens assimilated to the
broad mass of the people (this leaving aside the question of man-
orialism). In the case of the Roman world, however, this process
works reciprocally with a universalization of the Roman citizen¬
ship. The Roman Empire is thus both a mixed and a transitional
type. It is also a stage of World-historical importance in the
development of the polity: bureaucratic monarchy working recip¬
rocally with a self-defined political community surely marks the
first experiment in rational-legal domination, though in the
event it proved transitory.
iv Religion
I turn now to consider ancient religion. Here there are
strategic issues that require consideration, as I have indicated
before (section i above; also ch 2). Weber's overall concern in
the sociology of religion is with the economic ethics of the
Great World Religions; to a great extent, this provides his app¬
roach to the contrasting medieval civilizations of East .and West,
and the emergence of modernity out of the latter. But his app¬
roach to Antiquity is mainly through the concept of non-peaceful
economic action. In keeping with this, his treatment of ancient
religion is really only a condensed outline, except for ancient
Judaism (the main text is "Economy and Society" Part ii ch 6,
especially the opening sections; parts of ch 15 are also relev¬
ant). He treats it as a prologue to the Great World Religions
rather than as an essential dimension of the Ancient Civilization
itself.
This accords with Weber's conception of the changing socio¬
logical location of religion as religious conceptions and instit¬
utions develop. Weber sees religion as originating (Weber 1978
p 339 et seq) not in irrationality as such, but out of a combin¬
ation of limited empirical knowledge and a sensitivity to the un¬
usual - to what transcends the everyday routine. From this, rel¬
igion develops in its initial character overwhelmingly as a coll¬
ection of means: means to material, often economic, ends. Relig- '
ion is a symbolic dimension through which action can be directed,
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to the achievement of this-worldly ends. Only as a consequence of
a further process of development, involving soteriological con¬
ceptions, prophecy and rejection of the world, does religion he-
come a symbolic realm in itself, in which both the means and the
ends of action are located - a process of "irrationalization"
(see Weber 1978 p 424)« This is closely associated with the Great
World Religions, though it is a historical process, variously
located and extending over time. Ancient religion is on the whole
prior to this development; at least, it mostly takes place late
in Antiquity (and much of it outside the West).
The rationalization and disenchantment thesis of modernity,
then, can be interpreted at two levels: as annulling the Great
World Religions, or as annulling religion as such. But there are
two issues here: the rational pursuit of transcendental values,
and the use of non-rational means to this-worldly ends. For the
first, rationalization is always a function of priesthoods and
other intellectuals, who are thus in cultural dialogue with char¬
ismatic prophets. Modernity resulted from the creation of a form
of theodicy which permitted complete rationalization, its own
annullment - like dealing a hand of Patience and then resolving
it. This results in the extinction of transcendental values. But
as to the second, non-rational means to this-worldy ends, it is
not that science gives us greater empirical knowledge, but rather
that rational capitalism grounds a belief in the rational compre-
hensibility-in-principle of the world, that disenchants the modern
world (Weber 1970b i p 139)« In view of military and ecological
developments since Weber's time, it might be worthwhile to keep
the above issues separate, and to keep an open mind about them,
especially the latter. As for comparative analytic purposes, it
seems most useful to contrast the regimes of rational capitalism
and of non-peaceful economic action, the essential predictability
of the one and non-predictability of the other, as negative and
positive cultural environments respectively for the employment of
non-rational means, accepting that social action in both modern¬
ity and Antiquity is overwhelmingly this-world oriented. Antiqui¬
ty and modernity (that is, bureaucratized "Advanced" Capitalism),
then, are both to be understood primarily in terms of the economy
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and. power. Religion is a secondary factor in both.
This stated, it should be added that ray own strategy towards
gender theory has focussed on power, the economy and demographics
- material issues. Against this, I have not seen great causal
value in the ideological realm. Its greatest interest I see in
the question how gender considerations have entered into and
shaped the long-term development of culture, for example negative
evaluations of women and sex in the Judaeo-Christian tradition.
Here indeed is a major reason for studying Antiquity. I will re¬
turn to this. But in all that follows, the outlines can only be
roughly drawn, and it has been necessary too to go beyond Weber
rather more than in the previous two sections..
Religion requires to be considered in two aspects, the ideal
and the material - or if you prefer, the "content1* of religion,
and its organizational basis. I will take the organizational side
first. Here the most basic point is that religion in Antiquity is
a matter of cultaic communities, which are generally purely local
in character. There are a few inter-local (i.e. shared) cult cen¬
tres, for instance Delphi, and there are universal gods. Hut what
is lacking is any kind of trans-local integration, even for cults
of the same deity. Thus the cult of Athene at Sparta is quite sep¬
arate from the cult of Athene at Athens - she was patroness of
both Cities. This principle holds equally for widespread salvat¬
ion-cults such as Mithraism in Roman times: the various cult cen¬
tres are quite independent and unrelated. There is neither Church
nor monastic order in Antiquity (that is, leaving aside the Jews).
As to priesthoods and temples, I have commented on these
earlier (section ii above): the ancient temple is much better
understood as a monastery than as a church. Basically it is a
dwelling-place of the god; he may receive his clients there -
individuals who approach him with sacrifice and prayer - but
there is no regular collective act of worship within the temple.
Annual festivals and processions are the closest analogues to
this. The temple will have lands, livestock, perhaps slaves, and
other such assets allocated for its upkeep; it is an oikos, and
as such little distinguishable from the oikos of a mortal patric¬
ian. In bureaucratic conditions the endowment of the temple may
be considerable, and there will be a bureaucratically appointed
staff of priests in permanent attendance. In this, there may be a
division between the lay administration that oversees the temp¬
le' s material endownment and the priestly staff who actually att¬
end the god - this is especially typical for Egypt. The relations
between the priesthoods and the state may be various: the priest¬
hoods may be appropriated and hereditary, or they may be assimil¬
ated to the patrimonial bureaucracy. Here exceptionally a degree
of inter-local co-ordination may appear, but this is on analogy
with the various departments of the state bureaucracy and is lim¬
ited to the material administration; it does not extend to the
priestly functions themselves. In the City-state by contrast the
economic endowment will be more slight, and the priesthoods will
be appropriated by an aristocratic clan, or else allocated among
the citizens like a magistracy. In the latter case especially the
priests are typically amateur, part-time and non-residential. But
in all cases save the most strongly centralized Bureaucratic
Kingdoms, the priests are purely local and have nothing to do
with each other.
The cultaic communities for the most part relate fairly
straightforwardly to social morphology: wherever there is an
association of some permanence, a common cult will be formed. The
two most basic elements here are the household and the City. The
household has its altars and its ancestor cult (or cult of the
dead); it also marks the occasions of the life-cycle such as
birth, death, coming of age and marriage. The City will have its
patron, and other recognized gods in cohort with him (her); it
will provide temples and priesthoods for them, and an annual
cycle of festivals and processions in which all participate, and
which comprises the City's calendar. This seems to hold broadly
for "administrative" cities in Bureaucratic Kingdoms and complex
empires as well as for City-states. There are other levels of
cultaic association, the tribes and phratries for example. Again,
the various crafts and trades may set up their own cults, as may
an army unit, or a group of immigrants may bring their god with
them. Broadly, one can distinguish between state religion and
private religion, or rather, between public compulsory religion
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and. private elective religion. However the gods of the citizen
household and of the City will be basically the same. The state
religion may include elements that reach beyond the City, the
cult of the royal family for example, or of Rome and the emper¬
or' s genius. Again, private religion includes gods who are priv¬
ately approached for help in the event of individual misfortune
of a kind that precludes approach to the public gods (for example
deformity)•
Communal activity comprises festivals and processions, typ¬
ically held annually for each deity. Everyone will take part
within certain restrictions - foreigners or slaves might be ex¬
cluded. Omens are taken for the community, for example before the
start of a campaign. There is also the individual approach to the
gods. This typically takes the form of sacrifice and prayer. The
approach is made for material wants: wealth, victory, harm to an
enemy, or an omen for affairs in prospect. The transaction is
seen as an exchange, a gift for a favour, requested courteously
but confidently. This is far from abasement before an absolute
god, or again from the quest for spiritual benefits such as grace
or the forgiveness of sin. Indeed, though the displeasure of the
gods is feared, and even their laws may be kept, a strictly eth¬
ical content to the god's character, or to one's relationship to
the gods, is a gradual development of ancient religion. Rather
the relationship is seen pragmatically, very much in terms of
clientage upon a patrician. At any rate, the categories "belief"
and "worship" are probably generally inappropriate to ancient
religion. One might better talk in terms of knowing about the
gods and acknowledging them; perhaps choosing one or two for
special patronage, or being exceptionally driven to approach
another for some special need. But the gods of the polity must
be acknowledged by everyone; there is a communal responsibility
to see that the community's patrons are not offended.
The plurality of cults and deities is subject to a process
of rationalization, in terms of integration into a pantheon with
differentiated functions and attributes. This is an early pro¬
cess, and is the work of intellectuals. The principles involved
are various, and often involve the inter-negotiation of cultural
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symbols between conflicting groups. A continuing underlying equi¬
valence of deities should then be kept in view. Thus the Greek
Cities acknowledge the same gods but choose each different pat¬
rons from among them. So also it is with the various elements of
the social order: patricians, peasants and proletarians each fav¬
our different gods, while the City publicly acknowledges all of
them. But again, there is protection of human activities: the
various crafts; sea-faring and travelling; war, political debate,
legal proceedings, peaoe-making and alliance; agriculture and
stock-breeding; sex and love; childbirth; marriage and mother¬
hood; etc. There is also a more purely cognitive content, in
terms of for example cosmology, the natural environment, and the
origins of humanity. All these different aspects are inter-woven
together, and it should be realized that the pattern is constant¬
ly changing: different deities are syncretized into one; syncret-
ized deities are re-differentiated; foreign deities are imported
and given new functions; and so on. All this will include the
reflection of changing political hegemonies. Here again is an
area where scholarship must beware of imposing more coherence
than is there. It should be realized too that the debate of
intellectuals with ancient religion - whether as individuals or
within organized priesthoods - is a long-standing characteristic
of the Ancient Civilization.
All this has taken us well into the ideal, content, side of
ancient religion. But there are difficulties. Ancient religion
does not have written dogmas or scriptures, though it may have
magical texts. Even the books of the Jews are only canonized at
the end of Antiquity. Prophecy (and its social reception) change
the whole character of religion. The written material that we
have is the work of intellectuals, whether within or without the
priesthoods. Even the versions we have of ancient myths are of
this kind. As I have said, intellectuals are in constant debate
with religion, rationalizing its contents whether before or after
prophecy; but the definition and closure of dogma entail develop¬
ments in the organizational basis of religion, in terms of Church
and Church/state relations, which only emerge as Antiquity ends.
The work of intellectuals does not in itself define an orthodoxy
- at least, not a compulsory orthodoxy. (An added problem is that
modern scholarship even from the side of Religious Studies seems
somewhat lacking in synthetic accounts of ancient religion, and
appears still to be influenced by obsolete works such as Frazer's
"Golden Bough". See e.g. Eliade 1958; James 1958, I968; also
Frazer 1963.)
It is more the sociological basis that throws light on the
content of ancient religion. Thus different strata differ not
only in their chosen gods, but in how they conceive and relate to
them, and what (if anything) they want from them. For example,
bureaucratic and military aristocracies are unalike in their
ideas, as indeed are rural and urban strata (it is the former
that are most concerned with agriculture, weather, etc.). With
this, there are the different and contrasting needs of privileged,
and disprivileged strata: the former want legitimation of their
privileges, the latter compensation for their disprivileges. But
it is the loss of political centrality on the part of the privil¬
eged that makes for spiritualized soteriologies: receptiveness to
prophecy and a turning away from the world. Of themselves, the
orientations of all strata remain materialistic and this-world
oriented.
Taking these elements together, it is possible to identify
two broad streams in ancient religion: political cults and pop¬
ular soteriologies. The first comprises the public religion of
the polity, the gods whose temples and priesthoods the state
provides, and whose festivals and processions make up the civic
calendar. The second concerns the pursuit of "salvation". This
should not be understood in the purely spiritual sense developed
in Christianity. The conception is rather material, and might
include relief from illness or misfortune - though these are
matters rather for individual than communal pursuit. But the com¬
munal cults of popular soteriology were mostly concerned with
death, and apparently with some conception of life after death.
This seems to be conceived after this-worldly fashion, and was
based simply on initiation and cult-membership, without mastery
of dogma or ethical requirements. (However it is no concern of
mine to prove Christianity, especially early Christianity, super-
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ior to this.)
The two streams, political and soteriological, are not nec¬
essarily separate: indeed, one should rather see them as respect¬
ively the public religion of the citizens and the elective relig¬
ion of the urban proletariat. Where these coalesce, the religious
streams will coalesce also. The main case is the Bureacratic
Kingdom, which both proletarianizes and gives citizenship to all
the people, as I have tried to show above (see especially ch 4) •
Indeed the impact of the World Empires towards the end of Antiqu¬
ity was to universalize the popular soteriological stream of
religion as the citizen-strata of the Cities were de-militarized
and depoliticized. But a Plebeian City of radical democracy too
will merge the streams: Athens gave state recognition to the
Eleusinian Mysteries. It might be added that the migrant nature
of the urban proletariat and their lack of funerary property or
of heirs to maintain their funerary cult seem to be the probable
reasons for their demand for such soteriological cults. Again,
the Egyptian cult of the dead can probably be seen as a compro¬
mise between the (political) ancestor cults and (soteriological)
salvation cults of the Greeks and Romans: an ancestor cult that
would be maintained only for a generation or two by the descend¬
ants, and would then be entrusted to the gods.
Some classification of cognitive and ideal content is poss¬
ible on the basis of the above analysis. Popular soteriologies
typically use agriculture, especially grain, for their symbolism,
and centre on a mother-goddess, identified with the earth, to¬
gether with a male consort who passes through an annual cycle
from son to lover through death to son again - a dying corn-god.
There are variations on this, and inter-fusions with other mean¬
ings. In particular, Osiris in Egypt, with his son Horus, is
equally involved in the this-worldly problem of succession, esp¬
ecially royal succession, and the widow I sis, who secures the
succession, is as much hero as mother.
But to turn to the other side, political cults cannot simply
be concerned with public affairs such as war, politics and law,
nor simply with the legitimation of authority and privilege. As
the religion of estate-owning patricians and of peasant citizens,
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it must concern itself with agriculture too; and again, it must
concern itself with the perpetuation of the lineage through marr¬
iage and procreation. For this last, stock-breeding provides the
typical symbolism, especially the bull, at least at the levels of
aristocracy and royalty. The phallus is also typically and more
generally found as a symbol. Against this, the concern with agri¬
culture is simply a concern with agriculture, though sexual in¬
tercourse and human fertility will still be associated with it,
in a form superficially similar to the popular soteriologies. But
again, late in Antiquity there appear soteriological cults that
include bull symbolism: Gybele and Attis, Mithras; or again,
where the dying god appears without a mother-goddess: Mithras,
Jesus. Meanings here as I have said are shared and negotiated on
a basis of social conflict; moreover the patterns change.
These remarks go somewhat beyond Weber, but it is germane to
this thesis to ask how sex and gender appear in ancient religion.
This again has to be answered in the light of the sociological
basis; one cannot proceed directly to the ideal realm. The most
basic point is that women have their specific deities, patroness¬
es and protectresses of the various activities and aspects of
women* s lives. These include the hearth, spinning and weaving,
marriage and motherhood; also such matters as virginity, menstru¬
ation, pregnancy, child-birth, the passage from maiden to woman¬
hood; and also sexual intercourse and love. It is notable that,
where the City-state tends to separate out the three sectors here
- the patronesses of the citizen wife and matron and her activ¬
ities; the protectress of female biological functions; and the
patroness of prostitutes and protectress of sexual intercourse -
Bureaucratic Kingdoms tend to fuse them together, and moreover to
fuse them with the soteriological mother-goddesses and agricult¬
ural cults. Temple prostitution was at least partly a factor of
this, though also of course of the economic location of the tem¬
ples and seemingly also of sociodemographic factors - it was
mainly a practice of the Ancient Near East. With this, the tend¬
ency for the political and soteriological streams of religion to
merge in conditions of bureaucracy should be recalled. In Egypt,
the patroness of sexual intercourse and love bears the name "Hat-
hor", which means "the mother of Horns"; the soteriological moth¬
er-goddess Isis' name neans "the throne". Both goddesses, and
especially Hat-hor, commonly appear in cow form or cow-headed;
indeed cow symbolism is common in ancient Egyptian religion,
answering the bull symbolism discussed above. Again, at Athens
where the streams are merged for a different reason, the Eleusin-
ian goddesses reflect the passage from maiden to womanhood, as
well as relating to the agricultural soteriology. However, it
should be noted for City-states generally that the protectresses
of female biological functions as well as the patronesses of the
citizen wife and matron are included in the pantheon of the
City's political gods.
But it is difficult to go beyond this. Host male activities
have male patrons - the crafts, the conduct of public affairs -
although abstractions such as justice or victory may be personi¬
fied as female. But it should be noted that the patron of the
polity can as well be female as male; the warrior goddess (e.g.
Athene) is a very common figure in ancient religion. Beyond this,
there are probably no inherent requirements, of cosmology (the
Egyptians made the sky female and the earth male), political
life, farming, human biology, or anything else, that absolutely
demand or forbid expression in terms of each other in particular
ways, though there may be some common tendencies. Moreover anc¬
ient religion has no "original form"; it is what it is when it
is. Too, it must be remembered that ancient religion is located
in a cosmopolitan world, and moreover is constantly subject to
rationalization by intellectuals. All in all, it seems to me that
one must look at this question of sex and gender in ancient re¬
ligion not in terms of a set of statements but as a language, in
which a very wide range of things might be said.
To conclude, the ancients made full cognitive use of sex and
gender in their religious thinking, and did so with enough flex¬
ibility to accomodate a wide range of variation and change in
conditions. But their conceptions always remain personalized: the
ancient West never developed an impersonal cosmological concept¬
ion like the Chinese yin and yang. Such conceptions however are
concious and rational developments; they are neither unconcious
nor pre-civilized. I have stated earlier (ch 2 & 3; see also App¬
endix B) that to me, the whole picture suggests a cultural text
co-written and read by the two sexes together, rather than women
living under male cultural hegemony.
Finally, I turn to the Judaeo-Christian tradition. I have no
specific focus in this thesis on the Ancient or indeed the Hell¬
enistic or Roman Near East, and so only some notes can he given
here. The beginning is the exclusive orientation of the early
Jews to a political god, the patron of their military confederat¬
ion, and the refusal to acknowledge other deities. This is mono-
latry not monotheism incidentally: an elective relationship in a
context of polytheism. The Jews, like the Greeks and for similar
reasons, excluded women from political life, and their cult was
part of this of course. Following this is the Jews' conflict
within Palestine with their gentile neighbours: their rejection
of any assimilation, and constant conflicts with the cults and
adherents of agricultural and soteriological goddesses, and the
"whoredom" associated with them. This features in the activities
of the prophets. In due time, the vicissitudes of the Jews in
conflict with more powerful realms brought them to develop soter¬
iological conceptions themselves, but always exclusively in terms
of their own god and their relationship to him. Early Christian¬
ity is a part of this - though it is hard to be clear what "sal¬
vation" meant in Judaeo-Christianity even at this stage. Protect¬
ion from magic and demons seems to have been at least one elem¬
ent in it.
Christianity spread first in the Greek East, and there is an
increasing Greek contribution to its content, especially as the
theological debates begin in the 2nd century. But Christianity's
early success is probably due more to organizational factors than
to doctrinal content: the trans-local integration of cultaic com¬
munities into a Church with a centralized priesthood. Presumably
this was modelled on the Jewish Diaspora and its continued orien¬
tation to the Temple at Jerusalem, in the face of the vicissitud¬
es of the Jewish state. Women were excluded from active particip¬
ation, as with public affairs among both the Jews and the Greeks.
With this, there enters a specifically Greek misogyny, originat-
ing in the sociodemographic pressures on the peasantry at the
time of the class-struggles - the situation of Hesiod. This in¬
deed has some parallel in Jewish history. But there is also a
more formal contribution of Greek, especially Platonic, philoso¬
phy to Christian theology, including importantly Hind/body dual¬
ism. This came to be synthesized in due course with Persian dual-
istic theodicy: the conception of the World as the arena for the
conflict of two creator gods, one good, the other evil. Thus came
the eventual superimposition of the divisions good/evil, spirit/
flesh, and man/woman of Christian theological tradition.
As to the equation of sex with sin, this seems to be logic¬
ally entailed. There is certainly an ample tradition of polemic
for it to draw upon, not only from the Jews' detestation of the
"whoredom" of alien soteriological goddesses, but also from the
status conflicts in City-states, over patrician men trying to
take plebeian girls as concubines but refusing them marriage, and
equally over citizen men preferring concubines to citizen-wives
(a factor especially of the City-state's decline). I have dis¬
cussed these things in the chapters above. Notably they are all
factors of the City-state - at least, the Jews as a political
community are broadly assimilable to the City-state type. There
are no equivalents from Bureaucratic Kingdoms. However, as such
they are contextualized with a distinction between marriage and
prostitution, and are basically concerned (the latter two cases
at least) with the balance between these two kinds of sexual
relationship. There is no condemnation of sexuality as such. In¬
deed it is rather love that is problematic, and sexuality is
problematic only indirectly for the risks it entails of inapprop¬
riate and anti-social love (or over-reproduction, of course).
Christian theology is basically in the City-state plebeian trad¬
ition, then, as favouring a dispassionate partnership in marriage
and an orientation of sex to procreation. Its major difference is
the condemnation of prostitution, and exclusion of prostitutes
themselves. Probably a major factor here is that the Churches
were engaged in an attempt to create a kind of quasi-citizenship
among the urban poor, whose material situation simply would not
support it. Prostitutes were both compelled and enabled to have
both material and ideological independence; the latter especially
would re-awaken the old polemic against "whoredom", of course. At
least the failure of Christian compassion towards prostitutes
does require some explanation. The theological condemnation of
sexuality however was worked out over a period of some centuries,
and is an intellectual response to the problems rather than a
simple reflection of them.
This provides no more than a thumbnail sketch. But the point
I want to make is how far the Judaeo-Christian tradition on women
and sex is made up of a cumulation of often contingent factors -
not least the personal idiosyncracies of individual intellect¬
uals. It was by no means the inevitable, or even the natural,
outcome of Antiquity. The character of Roman culture in the West¬
ern Principate is proof enough of that.
We should remember here Weber's views on the role of cultur¬
al factors in sociohistorical causation (Weber 1970b ii p 280).
Weber sees the material and the ideal as opposed realms, without
causal interlinkage and each subject to independent development
through rationalization and creative innovation, and yet drawn
constantly towards inter-correspondance, to mirroring each other.
Social actors, placed between these realms, act in terms of their
material and ideal interests. Against this, an idea is an except¬
ional innovation in the ideal realm, which, in Weber's metaphor,
can serve as a railway points, diverting the train of history and
sending it down a new course. The Judaeo-Christian tradition on
women and sex should surely be seen in this light. But women and
sex in ancient culture itself are very much as in ancient mater¬
ial social arrangements. Only in the context of the long-terra
development of culture does this acquire special sociological
significance.
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In chapter 3 of this thesis, I introduce Analytical Psychol¬
ogy, the depth psychology of Carl Jung, together with some crit¬
ical comments on the Freudian tradition in social theory. I pro¬
ceed to develop the conception of sexual polarity that is central
to this thesis very much in the light of Jungian insights. Yet as
I remark, the issue is presentationally very difficult, for
Jung's thought is probably quite unfamiliar to most sociologists.
Accordingly, I now present as an appendix a short account of the
Jungian system, and a discussion of the social-theoretical issues
involved, to supplement the necessarily restricted comments made
in the body of the text.
It must be understood that what follows is based almost
entirely on secondary literature. Jung* s Collected Works run to
eighteen volumes, plus two volumes of collected letters and some
oddments; Freud is even more prolific, and there are others to
consider. Moreover their thought is highly complex and ramified.
A full treatment of these matters would be a major undertaking,
and would require a thesis to itself. All that is undertaken here
is to Provide a sketch of the central elements of Analytical
Psychology, with some comments on its location in the history of
depth psychology and its potential for social theory; this spec¬
ifically in relation to the sociology of Max Weber and to gender
theory.
Criticizing the Freudian tradition in social theory, I re¬
marked earlier that social theory has favoured Freud above all
because he fits: he provides certain types of social theoretical
construction with logical closure of their explanatory structures.
These are theoretical syntheses tending towards grand or over-
arching theory, and they are quite various, even opposed, in
character: Frankfurt School Marxism, Althusserian Marxism, Levi-
Strauss' anthropology, Parsonian systems theory, Habermas' Crit¬
ical Sociology, the feminist theory of for instance Juliet Mitch¬
ell. Yet the Psychoanalytic contribution is always in the same
area and with the same force: ideology, conciousness, socializat¬
ion, childhood, the family; social continuity and reproduction.
The cost of this deployment of Psychoanalysis is that its central
ground, in the family, childhood, socialization and conciousness,
becomes closed off from sociological exploration and enquiry. It
is a purely explanatory project, directed as I have said to pro¬
viding the logical closure of theory. Kith this, the strategy is
self-perpetuating: so long as Psychoanalysis can provide this
closure, social theory at this level will formulate - and re¬
formulate - itself to achieve closure through Psychoanalysis; so
long as social theory at this level requires closure in this area
and of this kind, Psychoanalysis will be used to provide it. The
lock is built to fit the key, and the key is chosen to fit the
lock. Against this, much of what is done in social theory does
not aspire to this kind of overarching level, and ignores Freud
completely. But it seems to be accepted that this entails settl¬
ing for a reduced level of explanatory power (though perhaps act¬
ually attaining a more solid explanatory achievement), and it
seems rarely to be asked whether both the lock and the key could
be changed - that is, whether the problem of closure could be
shifted and a system other than Psychoanalysis used. (Consider
for example Collins 1975 P 225 ©"t seq; also Mitchell 1975 P 137
et seq, p 227 et seq.) In this sense, Freud's position in social
theory is hegemonic.
However, the impact of using Weber's sociology to theorize
gender appears to be to dissolve the sociological context for
Psychoanalysis, replacing the focus on conciousness, socializat¬
ion, childhood and the family with an Interpretive conception of
social reality and a focus on the migration process; together
with a strategic orientation to change not continuity. The first
concern with Jung then is simply as a counter to theoretical
inertia - to answer the question, "But what about Freud?". This
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raises two sets of questions. First, does Jung actually have a
critique and alternative to Psychoanalysis, on its own ground and
in its own terms? Does this enable us to explain in the areas of
culture, ideology and conciousness without tying us down as Freud
does in the areas of socialization, childhood and the family?
Second, can Jung positively help us to develop an orientation to
gender questions, for example to masculinity and femininity or to
childhood, such as will open them up to sociological exploration?
In the body of the text, most weight was given to the second of
these questions, but it is the first that carries the real chall¬
enge to the Freudian hegemony in social theory, and that there¬
fore most needs to be considered here. But first of all, an acc¬
ount of Analytical Psychology and its location in the history of
depth psychology must be given.
It is not easy to define "depth psychology". Indeed, though
I use the term as a generic this is by no means universal: often
"psychoanalysis" is used as the generic term. But then as I have
indicated above, Freudian Psychoanalysis is commonly treated in
social theory as sui generis, the existence of non-Freudian cog¬
nates being basically ignored. For a working definition, it can
be said that depth psychology is the theory and study of the
psyche, this being a concept of the mind that provides both con-
cious and unconcious aspects. It should be stressed that depth
psychology is neither academic psychology nor psychiatry, al¬
though in modern times both take some account of it. Depth psych¬
ology is ancestral to personality theory; indeed it can be fair¬
ly and usefully described as personality theory at the level of
grand theory, that is, ramified into the fields of art, religion,
and culture generally. One might call this the sociological di¬
mension.* Even so, depth psychology largely originated, and still
tends to be pursued, as a sui generis activity, whose practition¬
ers are typically of general education biased strongly towards
medicine. Its basic methodology is a mixture of case history and
*Here again one could raise the question of the social science
and cultural science perspectives. However this cannot be sys¬
tematically explored here; it is rather the growing edge of my
thinking as this present thesis reaches finalization.
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introspection, and. its psychotherapeutic pretensions are always
central. With this, there are problems as to its scientific stat¬
us, and problems too of where to draxv the line: depth psychology
can and always could look eccentric, and some of its offshoots,
derivatives and imitations are pretty weird even by the standards
of social theory. Consider Scientology for example. This point
will be taken up again later.
For present purposes, however, the issues can perhaps be
clarified by an insistence on the notion of grand theory, and a
historical approach. Grand theory I have defined above in terms
of ramification into the sociological dimension - a theory of
culture. On the historical side, the pivotal figure remains that
of Sigmund Freud. Freud indeed has precursors and contemporaries
of a kind; Pierre Janet is perhaps the most important. I do not
propose to go into that kind of question here. The essential
narrative that needs to be put across is as follows: Freud's own
intellectual career is very lengthy, extending from the 1880s to
the end of the 1930s, but within this one can distinguish two
crucial phases, one in which Psychoanalytic theory was given its
first definitive formulation; the other in which it was recast
and reformulated in a second definitive form. The first of these
phases runs from circa 1900 - 1914; this is called the phase of
Id-psychology. The second runs from circa 1914 - 1930, and is
called the phase of Ego-psychology. It may be noted that both
phases end with "sociological" works: the first with "Totem and
Taboo"; the second with "Civilization and its Discontents". But
that point is deceptive: following "Totem and Taboo" what Freud
wanted was to pursue the grounding of Psychoanalytic theory in
the biological and medical sciences. This aspiration he appears
to have abandoned permanently with the reformulation of Psycho¬
analytic theory as Ego-psychology. The crucial events which com¬
pelled Freud to abandon his program, and to undertake the reform¬
ulation, were unquestionably the defections of Alfred Adler and
Carl Jung, in the years 1911 - 13. (I am aware that the carnage
of the First World War is often cited as the real cause - though
I am not clear what bearing this has on the purposive nature of
the psyche. See below.) The definitive formulation of Psychoanal-
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ytic theory as Id-psychology had excluded their ideas; reformul¬
ation as Ego-psychology tried to incorporate them. In the mean¬
time, both men developed their ideas into their own systems:
Individual Psychology (Adler) and Analytical Psychology (Jung).
Adler and Jung then have an importance in the history of depth
psychology that later schismatics such as Reich and Fromm do not
have - especially since Ego-psychology never in fact received
such a clear-cut and definitive form as Id-psychology had, and
further of course in view of Freud's eventual death and the sub¬
sequent development of his work by others.
I do not want to try to give an extended account of Psycho¬
analytic theory here - it would take too long, and in any case it
should be familiar enough (see e.g. Fine 1962; Stafford-Clark
I965). Some of the main points of difference between Id-psychol¬
ogy and Ego-psychology should however be indicated. Id-psychology
centres on the notions of the unconcious, libido and infant sex¬
uality. This last includes a first account of the Oedipus con¬
flicts, as well as the stages of infant sexuality: oral, anal and
genital. Ego-psychology brings in an aggressive instinct as well
as the sexual instinct, and centres on the notions of id, ego and
superego. The Oedipus conflicts are developed into the Oedipus
complex, a crucial process in the formation of personality (the
superego) rather than simply a cause of neurosis. Kith this, the
stages of infant sexuality are given further elaboration. For
present purposes, there should be no need to say more than this
here, although the continuing grounding in the biology of sex and
reproduction and in family structure should be noted. But to get
a clearer idea of the Psychoanalytic system than this, I want to
turn to the alternatives to Psychoanalysis, and first to a brief
consideration of the ideas of Alfred Adler-.
It should be stated at the outset that Adlerian Individual
Psychology (see Way 1956; Brown 1963) is not really grand theory
in the way that Psychoanalysis (and Analytical Psychology) is.
That is, it attempts no systematic exploration of the sociologic¬
al dimension, although it does have manifold implications for
social policy. Indeed it is a definitive characteristic of Ad-
ler's work that it is directed primarily at the educator and the
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social worker and above all, the child-counsellor, rather than
the professional intellectual. It is to the former rather than
the latter that the psychotherapist is to be associated. Adler is
no intellectual lightweight, but neither is he a compulsive
theorist: he is a practitoner. As such, he could very much be
termed the father of permissiveness.
As a theorist, Adler's contribution to Psychoanalysis, which
later became his own system, centres on three notions: individ¬
uality, the aggressive instinct, and purposiveness. By individ¬
uality is meant the variation between individuals. This can be
grounded in physical, perhaps hereditary, factors: it was with
the notion of "organ deficiency" that Adler started, a congenital
weakness, deformity, or predisposition to illness centring on one
of the body's organs or systems. Later, he added a consideration
of environmental factors, especially family constellation: the
make-up of the family in terms of age and sex, and the child's
position in it. These factors provide the individual situation in
which the psyche is formed. But it is the child that forms its
psyche, through the process of exploration and mastery of its
world. That is, the child not merely explores but constructs its
world, and in doing so constructs itself. This is a process of
trial and error, in which the errors have as much significance as
the successes. The basic point is that the child mythologizes its
own situation of helplessness and dependence in terms of an in¬
feriority that has to be overcome or compensated for. (This of
course is the location of the notion of the inferiority complex.)
The striving for superiority, for mastery, for perfection, is
constant; this is the expression of the aggressive instinct. But
the terms in which the myth can be expressed are infinite, in
terms of the individual situation as the child constructs it. Yet
the myth is organizatory in its functions: the whole personality
is integrated around it and illuminated by it. This fact defines
the ultimate nature and location of neurosis. It follows then
that each person is unique, and must be understood in his/her own
terms and as a whole.
This gives only a most cursory statement of Adler's central
ideas, but from it it can be seen that, although Adler shares
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with Freud, an emphasis on early childhood, and a conception of
concious and unconcious elements in the psyche, he does not real¬
ly share much common ground with Freud. Rather he seems to have
tried to approach the whole matter from a different angle. Init¬
ially this was intended to fill out Psychoanalysis; later it "be¬
came an alternative system. To Adler, it seems to have made litt¬
le difference. However, there are some critically important und¬
erlying differences "between Freud and Adler that should be spelt
out. Freud was trained in a school of medical and biological
science which dealt purely in causal terms, and which moreover
took its own philosophical status for granted. Adler (who was 15
years younger) had a somewhat different intellectual background,
which included on the one side, functionalist approaches in the
biological and medical sciences and on the other, German philos¬
ophy, especially Kant and Nietzsche. From these came the notions
of purposiveness and the aggressive instinct - the former espec¬
ially being a fusion of functionalism and Intentionality, the
integration of the psyche around an unconcious purpose. It is
here that the great importance of Adler as a thinker lies; al¬
though not a grand theorist himself, he was a catalyst both for
the reformulation of Psychoanalysis as Ego-psychology (in which
the aggressive instinct and the theory of the ego seek to accom¬
odate his central insights - although the Freudian aggressive
instinct is never realized in the way that the sexual instinct
is), and also for Analytical Psychology and the work of Carl
Jung. It is to this that I now turn.
On Carl Jung, something of a biographical note should first
be given (see Brome 1978). Jung, 20 years younger than Freud, was
a German Swiss of Protestant background, working in Zurich. He
was thus quite remote from the Freud circle in Vienna, who were
mostly Jews. But even more than this, Jung was something that
none of the Freud circle were: he was a psychiatrist - also in
due course a university lecturer in psychiatry. This gave him
extensive contact with psychotics, especially schizophrenics (the
condition was then called dementia praecox), which the members of
the Freud circle (including Freud himself) could not have. The
Freud circle at this time were mostly dealing with hysterics and
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obsessional neurotics, and it was in terms of these conditions
that Psychoanalytic theory was being developed. It was in this
situation, then, in the years following 1900, that Jung first
encountered Psychoanalytic literature. He started trying to apply
its insights to his own cases, and published some papers on it
and eventually a book, "The Psychology of Dementia Praecox". It
was through this that he finally met Freud, in 1907. Although the
intellectual maturity of Freud at this time is undoubted, even so
the independence of Jung's thought should be realized, and how
much he had to contribute (politically as well as intellectually):
a completely independent figure, within the psychiatric establish¬
ment (and the university establishment), creatively developing
Psychoanalytic theory into important new areas, the theory of
psychosis. The split with Freud five years later was very bitter,
and it is still difficult to get a clear account of it. But al¬
though Jung seems to have tried to subordinate his genius to that
of Freud for a while, he broke away not long after Adler, and
between 1914 and circa 1922 - 23 founded the basic system of
Analytical Psychology, which he continued to develop until his
death in 1961.
The influence of Adler on Jung is hard to evaluate, not
least because of the elements of intellectual background they
shared - in particular, functionalism in the biological and med¬
ical sciences, and German philosophy, Kant and Nietzsche. On the
other hand, Jung unlike Adler was a compulsive intellectual.
Again, his clinical experience was completely different, although
he did begin treating neurotics in private practice after about
I909. Also, Jung had a compulsive interest in religion which Ad¬
ler did not share (nor did Jung share Adler's socialist sympath¬
ies). But however this may be, the decisive work with which Jung
broke away from Freud, "Two Essays in Analytical Psychology",
consists essentially of a single case-history told twice, once in
Freudian terms and once in Adlerian. This illustrated the risk of
the analyst constructing his patient in his own image - it was
Jung who insisted that the analyst's training must include being
analysed himself, to protect against this - and it is basic to
Jung's psychology that introversion and extraversion are respect-
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ively the Adlerian and. the Freudian personality. That is, Jung's
system is fundamentally a simultaneous critique and synthesis of
the systems of Adler and Freud. In this, if Jung so far as he is
a grand theorist necessarily leans towards Freud, the contribut¬
ory and catalytic role of Adler should not thereby be forgotten.
But this stated, a more full account of the Analytical Psychology
of Carl Jung should now be given.
Jung considers the psyche in terms of three levels: conc-
iousness, the personal unconcious, and the collective unconcious.
It is the last of these that is most distinctive, therefore it
should be taken first. The collective unconcious is the oldest
and most primitive level of the psyche, out of which conciousness
forms. In a sense then it corresponds to the Freudian id. But it
is not a location of instinctual impulses; its character is rath¬
er cognitive. It can be described as an innate propensity for
concept formation, in terms of a specific range of strongly emot¬
ionally coloured concepts relating to Man's evolutionary biolog¬
ical and cultural experience. These concepts, or rather the spec¬
ific propensities for the formation of these concepts, are called
the archetypes. In terms of the individual psyche, the innate
propensity can only be actualized (or "filled") through contact
with specific cultures the conception here is structuralist, and
is similar to Chomsky's ideas on language acquisition. But equal¬
ly the archetypes are implicated in the creation of culture: they
inform and give their significance to symbols, rituals and myths,
through which psychic energy is diverted from immediate instinct¬
ual or material needs to cultural purposes, or through which
culturally entailed energy is redirected. The creation of culture
is of the essence of humanity, and is an essentially arational
process; in all this, religion is central. It is important to
grasp at the outset the conception of psyche and culture mutually
created in the interaction of the collective unconcious and its
cultural environment, and indeed ultimately of Man creating him¬
self in the interaction of collective unconcious and material
environment. It can be seen then that Jiang's conception is ultim¬
ately sociological, rather than biological like Freud's.
Against this background, conciousness emerges, centred on
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the ego, and also there emerges the personal unconcious. This
last is perhaps rather an Adlerian than a Freudian unconcious: it
comprises repressed and forgotten material from the unconcious
hut not a primordial id. It rises, or falls, from conciousness
then, rather than rising from the collective unconcious. It has
to he realized here that Analytical Psychology is not articulated
as a theory of childhood. What is central is a notion of an inner
reality, the reality of the psyche, and an outer, cultural and
material, reality; hoth these realities present their demands
to the individual, who must balance between them. Here Jung makes
his fundamental distinction between the introvert and the extra-
vert: these are habitual modes of orientation of the individual,
the former to inner rather than outer reality, the latter to outer
reality rather than inner. Here also Jung provides the basic con¬
ception of libido - psychic energy - as flowing between opposite
poles but alternating in direction, thus progressing to satisfy
the needs of the concious and adapt to the outer world, regress¬
ing to satisfy the needs of the unconcious and adapt to the inner
world. Sleep and dreams exemplify the latter: regression is a
normal not a pathological function. Moreover libido has a rhythm,
turns naturally from one thing to another: it is tidal rather
than current-like in character. It should be stressed that for
Jung libido means only psychic energy. This has two main instinct¬
ual channels, sex and aggression, seen basically in Freudian and
Adlerian terms respectively.
Jung's views on the pathological are above all an integrated
approach to the neuroses and the psychoses. In this, the anchor,
so to speak, of his thinking is not as with Freud hysteria, but
dissociation, the extreme state of which is multiple personality.
In Jung's view, neurosis is to be seen in terms of frustrated
libido expressing itself by re-activating significant repressed
childhood memories. But the cause of the neurosis is the present
frustration; the past only provides a vocabulary of symptoms.
This is very typical of how Jung "depth-reverses" Freudian in¬
sights. Thus he also says that dreams are coded to express not to
conceal their meanings, and, unanswerably, that the free associa¬
tion process only leads away from the dream - the dream itself is
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the true meaning. But more than this, the neurosis is to he und¬
erstood. in terms of expression rather than repression: it acts
as the psychic equivalent of pain, to warn us of an inadequacy in
our adjustment, a frustration of libido that must be dealt with.
Thus the psyche is self-regulating; its tendency is to function,
not to malfunction. This conception distinguishes Jung from Adler
as well as from Freud, and indeed perhaps from most who have
worked in this area.
But to return to dissociation, Jung very early noted how in
word association tests, a number of words could be found which
were linked for the given person by a common feeling-tone. To
this he gave the name "complex" - this is apparently the origin
of the word in psychology. Further, he noted how these complexes
could apparently carry on a life of their own within the psyche,
almost as independent personalities. It was these that provided
the vocabulary of symptoms for neurosis; in the extreme forms of
dissociative neurosis actual realized alternative personalities
would appear, and take over the person in turn. Psychosis, at
least schizophrenia, could also be understood in these terms, as
the personality fragmenting into a number of such elements, the
point being that sense of identity is lost: the ego becomes only
one fragment among many. Yet even here there could be an attempt
at adaptation and recovery. Psychotic delusions can have a myth¬
ological quality, representing a drama of self-rescue (successful
or unsuccessful) through which the individual tries to resolve
his/her situation, to reconstruct his/her personality and world.
Again it is to be noted here that Jung's views of the psyche
and of culture are integrated. The capability to create autonom¬
ous personalities within ourselves informs literature and mythol¬
ogy and religion - and normal inter-personal relations - as well
as neurosis and psychosis. Actual cultural creation aside, both
empathy and the appreciation of culture depend upon this. Thus we
all carry a conception of say Hamlet within us, or our parents
or the Virgin Mary, which is directed by the logic of its "own"
character, not by our conciousness or will. It was precisely in
consideration of this, and because it is cultural as well as in¬
dividual, that Jung held that explanation solely in terms of an
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individual unconcious was inadequate: a collective unconcious
must be proposed. It should be clearly realized that the altern¬
ative to this is to propose the universality and ultimacy of the
Oedipus complex - which is sociologically disastrous. As I have
said earlier, Jung's system is ultimately sociological in its
grounding.
Jung associated neurosis with extraversion, and failure to
adjust to the outer world. Psychosis he associated with introver¬
sion, and failure to adjust to the inner world. But the problem
of psychosis was one of adjustment: the difficulties of satisfy¬
ing the needs of the psyche on the basis of the available cultur¬
al material. In a secularized, rationalized and disenchanted age
this difficulty accounts not only for schizophrenia as the psych¬
ic disease of our times, but also for the eccentricity, instabil¬
ity and lack of restraint in our religious, political and cultur¬
al affairs. It should be stressed that here Jung, for all that I
can establish, is paralleling Weber not quoting him. The index of
his collected works gives no mention of Weber at all (there is
only one late reference in the Collected Letters), and these
ideas seem implicit in Jung's thought from an early time.
Again, Jung associated extraversion with sexuality and intro¬
version with aggression - these being the two primary instinctual
channels of libido. He saw them in terms of the survival of the
species and the survival of the individual respectively. Aggress¬
ion he conceived in basically Adlerian terms, as a will to power,
to independence and control over one's own life. It is thus basic
to growing up, to growing away from parental dependence. Jung
does then provide a biological dimension to his theories. Sex
difference however he treats more as an explanans than an explan-
andum: the biological difference - or complementarity - between
the sexes is psychologically reflected in a complementarity at
the level of the archetypes. This I will take up below.
There is however a secondary level. Jung identifies four
psychic functions, grouped in two pairs of opposites: thinking
and feeling (better, valuing); sensing and intuition. He holds
that individuals are typically strongly developed in one of these
functions and correspondingly weakly developed in the opposite
function; this is not simply a question of how much libido the
functions attract but also of whether their operation is concious
or unconcious. Many commentators find this a problematic element
of Jung's psychology, and I have not stressed it. But Jung does
argue that the cultural environment may decentre the two sexes
in opposite directions at this level, as a factor of its general
construction of sex difference. Thus men in our culture tend to
have strongly developed intellects and weakly developed feelings;
they are subject then to moods, the irrational expression of the
unconcious function. Women by contrast tend to have strongly dev¬
eloped feelings but weakly developed intellects; they are then,
provocatively, subject to opinions. Again, modern culture directs
some women to take the male path instead of the female - in
Jung's view this was to invert the problem while doing nothing to
create whole, balanced persons. But it must be repeated that all
this is a secondary level. Just as Jung's psychology is not a
theory of childhood, so also it is not a theory of sex difference.
Jung is interested in the consequences and cultural implications
of sex difference, especially how culture acts back on the psyche.
But he tends to regard sex difference as ultimately given.
Jung's concern with the psyche and culture focusses ultimat¬
ely on the cultural understanding of the psyche. That is, he con¬
siders that his own psychology has predecessors, though perhaps
of less rational kind, among what could be termed religious and
quasi-religious intellectuals. (This of course is simply the pro¬
jection in the field of culture of a view of self-awareness as
man's highest function.) The medieval alchemists were one example
of this that he studied; another was Chinese Taoist thought. The
concommitant of this is that ultimately Jung saw his system in
terms of a secular religious philosophy, rather than as a medical
therapy. (The treatment of neurosos especially was always a minor
part of his career, and he tended to treat it in Freudian or Ad-
lerian terms.)
This brings us, then, to the final issue, the consideration
of the individuation process. By this, Jung means the process of
becoming separate and distinct individual persons. This implies
a degree of self-awareness and of inner and outer adjustment; it
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also implies a certain distancing of ourselves from those around
us and from our cultural environment. Generally this means a
movement away from the outer towards the inner world; the process
is psychotherapeutically at least more one for the second than
the first half of life. Yet Jung saw childhood in terms of indiv¬
iduation too: the developing internal differentiation of the per¬
sonality, and the movement of the child away from parental and
family dependence towards personal autonomy. This is a growing
towards the outer world, especially to the formation of adult
sexual and parental relationships. The individuation process then
has two reciprocal movements, in the kind of tidal relationship
that is characteristic of Jung's thought, (incidentally Jung also
saw human history in these terms, the development from primitive
to modern being one of increasing differentiation and individuat¬
ion. At this level, Jung was much influenced by the ideas of
Lucien Levy-Bruhl.) Individuation, then, is the opposite of a
number of familiar concepts: identification, empathy, participat¬
ion mystique, socialization. In regard to the last, it answers a
sociological question, though one not often asked: why are we
ourdelves, and not mere social artifacts, and why are we all dif¬
ferent? But as I have said, Jung's psychology is not centrally a
theory of childhood (and his views on child-therapy were that you
should treat the parents), and his main concern with the individ¬
uation process is with its second movement, the growing away from
the vrorld and into oneself.
Ultimately, then, Jung's account of the psyche centres on a
number of archetypes that relate to the psyche itself. These
archetypes are encountered both in dreams and in cultural, espec¬
ially religious, symbolism. They include: the ego, the persona,
the self, the Shadow, the animus and anima, the Wise Old Man, the
Earth Mother, and also such symbols as mandala. These last are
symbols of wholeness or unity, the reconciliation of opposites,
and stand for the psyche itself. The question here of course is
the ultimate location of "identity": the ego is the centre of
conciousness but the self is the centre of the psyche, poised
between concious and unconcious, between the inner and the outer
worlds. This is a distinctive Jungian conception of the self:
thus where Freud says "where was id, there shall be ego", Jung
rather says "where was ego, there shall be self" - though equal¬
ly, where was a confusion of contradictory elements, there shall
be self, reconciliation and wholeness. The self is often symbol¬
ized in dreams and in culture as a child. The persona is a social
mask for non-intimate dealings, an identity from which we would
all expect to distance ourselves. The Shadow is an unconcious
counter-ego, made up of unacceptable elements and impulses which
we repress; characteristically, Jung holds that these do not
exist piecemeal in our unconcious minds, but come together to
form a coherent sub-personality. The Shadow is the unconcious
shadow of the ego. It is commonly symbolized as a devil-figure.
The animus and anima are internal images that each sex carries of
the opposite sex, generalized images which mediate all our sig¬
nificant dealings with the opposite sex, especially in terms of
sex and love. But they also mediate our dealings with our uncon¬
cious (in opposition and balance to the persona); for Jung, sex¬
uality was ultimately to be seen in terms of the reconciliation
of opposites (male and female), rather than simply as a biologic¬
al drive related to reproduction. That is, sex is a psychic, not
an animal, function. Lastly, the Wise Old Man and the Earth Moth¬
er (the former for men, the latter for women) represent an uncon¬
cious force of inner wisdom and compassion.
It is ultimately in terms of these archetypes that sexual
differentiation is articulated, especially in regard to the Wise
Old Man/Earth Mother and the Shadow, which each sex holds in its
own image, and the animus/anima, which each sex holds in the
opposite sex image. These images have perhaps a specific basis in
the experiences of childhood: thus the Wise Old Man is a father
figure. On the other hand, they also have autonomy as cultural
figures: the Wise Old Man is God. Their role in the psyche is
somewhere intermediate between these two things, and the family
is not the "cause" of them, but only the typical arena in which
the collective unconcious is "filled" and the archetypes receive
their specific contents. The role of the family in the formation
of the psyche is only that of mediator of the culural environ¬
ment, and this holds in the ultimate as well as the immediate
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There is very much more that could he said on Jung's psych¬
ology than I have given here. There are his views on history, for
example, for Jung proposes a psychological history of culture,
especially in terms of religion and the development of the World
Religions out of ancient polytheism. Here Christian apologists
commonly distort Jung's views, for his respect for religion is
not specifically a respect for Christianity; indeed, he criticiz¬
es Christianity bitterly for its lack of a feminine principle.
Beyond this, there are questions such as the theory of synchron-
icity, which I cannot go into. The account I have given, however,
should serve its present purpose, which is to ground a brief
critical discussion, especially in relation to social theory and
gender.
In terms of evaluation, it could be argued that, where
Freud's work is grounded in no-nonsense terms on a concrete mat¬
erial reality, Jung's work is a lot of mystical nonsense. I would
guess that this is in fact a common reaction (see e.g. Brown 1963
p 42 et seq). But there is an answer. Firstly, Freud and Jung use
exactly the same methodology, a mixture of case-history and in¬
trospection, the former centred on psychopathology. With this,
however, Jung is mostly dependent on the experience and concious-
ness of adulthood, to which there can be some secure access,
rather than engaging in speculative reconstructions of the exper¬
ience and conciousness of babyhood and young childhood like
Freud. He is also much warier of the risks of constructing his
analysands. Secondly, Jung grounds his work on an integrated acc¬
ount of the neuroses and the psychoses, whereas Freud basically
deals in terms of the neuroses only - surely a strong point in
Jung's favour. Thirdly, where Freud takes the philosophical stat¬
us of his enterprise for granted, Jung grounds his explicitly in
Kantian philosophy, and he faces up to the questions of Intent-
ionality and Mind where Freud does not. Fourthly, Freud is capab¬
le of tremendous nonsense too - for example, the "psychoanalysis"
of Leonardo da Vinci. Indeed, all Freud's sociology is nonsense,
especially his speculative anthropology. Against this, Jung's
views on say alchemy are very sane.
There are other points that could he made. Freudian Psycho¬
analysis does, as outlined above, come in two phases, and the
definitive and clear-cut nature of Id-psychology is not combined
with the complexity and flexibility of Ego-psychology. With this,
Jung* s concern to reconcile the approaches of Freud and Adler
surely deserves respect, though it can be protested that he took
no account of the development of Ego-psychology. But beyond all
this, we have to face ourselves: any analytic account of the
psyche is out of accord with our commonsense everyday understand¬
ing of ourselves; on the other hand, we do rather live off sleep¬
ing pills, tranquilizers and psychiatrists. An honest evaluation
of any depth psychology should try to bear this point in mind.
These are not just intellectual toys; their practitioners' claim
that they cannot be really understood without undergoing analysis
oneself is a fair one. Ultimately, then, I can only say that I
myself find Jung's account intuitively attractive in its basic
outlines; I find difficulty in going all the way with some of it,
but my experience is limited. Freud by contrast I find to be not
only superficial but also destructive, and I believe that that is
not an unusual experience (see e.g. Faraday 1972 p 113 et seq,
p 187 et seq). I would also be quite categoric that the view that
prefers Freud to Jung on "commonsense" grounds is merely a pref¬
erence for the 19th century over the 20th. Better flying saucers
than universal stages of totemism'.
However, I want to turn now to the sociological questions
that I identified for discussion at the beginning of this appen¬
dix. Does Jung offer an alternative to Psychoanalysis? Does this
decouple the theory of culture and conciousness from the theory
of sex and reproduction? Does it have sociological competence in
either or both these areas?
On the first of these questions, I think that the above ex¬
egesis clearly justifies a simple "yes". The Jungian system is a
very powerful and impressive intellectual construction. I do not
know why, in historical terms, social theory has not taken acc¬
ount of it, but in effect this has been arbitrary and cannot be
defended. So far as Freud was ever considered in social theory,
Jung should have been considered too.
Beyond, this, it should also be clear from the account above
that Jung does indeed decouple the theory of culture and conc-
iousness from the theory of sex and reproduction. In this regard,
the collective unconcious has taken over the role of the Oedipus
complex, and the family, as I have said, is no more than the typ¬
ical arena in which the archetypes are filled with specific cult¬
ural content. This leads us, then, to the question of what socio¬
logical competence Analytical Psychology has in the area of cult¬
ure and conciousness. But in order to pursue this, it is necess¬
ary first to ask what general sociological compatibility Analyt¬
ical Psychology has - how its methodological foundations relate
to those of social theory.
This is a difficult question, with several aspects. On the
face of it, the Kantian philosophical input into Jung's thought
should put him into the same methodological universe as Inter¬
pretive sociology: both are centred on Intentionality. This is
one cardinal respect in which Jung's account of the psyche diff¬
ers from the purely causal account of Freud. I am not competent
to discuss whether there are problems at the level of philosoph¬
ical ultimates here. The point is that, for all that psyche is
not Mind, the notion of the (personal) unconcious itself should
not be problematic for Interpretivism; it simply feeds into the
complexities of motivation and limitations of self-awareness
which Interpretive methodology already knows (see e.g. Weber 1978
P 9 - 10). (Besides, Jung's personal unconcious is an Adlerian
rather than a Freudian unconcious, as discussed above.) Again,
although Jung conceives the individual in terms of a psychic
apparatus possessing a history and continuity, his conception
nonetheless remains basically existential: the individual lives
in the here-and-now and his past is subject to his present. Like
socialisation in Interpretive theory, childhood plays a very
subordinate role in Jungian psychology.
A more profound issue is the collective unconcious. As I
have said, Jung's ultimate conception is of the collective uncon¬
cious in transaction with the material environment, the process
in which psyche and culture and therefore Man are created. The
more immediate transaction of psyche with cultural environment
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in the existential world, is set against this background. It
should be stressed that Jung envisages here a psychological hist¬
ory of culture, not a closed theory of culture. It is the World-
historical scale on which this is conceived that puts Jung above
all into the same universe as Max Weber of all Interpretive soc¬
iologists. It seems to me that Jung's ideas here are basically
compatible with Interpretive theory, at least in regard to the
conception of a psychic construction of the material environment.
It is true that Jung would stress the irrational, unconcious side
of this process, where Interpretive sociology would stress the
rational, concious side, but this is in both cases an inbuilt
bias that each system is aware of and wishes to correct. It seems
to me that there is a genuine complementarity here (and one
should remember Jung's basic orientation to the reconciliation of
opposites). What is problematic is that Jung organizes his psych¬
ological history of culture on the lines of Levy-Bruhl's cognit¬
ive anthropology: an evolution from the primitive irrational col¬
lective mind to modern rational individuality. I do not know how
intractable this problem would be. It may be that Jung's interest
in Levy-Bruhl is more inspirational than committed, and that his
conceptions could be brought into line with Weber's more discip¬
lined comparative historical approach - Jung himself is a rather
undisciplined historian. It may also be that Levy-Bruhl's thought
is more complex and flexible than it might appear. But I am
frankly less familiar with this side of Jung's thought (and in¬
deed with Levy-Bruhl).
Methodological questions such as these require extensive
consideration, and this I cannot undertake here, even if I have
the skill to resolve them. But so far as I can see, the above are
the central issues, and on the face of it it seems to me that
there is a basic compatability, even a complementarity, between
Analytical Psychology and Interpretive, especially Weberian, soc¬
iology. I come then to the question of culture and conciousness,
where it seems to me that there are a number of issues on which
Jung's thought resonates most strikingly with that of Weber.
First, however, it should be reiterated that Jung's basic theory
of culture is simply that Man is a culture-creating animal.
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Although this entails the redirection of libido from primary in¬
stinctual purposes, it is not really a "repression theory" of
culture, for Jung does not consider that sexual and personal re¬
lationships can contain all one's psychic energy# Again, there is
nothing of the pathological here: indeed, if the threefold prob¬
lem of depth psychology is insanity, art and religion, then it
could be said that, where Freud makes art and religion forms of
insanity, Jung makes insanity and art forms of religion. But more
profoundly, the point is that Jung does not try to account psych¬
ologically for why Man creates culture. Rather he is interested
in what is entailed in the process, and in how psyche and culture
shape each other. In no sense does Jung derive society from the
family, nor does he tie cultural analysis (e.g. of myths) down to
childhood experiences. Rather the whole repertoire of the exist¬
ential experiences of the life-cycle is reflected in culture.
Kith this, although the analysis of culture is on a psychological
basis, the cast of that psychology is cognitive. Jung's basic
vision is of a non-rational creativity in dialogue with a drive
to rationalization - manifestations presumably of the sexual and
aggressive instincts. Strikingly, this is Weber's vision too.
Given these basics, it is most arresting to find in Jung's
thought a theory of rationalization and disenchantment in relat¬
ion to modern conciousness and culture. I do not know the history
of this idea, or how far Weber developed it for himself, but as I
have said, Jung does not appear to have derived it from Weber,
and in any case it is so far grounded in his own thought that it
must be regarded as a convergence. Jung's idea here is that the
conditions of modern culture provide an impossible environment
for the psyche, whose natural creativity never receives consist¬
ent or authoritative cultural validation and accordingly becomes
either frustrated or delinquent. This produces exaggerated, ecc¬
entric and unstable political and religious movements, and insub¬
stantial and transitory fashions in the arts, as well as schizo¬
phrenia and other psychic disorders and a general sense of exist¬
ential meaninglessness. Jung here certainly seems to be providing
a psychological complementation of Weber's thesis of the end of
transcendental values and value-rational action in an age of
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ends-rationality. Indeed, Weber tells us much more about ration¬
alization than he does about disenchantment. To my mind, this
issue alone is sufficient reason why social theory should know
about Jung.
Beyond this, there is perhaps also a complementarity between
on the one side, Jung* s ideas on the roles of the introvert and
the extravert in history, on the other, Weber's ideas on the
roles of the charismatic figure and the intellectual. This is
more difficult to elaborate. But it seems to me that Jung's con¬
ception of the individual as poised between the outer and the
inner worlds, and Weber's conception of the social actor as pois¬
ed between the material and the ideal realms, mirror each other,
and that indeed both thinkers implicitly share both conceptions.
The individual has biological needs which require him to deal
with the material world, and an innate psychic propensity for the
creation of culture; from these things, patterns of social action
and meaning arise, the material and ideal realms mirroring each
other. Equally, the psyche both forms the process and is formed
by it, rational and irrational, concious and unconcious, sides
alike. The charismatic and the intellectual courses are the in¬
trovert and extravert modes respectively of manipulating the
cultural environment. The extravert is oriented to immediate
cultural validation, and works conciously and rationally, whereas
the introvert works irrationally and unconciously and is far more
radical. He finds cultural validation problematic and may well
not receive it - this indeed is much of the reason he takes the
charismatic course. It seems to me that here again Jung and Weber
are complementary of each other's thinking. Indeed, they seem to
share the opposite halves of the same universe and to an extent
even to envisage each other. But perhaps I am too close to this
and cannot see the problems. (The four psychic functions of Jung-
ian psychology might also be drawn into the above account, the
intellectual and the charismatic relating to the functions of
thinking and intuition respectively.)
There is a further sociological insight in the area of con-
ciousness and culture that I have drawn from Jung, and which has
been mentioned in the main body of the text. This is the idea
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that a constellation of symbols can be assembled in different
psyches in different and complementary ways, thus providing for
a differential and complementary reading and writing of the same
cultural text. The division of the archetypes between the two
sexes discussed above is an obvious, and perhaps the most import¬
ant, case in point. The conception does perhaps have some parall¬
el in Weber, in terms of the mirroring in the ideal realm of the
different elements of the social structure. In both cases, it
seems to me that there is provided a conception of the cultural
realm as pluralistic, fragmented and negotiated, especially in
Antiquity and modernity when there is no cultural hegemony of the
Great World Religions. This conception seems to me to be quite
at variance with that of the Durkheimian conscience collective,
including its Parsonian and Western Marxist versions, and also
it seems to me to set limits to the notion of women living in a
man-made world, under male cultural hegemony. It should be noted
that Jung considered Christianity to be crippling of women's
psyches, through the absence and denial of the representation in
culture of the feminine archetypes (with the limited exception
of the Virgin). But this is a historically specific theory; it is
quite exceptional for the cultural realm to be organized in this
way. (I discuss these issues also in Appendix A iv - Religion.)
All this said, I have to add that I have a basic scepticism
about sociological theories of conciousness. I do not believe
that sociology can do more than to specify the sociological con¬
text of conciousness, and make heuristic approximations as to its
average contents - this on both the theoretical-predictive and
the empirical-investigative sides. Individuality is always there
as an unaccountable factor (Weber's theory of charisma is very
much a theory of the individual in history). With this, I am
equally sceptical as to the analysis of culture, whether from
sociological or psychological resources?* this seems to me to be
one of the most unsatisfactory and uncertain - and pretentious -
*Indeed, I would hold that the cultural science perspective
must be taken into account. Here I find great interest in the
ideas of A.L. Kroeber (esp. Kroeber 1952); but there has been
no time for systematic development of this here. Incidentally,
Kroeber had an early training in Psychoanalysis.
areas of modern intellectual enterprise. Any prospect for synth¬
esizing major sociological and psychological systems must he very
exciting, hut it must he clear that my own interest would not he
in the logical closure of explanatory structures hut in new
equipment for exploration. My own hase is after all in the comp¬
arative history of women, where there is no question of consolid¬
ating what we already know; it is all to find out. I would extend
this to all society: high level explanation is not necessarily
secure explanation.
However, I leave these matters here, and turn to the other
of my basic questions: Analytical Psychology and the theory of
sex and reproduction. Granted that Jung has disengaged the gener¬
al theory of conciousness and culture from this central Freudian
problematic, it can still he asked, how well does he handle these
matters themselves? What does he offer to social theory in this
area? This I have dealt with at length in the body of the text
(chapter 3), and I only repeat it here to complete this discuss¬
ion. In evaluating what Jung has to offer here, it is not suffic¬
ient simply to ask, what does Jung tell us? The problem with
Freud is that he tells us everything. The question should rather
he, what does Jung open up for us to enquire into? And the ans¬
wer, I think, is that, without reducing everything to a dogmatic
formula, Jung does seem to give us the basic conceptions with
which to create the methodological foundations for a specifically
sociological enquiry into the social relationships, practices and
meanings arising from our sexual-reproductive biology. He gives
us the overall conception of our natures as entailing both mater¬
ial survival and the creation of culture; within this he gives
us the conception of sex and reproduction in terms of a psychol¬
ogical apparatus that matches and complements our biological app¬
aratus. And, precisely because he does not argue that this spec¬
ific aspect of our psychological apparatus is ultimately respons¬
ible for the creation of all culture, Jung unlike Freud stays
within the realm of common sense. He frees us to enquire into
social actions and relationships, instead of trapping us in the
maze of conciousness and ideology.
Thus he gives us the basic instincts of sex and aggression;
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love and desire for the opposite sex; a cycle of growth and mat¬
uration from "babyhood to adult autonomy and independence; propen¬
sities for the procreation and raising of children; and a funda¬
mental division of masculinity and femininity that cross-cuts all
other personality structures and processes, thus giving in princ¬
iple the full range of personality variation to both sexes, with
a secondary level of culturally determined variation. So far as
this psychic apparatus inter-relates with Intentionality, it can
be inter-related to the conception of social action; seen as the
apparatus with which the individual approaches social reality, it
is a conditioning factor upon social reality not a determinant.
The rest is for us to find out.
It is on the basis, or at least in the light, of this that
I have developed my own methodological foundations, in terms of
the concepts of sexual polarity and its four component elements:
fertility and maternity, the maturational cycle, sexuality, and
aggression. The basic methodological discussion of each of these
is again illuminated by Jungian insights. Moreover, the basic
dimension of sociological variation that I have identified is
that in City-states the attempt is made to control these things,
while in Bureaucratic Kingdoms they are accepted as nature.
Whether I could have achieved these foundations without Jung is
another question of course. But the fact remains that, whatever
their originality and worth, it is through Jung that I came to
them.
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